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Abstract	  
The	  world	  confronts	  an	  interlinked	  ecological,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  crisis	  
crystallised	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change.	  The	  failure	  of	  governments	  acting	  alone	  
and	  through	  international	  institutions	  to	  effectively	  address	  the	  climate	  crisis	  has	  led	  
to	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  distinct	  climate	  movement	  within	  civil	  society	  whose	  broad	  aim	  is	  
to	  bring	  about	  the	  changes	  required	  to	  mitigate	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming.	  
This	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  role	  that	  ecosocialists	  are	  playing	  within	  the	  broader	  
climate	  movement.	  Utilising	  a	  modified	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  perspective	  that	  builds	  on	  
the	  work	  of	  Robert	  Cox	  and	  incorporates	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  as	  a	  category	  
within	  the	  Earth’s	  biosphere,	  the	  dissertation	  provides	  a	  critical	  ecological	  political	  
economy	  account	  of	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  Holocene	  to	  the	  Anthropocene	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  post-­‐war,	  US-­‐led	  ‘neoliberal	  globalisation.’	  
Building	  on	  extensive	  literature	  reviews	  in	  a	  range	  of	  different	  discipline	  areas	  
including	  the	  ecosocialist	  literature,	  the	  dissertation	  also	  draws	  on	  new	  primary	  data	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  online	  audio-­‐visual	  recordings	  of	  ecosocialist	  and	  scientific	  meetings	  
and	  conferences	  and	  debates	  between	  ecosocialists	  published	  on	  websites.	  This	  
material	  is	  supplemented	  by	  interviews	  with	  ecosocialists	  and	  climate	  activists	  
undertaken	  as	  a	  participant	  observer	  in	  a	  number	  of	  climate	  movement-­‐related	  
protest	  events,	  including	  at	  the	  2015	  Paris	  Climate	  Summit.	  
The	  study	  confirms	  the	  value	  of	  ecosocialists’	  analyses	  of	  the	  neoliberalising	  global	  
political	  economy	  that	  global	  capitalism	  does,	  indeed,	  result	  in	  multiple	  
interconnected	  ecological,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  crises.	  Focusing	  specifically	  
on	  the	  climate	  crisis,	  it	  describes	  the	  origins	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  primary	  
institutions	  established	  to	  address	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  (the	  
Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  
Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change)	  and	  analyses	  how	  the	  failure	  of	  governments	  
working	  through	  these	  institutions	  to	  mitigate	  global	  warming	  resulted	  in	  the	  
development	  and	  growth	  of	  the	  climate	  movement.	  Identifying	  a	  bifurcation	  of	  the	  
movement	  into	  a	  reform-­‐oriented	  climate	  action	  wing	  and	  a	  more	  system-­‐critical	  
climate	  justice	  wing	  after	  the	  2007	  Bali	  Climate	  Summit,	  the	  dissertation	  then	  studies	  
xii	  
the	  key	  role	  being	  played	  by	  ecosocialists	  in	  the	  movement’s	  more	  radical	  climate	  
justice	  wing.	  
Using	  Gramscian	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘war	  of	  position,’	  ‘passive	  revolution’	  and	  
‘trasformismo,’	  the	  dissertation	  evaluates	  both	  the	  ecosocialist	  strengths	  and	  the	  
challenges	  these	  actors	  face	  in	  participating	  in	  and	  influencing	  the	  broader	  climate	  
movement.	  	  The	  study	  concludes	  by	  describing	  some	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  
approaches	  adopted	  in	  conducting	  this	  research,	  engaging	  in	  a	  personal	  reflection	  on	  
the	  research	  project,	  and	  proposing	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research.
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Chapter	  One:	  Introduction	  and	  Overview	  
Today, humankind has begun to match and even exceed some of the 
great forces of nature in changing the biosphere and impacting other 
facets of Earth System functioning. In terms of fundamental element 
cycles and some climatic parameters, human-driven changes are 
pushing the Earth System well outside of its normal operating 
range…. the Earth System is now in a no-analogue situation, best 
referred to as a new era in the geological history of Earth, the 
Anthropocene. 
(Steffen et al. 2004, p. 81) 
The	  organic	  crisis	  of	  global	  capitalism	  in	  the	  Anthropocene	  
In	  the	  early	  21st	  century,	  humanity	  faces	  a	  number	  of	  serious	  challenges	  whose	  
origins	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  developments	  in	  the	  years	  following	  World	  War	  II.	  In	  
the	  post-­‐war	  years,	  United	  States	  (US)	  government	  representatives	  and	  
policymakers	  took	  the	  lead	  in	  working	  with	  their	  allies	  to	  establish	  a	  set	  of	  
international	  institutions	  designed	  to	  manage	  and	  expand	  the	  global	  economy.	  The	  
project	  of	  expanding	  the	  global	  economy	  received	  new	  impetus	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  
1980s	  when,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  US	  and	  its	  allies,	  governments	  and	  
policymakers	  around	  the	  world	  began	  implementing	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  that	  
extended	  and	  intensified	  the	  spread	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production.	  These	  
processes	  are	  frequently	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  ‘neoliberal	  globalisation,’	  
and	  many	  analysts	  argue	  that	  they	  contribute	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  ongoing	  economic,	  
political,	  and	  social	  crises	  that	  include	  growing	  inequalities	  and	  democratic	  deficits	  
and	  result	  in	  widespread	  social	  dislocation,	  insecurity	  and	  conflict.	  Adopting	  a	  critical	  
perspective	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  most	  significant	  effect	  of	  the	  
extension	  of	  global	  capitalism	  is	  the	  planetary-­‐wide	  ecological	  crisis	  caused	  by	  this	  
system’s	  inherent	  and	  insatiable	  drive	  for	  economic	  growth.	  
The	  Anthropocene	  
The	  environmental	  damage	  caused	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  production,	  trade,	  and	  
consumption	  is	  now	  so	  widespread	  and	  severe	  that	  many	  Earth	  System	  scientists	  
argue	  we	  have	  left	  the	  Holocene,	  the	  geological	  epoch	  that	  provided	  abundant	  
natural	  resources	  and	  stable	  climatic	  patterns	  amenable	  to	  the	  rise	  and	  flourishing	  of	  
human	  civilisations,	  and	  now	  live	  in	  a	  new	  geological	  epoch	  that	  they	  propose	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naming	  the	  Anthropocene,	  or	  ‘the	  Age	  of	  Humanity.’1	  The	  Anthropocene	  is	  
characterised	  by	  a	  ‘phase	  shift’	  in	  the	  Earth	  System	  caused	  by	  human	  activities	  that	  
have	  disrupted	  the	  Earth’s	  major	  biogeochemical	  cycles	  so	  profoundly	  that	  we	  are	  
now	  at	  risk	  of	  crossing	  several	  ‘planetary	  boundaries’	  or	  ‘tipping	  points’	  that	  could	  
render	  the	  planet	  uninhabitable	  for	  many	  life	  forms,	  including	  humans	  (Biermann	  et	  
al.	  2012;	  Hamilton	  2017;	  Hansen	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Steffen	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Steffen	  et	  al.	  2015).	  
The	  most	  serious	  change	  in	  the	  Earth	  System,	  and	  one	  that	  requires	  immediate	  
action,	  is	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming.	  While	  natural	  events	  and	  natural	  cycles	  led	  
to	  fluctuating	  average	  global	  temperatures	  in	  the	  Earth’s	  past,	  scientists	  have	  
established	  that	  the	  current,	  unprecedentedly	  rapid	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  Earth	  is	  
warming	  is	  due	  to	  anthropogenic	  greenhouse	  gas	  (GHG)	  emissions.	  
Official	  responses	  to	  the	  global	  warming	  crisis	  
GHG	  emissions	  are	  by-­‐products	  of	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  in	  the	  normal	  
operations	  of	  global	  capitalism	  as	  it	  has	  developed	  historically.	  Fossil	  fuels	  are	  used	  
to	  provide	  the	  energy	  that	  powers	  the	  production	  and	  transportation	  of	  goods	  and	  
services.	  In	  addition	  to	  emitting	  vast	  amounts	  of	  GHGs	  into	  the	  atmosphere,	  the	  
extension	  and	  intensification	  of	  capitalist	  methods	  of	  production	  and	  trading	  
patterns	  across	  the	  globe	  have	  degraded	  and	  destroyed	  (and	  continue	  to	  threaten	  
and	  destroy)	  many	  of	  the	  natural	  sinks	  that	  would	  otherwise	  absorb	  more	  of	  these	  
emissions	  than	  they	  are	  currently	  able	  to.	  While	  government	  representatives	  and	  
policymakers	  have	  co-­‐operated	  in	  establishing	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  
United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  with	  the	  
purported	  aim	  of	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  global	  warming,	  effective	  measures	  to	  
make	  the	  necessary	  GHG	  emission	  reductions	  have	  not	  eventuated	  despite	  more	  
than	  two	  decades	  of	  negotiations.	  The	  most	  recent	  major	  climate	  change	  
negotiation	  meeting	  of	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  highest	  decision-­‐making	  body,	  the	  Conference	  
of	  the	  Parties	  (COP),	  was	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  such	  meeting	  (COP-­‐21)	  and	  occurred	  in	  
Paris	  in	  2015.	  While	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  that	  was	  negotiated	  at	  COP-­‐21	  is	  lauded	  by	  
many	  as	  a	  major	  success	  because	  of	  its	  ‘high	  ambition’	  to	  aspire	  to	  limit	  average	  
global	  temperature	  rise	  to	  1.5°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels,	  scientists	  point	  out	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  ‘Anthropos’	  is	  a	  Greek	  word	  meaning	  ‘person’.	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even	  if	  all	  the	  states’	  voluntary	  pledges	  to	  reduce	  self-­‐nominated	  amounts	  of	  GHG	  
emissions	  declared	  in	  the	  Intended	  Nationally	  Determined	  Contributions	  (INDCs)	  
were	  met,	  this	  will	  still	  result	  in	  an	  average	  global	  warming	  of	  between	  2.6°C	  and	  
3.1°C	  by	  2100	  (Rogelj	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  
The	  climate	  movement	  
The	  evident	  inability	  of	  official	  policymakers	  to	  effectively	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  
anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  has	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  climate	  movement	  
comprised	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  environmental	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (ENGOs),	  
non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (NGOs),	  social	  movement	  organisations	  (SMOs),	  
and	  civil	  society	  organisations	  (CSOs).	  The	  loose	  coalition	  of	  disparate	  actors	  that	  
work	  together	  within	  the	  broader	  climate	  movement	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  common	  aim	  
of	  exerting	  pressure	  on	  officials	  to	  mitigate	  further	  global	  warming	  is	  divided	  along	  
many	  lines,	  the	  most	  important	  of	  which	  is	  ideological.	  The	  ideological	  line	  of	  
division	  revolves	  around	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  address	  the	  global	  
warming	  crisis	  by	  reforming	  the	  current	  system	  of	  global	  capitalism	  or	  whether	  
addressing	  this	  crisis	  requires	  fundamental	  ‘system	  change.’	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  
refer	  to	  the	  wing	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  that	  supports	  reforms	  as	  the	  ‘climate	  
action’	  wing,	  and	  to	  the	  group	  that	  calls	  for	  system	  change	  the	  radical	  ‘climate	  
justice’	  wing.	  Ecosocialists	  are	  a	  part	  of	  the	  climate	  justice	  wing	  of	  the	  climate	  
movement,	  and	  this	  dissertation	  is	  about	  the	  role	  that	  ecosocialists	  play	  in	  current	  
early	  21st	  century	  social	  justice	  struggles,	  particularly	  as	  these	  relate	  to	  the	  global	  
warming	  crisis.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  ecosocialists	  within	  the	  
climate	  movement	  with	  reference	  to	  their	  broad	  theoretical	  contributions	  as	  well	  as	  
their	  input	  in	  debates	  involving	  the	  climate	  movement’s	  strategy	  and	  tactics.	  
Given	  that	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  only	  one	  of	  several	  actors	  engaged	  with	  the	  
issue	  of	  climate	  change,	  I	  first	  locate	  this	  movement	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  
global	  political	  economy	  in	  which	  there	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  actors.	  The	  actors	  I	  consider	  
in	  my	  analysis	  include	  government	  representatives,	  international	  and	  
intergovernmental	  institutions,	  policymakers	  at	  a	  variety	  of	  levels,	  scientists,	  SMOs,	  
NGOs,	  organised	  labour,	  economic	  elites	  and	  their	  representatives,	  industry	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representatives,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  who	  make	  up	  the	  climate	  
movement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  broader	  global	  justice	  movement.	  Deploying	  the	  neo-­‐
Gramscian	  theoretical	  perspective	  adopted	  in	  this	  study,	  I	  emphasise	  power	  
relationships	  between	  the	  different	  actors	  throughout	  the	  analysis	  as	  these	  are	  
central	  to	  understanding	  the	  ability	  of	  different	  actors	  to	  achieve	  their	  aims.	  
Ecosocialist	  responses	  to	  the	  global	  warming	  crisis	  
As	  the	  primary	  climate	  movement	  actors	  I	  consider	  in	  my	  research	  are	  ecosocialists,	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  at	  the	  outset	  what	  ‘ecosocialism’	  is.	  There	  is,	  however,	  no	  
single	  ‘ecosocialism’	  and,	  as	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  there	  are	  many	  
debates	  between	  ecosocialists	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  original	  writings	  of	  
Marx	  and	  Engels	  focused	  sufficiently	  on	  environmental	  issues	  to	  justify	  considering	  
the	  lineage	  of	  ecosocialist	  thought	  as	  extending	  back	  to	  classical	  Marxist	  ideas.	  Some	  
theorists	  argue	  that	  classical	  Marxism	  is,	  in	  some	  respects,	  anti-­‐ecological	  and	  
describe	  ecosocialism	  as	  a	  body	  of	  thought	  that	  attempts	  to	  address	  these	  
shortcomings	  by	  combining	  ‘red’	  (Marxist)	  and	  ‘green’	  (environmental)	  theories	  (for	  
example,	  refer	  to	  Kovel	  2007	  and	  Löwy	  2015).	  Other	  theorists,	  such	  as	  John	  Bellamy	  
Foster	  (1992,	  2000,	  2002,	  2009,	  2012,	  2014)	  and	  Paul	  Burkett	  (2005,	  2014a,	  2014b),	  
argue	  that	  far	  from	  being	  anti-­‐ecological,	  Marx’s	  writings	  are	  suffused	  with	  concerns	  
about	  the	  environmental	  damage	  that	  results	  from	  capital’s	  exploitation	  of	  both	  
labour	  and	  nature	  so	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  incorporate	  a	  separate	  environmental	  
theory	  into	  classical	  Marxism.	  Despite	  these	  debates,	  one	  idea	  that	  unites	  
ecosocialists	  is	  that	  they	  view	  the	  current	  ecological,	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  
crises	  as	  all	  being	  interrelated	  and	  arising	  out	  of	  contradictions	  inherent	  in	  the	  
capitalist	  mode	  of	  production.	  They	  would	  thus	  describe	  the	  current	  crises	  in	  terms	  
of	  a	  single	  ‘organic	  crisis.’	  Ecosocialists	  also	  share	  the	  view	  that	  addressing	  the	  
current	  organic	  crisis	  of	  global	  capitalism	  will	  involve	  building	  post-­‐capitalist	  societies	  
that	  are	  “based	  on	  the	  best	  ecological	  principles”	  and	  are	  simultaneously	  socialist	  
(Angus	  2011,	  p.	  6).	  Identifying	  and	  analysing	  ecosocialist	  contributions	  to	  efforts	  to	  
achieve	  such	  system	  change	  in	  the	  context	  of	  existing	  power	  relations	  is	  a	  central	  
aim	  of	  this	  dissertation.	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Research	  Questions	  and	  Aims	  
One	  of	  my	  early	  research	  findings	  was	  that	  there	  is	  no	  identifiable	  ‘ecosocialist	  
movement’;	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  an	  ‘ecosocialist	  coalition’	  in	  Canada,	  that	  
maintains	  the	  website	  System	  Change	  Not	  Climate	  Change	  (SCNCC	  2017),	  the	  North	  
American	  ecosocialists	  that	  had	  attracted	  my	  initial	  interest	  work	  with,	  and	  within,	  
other	  established	  organisations	  and	  groups	  involved	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  justice	  
struggles.	  This	  understanding	  changed	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  research	  because	  many	  of	  the	  
research	  questions	  I	  had	  originally	  thought	  to	  be	  relevant	  were	  inappropriate	  given	  
that	  they	  related	  to	  issues	  such	  as	  organisational	  structures	  and	  recruiting	  strategies	  
(the	  interview	  questions	  are	  shown	  in	  Appendix	  I).	  The	  central	  research	  questions	  I	  
had	  posed,	  however,	  remained	  valid	  in	  modified	  form:	  “How	  do	  ecosocialists	  
contribute	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change	  
and	  simultaneously	  achieve	  climate	  justice,	  and	  how	  influential	  and	  effective	  are	  
these	  contributions?”	  These	  research	  questions	  essentially	  incorporated	  the	  three	  
main	  aims	  informing	  my	  research	  project:	  
• to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  ecosocialists	  and	  
other	  actors	  within	  the	  climate	  movement;	  
• to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  ecosocialist	  strategies	  and	  tactics;	  and	  
• to	  evaluate	  ecosocialist	  contributions	  to	  the	  climate	  movement,	  identifying	  
current	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  as	  well	  as	  ways	  in	  which	  ecosocialist	  
contributions	  could	  be	  strengthened	  in	  future.	  
In	  order	  to	  investigate	  these	  issues,	  I	  conducted	  extensive	  literature	  reviews	  and	  
used	  a	  range	  of	  qualitative	  research	  methods,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  
Research	  Methodology	  and	  Methods	  
My	  research	  methodology	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  single	  case	  study	  of	  the	  North	  
American	  ecosocialist	  coalition,	  System	  Change	  Not	  Climate	  Change	  (SCNCC).	  
Because	  ecosocialists	  work	  in	  loose	  coalitions	  with	  one	  another	  and	  with	  other	  
activists	  and	  actors	  in	  the	  wider	  global	  justice	  movement,	  I	  also	  refer	  to	  individual	  
ecosocialists	  who	  are	  not	  officially	  members	  of	  SCNCC	  when	  their	  contributions	  to	  
debates	  are	  relevant.	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The	  methods	  I	  adopt	  in	  answering	  the	  research	  question	  can	  be	  disaggregated	  into	  
several	  activities,	  including	  evaluating	  ecosocialists’	  own	  understanding	  of	  the	  
political	  economy	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  social	  injustice,	  and	  analysing	  various	  
debates	  between	  ecosocialists	  as	  well	  as	  between	  ecosocialists	  and	  other	  climate	  
movement	  activists.	  My	  attempts	  to	  determine	  ecosocialists’	  own	  understanding	  of	  
the	  political	  economy	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  social	  injustice	  entailed	  conducting	  
independent	  detailed	  investigations	  of	  the	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  current	  
ecological,	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  crises.	  These	  investigations	  were	  
undertaken	  by	  conducting	  literature	  reviews	  using	  a	  range	  of	  both	  primary	  and	  
secondary	  sources	  of	  information.	  Primary	  sources	  of	  information	  included	  a	  number	  
of	  reports	  by	  international	  organisations	  (IOs)	  such	  as	  the	  assessment	  reports	  
published	  by	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC).	  The	  secondary	  
sources	  used	  in	  my	  literature	  reviews	  drew	  on	  books	  and	  articles	  published	  in	  a	  
variety	  of	  academic	  discipline	  areas	  (as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  in	  this	  chapter).	  
I	  then	  compared	  my	  literature	  review	  findings	  with	  various	  ecosocialist	  primary	  and	  
secondary	  sources	  of	  information,	  such	  as	  the	  arguments	  presented	  in	  books	  written	  
by	  ecosocialists	  (for	  example,	  Angus	  2016,	  Burkett	  2014,	  Foster	  2000,	  Williams	  2010)	  
and	  articles	  published	  (and	  republished	  from	  other	  sources)	  on	  two	  major	  North	  
American	  ecosocialist	  websites	  (Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  and	  System	  Change	  Not	  
Climate	  Change).	  Other	  important	  primary	  sources	  of	  information	  analysed	  in	  
conducting	  this	  research	  project	  include	  audio-­‐visual	  recordings	  of	  meetings	  and	  
conferences	  that	  are	  available	  on	  the	  worldwide	  web	  and	  debates	  between	  
ecosocialists	  that	  are	  published	  on	  their	  websites.	  I	  also	  strategically	  interviewed	  key	  
individual	  ecosocialists	  and	  climate	  movement	  activists	  and	  academics,	  either	  face-­‐
to-­‐face	  or	  via	  Skype.2	  The	  interviews	  adopted	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  format,	  and	  largely	  
confirmed	  information	  readily	  available	  elsewhere	  (in	  books	  and	  on	  websites).	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  analysing	  the	  content	  of	  ecosocialist	  publications	  and	  presentations,	  I	  
also	  attended	  a	  number	  of	  conferences	  as	  part	  of	  my	  research.	  These	  included	  both	  
formal	  academic	  conferences	  and	  workshops	  (such	  as	  a	  workshop	  on	  Gramscian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Before	  conducting	  the	  interviews,	  a	  full	  ethics	  application	  was	  submitted.	  The	  Tasmania	  Social	  Sciences	  Human	  Research	  Ethics	  Committee	  approved	  the	  ethics	  application	  on	  29	  July	  2014	  (Reference	  Number:	  H0014070).	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theory	  held	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Sydney	  in	  2015)	  and	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  and	  online	  
conferences	  and	  meetings	  organised	  by	  social	  movement	  organisations	  (such	  as	  the	  
2016	  Socialist	  Alliance’s	  ‘Socialism	  for	  the	  21st	  Century’	  conference	  in	  Sydney	  and	  
some	  of	  the	  online	  audio-­‐visual	  discussions	  organised	  and	  hosted	  by	  SCNCC	  in	  2016).	  
I	  also	  conducted	  research	  as	  a	  participant	  observer	  at	  social	  movement	  events	  
organised	  around	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change,	  including	  the	  2014	  People’s	  Climate	  
March	  in	  Melbourne	  and	  the	  Paris2015	  climate	  justice	  movement	  protests	  and	  
events.	  I	  saw	  my	  own	  participation	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  as	  essential	  to	  this	  
research	  project	  because,	  as	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  social	  movement	  
literature,	  researching	  social	  movements	  as	  a	  distant	  observer	  is	  both	  potentially	  
unethical	  and	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  distorted	  research	  (Chesters	  2012;	  Darlington	  
&	  Dobson	  2013;	  Dawson	  &	  Sinwell	  2012;	  Lewis	  2012;	  McCurdy	  &	  Uldam	  2014;	  van	  
der	  Riet	  2008).	  More	  importantly,	  however,	  I	  participated	  in	  these	  events	  because	  I	  
agree	  with	  academic	  theorists	  such	  as	  Reitan	  and	  Gibson	  (2012)	  that	  the	  severity	  of	  
the	  impacts	  of	  global	  warming	  demand	  that	  we	  all	  engage	  actively	  in	  the	  issue:	  as	  
prominent	  climate	  activist	  Naomi	  Klein	  (2014)	  insists,	  the	  global	  warming	  crisis	  
‘changes	  everything,’	  and	  mitigating	  further	  climate	  change	  while	  working	  towards	  
regenerating	  the	  planet	  so	  that	  it	  remains	  habitable	  requires	  the	  participation	  of	  
everyone.	  The	  all-­‐encompassing	  nature	  of	  the	  challenges	  we	  face	  that	  prompted	  my	  
decision	  to	  participate	  in	  climate	  movement	  events	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  my	  
modification	  of	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  theoretical	  perspective	  so	  that	  it	  better	  suits	  the	  
kind	  of	  research	  required	  in	  the	  Anthropocene.	  
Theoretical	  perspective	  and	  general	  approach	  
In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  adopt	  a	  modified	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  critical	  methodology	  to	  analyse	  
the	  motivations,	  strategies	  and	  impact	  of	  ecosocialists	  in	  contemporary	  climate	  
movement	  politics.	  This	  critical	  perspective,	  which	  draws	  substantially	  on	  theory	  
developed	  by	  Italian	  Marxist	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	  was	  developed	  within	  the	  academic	  
discipline	  area	  of	  Global	  Political	  Economy	  (GPE)	  by	  one	  of	  the	  leaders	  in	  this	  field,	  
Robert	  Cox.	  In	  this	  research	  project,	  I	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  critical	  GPE	  
perspectives	  by	  modifying	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  perspective	  so	  that	  it	  is	  more	  
appropriate	  for	  incorporating	  the	  Earth’s	  biosphere	  as	  a	  major	  actor	  in	  its	  own	  right	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in	  the	  global	  political	  economy.3	  The	  necessity	  for	  this	  modification	  arises	  because	  
the	  no-­‐analogue	  situation	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  demands	  new	  perspectives	  on	  
interactions	  between	  humans	  and	  the	  biosphere.	  As	  Clive	  Hamilton	  (2017)	  argues,	  
the	  usual	  practice	  of	  social	  scientists	  incorporating	  ‘the	  environment’	  only	  
tangentially	  in	  their	  analyses	  is	  no	  longer	  adequate	  in	  the	  Anthropocene:	  the	  Earth	  
System	  as	  a	  whole	  (including	  the	  humans	  who	  have	  now	  become	  a	  ‘geological	  force’)	  
should	  inform	  our	  work	  as	  academics.	  These	  ideas	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  
Chapters	  2	  and	  3.	  
Given	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  topic	  and	  the	  necessity	  that	  academic	  work	  in	  the	  
Anthropocene	  be	  informed	  by	  holistic	  analyses,	  the	  general	  approach	  adopted	  in	  this	  
dissertation	  is	  to	  draw	  on	  literature	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  discipline	  areas	  located	  within	  
both	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  and	  the	  Natural	  Sciences.	  I	  therefore	  refer	  to	  literature	  from	  
fields	  of	  study	  as	  varied	  as	  GPE,	  International	  Relations	  (IR),	  Economics,	  Political	  
Theory,	  Legal	  Studies,	  Sociology,	  Philosophy,	  Environmental	  Studies,	  Social	  
Movement	  Studies,	  Psychology,	  History,	  Geography,	  Climate	  Science,	  and	  Earth	  
System	  science	  in	  my	  discussion.	  What	  is	  perhaps	  unusual	  in	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  
while	  GPE	  analyses	  routinely	  incorporate	  knowledge	  from	  other	  Social	  Science	  
discipline	  areas	  (Gill	  &	  Law	  1988;	  Gill	  1993;	  O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010;	  Palan	  2000;	  van	  
der	  Pijl	  2009),	  to	  date	  the	  Natural	  Sciences	  have	  not	  featured	  prominently	  in	  these	  
analyses	  (although	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  given	  the	  requirements	  of	  making	  
academic	  work	  relevant	  to	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  Anthropocene).	  In	  addition,	  
because	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  topic	  requires	  it,	  I	  also	  incorporate	  references	  to	  
newspaper	  and	  journal	  articles	  reporting	  on	  relevant	  current	  events;	  important	  
changes	  in	  both	  the	  Earth	  System	  and	  in	  the	  human	  systems	  that	  are	  embedded	  in	  it	  
are	  occurring	  at	  a	  very	  rapid	  pace,	  and	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  update	  my	  research	  as	  these	  
changes	  unfolded	  over	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  project.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  IPCC	  (2014b,	  p.	  1254)	  defines	  the	  biosphere	  as:	  “The	  part	  of	  the	  earth	  system	  comprising	  all	  ecosystems	  and	  living	  organisms,	  in	  the	  atmosphere,	  on	  land	  (terrestrial	  biosphere)	  or	  in	  the	  oceans	  (marine	  biosphere),	  including	  derived	  dead	  organic	  matter,	  such	  as	  litter,	  soil	  organic	  matter	  and	  oceanic	  detritus.”	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Structure	  of	  the	  dissertation	  
This	  dissertation	  is	  organised	  into	  nine	  chapters	  (including	  this	  introduction).	  The	  
overall	  approach	  in	  investigating	  the	  role	  of	  ecosocialists	  within	  the	  climate	  
movement	  can	  be	  described	  as	  one	  that	  progressively	  works	  through	  different	  levels	  
at	  which	  a	  variety	  of	  actors	  operate.	  Beginning	  with	  a	  ‘big	  picture’	  view	  of	  the	  global	  
political	  economy	  that	  constitutes	  a	  sub-­‐system	  existing	  within	  the	  finite	  planetary-­‐
level	  Earth	  System,	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  some	  of	  the	  main	  actors	  shaping	  both	  
systems.	  The	  human	  agents	  in	  my	  analysis	  include	  global	  economic	  and	  political	  
elites,	  national	  and	  international	  institutions,	  official	  policymakers,	  state	  
representatives,	  and	  civil	  society	  actors.	  Focusing	  my	  analysis	  on	  how	  these	  actors	  
operate	  within	  the	  dynamic	  (and	  now	  unstable	  and	  unpredictable)	  Earth	  System	  that	  
humans	  and	  their	  social	  systems	  are	  a	  part	  of,	  I	  discuss	  how	  the	  biosphere	  is	  both	  
affected	  by,	  and	  in	  turn	  affects,	  the	  material	  conditions	  of	  human	  socio-­‐economic	  
activities.	  I	  then	  progressively	  narrow	  my	  focus	  on	  social	  movements	  such	  as	  the	  
environmental	  movement	  and	  the	  climate	  movement,	  discussing	  the	  latter’s	  
constituent	  parts.	  Another	  way	  of	  describing	  my	  approach	  is	  that	  I	  begin	  with	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  global	  terrain	  that	  shapes	  many	  aspects	  of	  our	  lives	  and	  then	  
successively	  narrow	  the	  focus	  down	  to	  the	  climate	  movement,	  and	  then	  to	  the	  
radical	  climate	  justice	  wing	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  where	  ecosocialists	  are	  
located.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  my	  discussion	  constantly	  refers	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  actors	  
operating	  at	  local,	  national	  and	  global	  levels	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  Earth	  
System	  they	  are	  embedded	  in.	  
Given	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Anthropocene,	  I	  introduce	  the	  concept	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  at	  
an	  early	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  my	  overall	  argument.	  According	  to	  many	  Earth	  
System	  scientists,	  human	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  became	  significant	  at	  a	  
planetary	  scale	  only	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1940s,	  after	  which	  there	  was	  a	  ‘Great	  
Acceleration’	  in	  human	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment.	  This	  ‘Great	  Acceleration’	  in	  
human	  impacts	  is	  evident	  in	  data	  indicating	  sharp	  increases	  in	  socio-­‐economic	  trends	  
such	  as	  economic	  growth,	  population	  growth,	  primary	  energy	  use,	  and	  fertilizer	  
consumption	  matching	  sharp	  growths	  in	  trends	  affecting	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
biosphere,	  such	  as	  GHG	  concentrations,	  ocean	  acidification,	  and	  tropical	  forest	  loss	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since	  the	  1950s	  (Steffen	  et	  al.	  2015,	  pp.	  86	  –	  87).	  The	  post-­‐war	  period	  also	  marked	  
the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  phase	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy,	  
and	  modifications	  to	  this	  economy	  that	  began	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  were	  significant	  
enough	  that	  traditional	  IR	  perspectives	  could	  not	  account	  for	  them.	  These	  
developments	  are	  also	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  where	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  
global	  political	  economy	  established	  immediately	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  
(WWII)	  followed	  by	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  modifications	  made	  to	  it	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  
what	  many	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘neoliberal	  global	  capitalism.’	  These	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  
political	  economy	  also	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  new	  theoretical	  perspectives	  that	  
were	  better	  equipped	  than	  the	  traditional	  IR	  perspectives	  to	  analyse	  the	  unfolding	  
reality,	  and	  key	  features	  of	  one	  of	  these	  new	  tools	  of	  analysis,	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  
GPE	  perspective,	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
Chapter	  3	  outlines	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  theoretical	  perspective	  
as	  it	  was	  first	  developed	  in	  the	  1980s	  by	  Robert	  Cox	  (1981,	  1983)	  and	  subsequently	  
modified	  by	  his	  colleague	  Timothy	  Sinclair	  (2016).	  Critically	  evaluating	  both	  the	  
original	  analytical	  framework	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Method	  of	  Historical	  Structures’	  
(MHS)	  as	  well	  as	  its	  modification	  (MHS	  Redux)	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  need	  to	  apply	  
‘Anthropocene	  thinking’	  in	  our	  work	  as	  academics,	  I	  propose	  a	  further	  modification	  
to	  the	  MHS,	  which	  I	  call	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II,	  that	  puts	  the	  Earth’s	  biosphere	  more	  
prominently	  in	  the	  framework.	  The	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  contributes	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
a	  GPE	  adequate	  to	  the	  academic	  challenges	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  by	  providing	  a	  
framework	  that	  facilitates	  analyses	  of	  the	  dynamic	  relationships	  between	  the	  
biosphere	  (within	  which	  humans	  are	  embedded)	  and	  the	  social	  institutions	  
constituting	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  In	  Chapter	  3	  I	  also	  define	  some	  of	  the	  main	  
neo-­‐Gramscian	  and	  Gramscian	  concepts	  that	  I	  use	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  
analysis.	  
The	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  analytical	  framework	  is	  applied	  in	  Chapter	  4	  to	  critically	  analyse	  
the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  ecological,	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  crises	  that	  the	  
extension	  and	  intensification	  of	  global	  capitalism	  engenders	  by	  referring	  to	  relevant	  
academic	  literature	  from	  many	  different	  discipline	  areas.	  My	  main	  objective	  in	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drawing	  on	  this	  wide	  range	  of	  academic	  literature	  is	  to	  verify	  ecosocialist	  accounts	  
that	  there	  are,	  indeed,	  crises	  in	  all	  these	  systems	  and	  that	  they	  are	  interconnected.	  
A	  key	  argument	  that	  ecosocialists	  make	  is	  that	  capitalism	  and	  its	  institutions	  are	  
incapable	  of	  resolving	  the	  early	  21st	  century’s	  interrelated	  crises,	  and	  in	  Chapter	  5	  I	  
critically	  interrogate	  this	  assumption	  by	  reviewing	  the	  history	  and	  circumstances	  
under	  which	  the	  primary	  institutions	  established	  to	  address	  the	  causes	  of	  
anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  the	  IPCC	  and	  the	  UNFCCC,	  arose	  and	  developed.	  My	  
research	  indicates	  that	  ecosocialist	  arguments	  are	  correct	  where	  these	  particular	  
institutions	  are	  concerned:	  policymakers	  representing	  the	  United	  States	  in	  alliance	  
with	  other	  state	  representatives	  have,	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  
Chapter	  5,	  influenced	  both	  the	  form	  and	  substance	  of	  these	  institutions.	  The	  
institutional	  failures	  to	  address	  the	  urgent	  issue	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  
and	  the	  climate	  change,	  ocean	  acidification	  and	  other	  serious	  ecological	  problems	  it	  
causes	  has	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  distinct	  social	  movement,	  the	  ‘climate	  
movement,’	  which	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  Chapter	  6.	  
In	  Chapter	  6	  I	  trace	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  current	  climate	  movement	  partly	  to	  the	  
environmental	  movement	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  in	  
the	  1960s,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  global	  justice	  movement	  that	  became	  prominent	  with	  the	  
1999	  ‘alter-­‐globalization’	  movement	  protests	  in	  Seattle	  against	  international	  
economic	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organisation	  (WTO).	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  
discuss	  the	  formation	  and	  evolution	  of	  the	  climate	  movement,	  focusing	  on	  the	  
primary	  ideological	  division	  that	  developed	  within	  it	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  continuing	  
failure	  of	  governments	  and	  formal	  institutions	  to	  address	  the	  climate	  crisis.	  	  As	  many	  
analysts	  agree,	  by	  2007	  there	  were	  two	  distinct	  wings	  within	  the	  climate	  movement:	  
the	  reform-­‐oriented	  ‘climate	  action’	  wing	  and	  the	  more	  radical	  ‘climate	  justice’	  wing.	  
These	  constitute	  two	  extreme	  positions	  within	  the	  climate	  movement,	  with	  actors	  
adopting	  a	  range	  of	  positions	  in	  between,	  and	  I	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  role	  of	  ecosocialists	  (who	  occupy	  a	  space	  within	  the	  radical	  
climate	  justice	  wing	  of	  the	  movement).	  Given	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  as	  the	  climate	  crisis	  
unfolds,	  I	  argue	  that	  ecosocialist	  interventions	  in	  discussions	  and	  debates	  within	  the	  
climate	  movement	  are	  vital	  as	  ecosocialists	  are	  well	  equipped	  to	  support	  arguments	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that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  oppose	  what	  some	  actors	  in	  the	  climate	  movement	  refer	  to	  
as	  ‘false	  solutions’	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  propose	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  that	  
promote	  ‘real	  solutions’	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  both	  effective	  and	  socially	  just.	  
Before	  discussing	  specific	  instances	  of	  ecosocialist	  understandings	  of	  progressive	  
strategies	  and	  tactics	  in	  Chapter	  8,	  an	  overview	  of	  ecosocialist	  theoretical	  debates	  is	  
provided	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  These	  debates	  take	  place	  both	  between	  theorists	  who	  
identify	  as	  ecosocialist	  and	  between	  ecosocialists	  and	  other	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  
Breakthrough	  Institute’s	  proponents	  of	  ‘ecomoderism.’	  Deploying	  John	  Bellamy	  
Foster’s	  useful	  schema	  that	  distinguishes	  between	  ‘first-­‐stage,’	  ‘second-­‐stage,’	  and	  
‘third-­‐stage’	  ecosocialists,	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  some	  first-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  
critiques	  of	  classical	  Marxism	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  its	  allegedly	  ‘anti-­‐ecological’	  stances	  
and	  second-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  arguments	  that	  these	  critiques	  are	  based	  on	  selective	  
readings	  and	  misinterpretations	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels’s	  original	  works	  (Stache	  2016).	  
Foster	  describes	  third-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  as	  those	  theorists	  who	  use	  the	  analytical	  
tools	  of	  classical	  Marxism,	  including	  his	  ‘metabolic	  rift’	  theory,	  to	  analyse	  current	  
events.	  These	  analyses,	  in	  turn,	  inform	  the	  understanding	  of	  ecosocialist	  activists	  
who	  work	  towards	  achieving	  climate	  justice	  with	  other	  actors	  in	  the	  climate	  
movement.	  Ecosocialist	  activists	  are	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  strategy	  and	  
tactics,	  and	  the	  debates	  they	  have	  both	  among	  themselves	  and	  with	  others	  about	  
these	  issues	  are	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  
Debates	  between	  ecosocialists	  on	  issues	  of	  strategy	  and	  tactics	  are	  reviewed	  in	  
Chapter	  8	  with	  reference	  to	  three	  case	  studies	  that	  analyse	  ecosocialist	  positions	  on	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  support	  market	  mechanisms	  ostensibly	  promoted	  as	  ways	  of	  
reducing	  GHG	  emissions,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  working	  class	  in	  struggles	  for	  climate	  justice,	  
and	  appropriate	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  in	  relation	  to	  climate	  justice	  movement	  
activism	  at	  official	  COP	  negotiations.	  These	  case	  studies	  illuminate	  some	  of	  the	  main	  
issues	  that	  ecosocialists	  are	  concerned	  with	  and	  illustrate	  their	  sophisticated	  
understanding	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  trasformismo	  (a	  Gramscian	  concept	  whose	  meaning	  
is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3).	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In	  Chapter	  9,	  I	  conclude	  with	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  strengths	  and	  potential	  challenges	  
that	  ecosocialists	  face	  as	  well	  as	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  research	  
project,	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research,	  and	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  my	  own	  experiences	  
while	  working	  on	  this	  research	  project.	  The	  personal	  account	  is	  intended	  to	  
comment	  on	  not	  only	  the	  way	  in	  which	  ecosocialist	  discourses	  have	  influenced	  my	  
own	  understanding	  but	  also	  on	  the	  broader	  challenges	  we	  face	  as	  we	  engage	  with	  
the	  Anthropocene	  both	  in	  our	  personal	  lives	  and,	  very	  importantly,	  as	  academics	  
who	  have	  the	  resources,	  privilege,	  and	  the	  time	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  issues	  that	  are	  
emerging.	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Chapter	  Two:	  The	  post-­‐WWII	  global	  political	  economy	  
and	  the	  Anthropocene	  
“It is of utmost importance to understand that the ‘Anthropocene’ is 
not a term coined to describe the continued spread of human 
impacts on the landscape or further modifications to ecosystems; it 
is instead a term describing a rupture in the functioning of the Earth 
System as a whole, so much so that the Earth has now entered a new 
geological epoch.” 
 (Hamilton 2017, pp. 9 – 10, emphasis in original) 
This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  established	  after	  
WWII	  and	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  was	  modified	  in	  the	  1970s.	  These	  
modifications	  were	  significant	  enough	  to	  prompt	  the	  development	  of	  GPE	  as	  a	  
distinct	  field	  of	  academic	  study	  within	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR.4	  The	  single	  most	  
significant	  effect	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  global	  political	  economy,	  however,	  was	  
discovered	  in	  a	  field	  of	  study	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  scope	  of	  GPE	  studies,	  emerging	  
from	  a	  new	  discipline	  area	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  sciences:	  Earth	  System	  science.	  My	  
discussion	  in	  this	  chapter	  begins	  with	  a	  brief	  introduction	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
‘Anthropocene,’	  which	  many	  Earth	  System	  scientists	  have	  nominated	  as	  the	  term	  for	  
the	  new	  geological	  epoch	  that	  they	  argue	  replaces	  the	  Holocene	  (the	  formal	  
designation	  of	  the	  geological	  epoch	  we	  live	  in).5	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  is	  central	  to	  the	  investigations	  discussed	  in	  this	  
research	  project	  for	  two	  reasons:	  firstly,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  single	  most	  significant	  
outcome	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  global	  expansion	  of	  capitalism	  so	  that	  GPE	  studies	  
ignoring	  it	  are	  incomplete;	  and	  secondly,	  because	  of	  its	  importance	  to	  ecosocialists.	  
After	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  Anthropocene,	  I	  describe	  the	  key	  features	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  While	  the	  term	  ‘Global	  Political	  Economy’	  (GPE)	  is	  used	  throughout	  this	  text,	  in	  the	  orthodox	  literature	  the	  academic	  discipline	  of	  GPE	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘International	  Political	  Economy’	  (IPE)	  (Palan	  2013).	  As	  is	  often	  the	  case	  with	  terminology,	  ideological	  differences	  inform	  the	  use	  of	  these	  labels,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  ‘unorthodox’	  critical	  theorists	  who	  tend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  discipline	  area	  as	  GPE:	  the	  term	  ‘global’	  emphasises	  a	  more	  holistic	  approach	  that	  sees	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  power	  as	  integrated	  and	  also	  acknowledges	  the	  agency	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  such	  as	  social	  movements,	  while	  the	  term	  ‘international’	  in	  the	  IPE	  label	  implicitly	  draws	  attention	  to	  individual	  nation	  states	  and	  large,	  formally-­‐sanctioned	  international	  institutions	  as	  the	  most	  important	  key	  actors.	  5	  Refer	  to	  Angus	  (2016)	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  geological	  timespans	  and	  of	  the	  origins,	  developments	  and	  implications	  surrounding	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Anthropocene.	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current	  global	  political	  economy	  and	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  was	  modified	  in	  
the	  1970s.	  The	  chapter	  ends	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  ecological,	  economic,	  social	  and	  
political	  instabilities	  and	  crises	  resulting	  from	  the	  nature	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  global	  
political	  economy	  (which	  are	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4).	  These	  crises	  have	  led	  
to	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  movement	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  global	  justice	  movement	  and	  the	  
climate	  movement,	  which	  ecosocialists	  are	  allied	  with	  and	  whose	  role	  in	  these	  wider	  
social	  movements	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  research	  project.	  
As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  ecosocialists	  argue	  that	  current	  early	  21st-­‐century	  ecological,	  
economic,	  and	  socio-­‐political	  crises	  are	  all	  interrelated	  and	  can	  only	  be	  fully	  
understood	  and	  effectively	  addressed	  when	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  a	  systemic	  crisis	  
whose	  root	  cause	  is	  capitalism.	  It	  follows	  that	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  
development	  of	  the	  capitalist	  global	  political	  economy	  is	  of	  central	  importance	  for	  
four	  reasons:	  firstly,	  it	  provides	  an	  account	  of	  key	  developments	  that	  informed	  the	  
establishment	  of	  GPE	  (including	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  theoretical	  perspective	  deployed	  
in	  this	  research	  project)	  as	  a	  distinct	  field	  of	  study;	  secondly,	  it	  informs	  ecosocialists’	  
own	  theoretical	  analyses	  and	  understandings;	  thirdly,	  it	  informs	  this	  study	  of	  
ecosocialism	  because	  it	  is	  within	  the	  context	  of	  current	  power	  relationships	  that	  
ecosocialists	  act	  to	  achieve	  their	  aims;	  and	  finally,	  it	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  
causes	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  and	  exploring	  possible	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  living	  in	  this	  
new	  geological	  epoch	  on	  a	  planet	  that	  some	  analysts	  describe	  as	  a	  ‘different	  Earth.’	  
The	  Anthropocene:	  A	  new	  geological	  epoch	  
As	  ecosocialist	  Ian	  Angus	  explains,	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Earth	  as	  an	  integrated	  system	  
originated	  in	  the	  1980s	  when	  scientists	  realised	  that	  “nuclear	  weapons,	  ozone-­‐
destroying	  chemicals,	  and	  greenhouse	  gases	  could	  radically	  remake	  the	  world:	  
human	  activity	  was	  causing	  not	  just	  change	  but	  global	  change,	  with	  potentially	  
disastrous	  consequences”	  (Angus	  2016,	  p.	  30).	  By	  the	  year	  2000,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  
anthropogenic	  changes	  to	  the	  Earth	  system	  were	  so	  profound	  that	  atmospheric	  
scientist	  Paul	  Crutzen	  introduced	  the	  term	  ‘Anthropocene’	  to	  describe	  the	  new	  
geological	  epoch	  we	  now	  live	  in	  (Angus	  2016;	  Hamilton	  2017).	  While	  the	  
International	  Commission	  on	  Stratigraphy	  is	  yet	  to	  decide	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  to	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formally	  acknowledge	  the	  Anthropocene	  as	  a	  new	  geological	  epoch,	  Angus	  (2016,	  p.	  
58)	  points	  out	  that	  even	  if	  it	  rejects	  the	  Anthropocene	  Working	  Group’s	  
recommendation	  to	  do	  so,	  this	  “will	  not	  make	  the	  Anthropocene	  go	  away.”	  	  
The	  advent	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  constitutes	  what	  Hamilton	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  “rupture	  in	  
the	  functioning	  of	  the	  Earth	  System	  as	  a	  whole”	  (Hamilton	  2017,	  p.	  10,	  emphasis	  in	  
original)	  or	  “a	  phase	  shift	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  Earth	  System	  as	  a	  whole”	  
(Hamilton	  2017,	  p.	  25,	  emphasis	  added).	  Will	  Steffen,	  one	  of	  the	  ‘standard-­‐bearers’	  
of	  the	  Anthropocene	  concept	  (Hamilton	  2015,	  p.	  103),	  describes	  the	  implications	  of	  
this	  shift	  succinctly:	  “We	  are	  now	  living	  in	  a	  no-­‐analogue	  world”	  (Steffen	  et	  al.	  
2015b,	  p.	  94).	  In	  GPE	  terms,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  the	  global	  
expansion	  of	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  production	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  years	  have	  been	  so	  
great	  that	  they	  have	  changed	  the	  Earth	  system.	  Moreover,	  it	  means	  that	  these	  
changes	  in	  the	  Earth	  system	  are,	  in	  turn,	  having	  effects	  that	  are	  unpredictable	  (since	  
we	  now	  live	  in	  a	  ‘no-­‐analogue	  world’)	  on	  the	  global	  political	  economy,	  and	  this	  is	  
why,	  concurring	  with	  Hamilton	  (2017),	  I	  argue	  that	  GPE	  studies	  that	  neglect	  the	  
onset	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  are	  incomplete.	  
One	  of	  the	  debates	  geologists	  are	  now	  engaged	  in	  that	  has	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  GPE	  
studies	  involves	  determining	  when	  the	  Anthropocene	  started,	  with	  suggestions	  
ranging	  from	  Neolithic	  times	  to	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  and	  beyond	  (Oldfield	  et	  al.	  
2014).	  Steffen	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  point	  out	  that	  human	  activities	  prior	  to	  the	  1940s,	  while	  
affecting	  local	  ecosystems,	  were	  neither	  extensive	  enough	  nor	  profound	  enough	  to	  
have	  environmental	  effects	  on	  a	  planetary	  scale.	  It	  was	  only	  after	  the	  “phenomenal	  
growth	  of	  the	  global	  socio-­‐economic	  system”	  in	  the	  1940s,	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  Earth	  
System	  scientists	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Great	  Acceleration,’	  that	  planetary-­‐scale	  changes	  to	  
natural	  systems	  become	  evident	  (Steffen	  et	  al.	  2015b,	  pp.	  93	  –	  94;	  see	  also	  Hamilton	  
2017,	  pp.	  83	  –	  84	  and	  pp.	  134	  -­‐	  135).	  Graphs	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  trends	  such	  as	  
population,	  real	  GDP,	  foreign	  direct	  investment,	  primary	  energy	  use,	  fertilizer	  
consumption,	  transportation	  and	  international	  tourism,	  and	  graphs	  of	  biospheric	  
system	  trends	  such	  as	  GHG	  concentrations,	  ocean	  acidification,	  surface	  warming	  and	  
tropical	  forest	  loss	  over	  the	  period	  1750	  -­‐	  2010	  show	  sharp	  increases	  in	  all	  these	  
indicators	  after	  1950	  (refer	  to	  the	  graphs	  in	  Steffen	  et	  al.	  2015b,	  pp.	  86	  –	  87).	  On	  the	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basis	  of	  this	  evidence,	  the	  preferred	  date	  Steffen	  and	  his	  co-­‐authors	  suggest	  for	  
marking	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  is,	  in	  fact,	  very	  precise:	  	  
On Monday 16 July 1945, about the time that the Great 
Acceleration began, the first atomic bomb was detonated in the New 
Mexico desert. Radioactive isotopes from this detonation were 
emitted to the atmosphere and spread worldwide entering the 
sedimentary record to provide a unique signal of the start of the 
Great Acceleration, a signal that is unequivocally attributable to 
human activities. 
(Steffen et al. 2015, p. 93)  
While	  several	  theorists	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  argued	  that	  existing	  
theoretical	  perspectives	  in	  IR	  were	  inadequate	  analytical	  tools	  for	  understanding	  and	  
explaining	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  as	  traditionally	  
defined	  in	  the	  Holocene,	  they	  were	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  Anthropocene,	  which	  Hamilton	  
(2015)	  describes	  as	  requiring	  a	  revolutionary	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  the	  academy	  in	  all	  
discipline	  areas,	  of	  the	  sort	  described	  by	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  (1970).	  As	  discussed	  in	  
Chapter	  3,	  I	  modify	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  GPE	  perspective	  before	  using	  it	  in	  my	  analysis	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  accommodate	  this	  new	  understanding	  that	  because	  we	  no	  longer	  
live	  in	  the	  Holocene,	  we	  need	  to	  develop	  an	  ability	  to	  think	  differently	  —	  in	  a	  holistic	  
way	  that	  is	  appropriate	  for	  understanding	  and	  trying	  to	  address	  the	  interconnected	  
challenges	  we	  have	  to	  face	  in	  the	  Anthropocene	  (Hamilton	  2017).	  
The	  origins	  of	  GPE	  as	  a	  new	  field	  of	  academic	  study	  
Many	  academics	  (for	  example,	  Cohen	  2007;	  Cox	  1996b;	  Gill	  1993;	  Gilpin	  1987;	  Palan	  
2000)	  agree	  that	  new	  fields	  of	  study	  always	  arise	  within	  the	  context	  of	  developments	  
within	  the	  ‘real	  world’,	  when	  existing	  intellectual	  tools	  are	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task	  of	  
explaining	  events,	  their	  causes,	  and	  their	  implications.6	  Cox	  (1996c,	  p.	  176),	  for	  
example,	  explains	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  fields	  of	  academic	  enquiry	  as	  follows:	  
How does a new field of academic enquiry come into existence? 
Not surely through some form of intellectual parthenogenesis 
whereby existing realms of academic enquiry subdivide and 
multiply on their own. The new field is born from the fertilization of 
experienced reality [emphasis added]. Something important is going 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  validity	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  also,	  of	  course,	  demonstrated	  in	  my	  preceding	  discussion	  about	  the	  conditions	  leading	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  Earth	  System	  science	  as	  a	  field	  of	  study.	  
	   30	  
on that the academy cannot explain to our satisfaction. Sensitivity to 
the real world is the primary ingredient... 
Thus,	  GPE	  arose	  as	  a	  distinct	  field	  of	  academic	  study	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  
1980s	  because	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  nature	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  global	  political	  
economy	  that	  were	  initiated	  in	  the	  period	  immediately	  after	  WWII	  but	  shifted	  in	  
important	  ways	  in	  the	  1970s.	  In	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  WWII,	  the	  victors	  (led	  
by	  the	  primary	  victor,	  the	  United	  States)	  devised	  and	  implemented	  a	  variety	  of	  
measures	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  restoring	  conditions	  conducive	  to	  capital	  accumulation.	  
The	  resultant	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  was,	  however,	  abandoned	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  
phenomena	  such	  as	  the	  ‘stagflation’	  evident	  since	  the	  1960s	  provided	  a	  rationale	  for	  
governments	  and	  policymakers	  of	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  to	  begin	  
implementing	  economic	  policies	  that	  came	  to	  be	  called	  ‘neoliberal.’7	  This	  
rearrangement	  of	  national	  and	  global	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  and	  exchange	  
over	  the	  past	  four	  decades	  has,	  crucially,	  included	  important	  shifts	  in	  the	  priorities	  
and	  operations	  of	  nation-­‐states	  at	  the	  domestic	  and	  global	  levels	  (Cox	  1981,	  1983),	  
and	  these	  developments	  both	  intensify	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  have	  
profound	  and	  destabilising	  effects	  on	  many	  people’s	  everyday	  lives	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  
globe.8	  	  
In	  sum,	  it	  is	  widely	  agreed	  amongst	  scholars	  that	  the	  1970s	  heralded	  the	  beginning	  
of	  an	  increasingly	  unstable	  period	  in	  global	  history,	  and	  some	  theorists	  maintain	  that	  
the	  traditional	  tools	  used	  within	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR	  -­‐	  particularly	  the	  analytical	  tools	  
provided	  by	  its	  orthodox	  theoretical	  perspectives,	  Realism	  and	  Liberalism	  -­‐	  are	  
inadequately	  equipped	  to	  either	  analyse	  and	  explain	  the	  social	  and	  political	  
implications	  of	  current	  developments	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  or	  to	  trace	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  ‘Stagflation’	  describes	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  simultaneous	  increases	  of	  inflation	  and	  unemployment	  (Beeson	  2010).	  8	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘social	  relations	  of	  production’	  is	  used	  in	  the	  Marxist	  sense	  which,	  as	  Del	  Weston	  (2014,	  pp.	  5	  –	  6)	  observes,	  “is	  methodologically,	  theoretically	  and	  historically	  useful	  in	  answering	  the	  question:	  ‘can	  the	  problem	  of	  global	  warming	  be	  solved	  within	  the	  globalised	  capitalism	  political	  economy	  framework?’”	  This	  question	  constitutes	  the	  central	  preoccupation	  of	  ecosocialists,	  and	  Weston’s	  definition	  of	  ‘social	  relations	  of	  production’	  is	  relevant:	  “…humans’	  impact	  on	  the	  environment	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  particular	  social	  structure	  of	  the	  society,	  the	  social	  relations	  amongst	  people	  and	  the	  material/social	  relations	  of	  people	  with	  the	  broad	  ecology.”	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possible	  future	  trajectories	  heralded	  by	  these	  changes	  (Cox	  1981).9	  This	  is	  because	  
traditional	  IR	  perspectives	  had	  their	  origins	  in	  a	  very	  different	  context	  to	  the	  one	  
prevalent	  today.	  
The	  origins	  of	  International	  Relations	  as	  an	  academic	  discipline	  
area	  
O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  (2010)	  trace	  the	  origins	  of	  contemporary	  IR	  studies	  to	  the	  First	  
World	  War,	  which	  prompted	  studies	  of	  the	  ‘anarchical	  state	  system’	  as	  part	  of	  an	  
effort	  to	  prevent	  future	  outbreaks	  of	  such	  large-­‐scale	  conflicts.	  	  Subscribing	  to	  a	  
more	  overtly	  ‘political-­‐economic’	  explanation	  than	  this	  orthodox	  account	  of	  the	  
origin	  of	  IR,	  van	  der	  Pijl	  (2009,	  p.	  12)	  describes	  IR	  studies	  as	  being	  “originally	  a	  
doctrine	  of	  global	  governance	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  peace,	  with	  strong	  
legal	  overtones”	  -­‐	  in	  other	  words,	  van	  der	  Pijl	  argues	  that	  IR	  was	  conceived	  of	  as	  part	  
of	  a	  wider	  political	  project	  that	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  economic	  objectives.	  The	  latter	  
interpretation	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  political	  project	  is	  particularly	  evident	  when	  one	  subjects	  
Realist	  and	  Liberal	  IR	  approaches	  to	  critical	  scrutiny.	  	  
Traditional	  IR	  studies	  can	  be	  categorised	  in	  terms	  of	  three	  broad	  perspectives:	  
Realism/neo-­‐Realism,	  Liberalism/neo-­‐Liberalism	  and	  Structuralism	  (Palan	  2000;	  
Williams	  1996).	  The	  Realist	  perspective,	  which	  emphasises	  the	  actions	  of	  states	  and	  
analyses	  global	  politics	  in	  terms	  of	  zero-­‐sum,	  relative	  gains	  between	  different	  state	  
actors,	  has	  dominated	  IR	  studies	  within	  the	  academy	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).	  
Liberal	  (or	  pluralist)	  IR	  perspectives,	  which	  are	  also	  traditionally	  used	  in	  IR,	  similarly	  
see	  states	  as	  key	  actors,	  but	  they	  also	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  market	  actors	  
and	  private	  (primarily	  business)	  interest	  groups	  because	  of	  the	  perceived	  mutual	  
benefits	  of	  trade	  and	  investment;	  this	  ontological	  preference	  leads	  them	  to	  analyse	  
states’	  actions	  with	  the	  view	  that	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  achieve	  broadly-­‐defined	  social	  
goals.	  As	  Palan	  (2000)	  points	  out,	  however,	  the	  conclusions	  that	  IR	  Liberals	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  While	  even	  theorists	  working	  within	  critical	  GPE	  perspectives	  such	  as	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  one	  failed	  to	  identify	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  climate	  change	  as	  issues	  worthy	  of	  special	  attention,	  the	  urgency	  of	  addressing	  these	  environmental	  issues	  has	  become	  more	  evident	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  and	  scholars	  working	  within	  the	  critical	  tradition	  of	  Marxism	  have	  devoted	  much	  time	  and	  effort	  to	  address	  this	  shortcoming,	  as	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  7.	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Realists	  arrive	  at,	  generally	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  undefined	  broad	  ‘national	  
interest,’	  are	  often	  the	  same	  so	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two	  
perspectives	  (see	  also	  Williams	  1996).	  The	  third	  major	  perspective	  in	  traditional	  IR	  
studies,	  Structuralism	  (an	  example	  of	  which	  is	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein’s	  ‘World	  
Systems	  Theory’),	  denies	  the	  centrality	  of	  states	  in	  the	  international	  system	  and	  
adopts,	  instead,	  a	  Marxist-­‐inspired	  framework	  of	  analysis	  that	  treats	  capitalism	  as	  a	  
world-­‐wide	  system,	  with	  states	  being	  but	  one	  of	  several	  actors	  (Palan	  2000).	  Palan	  
(2000,	  p.	  2)	  argues	  that	  the	  major	  strands	  of	  GPE	  theory	  have	  developed	  beyond	  the	  
traditional	  contending	  IR	  perspectives	  of	  “realism,	  liberalism	  and	  structuralism”	  and	  
now	  “reflect	  broader	  issues	  and	  contemporary	  debates	  in	  political	  economy	  and	  the	  
social	  sciences.”	  
The	  contemporary	  issues	  and	  debates	  that	  Palan	  refers	  to	  are,	  as	  noted	  previously,	  
an	  outcome	  of	  the	  widespread	  changes	  or,	  as	  some	  theorists	  who	  use	  a	  more	  
nuanced	  approach	  (for	  example,	  Amoore	  et	  al.	  1997;	  Brenner,	  Peck	  &	  Theodore	  
2010)	  argue,	  ‘rearrangements’	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  global	  political	  economy.	  Broadly	  
speaking,	  these	  rearrangements	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  implementing	  policies	  and	  
creating	  additional	  institutions	  that	  further	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  project	  of	  
increasing	  and	  deepening	  the	  global	  integration	  of	  capitalism,	  and	  the	  penetration	  of	  
capitalist	  relations	  into	  more	  regions	  in	  the	  world	  as	  well	  as	  into	  more	  aspects	  of	  
social,	  biological	  and	  political	  life.10	  These	  processes	  of	  extending	  the	  global	  reach	  of	  
capitalist	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  while	  simultaneously	  intensifying	  these	  
relations	  where	  they	  already	  exist	  are	  frequently	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  academic	  
literature,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  work	  and	  statements	  of	  ecosocialists,	  as	  ‘globalisation’	  or	  
‘neoliberalism’	  —	  or,	  in	  some	  accounts,	  as	  ‘neoliberal	  globalisation,’	  a	  combination	  
of	  these	  two	  concepts.	  These	  terms	  are,	  however,	  ‘essentially	  contested	  concepts’	  (a	  
notion	  that	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  in	  this	  chapter),	  and	  their	  implications	  
are	  hotly	  disputed	  in	  the	  literature.	  Gill	  (1993)	  points	  out	  that	  even	  the	  question	  of	  
“what	  has	  really	  changed	  in	  the	  world	  order”	  (if	  anything)	  is	  open	  to	  debate,	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  terms	  ‘capitalism’	  and	  ‘capitalist	  economies’	  are	  used	  instead	  of	  ‘advanced	  economies,’	  ‘industrialised	  economies,’	  and	  ‘Western	  states’	  as	  the	  former	  terms	  are	  the	  appropriate	  ones	  given	  the	  theoretical	  perspectives	  I	  adopt	  are	  Marxist	  and	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  (for	  reasons	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  3).	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answers	  to	  this	  question	  depend	  on	  one’s	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  
assumptions.11	  Any	  discussion	  of	  what	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  current	  phase	  of	  
capitalism	  (in	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  historical	  period	  that	  many	  refer	  to	  as	  being	  
characterised	  by	  ‘neoliberal	  globalisation’)	  can	  only	  make	  sense	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
comparing	  the	  ever-­‐shifting	  status	  quo	  to	  what	  existed	  before	  the	  rearrangements	  
commenced.	  This	  necessitates	  an	  overview	  of	  some	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  features	  of	  
the	  origins	  of	  this	  current	  phase	  of	  capitalism:	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  
established	  at	  the	  end	  of	  WWII.	  
Key	  features	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  between	  1945	  
and	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  
In	  orthodox	  IR	  accounts,	  the	  period	  immediately	  following	  WWII	  was	  characterised	  
by	  the	  ‘Cold	  War,’	  which	  began	  in	  1945	  and	  ended	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  with	  the	  
‘collapse’	  of	  what	  was	  called	  the	  ‘Eastern	  Bloc.’	  At	  the	  inter-­‐state	  level,	  according	  to	  
these	  accounts,	  this	  period	  was	  characterised	  by	  a	  rivalry	  between	  an	  alliance	  of	  the	  
advanced	  capitalist,	  industrially	  developed	  ‘Western	  democracies’	  led	  by	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  its	  foremost	  ally,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  of	  
‘communist’	  states	  led	  by	  the	  Union	  of	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republics	  (USSR)	  or	  Soviet	  
Union	  (Cox	  with	  Sinclair	  1996,	  2002;	  Donnelly	  2013;	  Gilpin	  1987,	  2001).	  The	  Cold	  
War	  had	  military,	  economic,	  political	  and	  ideological	  dimensions	  as	  those	  in	  power	  in	  
the	  US-­‐	  and	  Soviet-­‐led	  blocs	  of	  nations	  attempted	  to	  spread	  and	  entrench	  their	  
economic	  and	  political	  systems	  and,	  equally	  importantly,	  their	  ideologies	  throughout	  
the	  globe	  (Cox	  with	  Sinclair	  1996;	  Gill	  &	  Law	  1988).	  Ideologies	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  
“conscious	  constructions	  which	  give	  general	  orientations	  to	  understanding	  and	  
action”	  (Cox	  2002,	  p.	  89).	  The	  entrenchment	  of	  an	  ideological	  perspective	  involves	  
promoting	  ideas	  (such	  as	  the	  superiority	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  political	  systems	  and	  
of	  a	  ‘free	  market’)	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they,	  and	  associated	  institutions,	  “come	  to	  be	  
seen	  as	  natural	  and	  legitimate,	  and	  that	  they	  become	  embedded	  in	  the	  frameworks	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Ontology	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  reality,	  what	  “its	  key	  components	  and	  relationships	  are”	  and	  how	  these	  components	  and	  relationships	  change	  over	  time	  (Gill	  1993,	  p.	  9);	  epistemology	  refers	  to	  “what	  human	  beings	  can	  and	  cannot	  know	  about	  the	  social	  world”	  (Burchill	  &	  Linklater	  2013,	  p.	  6)	  and	  how	  we	  can	  investigate	  it.	  Ontological	  and	  epistemological	  views	  are	  interrelated	  and	  also	  influence	  choices	  of	  appropriate	  research	  methodologies.	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of	  thought	  of	  the	  politically	  and	  economically	  significant	  parts	  of	  the	  population”	  
(Gill	  &	  Law	  1988,	  p.	  78).	  According	  to	  traditional	  IR	  theorists,	  the	  two	  primary	  aims	  of	  
the	  contending	  blocs	  of	  allies	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  were	  to	  consolidate	  their	  power	  
domestically	  and	  to	  extend	  it	  more	  widely	  throughout	  the	  international	  state	  system	  
by	  attracting	  the	  governments	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘developing’	  nation-­‐states	  into	  their	  
spheres	  of	  influence.	  Given	  the	  later	  disintegration	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  alliance	  and	  
the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  a	  political	  entity,	  this	  chapter	  is	  mostly	  
concerned	  with	  developments	  emanating	  from	  the	  US-­‐led	  advanced	  capitalist	  
economies,	  as	  these	  created	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  prevailing	  global	  political	  
economy	  and	  the	  challenges	  it	  presents	  to	  those	  civil	  society	  forces	  (the	  global	  
justice	  movement	  –	  and	  primarily	  ecosocialists	  in	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  
movement)	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  research	  project.12	  	  
The	  current	  global	  political	  economy	  was	  shaped	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  number	  
of	  key	  international	  and	  supranational	  alliances	  and	  institutions	  by	  the	  victors	  of	  the	  
WWII,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  foremost	  victor,	  the	  United	  States	  (Higgott	  2010).	  
These	  institutions	  were	  established	  in	  1944	  and	  have	  since	  been	  (and	  continue	  to	  
be)	  refined	  and	  supplemented	  with	  additional	  mechanisms	  for	  achieving	  specific	  
economic	  and	  political	  purposes.	  As	  well	  as	  creating	  the	  intergovernmental	  military	  
alliance,	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organisation	  (NATO),	  in	  1949	  under	  the	  direction	  
of	  the	  United	  States	  —	  with	  the	  integration	  of	  West	  Germany	  in	  1955	  provoking	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐led	  Warsaw	  Pact	  (Kaplan	  1969;	  Wolfe	  1966)	  —	  political	  
leaders	  and	  other	  powerful	  actors	  of	  the	  US-­‐led	  alliance	  of	  advanced	  capitalist	  states	  
sought	  to	  reinforce	  and	  strengthen	  their	  position	  in	  the	  international	  state	  system	  by	  
incorporating	  and	  integrating	  more	  states	  into	  capitalist	  market	  relations.	  The	  post-­‐
WWII	  period	  was	  thus	  characterised	  by	  the	  increasing	  integration	  of	  the	  advanced	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  specific	  forms	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  arrangements	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  ‘Western	  democracies’	  were	  influenced	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  alternative	  model	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  organisation	  presented	  by	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  Eastern	  bloc;	  similarly,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  that	  has	  been	  unfolding	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  era	  is	  also	  partially	  attributable	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  and	  the	  resulting	  apparent	  absence	  of	  an	  alternative,	  non-­‐capitalist,	  model	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  organization.	  The	  new	  social	  movements	  have	  also	  been	  influenced	  by	  both	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc	  as	  well	  as	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  specific	  forms	  of	  ‘actually	  existing	  socialism’	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  before	  its	  collapse,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  6,	  7	  and	  8.	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capitalist	  economies	  and	  other	  ‘emerging	  economies’	  into	  a	  global	  economic	  system	  
through	  a	  variety	  of	  international	  and	  supranational	  economic	  and	  political	  
institutions	  (Cox	  1987;	  Gill	  &	  Law	  1988)	  whose	  role	  in	  managing	  global	  affairs	  has	  
become	  increasingly	  important.	  With	  the	  stated	  purposes	  of	  promoting	  ‘economic	  
growth’	  through	  ‘free	  trade,’	  and	  reducing	  protectionism	  and	  monetary	  crises,	  the	  
institutions	  established	  in	  this	  post-­‐war	  period	  continue	  to	  facilitate	  the	  penetration	  
of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  into	  more	  regions	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  
also	  foster	  the	  deepening	  of	  regional	  and	  global	  integration	  of	  capitalist	  economies	  
(Gill	  &	  Law	  1993;	  Overbeek	  2000;	  Spruyt	  2000).	  While	  the	  International	  Monetary	  
Fund	  (IMF)	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  were	  the	  main	  economic	  institutions	  initially	  created	  
to	  manage	  the	  global	  spread	  of	  capitalist	  relations,	  a	  number	  of	  other	  international	  
institutions	  were	  also	  established	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN).13	  
Post-­‐WWII	  International	  Institutions:	  the	  United	  Nations	  
The	  UN	  has	  developed	  in	  complex	  ways	  since	  its	  establishment	  (Cox	  with	  Sinclair	  
1996;	  Frova	  2015;	  Weiss	  2015).	  O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  (2010)	  identify	  two	  of	  its	  
‘elements’	  as	  being	  particularly	  significant:	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  
composed	  of	  five	  permanent	  members	  with	  veto	  power	  over	  decisions	  about	  war	  
and	  peace	  as	  well	  as	  the	  power	  to	  authorise	  economic	  sanctions	  against	  states	  they	  
want	  to	  ‘punish’	  for	  perceived	  infractions,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  specialised	  agencies.14	  
Examples	  of	  such	  specialised	  agencies	  are	  the	  World	  Health	  Organisation	  (WHO),	  the	  
Food	  and	  Agricultural	  Organisation	  (FAO),	  the	  World	  Meteorological	  Organisation	  
(WMO),	  and	  the	  International	  Labour	  Organization	  (ILO).	  Many	  of	  these	  specialised	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  An	  analysis	  of	  their	  real	  powers	  shows	  that	  many	  of	  these	  UN	  institutions	  were	  designed	  to	  perform	  the	  ideological	  role	  of	  legitimising	  the	  new	  global	  order	  rather	  than	  to	  facilitate	  any	  real	  ‘power-­‐sharing.’	  An	  illustrative	  example	  of	  the	  inequitable	  power	  built	  into	  UN	  institutions	  is	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  which	  gives	  all	  member	  state	  representatives	  the	  opportunity	  to	  vote	  on	  a	  restricted	  number	  of	  policy	  issues	  but	  is	  only	  authorised	  to	  make	  recommendations	  (rather	  than	  binding	  resolutions)	  on	  non-­‐budgetary	  issues	  (United	  Nations	  Foundation	  2012).	  In	  addition,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  is	  not	  authorised	  to	  make	  recommendations	  on	  any	  issues	  that	  are	  under	  consideration	  in	  the	  Security	  Council	  (UN	  n.d.).	  14	  The	  five	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  are	  the	  US,	  the	  UK,	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  France	  and	  China.	  The	  Security	  Council’s	  power	  is	  evident	  in	  many	  different	  ways,	  including	  in	  its	  power	  to	  select	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Secretariat,	  the	  administrative	  organ	  of	  the	  UN	  (Baumann	  2016).	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agencies	  were	  established	  to	  address	  specific	  issue	  areas	  or,	  as	  O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  
(2010,	  p.	  136)	  put	  it,	  “to	  cope	  with	  the	  casualties	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy.”	  
Unlike	  the	  powerful	  economic	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions,	  which	  were	  established	  
to	  manage	  the	  development	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  global	  capitalist	  financial	  system,	  the	  
specialised	  agencies	  have	  little	  power	  and	  influence	  within	  the	  larger	  structure	  of	  the	  
global	  political	  economy	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).15	  In	  addition	  to	  specialised	  
agencies,	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  IPCC	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks	  such	  as	  the	  
UNFCCC	  have	  also	  been	  established	  to	  address	  the	  most	  significant	  ‘casualty’	  of	  
global	  capitalism	  discussed	  in	  this	  dissertation:	  the	  Earth’s	  biosphere.	  In	  addition	  to	  
being	  much	  more	  powerful	  than	  the	  specialised	  agencies,	  the	  economic	  institutions	  
and	  arrangements	  originating	  with	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions	  also	  take	  
precedence	  over	  the	  IPCC	  and	  UNFCCC	  and	  present	  serious	  obstacles	  to	  taking	  
action	  to	  mitigate	  global	  warming,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  later	  chapters.	  An	  
understanding	  of	  the	  origins	  and	  key	  features	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions	  is	  
therefore	  essential	  in	  my	  analysis.	  
Post-­‐WWII	  Economic	  Institutions:	  The	  Bretton	  Woods	  System	  
O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  (2010)	  identify	  the	  two	  main	  components	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  
Bretton	  Woods	  System	  as	  being	  a	  new	  international	  monetary	  system	  (IMS)	  and	  a	  
new	  credit	  system.	  The	  IMS	  established	  rules	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  national	  currencies	  
while	  the	  credit	  system	  determined	  how	  credit	  would	  be	  created	  and	  distributed	  
across	  borders.	  The	  US	  had	  emerged	  from	  WWII	  as	  economically	  and	  militarily	  
dominant,	  which	  gave	  it	  the	  leverage	  to	  shape	  the	  post-­‐war	  world	  order	  that	  would	  
dictate	  the	  terms	  of	  economic	  relations	  amongst	  the	  Western	  capitalist	  states	  (Gilpin	  
1975).	  Given	  US	  dominance,	  one	  important	  outcome	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  
conference	  was	  an	  IMS	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  based	  on	  the	  US	  dollar	  which	  was,	  
until	  1971,	  valued	  with	  respect	  to	  gold	  reserves	  (Higgott	  2010;	  Ougaard	  2016).	  	  
Acting	  as	  the	  world’s	  primary	  reserve	  currency	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1940s,	  the	  US	  dollar	  is	  
the	  currency	  most	  used	  by	  central	  banks	  as	  a	  reserve	  asset	  as	  well	  as	  the	  currency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Perceptions	  of	  the	  relative	  efficacy	  of	  the	  different	  UN	  institutions	  are	  ideological	  issues	  on	  which	  IPE	  and	  GPE	  theorists	  adopt	  differing	  positions.	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most	  used	  when	  purchasing	  commodities	  and	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  international	  loans	  
(Lucarelli	  2012).	  The	  central	  role	  that	  the	  US	  dollar	  plays	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  has	  
enabled	  it	  to	  sell	  its	  government	  bonds	  to	  foreigners	  at	  relatively	  low	  interest	  rates	  
and	  thereby	  fund	  large	  budget	  deficits	  relatively	  cheaply.	  Moreover,	  when	  the	  US	  
government	  borrows	  money	  there	  is	  no	  risk	  of	  its	  debt	  increasing	  if	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
US	  dollar	  falls,	  whereas	  the	  debt	  repayments	  of	  other	  countries	  that	  borrow	  money	  
denominated	  in	  US	  dollars	  increase	  if	  their	  currency	  loses	  its	  value.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  
US	  dollar	  as	  the	  world’s	  primary	  reserve	  currency	  is	  thus	  clearly	  favourable	  to	  US	  
government	  and	  business	  interests	  while	  it	  means	  that	  US	  economic	  policies	  can	  
cause	  financial	  (and	  hence	  social)	  crises	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.16	  An	  IMS	  based	  
on	  the	  US	  dollar	  was	  accompanied	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  two	  institutions	  charged	  with	  
the	  task	  of	  overseeing	  the	  establishment	  and	  operation	  of	  a	  new	  international	  trade	  
and	  credit	  system:	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  (Gill	  &	  Law	  1988).	  The	  establishment	  
of	  these	  institutions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  favours	  US	  interests	  is	  also	  clearly	  evident:	  unlike	  
in	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  where	  all	  member	  states	  have	  equal	  representation,	  
voting	  in	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IMF	  works	  on	  a	  complex	  quota	  system	  that	  gives	  
the	  US	  vote	  much	  greater	  weight	  than	  that	  of	  other	  member	  states	  (IMF	  2016a;	  
World	  Bank	  2016).17	  
According	  to	  the	  IMF	  (2016a),	  its	  primary	  tasks	  between	  1944	  and	  1971	  involved	  
“overseeing	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  to	  ensure	  exchange	  rate	  stability	  and	  
encouraging	  members	  to	  eliminate	  exchange	  restrictions	  that	  hinder	  trade.”	  The	  
purpose	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  through	  one	  of	  its	  branches,	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  
Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  (IBRD),	  was	  to	  provide	  credit	  to	  European	  states	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  1980s	  ‘Third	  World’	  debt	  crisis	  is	  a	  dramatic	  illustrative	  example	  of	  how	  US	  domestic	  US	  monetary	  policy	  can	  reverberate	  through	  the	  global	  economy.	  The	  2007/8	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  (GFC)	  is	  another	  example	  of	  how	  a	  ‘housing	  bubble’	  originating	  in	  the	  US	  affects	  the	  global	  economy.	  Evidence	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  fallout	  from	  the	  GFC	  is	  still	  ongoing	  almost	  a	  decade	  after	  it	  began	  (Buzan	  &	  Lawson	  2014;	  IMF	  2016b;	  Keaney	  2014;	  UNCTAD	  2016;	  World	  Bank	  Group	  2016;	  WTO	  2016b).	  These	  economic	  crises	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  17	  In	  2015,	  the	  quota	  of	  the	  US	  vote	  in	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  was	  more	  than	  double	  that	  of	  Japan,	  the	  member	  state	  with	  the	  second	  highest	  voting	  quota	  in	  these	  institutions.	  An	  examination	  of	  the	  voting	  quotas	  listed	  on	  the	  relevant	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  webpages	  demonstrates	  that	  ‘developing	  economy’	  member	  states	  are	  given	  very	  little	  say	  in	  the	  decisions	  made	  in	  these	  organisations.	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rebuild	  their	  economies	  after	  the	  destruction	  of	  WWII	  (Gill	  &	  Law	  1988).	  Some	  of	  
these	  arrangements	  proved	  to	  be	  temporary,	  as	  they	  were	  only	  partially	  successful	  
in	  establishing	  a	  stable	  global	  financial	  system	  that	  suited	  the	  major	  capitalist	  states	  
(primarily	  the	  United	  States).	  According	  to	  analysts,	  there	  were	  two	  inter-­‐related	  
problems	  with	  this	  system:	  the	  IBRD	  had	  insufficient	  funds,	  and	  the	  link	  between	  the	  
US	  dollar	  and	  gold	  was	  unsustainable.	  As	  the	  IBRD	  did	  not	  have	  sufficient	  funds	  to	  
provide	  the	  credit	  required	  for	  post-­‐WWII	  reconstruction	  in	  Western	  Europe	  as	  well	  
as	  for	  purchasing	  American	  goods	  in	  US	  dollars,	  the	  US	  facilitated	  international	  
capital	  liquidity	  through	  military	  spending,	  foreign	  investment	  and	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  
(O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).18	  	  
The	  Marshall	  Plan	  is	  an	  illuminating	  example	  of	  the	  intricate	  relationship	  between	  
politics	  and	  economics:	  it	  was	  a	  political	  event	  (the	  ‘communist	  coup’	  in	  
Czechoslovakia	  in	  1948)	  that	  persuaded	  the	  US	  Congress	  to	  inject	  money	  into	  Europe	  
for	  reconstruction	  via	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  in	  order	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  the	  spread	  of	  
‘communist’	  influence	  in	  Europe	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010;	  see	  also	  Desai,	  Freeman	  
&	  Kagarlitsky	  2016).19	  Moreover,	  the	  conditions	  attached	  to	  credit	  provided	  through	  
the	  Marshall	  Plan	  prefigured	  the	  approach	  that	  would	  later	  be	  used	  extensively	  by	  
the	  IMF’s	  ‘Structural	  Adjustment	  Programs’	  (SAPs),	  whereby	  its	  loans	  were	  
conditional	  to	  agreements	  by	  recipient	  governments	  that	  they	  would	  implement	  
policies	  aligned	  with	  liberal	  capitalist	  economic	  principles.20	  States	  granted	  funds	  
through	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  had	  to	  agree	  to	  ‘liberalise’	  their	  economies	  and	  engage	  in	  
‘freer	  trade’	  and	  were	  also	  required	  to	  agree	  on	  how	  the	  funds	  should	  be	  distributed	  
(Cox	  1987),	  thus	  providing	  mechanisms	  for	  their	  deeper	  integration	  into	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  This	  transfer	  of	  capital	  from	  the	  United	  States	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  caused	  other	  problems	  as	  by	  1960	  there	  were	  more	  US	  dollars	  in	  circulation	  than	  reserves	  of	  US	  gold,	  leading	  to	  the	  US	  government	  breaking	  the	  link	  with	  gold	  in	  1971	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).	  US	  rising	  debt	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  was	  another	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  decouple	  the	  US	  dollar	  from	  gold	  (Gilpin	  2001).	  19	  The	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘communist’	  to	  describe	  the	  politico-­‐economic	  systems	  in	  existence	  in	  the	  Eastern	  bloc	  is	  contested;	  nevertheless,	  traditional	  IR	  accounts	  refer	  to	  that	  system	  as	  ‘communist.’	  20	  Liberal	  economic	  principles	  entail	  a	  commitment	  to	  free	  markets	  with	  minimal	  state	  regulation	  of	  the	  economy	  (at	  least	  insofar	  as	  the	  freedom	  of	  capital	  is	  concerned,	  although	  the	  regulation	  of	  labour	  is	  condoned),	  with	  the	  purported	  aims	  of	  achieving	  “maximum	  efficiency,	  economic	  growth,	  and	  individual	  welfare”	  (Gilpin	  1987,	  p.	  27).	  
	   39	  
international	  capitalist	  economic	  system.21	  	  Institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Organisation	  of	  
European	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation,	  later	  incorporating	  states	  outside	  Europe	  and	  
renamed	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD),	  
were	  also	  established	  to	  facilitate	  the	  wider	  and	  deeper	  integration	  of	  the	  global	  
capitalist	  system	  (Cox	  1987).	  While	  the	  task	  of	  providing	  international	  capital	  
liquidity	  was	  initially	  funded	  by	  public	  sources	  (primarily	  by	  the	  US	  government),	  
increasing	  percentages	  of	  credit	  would	  be	  distributed	  by	  private	  sources	  as	  time	  
passed,	  which	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Euro-­‐currency	  markets	  (O’Brien	  &	  
Williams	  2010).	  Having	  taken	  steps	  to	  inject	  liquidity	  into	  the	  international	  capitalist	  
system,	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  countries	  also	  created	  a	  mechanism	  designed	  to	  
facilitate	  shaping	  an	  international	  ‘free	  trade’	  regime,	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  
Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  (GATT).	  
Like	  the	  global	  capitalist	  financial	  system	  established	  after	  WWII,	  the	  trade	  regime	  
established	  under	  the	  GATT	  (in	  effect	  between	  1947	  and	  1994)	  clearly	  favoured	  the	  
economic	  interests	  of	  key	  players	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  and	  
discriminated	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  ‘developing’	  economies	  by	  retaining	  
protectionism	  in	  those	  economic	  sectors	  that	  suit	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  nations	  —	  
that	  is,	  in	  sectors	  such	  as	  agriculture	  and	  the	  textile	  and	  clothing	  industries,	  where	  
developing	  capitalist	  economies	  enjoy	  a	  ‘comparative	  advantage’	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  advanced	  
capitalist	  economies	  (McPhee	  1992).22	  A	  related	  development	  to	  this	  selective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  use	  of	  specific	  terminology	  such	  as	  ‘liberalise’	  is	  not	  value-­‐free:	  while	  the	  word	  ‘liberalise’	  has	  positive	  connotations,	  an	  alternative	  word,	  ‘deregulate,’	  is	  arguably	  less	  ideologically-­‐informed	  as	  ‘deregulation’	  can	  have	  either	  positive	  connotations	  (if	  one	  subscribes	  to	  laissez-­‐faire	  liberal	  capitalism)	  or	  negative	  connotations	  (if	  one	  supports	  a	  more	  regulated	  form	  of	  capitalism,	  or	  adopts	  a	  critical	  position	  regarding	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production).	  22	  David	  Ricardo’s	  ‘law	  of	  comparative	  advantage’	  is	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  liberal	  economic	  theory	  and	  holds	  that	  in	  their	  trade	  relations	  with	  other	  nations,	  “countries	  will	  tend	  to	  specialize	  in	  those	  commodities	  whose	  costs	  are	  comparatively	  lowest”	  (Gilpin	  1987,	  p.	  173).	  In	  the	  1980s,	  the	  neoclassical	  reformulation	  of	  this	  theory	  maintained	  that	  “a	  nation’s	  comparative	  advantage	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  relative	  abundance	  and	  most	  profitable	  combination	  of	  its	  several	  factors	  of	  production,	  such	  as	  capital,	  labor,	  resources,	  management,	  and	  technology”	  (Gilpin	  1987,	  p.	  175).	  Absent	  from	  these	  accounts	  is	  any	  notion	  of	  how	  asymmetrical	  power	  structures	  play	  any	  role	  in	  trade	  relations,	  or	  how	  this	  theory’s	  underlying	  assumptions	  of	  the	  immobility	  of	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  of	  production	  (primarily	  capital,	  but	  also	  labour)	  are	  not	  valid	  in	  the	  current	  context	  of	  neoliberalising	  global	  capitalism	  so	  that	  practices	  justified	  on	  the	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protectionism	  was	  the	  emergence	  of	  regionalism,	  whereby	  the	  governments	  of	  
nation-­‐states	  created	  regional	  ‘trade	  blocs’	  or	  alliances	  based	  on	  capitalist	  market	  
principles.	  
Established	  in	  1957,	  analysts	  identify	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  (EEC)	  as	  
the	  initiator	  of	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  regionalism	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).	  The	  aim	  of	  
regionalism	  in	  this	  phase	  was	  to	  create	  regional	  groupings	  of	  nation-­‐states	  that	  
would	  help	  stimulate	  industrialisation	  and	  the	  development	  of	  capitalist	  trade	  
relations;	  this	  was	  done	  by	  diverting	  trade	  rather	  than	  dismantling	  barriers	  to	  
stimulate	  trade.23	  Regionalism	  would	  later	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  
further	  neoliberal	  globalisation	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world	  economy.	  Another	  obstacle	  to	  
the	  establishment	  of	  a	  completely	  ‘unregulated,	  free	  market’	  global	  economy	  was	  
presented	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.24	  	  The	  Soviet	  central	  planning	  model	  
for	  economic	  development	  and	  social	  policies	  that	  provided	  secure	  jobs,	  free	  health	  
care,	  education,	  and	  housing	  could	  not	  be	  ignored	  in	  the	  ideological	  and	  political	  
struggle	  against	  ‘communism.’25	  Cold	  War	  considerations	  thus	  played	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  shaping	  both	  the	  domestic	  policies	  of	  governments	  presiding	  over	  capitalist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  basis	  of	  ‘win-­‐win’	  situations	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ‘comparative	  advantage’	  become	  zero-­‐sum	  games	  that	  favour	  the	  owners	  of	  capital,	  who	  enjoy	  an	  absolute	  advantage	  (Daly	  1993).	  23	  “Trade	  diversion	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  where	  low-­‐cost	  suppliers	  from	  outside	  the	  union	  are	  replaced	  by	  high-­‐cost	  suppliers	  within	  the	  regional	  grouping.	  Trade	  creation	  refers	  to	  the	  situation	  where,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  dismantling	  barriers	  within	  the	  region,	  trade	  is	  stimulated”	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010,	  p.	  179).	  24	  ‘Free	  markets’	  are,	  paradoxically,	  always	  enforced	  by	  strict	  global	  trade	  rules	  backed	  up	  by	  sanctions	  for	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  comply.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  these	  rules	  also	  greatly	  favour	  the	  groups	  who	  have	  the	  power	  to	  develop	  and	  implement	  them.	  25	  While	  this	  is	  seldom	  discussed	  in	  orthodox	  academic	  and	  mainstream	  literature,	  there	  is	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  justify	  claims	  of	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  central	  planning	  model	  adopted	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  As	  Gill	  and	  Law	  (1988,	  p.	  309)	  record,	  “growth	  rates	  for	  industrial	  production	  in	  [the]	  CMEA	  [Council	  for	  Mutual	  Economic	  Assistance]…consistently	  exceeded	  those	  for	  the	  EEC	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  (although	  these	  slowed	  considerably	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s).”	  	  There	  is	  little	  or	  no	  unemployment	  in	  centrally	  planned	  economies	  (Gill	  &	  Law	  1988).	  In	  addition,	  relative	  to	  western	  ‘free	  market’	  economies,	  the	  centrally	  planned	  economies	  were	  characterised	  by	  “considerably	  less	  waste	  (there	  was	  no	  planned	  obsolescence,	  mass	  advertising,	  and	  unsalable	  surplus	  production,	  except	  where	  goods	  are	  defective).”	  These	  data	  can	  be	  used	  to	  support	  ecosocialist	  arguments	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  meet	  social	  needs	  while	  avoiding	  wasteful	  and	  unnecessary	  production	  and	  consumption,	  and	  to	  thereby	  avoid	  the	  worst	  impacts	  of	  the	  ecological	  disasters	  that	  are	  certain	  to	  generate	  widespread	  social	  disruption	  and	  misery	  in	  a	  ‘business	  as	  usual’	  scenario	  of	  an	  the	  continued	  global	  expansion	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production.	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economies	  and	  the	  US-­‐led	  policy	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  form	  of	  the	  emerging	  post-­‐
WWII	  global	  political	  economy.	  
‘Cold	  War’	  ideology	  and	  ‘embedded	  liberalism’	  
During	  the	  Cold	  War	  period	  (1945	  –	  1989),	  the	  ideological	  struggle	  to	  demonstrate	  
the	  attractiveness	  of	  capitalism	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  domestic	  political	  
economies	  of	  the	  industrially	  advanced	  capitalist	  states,	  whose	  governments	  were	  
forced	  to	  adopt	  welfare	  nationalist	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  alleviate	  the	  negative	  effects	  
of	  private	  wealth	  accumulation	  and	  thus	  prevent	  social	  unrest	  and	  sympathy	  
towards	  the	  opposing	  ideology	  of	  ‘communism’	  (Desai-­‐Freeman	  &	  Kagarlitsky	  2016;	  
Dunford	  2000;	  Gill	  &	  Law	  1988;	  Gilpin	  1987,	  2001).	  This	  phenomenon	  was	  
encapsulated	  by	  the	  term	  ‘embedded	  liberalism,’	  coined	  by	  John	  Ruggie	  in	  1982.	  
Embedded	  liberalism	  referred	  to	  the	  development	  of	  an	  international	  capital	  
accumulation	  regime	  that	  achieved	  a	  compromise	  between	  the	  laissez	  faire	  ‘free	  
market’	  ideals	  of	  classical	  economics	  and	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  a	  stable	  domestic	  
political	  climate	  that	  facilitated	  continued	  capital	  accumulation.	  Also	  important	  
during	  this	  period	  in	  the	  major	  capitalist	  states	  was	  the	  need	  to	  present	  Western	  
liberal	  (or	  ‘representative’)	  democratic	  systems	  as	  effective	  and	  superior	  
mechanisms	  of	  government	  (vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  competing	  Soviet	  model	  of	  state	  socialism)	  
that	  were	  responsive	  to	  the	  needs	  and	  preferences	  of	  their	  populations.	  
Liberal	  democratic	  theory	  contends	  that	  citizens	  have	  the	  power	  to	  influence	  policies	  
adopted	  by	  their	  governments	  by	  voting	  in	  political	  parties	  that	  represent	  their	  
interests	  (which	  would	  include	  access	  to	  work	  that	  secures	  a	  living	  wage	  and	  having	  
their	  basic	  needs	  met).26	  In	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  therefore,	  the	  social	  relations	  of	  
production	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  were	  characterized	  by	  Fordism	  and	  
Keynesianism,	  both	  being	  strategies	  designed	  to	  minimise	  unemployment	  rates,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  As	  Cox	  (1996d,	  p.	  532)	  notes,	  in	  the	  classic	  meaning	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  there	  is	  a	  formal	  separation	  between	  the	  political	  sphere	  (where	  citizens	  have	  ‘equal	  rights’)	  and	  the	  economic	  sphere	  (where	  private	  property	  has	  rights	  and	  citizens	  do	  not).	  This	  distinction	  lost	  some	  coherence	  in	  the	  period	  under	  consideration	  here	  and	  “people	  used	  their	  political	  rights	  to	  limit	  and	  to	  channel	  the	  rights	  of	  property	  –	  to	  correct	  the	  inequities	  of	  the	  market”	  (Cox	  with	  Sinclair	  1996,	  p.	  532);	  however,	  big	  business	  continued	  to	  thrive.	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bolster	  consumer	  spending	  power,	  and	  thus	  ensure	  social	  stability	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  
governments	  with	  tools	  to	  smooth	  out	  the	  inevitable	  ‘market	  failures’	  (Cox	  1987;	  
Gilpin	  2001)	  that	  Marx,	  as	  well	  as	  Keynes	  and	  other	  economists,	  recognised	  as	  being	  
endemic	  to	  capitalism.	  Despite	  the	  moderate	  success	  of	  this	  ‘post-­‐war	  social	  
compromise’	  in	  creating	  “the	  conditions	  for	  the	  most	  successful	  phase	  of	  expansion	  
in	  the	  history	  of	  capitalism”	  (Dunford	  2000,	  p.	  151),	  a	  number	  of	  structural	  changes	  
in	  the	  global	  capitalist	  economic	  system	  were	  also	  occurring	  in	  the	  1970s	  that	  
heralded	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  these	  principles	  and	  a	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  global	  
political	  economy.	  
As	  Cox	  (1987;	  2002)	  points	  out,	  while	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  1968-­‐75	  crisis	  in	  the	  ‘world	  
order’	  established	  after	  WWII	  are	  open	  to	  debate,	  many	  political	  theorists	  agree	  that	  
developments	  leading	  to	  the	  world	  recession	  that	  began	  in	  1974	  prompted	  a	  
significant	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  operations	  and	  management	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  
global	  political	  economy	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Gilpin	  1975;	  Hall	  2011;	  Jefferies	  2015;	  
Jones	  1997;	  Keaney	  2014;	  Latham	  1997;	  Robinson	  2007;	  Starosta	  2010).27	  Although	  I	  
present	  contending	  views	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  structural	  crisis	  in	  my	  
discussion	  below,	  in	  Chapter	  4	  I	  conduct	  my	  own	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  
developments	  using	  the	  critical	  GPE	  perspective	  because	  this	  theoretical	  perspective	  
is,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  best	  equipped	  to	  account	  for	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  
interrelationships	  between	  different	  actors	  shaping	  social	  systems	  as	  well	  as	  (in	  
modified	  form)	  the	  interrelationships	  between	  human	  social	  systems	  and	  the	  
biosphere.	  
Structural	  crisis	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  world	  order	  in	  the	  mid-­‐
1970s	  
Analysts’	  attempts	  to	  explain	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  structural	  crisis	  of	  global	  
capitalism	  vary	  in	  many	  ways,	  including	  in	  the	  issues	  they	  choose	  to	  focus	  on.	  For	  
example,	  some	  theorists	  emphasise	  the	  falling	  rate	  of	  profit	  in	  the	  US,	  including	  the	  
limitations	  placed	  on	  productivity	  efficiencies	  and	  economic	  growth	  by	  the	  Fordist	  
production	  model	  (Rupert	  1997)	  and	  the	  relative	  increase	  in	  ‘the	  wage	  share’	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  ‘World	  order’	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  in	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  perspective,	  and	  its	  meaning	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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income	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  power	  of	  trade	  unions.	  Representing	  the	  state-­‐centric	  
Realist	  IR	  perspective,	  Gilpin	  (1987)	  identifies	  the	  crisis	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  era	  
of	  American	  economic	  dominance	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  as	  a	  result	  of	  several	  
factors,	  including	  ‘excessive	  Keynesian	  policies’;	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  in	  
the	  1960s	  and	  the	  resultant	  growing	  US	  budget	  deficit;	  the	  increasing	  economic	  
competitiveness	  of	  Japan,	  West	  Germany	  and	  the	  newly	  industrialising	  countries	  
(NICs);	  and	  ‘the	  first	  oil	  shock’	  presented	  by	  the	  quadrupling	  of	  world	  energy	  prices	  
with	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Organisation	  of	  Petroleum	  Exporting	  Countries	  (OPEC)	  in	  
1973-­‐1974.	  O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  (2010)	  argue	  that	  while	  the	  imports	  of	  cheap	  
manufactured	  goods	  threatened	  some	  jobs	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  states,	  the	  
benefits	  of	  access	  to	  cheap	  imported	  consumer	  goods	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  
employment	  opportunities	  in	  new	  economic	  sectors	  led	  to	  the	  willing	  acquiescence	  
of	  workers	  to	  the	  trade	  liberalization	  process	  that	  ensued	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  crisis.	  
Cox	  (1987),	  however,	  argues	  that	  accounts	  emphasising	  worker	  complicity	  in	  the	  
changes	  are	  incomplete	  because	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  
also	  crucially	  involved	  governments	  adopting	  domestic	  policies	  that	  greatly	  
weakened	  the	  ability	  of	  workers	  to	  mount	  effective	  resistance	  to	  these	  changes.28	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  weakening	  domestic	  labour	  movements	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  UK	  and	  
Australia	  during	  the	  1980s	  has	  been	  extensively	  documented	  by	  many	  analysts,	  
adding	  validity	  to	  Cox’s	  critique.29	  	  
Beyond	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  labour	  movement,	  government	  leaders	  and	  policy-­‐
makers	  of	  this	  ‘advance	  wave’	  of	  the	  neoliberalising	  capitalist	  project	  were	  
important	  agents	  initiating	  and	  organising	  several	  other	  necessary	  policy	  changes	  to	  
prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  its	  signature	  features:	  deregulation	  of	  capital	  and	  labour	  
markets;	  deindustrialisation	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies;	  and	  the	  erosion	  of	  
welfare	  state	  provisioning	  of	  basic	  needs	  and	  services	  through	  cutbacks	  where	  full	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  This	  example	  illustrates	  the	  point	  I	  make	  in	  the	  final	  sentence	  of	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  this	  chapter:	  that	  the	  critical	  GPE	  perspective	  developed	  by	  Cox	  (1981,	  1983)	  facilitates	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  approach	  to	  analysing	  and	  explaining	  the	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  29	  For	  example,	  refer	  to	  Cahill	  (2014)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  Australian	  case	  and	  to	  Cox	  (1987),	  Harvey	  (2005)	  and	  Klein	  (2007)	  for	  analyses	  of	  the	  US	  and	  British	  cases.	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privatisation	  was	  not	  feasible.30	  These	  policy	  shifts	  were,	  however,	  facilitated	  by	  a	  
number	  of	  other	  important	  developments,	  including	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  in	  1991	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  capitalism	  into	  the	  former	  ‘communist’	  states.	  
While	  the	  balance	  of	  individual	  factors	  driving	  and	  facilitating	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  
global	  political	  economy	  are	  given	  different	  weight	  by	  different	  theorists,	  there	  is	  no	  
doubt	  that	  technological	  developments,	  particularly	  in	  the	  information	  and	  
communications	  technologies	  (ICT)	  sector,	  also	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  facilitating	  
‘globalisation’	  and	  the	  further	  expansion	  of	  capitalism.	  However,	  many	  theorists	  (for	  
example,	  Amoore	  et	  al.	  1997	  and	  Gills	  1997)	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  both	  simplistic	  and	  
misleading	  to	  identify	  ICT	  as	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  driving	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  
political	  economy	  as	  some	  analysts	  do	  because	  the	  development	  and	  widespread	  
adoption	  of	  ICT	  was	  itself	  supported	  and	  promoted	  by	  government	  policies	  and	  
funding	  (Jones	  1997)	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  because	  technological	  advances	  cannot	  
explain	  the	  specific	  form	  that	  the	  current	  phase	  of	  globalisation	  has	  taken:	  neoliberal	  
globalisation.	  
Technology	  itself	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  tool;	  it	  is	  people	  (in	  this	  case,	  people	  with	  
economic	  and	  political	  power)	  who	  decide	  which	  technologies	  will	  be	  developed	  and	  
promoted,	  and	  how	  they	  will	  be	  used.	  The	  ongoing	  and	  well-­‐documented	  reticence	  
of	  governments	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  to	  promote	  
renewable	  energy	  technologies	  such	  as	  wind-­‐	  and	  solar-­‐powered	  energy	  systems	  
(Ekins	  2015;	  Grattan	  2016;	  Hamilton	  2014;	  McKie	  2016;	  Steffen	  2015),	  while	  
simultaneously	  supporting	  fossil	  fuels	  with	  enormous	  subsidies	  (Coady	  et	  al.	  2015;	  
IEA	  2015),	  is	  an	  important	  illustrative	  example	  of	  how	  decisions	  about	  technology	  
are	  political	  decisions	  that	  reflect	  dominant	  power	  relations.	  Political	  contestations	  
over	  practical	  issues	  such	  as	  which	  technologies	  to	  support	  are	  reflected	  in	  discursive	  
political	  contestations	  over	  the	  meanings	  of	  key	  concepts.	  	  As	  with	  many	  other	  key	  
concepts	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	  different	  users	  assign	  different	  meanings	  to	  the	  
terms	  ‘globalisation’	  and	  ‘neoliberalism’	  (Amoore	  et	  al.	  1997;	  Bruff	  2005;	  Douglas	  
1997;	  Hall	  2011;	  Jones	  1997;	  Kacowicz	  &	  Mitrani	  2016;	  Yeates	  2002),	  and	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Many	  analysts	  identify	  the	  Thatcher	  government	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  the	  Hawke-­‐Keating	  government	  in	  Australia	  as	  being	  among	  the	  first	  to	  begin	  implementing	  neoliberalisation	  policies	  such	  as	  these.	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inconsistent	  application	  results	  in	  conceptual	  confusions	  that	  have	  both	  theoretical	  
and	  practical	  implications.	  One	  way	  of	  avoiding	  the	  incoherence	  arising	  from	  
conceptual	  confusions	  about	  the	  meanings	  of	  these	  terms	  is	  to	  be	  aware	  from	  the	  
outset	  that	  ‘globalisation’	  and	  ‘neoliberalism’	  are	  examples	  of	  what	  Gallie	  (1956)	  
refers	  to	  as	  ‘essentially	  contested	  concepts,’	  with	  their	  very	  ‘contestedness’	  having	  
important	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  implications,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  
Essentially	  contested	  concepts	  and	  their	  ideological	  role	  
It	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  meanings	  of	  key	  social	  science	  concepts	  such	  as	  
‘democracy,’	  ‘social	  justice,’	  and	  ‘freedom’	  are	  ‘essentially	  contested.’	  Because	  of	  
their	  complexity	  and	  the	  multidimensional	  phenomena	  they	  refer	  to,	  and	  particularly	  
because	  of	  the	  normative	  values	  they	  implicitly	  embody,	  the	  meanings	  of	  essentially	  
contested	  concepts	  are	  ambiguous	  and	  ‘persistently	  vague’	  so	  that	  “different	  
persons	  or	  parties	  adhere	  to	  different	  views	  of	  the[ir]	  correct	  use”	  (Gallie	  1956,	  p.	  
172).	  While	  the	  resulting	  intellectual	  confusion	  is	  sometimes	  accidental	  (arising	  
either	  from	  commentators	  themselves	  using	  such	  concepts	  inconsistently	  or	  from	  an	  
assumption	  that	  everyone	  else	  understands	  and	  agrees	  with	  their	  own	  definitions),	  
at	  other	  times	  different	  understandings	  of	  the	  meanings	  of	  key	  concepts	  arise	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  ‘conceptual	  contestation’	  (Collier,	  Hidalgo	  &	  Maciuceanu	  2006,	  p.	  212;	  
emphasis	  in	  original).	  Gallie	  (1956,	  p.	  169)	  defines	  ‘essentially	  contested	  concepts’	  as	  
those	  concepts	  that	  “inevitably	  involve	  endless	  disputes	  about	  their	  proper	  uses	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  their	  users”	  and	  proposes	  seven	  criteria	  whereby	  such	  concepts	  can	  be	  
identified.	  	  
Essentially	  contested	  concepts	  are:	  ‘appraisive’	  (evaluative,	  thereby	  implicitly	  
embodying	  normative	  positions);	  internally	  complex	  (comprising	  of	  ‘component	  
parts	  or	  features’	  (Ruben	  2010,	  p.	  263)	  that	  can	  be	  differently	  ranked	  in	  order	  of	  
importance);	  initially	  diversely	  describable	  (so	  that	  alternative	  explanations	  exist	  
from	  the	  outset	  because	  of	  their	  internal	  complexity);	  ‘open’	  (in	  the	  sense	  that	  their	  
meaning	  can	  change	  if	  new	  situations	  develop);	  and	  recognised	  to	  have	  multiple	  
interpretations	  that	  are	  used	  both	  aggressively	  and	  defensively.	  Another	  important	  
feature	  of	  essentially	  contested	  concepts	  is	  that	  they	  allow	  for	  interpretive	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contestations	  that	  enable	  their	  refinement	  through	  debate.31	  While	  the	  concepts	  
‘globalisation’	  and	  ‘neoliberalism’	  (as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  key	  concepts	  relevant	  to	  
this	  study)	  are,	  by	  Gallie’s	  criteria,	  clearly	  essentially	  contested,	  debates	  about	  the	  
meaning	  of	  such	  key	  concepts	  are	  not	  only	  intellectually	  interesting	  but	  have	  
important	  practical	  implications	  as	  they	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  support	  the	  
status	  quo	  or	  they	  present	  critical	  challenges	  to	  it.32	  As	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  
Chapters	  6	  and	  8,	  for	  example,	  different	  definitions	  of	  contested	  concepts	  such	  as	  
‘climate	  justice’	  and	  ‘sustainability’	  have	  very	  real	  implications	  for	  people,	  for	  the	  
integrity	  of	  ecosystems,	  and	  for	  the	  fates	  of	  non-­‐human	  life	  forms.	  
‘Neoliberal	  globalisation’:	  An	  essentially	  contested	  concept	  
In	  concrete	  terms,	  varying	  definitions	  of	  essentially	  contested	  concepts	  are	  
distinguished	  by	  which	  of	  the	  multiple	  features	  of	  the	  concepts	  they	  choose	  to	  draw	  
attention	  to	  and	  emphasise,	  and	  which	  of	  those	  features	  they	  choose	  to	  downplay	  
or,	  in	  some	  cases,	  ignore	  altogether;	  these	  differences	  have	  important	  strategic	  
implications,	  as	  Gills	  (1997)	  notes	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  ‘globalisation	  discourse’:	  
… among the ‘litany of sins’ of globalisation discourse that we most 
seek to expose and react to are: its economism; its economic 
reductionism; its technological determinism; its political cynicism, 
defeatism and immobilism; its de-socialisation of the subject and re-
socialisation of risk; its teleological subtext of inexorable global 
‘logic’ driven exclusively by capital accumulation and the market; 
and its ritual exclusion of factors, causes or goals other than capital 
accumulation and the market from the priority of values to be 
pursued by social action. In our view, the upshot of this type of 
globalisation is to bring about ‘the death of politics’, via ‘the death 
of our ideals’…. Globalisation discourse involves a serious political 
risk, i.e. the danger that the insidiously apolitical ‘logic of 
inevitabilism’ will prevail, and thus obscure the many political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  One	  key	  underlying	  theoretical	  academic	  debate	  about	  ‘globalisation’	  is,	  as	  McMichael	  (2000)	  suggests,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  a	  conscious	  policy	  implementation	  (a	  ‘project’)	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  ‘natural’	  occurrence	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  a	  ‘free	  market’	  (a	  ‘trend’).	  Cahill	  (2014)	  discusses	  the	  problematic	  and	  confusing	  definitions	  of	  ‘neoliberalism’	  at	  length,	  contending	  that	  both	  proponents	  of	  neoliberalism	  (such	  as	  Friedrich	  Hayek	  and	  Milton	  Friedman)	  and	  many	  of	  its	  critics	  (reformists	  such	  as	  Joseph	  Stieglitz	  and	  even	  Marxists	  such	  as	  Eric	  Hobsbawm	  and	  David	  Harvey)	  begin	  from	  idealist	  positions	  that	  neoliberal	  policies	  are	  the	  products	  of	  neoliberal	  ideas	  and	  think	  tanks.	  32	  Another	  way	  of	  conceiving	  ‘essentially	  contested	  concepts’	  is	  to	  think	  of	  them	  as	  ‘boundary	  concepts’	  (de	  Lucia	  2014)	  whose	  meaning	  is	  of	  vital	  importance	  because	  it	  informs	  possible	  actions	  that	  influence	  future	  trajectories	  (as	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  6,	  7	  and	  8).	  
	   47	  
alternatives to neoliberal globalisation that do actually exist and 
may yet be politically attainable. This logic of inevitabilism rests on 
deeply flawed arguments that mistake technological determinism for 
social explanation, and present recent politically and ideologically 
generated trends as deep inexorable structural changes. 
(Gills 1997, pp. 12 – 13) 
Also	  representative	  of	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  many	  critical	  theorists	  (for	  example,	  
Bieler	  &	  Morton	  2003;	  Cahill	  2014;	  Carroll	  &	  Jarvis	  2015;	  Cox	  with	  Sinclair	  1996),	  
Douglas	  (1997,	  pp.	  173	  –	  174)	  emphasises	  that	  it	  is	  only	  by	  critically	  interrogating	  the	  
meaning	  of	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘globalisation,’	  and	  arguing	  for	  alternative	  meanings,	  
that	  those	  concerned	  about	  their	  practical	  implications	  “…can	  guard	  against	  their	  
exclusive	  inclusion	  into	  the	  political	  projects	  of	  social	  groups	  of	  whatever	  kind.”	  With	  
respect	  to	  the	  ‘globalisation’	  phenomenon,	  Douglas	  (1997,	  p.	  174)	  points	  out	  that	  
“by	  internalising	  the	  discourse	  of	  ‘the	  global’,	  and	  its	  associated	  myths,	  we	  all	  
become	  ‘vectors’	  ensuring	  the	  transmission	  of	  the	  new	  normalcy.”	  One	  way	  of	  
avoiding	  the	  pitfall	  of	  becoming	  a	  ‘transmission	  vector’	  confirming	  the	  inevitability	  of	  
the	  status	  quo	  is	  to	  think	  of	  what	  is	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘neoliberal	  globalisation’	  as	  
being	  a	  process,	  a	  part	  of	  an	  incomplete	  project	  that	  manifests	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  
regulatory	  experiments	  which	  are	  path-­‐dependent	  and	  necessarily	  evolve	  “unevenly	  
across	  places,	  territories	  and	  scales”	  (Brenner,	  Peck	  &	  Theodore	  2010,	  p.	  331;	  see	  
also	  Peck	  2013)	  and	  are	  therefore	  open	  to	  contestation.	  Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  
(ibid.,	  p.	  329)	  usefully	  describe	  the	  neoliberalisation	  process	  as	  	  
…one among several tendencies of regulatory change that have 
been unleashed across the global capitalist system since the 1970s: 
it prioritizes market-based, market-oriented, or market-disciplinary 
responses to regulatory problems; it strives to intensify 
commodification in all realms of social life; and it often mobilizes 
speculative financial instruments to open up new areas for capitalist 
profit-making. 
Despite	  the	  difficulties	  of	  disentangling	  what	  has	  really	  changed	  from	  the	  
ideologically-­‐charged	  claims	  about	  what	  has	  changed	  in	  this	  current	  phase	  of	  
capitalist	  expansion	  (Cahill	  2014),	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  briefly	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
important	  empirically-­‐observable	  changes	  (the	  ‘what’)	  relevant	  to	  the	  issues	  being	  
analysed	  before	  discussing	  different	  views	  of	  both	  the	  origins	  of	  these	  changes	  (the	  
‘how’	  and	  ‘why’)	  and	  their	  possible	  implications	  for	  both	  the	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	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ecosocialist	  challenges	  to	  them.	  Even	  descriptive	  accounts	  are,	  however,	  biased:	  as	  
noted	  previously,	  the	  selection	  of	  ‘facts’	  to	  focus	  one’s	  attention	  on	  is	  itself	  a	  
subjective	  exercise.	  Given	  that	  ecosocialists	  aim	  to	  address	  the	  ecological,	  economic	  
and	  political	  crises	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  coherent,	  interlinked	  and	  social	  justice	  
framework,	  the	  ‘facts’	  of	  what	  has	  changed	  outlined	  below	  (and	  analysed	  in	  more	  
detail	  in	  Chapter	  4)	  are	  selected	  accordingly:	  I	  focus	  on	  those	  changes	  that	  transfer	  
more	  power	  from	  people	  living	  and	  working	  in	  specific	  places	  (the	  ‘local’)	  to	  global	  
elites	  comprising	  the	  transnational	  capitalist	  class	  (TCC)	  and	  its	  allies	  and	  institutions	  
(the	  ‘national’	  and	  the	  ‘global’).	  
Post-­‐1970s	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  and	  
their	  significance	  
Extensive	  modifications	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  global	  capitalist	  political	  economy	  
since	  the	  1970s	  are	  interconnected	  and	  include	  a	  great	  increase	  in	  global	  trade	  
facilitated	  by	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  and	  credit	  systems;	  the	  
deregulation	  of	  the	  finance	  industry	  (constituting	  what	  some	  theorists	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  
‘financialisation’	  of	  capitalism);	  the	  exponential	  increase	  of	  large	  transnational	  
corporations	  (TNCs)	  that	  have	  reorganised	  how	  and	  where	  goods	  are	  produced	  and	  
consumed;	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology	  among	  policy-­‐makers	  at	  both	  
the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  international	  level	  as	  well	  as	  more	  widely	  amongst	  the	  working	  
class;	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of,	  and	  connections	  between,	  powerful	  regional	  and	  
international	  institutions,	  regimes	  and	  trade	  treaties	  that	  implement	  neoliberal	  
economic	  policies;	  and	  finally	  (and	  relatedly),	  but	  most	  importantly,	  the	  rapidly	  
unfolding	  changes	  in	  the	  Earth	  System	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  global	  spread	  and	  
intensification	  of	  capitalist	  social	  relations	  of	  production,	  trade	  relations,	  and	  
consumption	  patterns.	  As	  noted	  previously,	  these	  changes	  and	  their	  
interrelationships	  are	  important	  to	  understand	  because	  they	  transfer	  more	  power	  to	  
global	  elites	  and	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  people	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  local	  interests	  
and	  the	  environment	  they	  live	  in	  at	  a	  time	  when	  it	  is	  more	  urgent	  than	  ever	  to	  avoid	  
further	  environmental	  damage.	  International	  economic	  governance	  institutions	  and	  
trade	  treaties	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  organisation	  and	  policing	  of	  this	  global	  spread	  
and	  intensification	  of	  capitalist	  social	  relations	  of	  production,	  and	  I	  begin	  my	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overview	  of	  the	  neoliberalising	  processes	  of	  global	  capital	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  major	  international	  economic	  institutions	  since	  their	  establishment	  
at	  Bretton	  Woods.	  
The	  expanding	  number	  and	  role	  of	  international	  economic	  
governance	  institutions,	  regional	  groupings	  and	  trade	  treaties	  
The	  creation	  of	  the	  WTO	  in	  1995	  is	  significant	  in	  that	  its	  replacement	  of	  the	  GATT	  
represents	  a	  further	  and	  deeper	  institutionalisation	  of	  liberal	  trade	  rules	  and	  also	  
because	  it	  has	  a	  greater	  capacity	  to	  enforce	  compliance	  through	  a	  formal	  and	  legally	  
binding	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanism	  (Higgott	  2010).33	  Whereas	  the	  GATT’s	  trade	  
dispute	  mechanism	  had	  required	  unanimous	  consent	  before	  recommendations	  of	  
the	  dispute	  panel	  could	  be	  adopted	  (a	  stipulation	  which	  meant	  its	  decisions	  could	  be	  
blocked),	  the	  WTO’s	  dispute	  settlement	  decisions	  can	  only	  be	  overturned	  if	  there	  is	  a	  
negative	  consensus,	  that	  is,	  if	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  WTO’s	  General	  Council	  agree	  to	  
overturn	  the	  decision	  (WTO	  2016a).	  O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  (2010,	  p.	  168)	  identify	  
three	  major	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  WTO	  has	  transformed	  the	  management	  of	  world	  
trade:	  it	  set	  up	  conditions	  for	  the	  deep	  (as	  opposed	  to	  previously	  shallow)	  
integration	  of	  trade	  liberalisation	  policies	  by	  shifting	  the	  focus	  from	  tariff	  
concessions	  to	  “domestic	  policies,	  institutional	  practices	  and	  regulations”;	  it	  acts	  as	  a	  
mechanism	  for	  expanding	  the	  multilateral	  trade	  agenda	  to	  include	  new	  issues	  such	  
as	  trade	  in	  services,	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  and	  investment	  measures;	  and	  it	  has	  
changed	  “the	  character	  of	  negotiations	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  bargaining	  over	  products	  to	  
negotiations	  over	  policies	  that	  shape	  the	  conditions	  of	  competition.”	  The	  overall	  
effects	  of	  these	  changes	  include	  the	  transfer	  of	  power	  from	  local	  and	  national	  
authorities	  to	  distant	  technocratic	  institutions	  that	  establish	  and	  enforce	  rules	  
favouring	  capital	  while	  sidelining	  the	  ability	  of	  citizens	  to	  hold	  their	  governments	  
accountable	  for	  the	  detrimental	  environmental,	  economic,	  and	  social	  effects	  of	  
these	  policies.	  
Using	  both	  ‘soft	  power’	  to	  influence	  behaviour	  and	  more	  overt,	  economic	  power	  to	  
demand	  policy	  change,	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  WTO,	  the	  IMF,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  All	  of	  the	  WTO’s	  interlocking	  legal	  agreements,	  including	  the	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Understanding,	  must	  be	  accepted	  as	  a	  package	  by	  member	  states	  (WTO	  2016a).	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World	  Bank,	  and	  the	  OECD	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  promoting	  and	  enforcing	  the	  
adoption	  of	  ‘free	  market’	  measures	  such	  as	  economic	  deregulation,	  privatisation,	  
and	  the	  implementation	  of	  austerity	  programs	  by	  governments	  who	  are	  required	  to	  
balance	  their	  national	  budgets	  while	  simultaneously	  providing	  optimum	  conditions	  
for	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  capital	  and	  trade	  (Keaney	  2014).	  According	  to	  the	  ‘Washington	  
Consensus,’	  such	  policies	  are	  the	  best	  route	  to	  follow	  to	  facilitate	  ‘economic	  growth’	  
and	  development	  (Beeson	  2010).34	  In	  addition	  to	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  WTO,	  the	  
IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  developing,	  promoting	  and	  implementing	  policies	  designed	  
to	  extend	  and	  deepen	  the	  global	  integration	  of	  national	  capitalist	  economies,	  an	  
increasing	  number	  of	  regional	  trade	  groupings	  and	  economic	  integration	  treaties	  
have	  also	  been	  established	  over	  the	  years	  (a	  process	  that	  is	  ongoing	  as	  new	  
groupings	  and	  treaties	  continue	  to	  be	  proposed	  and	  negotiated).	  Examples	  of	  such	  
treaties	  and	  groupings	  include	  the	  North	  American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA),	  
the	  Common	  Market	  of	  the	  South	  (MERCOSUR),	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU),	  Asia-­‐
Pacific	  Economic	  Cooperation	  (APEC)	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  Southeast	  Asian	  Nations	  
(ASEAN).	  These	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  trade	  
agreements	  have	  led	  to	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  changes	  in	  international	  
trading	  patterns,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  The	  changes	  in	  trading	  patterns	  
are	  significant	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  are	  used	  to	  transfer	  wealth	  
from	  workers	  and	  other	  subordinate	  classes	  to	  the	  wealthy,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  
are	  particularly	  harmful	  to	  the	  environment:	  increased	  competition	  between	  
corporations	  encourages	  environmentally	  damaging	  production	  methods	  in	  low-­‐
wage	  countries	  with	  weak	  environmental	  standards	  and	  also	  leads	  to	  increased	  GHG	  
emissions	  as	  component	  parts	  used	  in	  the	  cheapest-­‐possible	  production	  of	  goods	  are	  
transported	  vast	  distances	  using	  fossil	  fuel	  based	  transport	  systems,	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  “Originally	  coined	  by	  the	  American	  economist	  John	  Williamson	  (1994),	  the	  ‘Washington	  Consensus’	  referred	  to	  what	  Williamson	  called	  the	  ‘common	  core	  of	  wisdom	  embraced	  by	  all	  serious	  economists’,”	  including	  ‘free	  trade’	  policies	  facilitated	  by	  privatization,	  fiscal	  discipline,	  tax	  reform,	  interest	  rate	  liberalization	  and	  liberalization	  of	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  flows	  (Beeson	  2010,	  p.	  87).	  Given	  existing	  economic	  and	  power	  asymmetries,	  however,	  when	  considered	  at	  the	  interstate	  level	  free	  trade	  measures	  such	  as	  these	  benefit	  the	  stronger	  economic	  actors	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  national	  economies	  in	  both	  the	  Global	  South	  (states	  previously	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘developing’)	  and	  the	  Global	  North	  (states	  previously	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘developed’).	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finished	  goods	  also	  being	  transported	  across	  great	  distances	  to	  be	  sold	  in	  distant	  
locations.	  
The	  growth	  and	  changing	  nature	  of	  international	  trade	  
Not	  only	  has	  the	  volume	  of	  international	  trade	  grown	  more	  than	  fourfold	  between	  
1945	  and	  2007,	  clearly	  demonstrating	  the	  increasing	  interconnectedness	  of	  global	  
capitalist	  economic	  activities	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010,	  p.	  157),	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  
that	  trade	  has	  also	  changed	  fundamentally.	  A	  breakdown	  of	  what	  is	  traded	  
demonstrates	  the	  increasingly	  important	  role	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  the	  global	  
economy,	  with	  the	  volume	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  trading	  (buying	  and	  selling	  of	  
national	  currencies)	  increasing	  eightfold	  since	  1986,	  and	  “the	  amount	  of	  investment	  
capital	  seeking	  higher	  returns”	  increasing	  tenfold	  between	  1980	  and	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  
(Gilpin	  2001,	  p.	  6).	  This	  growth	  in	  financial	  trade	  indicates	  that	  much	  international	  
trade	  is	  now	  ‘decoupled’	  from,	  or	  only	  indirectly	  linked	  to,	  the	  ‘real	  economy’	  (the	  
production	  of	  new	  goods)	  (Cox	  2002),	  with	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  frequency	  
and	  global	  scope	  of	  financial	  crises.	  Similarly,	  Gilpin	  (2001,	  p.	  7)	  notes	  that	  “as	  many	  
of	  these	  financial	  flows	  are	  short-­‐term,	  highly	  volatile,	  and	  speculative,	  international	  
finance	  has	  become	  the	  most	  unstable	  aspect	  of	  the	  global	  capitalist	  economy.”35	  
Key	  to	  many	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  its	  inherent	  instability	  has	  
been	  the	  creation	  of	  several	  new	  ‘financial	  instruments’	  and	  ‘financial	  products,’	  the	  
development	  of	  which	  is	  facilitated	  by	  an	  IMS	  of	  floating	  exchange	  rates	  and	  the	  
deregulation	  of	  the	  finance	  industry	  (Gilpin	  2001)	  –	  key	  components	  of	  what	  Keaney	  
(2014)	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  ‘global	  neoliberal	  Social	  Structure	  of	  Accumulation	  (SSA)’.36	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  As	  the	  effects	  of	  global	  warming	  unfold,	  however,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  will	  replace	  the	  current	  dominant	  concern	  about	  financial	  stability.	  36	  Keaney	  (2014,	  p.	  45)	  defines	  Social	  Structures	  of	  Accumulation	  (SSAs)	  as	  “…the	  institutional	  ensembles	  that	  cohere	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  facilitate	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  orderly,	  profitable	  capital	  accumulation.”	  He	  proceeds	  to	  explain	  the	  origins	  of	  SSA	  theory	  as	  having	  “…	  first	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  questions	  surrounding	  the	  economic	  decline	  of	  the	  USA	  during	  the	  1970s.	  A	  previously	  successful	  model	  of	  growth	  that	  had	  delivered	  measurable,	  significant	  gains	  for	  the	  US	  working	  class	  had	  stagnated.	  Profit	  rates	  had	  fallen	  continuously	  since	  the	  1960s…”	  (Keaney	  2014,	  p.	  46).	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Changes	  to	  the	  International	  Monetary	  System	  (IMS)	  
The	  IMF	  (2016)	  identifies	  the	  key	  event	  signalling	  the	  gradual	  dissolution	  of	  the	  
Bretton	  Woods	  System	  (which	  it	  dates	  as	  occurring	  between	  1968	  and	  1973)	  as	  the	  
1971	  decoupling	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  US	  dollar	  from	  gold	  by	  US	  President	  Richard	  
Nixon,	  which	  US	  policymakers	  saw	  as	  necessary	  because	  government	  debt	  exceeded	  
gold	  reserves	  (Gilpin	  1975;	  O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).37	  The	  effect	  of	  this	  decoupling	  
was	  to	  shift	  the	  IMS	  from	  fixed	  to	  floating	  exchange	  rates.	  One	  implication	  of	  a	  
global	  financial	  system	  based	  on	  floating	  exchange	  rates	  is	  that,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
deregulated	  financial	  sector,	  it	  adds	  volatility	  to	  the	  global	  capitalist	  system	  by	  
allowing	  financial	  traders	  to	  speculate	  in	  currency	  trades	  through	  the	  ‘Euro-­‐currency	  
markets’	  by	  selling	  currencies	  they	  believe	  will	  decline	  in	  value	  and	  then	  buying	  them	  
back	  when	  they	  are	  cheaper,	  thus	  making	  a	  profit	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).38	  But	  
the	  finance	  industry	  also	  expanded	  beyond	  currency	  trading	  in	  this	  period,	  a	  
development	  that	  could	  not	  have	  occurred	  without	  the	  deregulation	  of	  finance	  and	  
the	  creation	  of	  new	  financial	  instruments.	  
Deregulation	  of	  the	  finance	  sector	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  
financial	  instruments	  
While	  financial	  operators	  devised	  instruments	  such	  as	  Euro-­‐currency	  markets	  to	  
avoid	  regulation	  of	  their	  economic	  activities,	  governments	  themselves	  also	  adopted	  
policies	  that	  dismantled	  existing	  financial	  regulatory	  systems	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  
‘capital	  mobility’	  -­‐	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  across	  national	  borders	  (Keaney	  
2014;	  Lucarelli	  2012).	  The	  US	  government	  eliminated	  capital	  controls	  in	  1974	  and	  
the	  UK	  in	  1979,	  and	  further	  deregulation	  of	  the	  finance	  industry	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  1986	  
dismantled	  regulations	  that	  prevented	  banks,	  stockbroking	  firms	  and	  insurance	  
companies	  from	  competing	  in	  each	  other’s	  industries	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  (2010)	  attribute	  the	  decision	  of	  US	  policymakers	  to	  decouple	  the	  dollar	  from	  gold	  to	  the	  refusal	  of	  the	  governments	  of	  some	  of	  the	  European	  states	  and	  Japan	  to	  revalue	  their	  currencies	  against	  the	  dollar,	  which	  enabled	  their	  industries	  to	  gain	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  over	  US	  industries.	  38	  The	  so-­‐called	  ‘Euro-­‐currency	  markets’	  are	  an	  important	  financial	  innovation	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  1950s	  but	  gaining	  increasing	  importance	  in	  the	  1980s;	  O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  (2010)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  term	  ‘Euro-­‐currency’	  is,	  however,	  misleading	  as	  the	  trading	  does	  not	  only	  involve	  European	  currencies	  but	  any	  currency	  other	  than	  that	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  the	  transaction	  is	  occurring.	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These	  policies	  encouraged	  risky	  financial	  practices	  that	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	  financial	  
crises	  in	  the	  UK:	  the	  stock	  market	  crash	  in	  1987	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  housing	  
market	  (which	  had	  been	  fuelled	  by	  an	  expansion	  in	  credit)	  and	  a	  recession	  in	  1988	  
(O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).	  Despite	  the	  patently	  negative	  outcomes	  for	  the	  victims	  of	  
such	  economic	  catastrophes,	  global	  financial	  deregulation	  accelerated	  in	  the	  1990s	  
(Keaney	  2014),	  with	  an	  important	  example	  being	  the	  1999	  repeal	  of	  the	  US	  Glass-­‐
Steagall	  Act	  that	  had	  been	  enacted	  during	  the	  1930s	  depression	  to	  reduce	  the	  
financial	  risks	  associated	  with	  lending	  by	  separating	  investment	  and	  commercial	  
banking	  (Lucarelli	  2012).	  Advances	  in	  ICTs	  that	  facilitate	  near-­‐instantaneous	  24-­‐hour	  
global	  financial	  transactions	  have	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  of	  
global	  financial	  transactions,	  also	  adding	  to	  the	  volatility	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  
arising	  from	  financial	  deregulation	  (Douglas	  1997).	  Moreover,	  the	  deregulation	  of	  
the	  financial	  sector	  encouraged	  the	  creation	  of	  complex	  new	  ‘financial	  instruments’	  
such	  as	  ‘derivatives’	  (for	  example,	  ‘futures’	  and	  ‘options’),	  which	  were	  ostensibly	  
designed	  to	  reduce	  financial	  risks	  for	  producers	  and	  investors	  arising	  from	  price	  and	  
exchange	  rate	  fluctuations	  but	  which	  have	  increasingly	  been	  used	  by	  financial	  
speculators	  to	  make	  money	  by	  betting	  on	  the	  value	  of	  commodities	  and	  currencies	  
at	  some	  time	  in	  the	  future	  (Lucarelli	  2012).39	  
In	  general,	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  complex	  new	  ‘financial	  products’	  are	  traded	  
overwhelmingly	  favour	  financial	  speculation:	  these	  ‘products’	  can,	  for	  example,	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  “The	  term	  ‘derivative’	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  array	  of	  financial	  instruments	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  more	  basic	  financial	  instruments.	  Carneiro	  et	  al.	  (2015,	  p.	  644)	  demonstrate	  that	  even	  definitions	  of	  derivatives	  are	  ‘essentially	  contested,’	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  standard	  textbook	  definition	  of	  derivatives	  as	  “…financial	  contracts	  that	  establish	  future	  payments,	  whose	  value	  derives	  from	  an	  asset,	  financial	  instrument,	  or	  event	  occurrence”	  can	  be	  “…misleading	  as	  it	  suggests	  a	  causality	  that	  is	  not	  always	  true,	  
i.e.,	  it	  proposes	  that	  the	  price	  formation	  of	  derivative	  contracts	  depends	  on	  prices	  in	  the	  spot	  market.”	  The	  two	  most	  common	  forms	  of	  derivative	  are	  futures	  and	  options,	  which	  are	  derived	  or	  ‘spun	  off’	  from	  stocks	  or	  bonds	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010,	  p.	  230).	  Financial	  deregulation	  resulted	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  several	  additional,	  exotic	  derivatives,	  including	  the	  ‘collateralized	  debt	  obligations’	  used	  by	  commercial	  banks	  to	  maintain	  nominally	  ‘healthy’	  balance	  sheets	  that	  did	  not	  show	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  leverage	  after	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  Glass-­‐Steagall	  Act	  enabled	  them	  to	  extend	  their	  lending	  to	  unsecuritized	  mortgages.	  The	  deregulation	  of	  the	  finance	  sector	  also	  allowed	  investment	  banks	  to	  create	  ‘credit	  default	  swaps,’	  which	  became	  instruments	  of	  financial	  speculation	  and	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  ‘contagion’	  of	  the	  entire	  global	  economy	  in	  2007/8	  when	  the	  US	  housing	  bubble	  led	  to	  the	  imminent	  collapse	  of	  the	  US	  banking	  system	  (Helleiner	  &	  Pagliari	  2009;	  Lucarelli	  2012;	  White	  2009).	  
	   54	  
bought	  ‘on	  margin,’	  with	  buyers	  paying	  only	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  purchase	  price	  as	  a	  
down-­‐payment	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams,	  2010).	  In	  addition,	  purchasers	  of	  commodity	  
stocks	  and	  bonds	  can	  back	  out	  of	  the	  purchase	  if	  the	  price	  of	  the	  commodity	  goes	  
down,	  losing	  only	  their	  fee,	  but	  they	  can	  buy	  the	  commodity	  if	  the	  price	  goes	  up	  and	  
then	  sell	  it	  for	  a	  profit	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams,	  2010).	  Under	  conditions	  so	  favourable	  to	  
finance	  capital,	  financial	  traders	  can	  make	  large	  profits	  without	  paying	  for	  the	  
product	  they	  are	  purchasing	  when	  they	  buy	  it.	  The	  risk	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  global	  
financial	  system	  presented	  by	  these	  new	  financial	  instruments	  increased	  in	  the	  
1990s	  and	  in	  the	  early	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  large	  financial	  
players	  such	  as	  hedge	  funds,	  credit	  ratings	  agencies	  and	  institutional	  investors	  
(Lucarelli	  2012),	  and	  these	  agents	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  2007/8	  GFC	  that	  lead	  to	  
many	  people	  losing	  not	  only	  their	  homes	  but	  also	  their	  savings	  (as	  discussed	  in	  more	  
detail	  in	  Chapter	  4).	  	  
New	  financial	  players	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy:	  Hedge	  
funds,	  credit	  ratings	  agencies	  and	  institutional	  investors	  
Hedge	  funds	  are	  financial	  companies	  not	  subject	  to	  government	  regulations	  that	  buy	  
and	  sell	  complex	  combinations	  of	  products	  over	  short	  and	  long	  time	  frames.	  Hedge	  
funds	  have	  come	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  financial	  crises	  because	  they	  buy	  
‘short’	  with	  very	  little	  capital	  and	  are	  prone	  to	  making	  large	  losses	  of	  borrowed	  
money	  if	  the	  future	  stock	  values	  they	  trade	  in	  do	  not	  fall	  (Helleiner	  &	  Pagliari	  
2009).40	  Credit	  ratings	  agencies	  such	  as	  Moody’s,	  Standard	  &	  Poor’s	  and	  Fitch	  also	  
contribute	  to	  instability	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  system	  by	  providing	  information	  to	  
investors	  about	  profit-­‐making	  opportunities	  in	  different	  countries,	  thus	  exerting	  
great	  influence	  over	  capital	  flows	  (Burchill	  &	  Linklater	  2013;	  Helleiner	  &	  Pagliari	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  “Buying	  ‘short’	  positions	  involves	  borrowing	  a	  stock	  from	  its	  owner	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  stock	  is	  initially	  sold	  and	  then	  bought	  at	  a	  future	  date	  and	  returned	  to	  the	  owner.	  If	  the	  value	  of	  the	  stock	  falls	  during	  this	  period,	  the	  hedge	  fund	  makes	  money	  because	  it	  sold	  the	  stock	  when	  it	  was	  high	  and	  bought	  it	  back	  when	  it	  dropped	  in	  value.	  A	  ‘short’	  position	  is	  taken	  when	  one	  believes	  the	  value	  of	  the	  asset	  (oil,	  currencies)	  will	  fall	  over	  time.	  The	  profit	  is	  usually	  invested	  in	  a	  long	  position	  or	  an	  asset	  whose	  value	  will	  increase	  over	  time”	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010,	  p.	  232).	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2009;	  White	  2009).41	  The	  negative	  outcomes	  of	  financial	  crises	  on	  ordinary	  people’s	  
lives	  that	  result	  from	  the	  actions	  of	  such	  financial	  institutions	  go	  well	  beyond	  their	  
effects	  on	  the	  real	  economy	  (with	  increases	  in	  unemployment):	  since	  the	  1990s,	  
workers	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  have	  been	  forced	  by	  their	  
governments	  to	  hand	  part	  of	  their	  wages	  over	  to	  pension	  funds,	  which	  are	  
institutional	  investors	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010),	  with	  the	  result	  that	  ordinary	  
working	  people	  are	  forced	  to	  bear	  the	  losses	  when	  stock	  market	  ‘players’	  gamble	  
with	  their	  savings.	  Processes	  locking	  workers	  into	  the	  unstable	  global	  financial	  
system	  were	  also	  reinforced	  in	  the	  1990s	  when	  governments	  scaled	  back	  on	  state	  
pensions,	  forcing	  people	  to	  invest	  their	  money	  (usually	  in	  the	  stock	  market)	  in	  order	  
to	  save	  for	  their	  retirement.	  Financial	  crises	  destroy	  the	  value	  of	  these	  inadvertent	  
‘mom	  and	  pop’	  “stock	  market	  players’”	  savings	  and	  pensions	  as	  financial	  speculators	  
who	  have	  nothing	  to	  lose	  gamble	  with	  their	  savings	  (Peck,	  Theodore	  &	  Brenner	  
2009).	  While	  these	  new	  features	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  system	  effectively	  lead	  to	  
financial	  speculation	  and	  the	  increasing	  decoupling	  of	  much	  international	  trade	  from	  
production,	  they	  also	  facilitate	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  TNCs	  that	  
manage	  a	  growing	  proportion	  of	  the	  global	  production	  of	  commodities	  so	  that	  these	  
firms	  have	  become	  increasingly	  important	  players	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy,	  
with	  disastrous	  results	  for	  the	  environment	  and	  for	  workers	  in	  both	  the	  Global	  North	  
(who	  lose	  their	  jobs)	  and	  the	  Global	  South	  (who	  are	  intensively	  exploited).	  	  
The	  role	  of	  transnational	  corporations	  in	  the	  global	  political	  
economy	  
By	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  TNCs	  “account[ed]	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
global	  production	  structure	  and	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  world	  trade”	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  
2010,	  p.	  141).42	  Their	  size	  and	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  give	  TNCs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  White	  (2009,	  p.	  396)	  maintains	  that	  “It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  credit	  rating	  agencies	  were	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  subprime	  debacle”	  that	  led	  to	  the	  2007	  ‘housing	  bubble’	  and	  the	  2007/8	  GFC.	  42	  While	  many	  writers	  use	  the	  terms	  multinational	  corporations	  (MNCs),	  transnational	  corporations	  (TNCs)	  and	  global	  corporations	  interchangeably,	  O’Brien	  and	  Williams	  (2010,	  p.	  188)	  suggest	  that	  the	  term	  TNC	  “more	  accurately	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  firms	  are	  usually	  owned	  and	  controlled	  by	  the	  nationals	  of	  one	  country	  and	  enter	  into	  direct	  production	  activities	  abroad.”	  Some	  writers,	  however,	  prefer	  the	  term	  ‘global	  corporations’	  as	  it	  “reflects	  the	  impact	  of	  their	  activities”	  Most	  analysts	  agree	  that	  TNCs	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great	  bargaining	  power	  in	  their	  dealings	  with	  the	  governments	  of	  particular	  states	  
because	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  implications	  of	  their	  investment	  decisions	  
(UNCTAD	  2016).	  While	  increasing	  competition	  resulting	  from	  innovations	  in	  
production	  and	  ICT	  both	  facilitates	  and	  drives	  the	  global	  expansion	  of	  TNCs,	  the	  
adoption	  of	  several	  policies	  by	  governments	  and	  inter-­‐governmental	  bodies	  are	  also	  
crucial	  factors	  in	  their	  growth	  (demonstrating	  that	  the	  ‘free	  market’	  can	  only	  exist	  if	  
it	  is	  actively	  created	  by	  people	  in	  positions	  of	  power).	  For	  example,	  governments’	  
and	  national	  policymakers’	  actions	  leading	  to	  the	  deregulation	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  
system	  facilitated	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI),	  and	  the	  
creation	  of	  new	  financial	  instruments	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  made	  this	  capital	  more	  
readily	  accessible	  by	  TNCs	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).43	  Binding	  bilateral,	  multilateral	  
and	  international	  trade	  agreements	  negotiated	  by	  policymakers	  on	  behalf	  of	  
powerful	  financial	  actors	  such	  as	  TNCs	  also	  establish	  a	  wider	  context	  facilitating	  the	  
global	  reach	  of	  such	  firms.	  
The	  governments	  of	  many	  developing	  countries	  facilitate	  the	  expansion	  of	  TNCs	  by	  
instituting	  measures	  to	  attract	  foreign	  investment:	  for	  example,	  by	  establishing	  
export	  processing	  zones	  with	  low	  labour	  and	  environmental	  standards	  and	  taxation	  
laws	  attractive	  to	  capital	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  
widespread	  practice	  of	  ‘off-­‐shoring,’	  with	  TNCs	  shifting	  their	  production	  activities	  
away	  from	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  states’	  territories	  (with	  the	  resultant	  
deindustrialisation	  generating	  unemployment)	  to	  low-­‐wage,	  low-­‐tax	  territories	  that	  
also	  offer	  the	  advantage	  of	  providing	  opportunities	  for	  the	  TNCs	  based	  there	  to	  
more	  easily	  access	  new	  markets.	  Many	  TNCs	  have,	  moreover,	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  
their	  core	  activities,	  outsourcing	  manufacturing	  to	  global	  contractors	  while	  retaining	  
control	  over	  research	  and	  development	  and	  marketing	  functions	  (Starosta	  2010).	  In	  
addition	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  such	  practices	  contribute	  to	  increased	  environmental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (or	  MNCs/global	  corporations)	  are	  defined	  as	  firms	  “with	  production	  facilities	  in	  two	  or	  more	  countries”	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010,	  p.	  189).	  	  43	  “Foreign	  direct	  investment	  refers	  to	  investment	  made	  outside	  the	  home	  country	  of	  the	  investing	  company	  in	  which	  control	  over	  the	  resources	  transferred	  remains	  with	  the	  investor.	  It	  consists	  of	  a	  package	  of	  assets	  and	  intermediate	  goods	  such	  as	  capital,	  technology,	  management	  skills,	  access	  to	  markets	  and	  entrepreneurship”	  (O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010,	  p.	  187).	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degradation	  and	  GHG	  emissions,	  they	  have	  also	  ‘freed’	  TNCs	  from	  the	  need	  to	  re-­‐
invest	  profits	  into	  production,	  a	  development	  that	  coincides	  with	  “changes	  in	  
corporate	  governance	  that	  tie	  managerial	  decision-­‐making	  more	  closely	  to	  
shareholder	  interests	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  stakeholders,	  arguably	  weakening	  the	  
commitment	  of	  financial	  resources	  to	  longer	  investment	  horizons	  and	  biasing	  
investment	  patterns	  towards	  sectors	  and	  activities	  that	  promise	  quick	  returns”	  
(UNCTAD	  2016,	  p.	  140).	  In	  short,	  the	  ‘profit-­‐investment	  nexus’	  is	  weakening:	  while	  
shareholder	  profits	  rise,	  these	  gains	  are	  not	  translated	  into	  productive	  investment	  
and	  the	  creation	  of	  jobs	  (UNCTAD	  2016).	  
While	  TNCs	  take	  advantage	  of	  these	  conditions	  to	  maximize	  their	  profits,	  they	  also	  
use	  intra-­‐firm	  trade	  as	  an	  important	  tool	  for	  cutting	  their	  costs	  (and	  thus	  increasing	  
their	  profit	  margins	  even	  more).44	  Intra-­‐firm	  trade	  benefits	  TNCs	  by	  providing	  them	  
with	  a	  pricing	  tool	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  hide	  real	  profits	  and	  thereby	  minimize	  their	  
taxation	  costs,	  a	  legal	  profit-­‐maximising	  strategy	  known	  as	  ‘tax	  avoidance’	  that	  is	  
justified	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  firms	  have	  a	  “fiduciary	  duty	  to	  maximise	  shareholder	  
value”	  (UNCTAD	  2016).	  TNCs	  are	  also	  able	  to	  profit	  from	  decreasing	  their	  tax	  bills	  by	  
establishing	  their	  headquarters	  in	  ‘tax	  havens’	  (Oxfam	  Australia	  2016;	  UNCTAD	  
2016).	  While	  benefiting	  corporate	  Chief	  Executive	  Officers	  (CEOs)	  with	  higher	  
salaries	  and	  shareholders	  with	  higher	  dividends,	  TNC	  tax-­‐minimising	  and	  tax-­‐
avoidance	  tactics	  have	  serious	  social	  implications	  as	  the	  lost	  revenues	  adversely	  
affects	  the	  ability	  of	  governments	  to	  fund	  social	  programmes	  (UNCTAD	  2016).	  While	  
the	  many	  environmental,	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  crises	  generated	  by	  global	  
economic	  neoliberalisation	  processes	  such	  as	  these	  are	  critically	  analysed	  in	  detail	  in	  
Chapter	  4,	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  these	  crises	  is	  provided	  below.	  
Overview	  of	  the	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  outcomes	  and	  
implications	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  global	  capitalism	  
Loss	  of	  tax	  revenue	  to	  fund	  social	  projects	  is	  only	  one	  of	  the	  socially	  harmful	  effects	  
of	  global	  capital	  accumulation	  strategies	  such	  as	  tax	  avoidance	  and	  tax	  evasion.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  later	  chapters,	  the	  capital	  accumulation	  strategies	  referred	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Intra-­‐firm	  trade	  refers	  to	  the	  practices	  whereby,	  through	  various	  mechanisms,	  firms	  conduct	  their	  trade	  internally	  (within	  their	  own	  firm)	  rather	  than	  with	  other	  companies.	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above	  generate	  several	  other	  ecological,	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  crises,	  the	  
most	  important	  of	  which	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  increase	  in	  GHG	  emissions	  that	  accompany	  
the	  intensification	  and	  extension	  of	  global	  capitalism.	  Other	  problems	  that	  the	  global	  
expansion	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  lead	  to	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  
economies	  (often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Global	  North’	  in	  the	  literature)	  include	  rising	  
unemployment	  and	  underemployment	  with	  the	  increasing	  casualisation	  of	  work;	  
wage	  stagnation;	  rising	  inequality;	  diminishing	  access	  to	  essential	  services	  such	  as	  
quality	  and	  affordable	  healthcare	  and	  education;	  and	  feelings	  of	  political	  
powerlessness	  as	  governments	  and	  policymakers	  claim	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  take	  
action	  to	  protect	  their	  citizens	  against	  the	  ‘juggernauts’	  of	  large	  corporations,	  
finance	  capital	  and	  the	  dictates	  of	  large	  international	  institutions	  and	  trade	  
agreements	  (Cronin	  2013;	  Harvey	  2010;	  UNCTAD	  2016).	  These	  capital	  accumulation	  
strategies	  simultaneously	  generate	  many	  crises	  for	  populations	  living	  in	  the	  Global	  
South	  (the	  so-­‐called	  ‘developing’	  world),	  including	  poverty	  and	  rising	  inequality	  
(UNCTAD	  2016);	  land-­‐grabbing	  and	  the	  concomitant	  displacement	  of	  subsistence	  
farmers	  and	  fisher-­‐people	  from	  their	  means	  of	  reproduction	  (Fairhead,	  Leach,	  &	  
Scoones	  2012);	  the	  displacement	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  from	  their	  lands,	  where	  they	  
have	  subsisted	  sustainably	  and	  protected	  their	  environments	  for	  centuries	  
(Dell’Angelo,	  D’Odorico,	  Rulli,	  &	  Marchand	  2017);	  freshwater	  scarcity	  caused	  by	  
climate	  change	  (UNEP	  2015)	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  capitalist	  methods	  of	  food	  
production	  (Ahlers	  2010);	  and	  conflicts	  related	  to	  the	  strategic	  interests	  of	  the	  US	  
and	  its	  allies	  (Burke-­‐White	  2014;	  Hudson	  2016;	  Morton	  2016).	  In	  addition,	  and	  more	  
importantly	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  project,	  these	  capital	  accumulation	  
strategies	  also	  lead	  to	  a	  plethora	  of	  very	  serious	  global	  ecological	  problems.	  	  
Overview	  of	  the	  ecological	  implications	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  
global	  capitalism	  
The	  expansion	  of	  capitalism,	  and	  its	  drive	  for	  ever-­‐increasing	  ‘economic	  growth’	  that	  
defines	  it	  as	  a	  system	  of	  exploitative	  social	  relations	  of	  production,	  comes	  at	  a	  great	  
cost	  as	  environmentally	  damaging	  production	  and	  transportation	  methods	  
contaminate	  more	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  and	  unsustainable	  consumption	  patterns	  are	  
encouraged	  both	  in	  the	  Global	  North	  and	  in	  the	  ‘developing’	  economies	  of	  the	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Global	  South	  (Williams	  1996).	  Scientists	  warn	  that	  the	  environmental	  consequences	  
of	  these	  and	  other	  damaging	  practices	  risk	  making	  the	  planet	  uninhabitable	  as	  
serious	  environmental	  degradation	  threatens	  the	  viability	  of	  major	  ecosystems	  and	  
of	  the	  entire	  biosphere	  within	  which	  humans	  are	  embedded	  (Steffen	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  
Environmental	  destruction	  takes	  many	  forms,	  but	  scientists	  working	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  
discipline	  areas	  agree	  that	  the	  most	  urgent	  current	  symptoms	  of	  the	  many	  
interlinked	  environmental	  crises	  are	  the	  global	  warming,	  climate	  change	  and	  ocean	  
acidification	  resulting	  from	  historical	  and	  ongoing	  anthropogenic	  GHG	  emissions.45	  
As	  prominent	  climate	  activist	  Naomi	  Klein	  (2014,	  p.	  18)	  observes:	  
…it is our great collective misfortune that the scientific community 
made its decisive diagnosis of the climate threat at the precise 
moment when … elites were enjoying more unfettered political, 
cultural, and intellectual power than at any point since the 1920s.46 
Indeed, governments and scientists began talking seriously about 
radical cuts to greenhouse gas emissions in 1988 – the exact year 
that marked the dawning of what came to be called ‘globalization,’ 
with the signing of the agreement representing the world’s largest 
bilateral trade relationship between Canada and the United States, 
later to be expanded into the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) with the inclusion of Mexico. 
In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  need	  to	  take	  decisive,	  immediate	  and	  effective	  action	  to	  
maintain	  a	  habitable	  biosphere,	  the	  neoliberalising	  policies	  implemented	  over	  the	  
past	  five	  decades	  that	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  global	  expansion	  of	  capitalism	  present	  an	  
additional	  challenge:	  they	  have	  been	  accompanied	  by	  equally	  important	  socio-­‐
cultural	  changes	  that	  destroy	  communities	  and	  social	  solidarity	  and	  promote	  
individualism	  (Dunford	  2000)	  and	  environmentally	  unsustainable	  consumerism.	  
The	  individualistic	  ideology	  that	  permeates	  western	  (and	  ‘westernised’)	  societies	  is	  
particularly	  significant	  as	  it	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  those	  arguing	  for	  change	  to	  
organise	  the	  collective	  action	  needed	  to	  address	  the	  serious	  ecological,	  economic	  
and	  socio-­‐political	  crises	  accompanying	  the	  continuing	  implementation	  of	  the	  
neoliberal	  globalisation	  project,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  6.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Because	  climate	  change	  is	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  ecosocialist	  theorising	  and	  activity,	  it	  is	  discussed	  in	  great	  detail	  in	  later	  chapters	  and	  is	  only	  briefly	  mentioned	  at	  this	  point.	  46	  The	  immense	  increase	  of	  global	  elites’	  economic	  power	  should	  be	  added	  to	  this	  list.	  [This	  footnote	  has	  been	  added	  by	  the	  author	  of	  this	  dissertation;	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  original	  quotation.]	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neo-­‐Gramscian	  theoretical	  perspective,	  developed	  by	  Robert	  Cox	  (1981,	  1983,	  1987)	  
and	  then	  refined	  by	  Timothy	  Sinclair	  (2016)	  and	  modified	  in	  this	  dissertation	  to	  take	  
the	  biosphere	  into	  account,	  provides	  a	  useful	  framework	  for	  evaluating	  both	  the	  
material	  and	  the	  ideological	  constraints	  within	  which	  ecosocialists	  and	  the	  wider	  
global	  justice	  movement	  actors	  are	  working	  to	  effect	  this	  change,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
opportunities	  the	  interlinked	  global	  crises	  (and	  particularly	  the	  global	  warming	  crisis)	  
present	  for	  a	  deeply	  transformational	  change.	  The	  need	  for	  social	  science	  
perspectives	  that	  can	  incorporate	  ecological	  struggles	  in	  this	  new	  age	  of	  the	  
Anthropocene	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  as	  are	  the	  key	  features	  of	  the	  
neo-­‐Gramscian	  and	  Marxist	  Gramscian	  perspectives	  used	  as	  analytical	  tools	  in	  this	  
dissertation.	  
	   61	  
Chapter	  Three:	  Theoretical	  perspective:	  The	  Method	  of	  
Historical	  Structures	  Redux	  II	  
“The social sciences taught in our universities – including those that 
‘take the environment into account’ – must now be regarded as 
Holocene disciplines. The process of reinventing them – so that 
what is taught in arts faculties is true to what has emerged in science 
faculties – will be a sustained and arduous intellectual enterprise.” 
(Hamilton 2017, p. 129). 
Having	  outlined	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  and	  processes	  defining	  the	  global	  
political	  economy	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  explain	  why	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  
theoretical	  perspective	  provides	  the	  most	  appropriate	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  analyse	  
the	  interrelated	  ecological,	  economic,	  and	  socio-­‐political	  crises	  generated	  by	  global	  
capitalism	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  that	  ecosocialists,	  as	  actors	  in	  a	  wider	  social	  movement	  
engaged	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change,	  play	  in	  trying	  to	  address	  these	  crises.	  The	  
neo-­‐Gramscian	  analytical	  framework	  was	  originally	  developed	  by	  Robert	  Cox	  in	  the	  
1980s	  and	  then	  refined	  by	  Timothy	  Sinclair	  thirty-­‐five	  years	  later.	  As	  I	  note	  in	  
Chapter	  2,	  I	  have	  introduced	  another	  modification	  to	  Sinclair’s	  adapted	  framework	  
so	  that	  it	  can	  more	  readily	  meet	  the	  analytical	  challenges	  presented	  not	  only	  by	  this	  
research	  project	  but	  also	  by	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Anthropocene.	  Once	  the	  key	  features	  of	  
the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  analytical	  framework	  and	  its	  modifications	  are	  described,	  I	  briefly	  
discuss	  the	  meanings	  of	  Gramscian	  concepts	  that	  are	  deployed	  in	  later	  chapters	  to	  
critically	  analyse	  the	  current	  balance	  of	  natural	  and	  social	  forces	  in	  the	  
Anthropocene	  epoch’s	  global	  political	  economy,	  which	  is	  embedded	  in	  and	  
dynamically	  related	  to	  the	  Biosphere	  in	  my	  modified	  analytical	  framework.47	  I	  begin	  
the	  overview	  of	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  GPE	  perspective	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  theory	  and	  practice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Initially	  developed	  by	  Italian	  Marxist	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	  the	  meanings	  of	  these	  Gramscian	  terms	  are	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  sources,	  including	  primary	  texts	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  English	  translation	  of	  Gramsci’s	  work	  itself	  (Forgacs	  2000);	  Cox’s	  writings;	  the	  work	  of	  contemporary	  Gramscian	  scholars	  such	  as	  Adam	  Morton	  (2007),	  Peter	  Thomas	  (2013b)	  and	  Mark	  Rupert	  (2005);	  and	  theoretical	  interpretations	  of	  social	  movement	  activist-­‐scholars	  such	  as	  William	  Carroll	  (2010).	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The	  role	  of	  theory	  in	  informing	  practice	  	  
The	  role	  that	  theory	  plays	  in	  understanding	  and	  acting	  in	  the	  world	  relates	  to	  the	  
issue	  of	  essentially	  contested	  concepts	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  and	  was	  also	  a	  crucial	  
issue	  in	  the	  social	  science	  debates	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  that	  led	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  GPE	  perspectives	  (Palan	  2000).	  As	  many	  academics	  point	  out,	  while	  
‘facts’	  are	  defined	  as	  information	  about	  the	  real	  world,	  theorists	  select	  which	  facts	  
they	  consider	  significant	  enough	  to	  focus	  their	  analyses	  on,	  and	  their	  interpretations	  
of	  the	  facts	  and	  of	  the	  interrelationships	  between	  those	  facts	  are	  informed	  by	  the	  
theoretical	  perspectives	  they	  adopt	  (Burchill	  &	  Linklater	  2013;	  Cox	  with	  Sinclair	  
1996;	  O’Brien	  &	  Williams	  2010).	  Furthermore,	  no	  theory	  is	  value-­‐free;	  as	  Robert	  Cox	  
succinctly	  puts	  it,	  “Theory	  is	  always	  for	  someone	  and	  for	  some	  purpose”	  (Cox	  1996b,	  
p.	  87).48	  Also	  important	  (and	  not	  always	  acknowledged)	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  theories	  
are	  historically	  grounded:	  theoretical	  perspectives	  develop	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
specific	  “social	  and	  political	  time	  and	  space”	  (Cox	  1996b).	  Theories	  claiming	  to	  be	  
objective	  and	  universal	  should	  therefore	  always	  be	  closely	  examined	  because	  such	  
claims	  to	  neutrality	  and	  timelessness	  hide	  the	  existence	  of	  concealed	  ideological	  
perspectives,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  ‘neutrality’	  of	  these	  theories	  are	  
aware	  of	  this	  (Cox	  1996b,	  p.	  87).	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  different	  theories	  
can	  be	  classified,	  but	  a	  broad	  categorisation	  central	  to	  Cox’s	  work,	  which	  relates	  to	  
the	  issue	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  all	  theory	  is	  “for	  someone	  and	  for	  some	  purpose,”	  is	  
the	  distinction	  he	  makes	  between	  ‘problem-­‐solving	  theory’	  and	  ‘critical	  theory.’	  	  A	  
brief	  discussion	  of	  this	  broad	  categorisation	  will	  help	  to	  contextualise	  both	  my	  own	  
decision	  to	  use	  a	  critical	  approach	  in	  this	  research	  project	  and	  the	  positions	  that	  
ecosocialists	  and	  other	  actors	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  and	  the	  global	  justice	  
movement	  adopt	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  different	  possible	  approaches	  to	  addressing	  climate	  
change	  and	  social	  injustice.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Halliday	  (1994),	  cited	  in	  Burchill	  and	  Linklater	  (2013,	  p.	  17),	  makes	  the	  observation	  that	  “…	  no	  human	  agent	  …	  whether	  academic	  or	  not,	  can	  rest	  content	  with	  facts	  alone:	  all	  social	  activity	  involves	  moral	  questions,	  of	  right	  and	  wrong,	  and	  these	  can,	  by	  definition,	  not	  be	  decided	  by	  facts.”	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Problem-­‐solving	  theory	  and	  critical	  theory	  
In	  Cox’s	  (1981)	  categorisation,	  while	  problem-­‐solving	  theory	  focuses	  on	  solving	  
specific	  problems,	  its	  underlying	  ideology	  is	  that	  it	  supports	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  aims	  
to	  make	  the	  existing	  system	  work	  more	  smoothly	  rather	  than	  question	  it	  or	  
fundamentally	  change	  it.	  Critical	  theory,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  questions	  the	  status	  
quo:	  “it	  stands	  apart	  from	  the	  prevailing	  order	  of	  the	  world	  and	  asks	  how	  that	  order	  
came	  about”	  (Cox	  1996b,	  p.	  88).	  Unlike	  problem-­‐solving	  theory,	  which	  addresses	  
discrete	  issues,	  “critical	  theory	  is	  directed	  to	  the	  social	  and	  political	  complex	  as	  a	  
whole….	  [and]	  leads	  toward	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  larger	  picture	  of	  the	  whole”	  even	  if	  
it	  begins,	  like	  problem-­‐solving	  theory,	  by	  analysing	  one	  of	  the	  components	  of	  the	  
whole	  (Cox	  with	  Sinclair	  1996,	  p.	  89).	  Summarising	  the	  hidden	  ideology	  informing	  
traditional	  problem-­‐solving	  theory,	  Cox	  (1996b,	  pp.	  89	  –	  90)	  states:	  
…the purpose served by problem-solving theory is conservative, 
since it aims to solve the problems arising in various parts of a 
complex whole in order to smooth the functioning of the whole. 
This aim rather belies the frequent claim of problem-solving theory 
to be value-free. It is methodologically value-free insofar as it treats 
the variables it considers as objects… but it is value-bound by virtue 
of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own 
framework. 
By	  questioning	  the	  status	  quo,	  critical	  perspectives	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  ideologically	  
value-­‐free:	  they	  generally	  and	  consciously	  propose	  “normative	  choice[s]	  in	  favour	  of	  
a	  social	  and	  political	  order	  different	  from	  the	  prevailing	  order”,	  which	  leaves	  them	  
open	  to	  the	  criticism	  of	  being	  ‘utopian’	  (Cox	  1996b,	  p.	  90).49	  Cox	  argues	  that	  this	  
utopianism	  is,	  however,	  limited	  in	  that	  critical	  theory	  “reject[s]	  improbable	  
alternatives	  just	  as	  it	  rejects	  the	  permanency	  of	  the	  existing	  order”	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  
used	  to	  “guide	  strategic	  action	  for	  bringing	  about	  an	  alternative	  order,	  whereas	  
problem-­‐solving	  theory	  is	  a	  guide	  to	  tactical	  actions	  which,	  intended	  or	  unintended,	  
sustain	  the	  existing	  order”	  (Cox	  1996b,	  p.	  90).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  A	  normative	  position	  is	  one	  that	  specifies	  “how	  the	  world	  should	  work”	  and	  is	  often	  (and	  contentiously)	  contrasted	  to	  ‘value-­‐free,’	  “scientific	  descriptions	  of	  how	  the	  world	  
does	  work”	  (Gilpin	  1987,	  p.	  26).	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Cox’s	  distinction	  between	  utopian	  and	  realistic	  possible	  alternatives	  is	  particularly	  
salient	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  GPE	  perspective	  for	  
analysing	  and	  evaluating	  the	  role	  that	  ecosocialists	  play	  in	  the	  wider	  global	  justice	  
movement	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  (which	  in	  itself	  demands	  holistic	  and	  
dialectical	  analysis	  since	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  approach	  is	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task	  of	  
even	  understanding	  the	  Earth	  System,	  and	  even	  less	  to	  the	  task	  of	  addressing	  the	  
challenges	  that	  an	  unstable	  and	  unpredictable	  Earth	  System	  present).	  As	  is	  
demonstrated	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  7	  and	  8,	  ecosocialist	  assessments	  of	  the	  
status	  quo	  and	  of	  the	  prevailing	  balance	  of	  forces	  are	  realistic,	  sophisticated	  and	  
sobering.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  given	  the	  contradictions	  between	  the	  
inflexibility	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  and	  the	  laws	  of	  capitalism	  (an	  economic	  system	  
which	  depends	  on	  infinite	  growth	  and	  on	  exploiting	  both	  labour	  and	  nature	  for	  its	  
very	  survival),	  the	  aims	  of	  ecosocialism	  are	  far	  from	  utopian	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  
solutions	  ecosocialists	  propose	  are	  unavoidable	  if	  we	  want	  to	  preserve	  the	  
habitability	  of	  our	  planet.	  These	  understandings	  guide	  ecosocialist	  efforts	  to	  work	  
with	  others	  in	  the	  wider	  climate	  and	  global	  justice	  movements,	  and	  their	  
understanding	  of	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  situation	  motivates	  them	  to	  persist	  in	  these	  
efforts	  despite	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  monumental	  nature	  of	  the	  task	  ahead.	  The	  
appropriateness	  of	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  GPE	  perspective	  for	  GPE	  practice	  in	  the	  
Anthropocene,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  this	  particular	  research	  project,	  is	  evident	  in	  how	  this	  
perspective	  facilitates	  not	  only	  a	  comprehensive	  incorporation	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  actors	  
(such	  as	  states,	  institutions,	  socio-­‐economic	  classes	  and	  social	  movements)	  but	  also	  
in	  how	  it	  facilitates	  analyses	  of	  the	  dynamism	  inherent	  in	  social	  life	  as	  material	  
conditions,	  existing	  institutions	  and	  ideational	  forces	  interact	  dialectically,	  thus	  
exposing	  contradictions	  within	  the	  system	  and	  revealing	  possibilities	  for	  social	  
change.	  
The	  Neo-­‐Gramscian	  GPE	  Perspective:	  A	  Method	  of	  Historical	  
Structures	  
The	  lasting	  legacy	  of	  Robert	  Cox’s	  theoretical	  contributions	  in	  the	  field	  of	  critical	  GPE	  
is	  celebrated	  in	  a	  special	  issue	  of	  the	  academic	  journal	  Globalizations	  (Volume	  13,	  
Number	  5)	  published	  in	  2016.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  issue	  that	  one	  of	  Cox’s	  colleagues,	  Timothy	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Sinclair,	  provides	  a	  concise	  summary	  and	  critique	  of,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  modification	  to,	  
Cox’s	  MHS.50	  Cox	  introduced	  the	  MHS	  in	  1981	  in	  a	  paper	  entitled	  Social	  forces,	  
states,	  and	  world	  orders:	  beyond	  international	  relations	  theory,	  the	  first	  of	  two	  
journal	  articles	  he	  wrote	  that	  many	  theorists	  recognise	  as	  having	  been	  ground-­‐
breaking	  in	  the	  field	  of	  critical	  GPE.	  Important	  achievements	  of	  Cox’s	  MHS	  include	  
the	  critiques	  of,	  and	  the	  alternatives	  it	  offers	  to,	  traditional	  IR	  ontological	  
assumptions.	  These	  ontological	  assumptions	  are	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  separate	  
politics	  (‘the	  state’)	  from	  ‘civil	  society’	  (the	  economy	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  social	  life)	  
and	  to	  treat	  a	  reified,	  ahistorical	  ‘state’	  as	  the	  basic	  unit	  of	  analysis	  in	  the	  ‘inter-­‐state	  
system’	  without	  recognising	  and	  accounting	  for	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  real	  world	  
(Sinclair	  2016).	  Traditional	  IR	  theorists	  do	  not,	  for	  instance,	  consider	  the	  variety	  of	  
actors	  and	  plurality	  of	  forms	  of	  state	  that	  exist,	  or	  the	  power	  relations,	  
interrelationships	  and	  shifting	  dynamics	  between	  all	  these	  actors.	  Cox’s	  critique	  is	  
particularly	  pertinent	  to	  this	  research	  project,	  as	  neither	  the	  traditional	  IR	  
perspectives	  nor	  the	  dominant	  IPE	  perspectives	  of	  neo-­‐Realism	  and	  neo-­‐Liberalism	  
accommodate	  deep	  analyses	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ‘civil	  society’	  actors	  I	  focus	  on:	  the	  
climate	  movement	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  its	  subset	  of	  radical	  climate	  justice	  
movement	  actors	  that	  include	  ecosocialists.51	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Sinclair	  is	  also	  the	  author	  of	  the	  introduction	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  Robert	  Cox’s	  writings	  published	  under	  the	  title	  Approaches	  to	  World	  Order	  in	  1996.	  	  51	  Realist/neo-­‐Realist	  IR	  and	  IPE	  analyses	  of	  global	  environmental	  politics,	  such	  as	  Paterson	  and	  Grubb’s	  (1992),	  focus	  on	  states	  as	  the	  main	  actors	  in	  the	  field	  of	  climate	  politics.	  While	  some	  IPE	  theorists’	  work,	  such	  as	  the	  paper	  by	  Newell	  and	  Paterson	  (2010),	  acknowledges	  that	  some	  civil	  society	  actors	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  contest	  emerging	  forms	  of	  ‘climate	  capitalism’,	  these	  actors	  play	  a	  marginal	  role	  and	  the	  overall	  argument	  of	  these	  authors	  acts	  as	  what	  Douglas	  (1997,	  p.	  174)	  refers	  to	  as	  “…	  ‘vectors’	  ensuring	  the	  transmission	  of	  the	  new	  normalcy.”	  Adopting	  a	  largely	  liberal-­‐institutionalist	  IPE	  perspective,	  Newell	  and	  Paterson	  (2010,	  p.	  81)	  make	  a	  ‘normative	  claim’	  calling	  for	  the	  transformation	  of	  capitalism	  into	  a	  ‘climate	  capitalism’	  and	  downplay	  the	  possibilities	  of	  radical	  change	  opened	  by	  contestations	  against	  this	  project.	  These	  authors	  foreclose	  the	  possibility	  of	  anti-­‐capitalist	  alternatives	  by	  arguing	  that	  “…it	  is	  clear	  that,	  like	  it	  or	  not,	  neo-­‐liberal	  capitalism(s)	  will	  provide	  the	  context	  and	  historical	  moment	  in	  which	  action	  [to	  mitigate	  climate	  change]	  has	  to	  take	  place”	  and	  that	  “This	  implies	  engagement	  with	  prominent	  actors	  in	  neo-­‐liberalism	  from	  business	  and	  finance,	  whose	  strategies	  need	  to	  be	  aligned	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  climate	  protection.”	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Sinclair’s	  summary	  of	  the	  five	  main	  features	  of	  Cox’s	  alternative	  and	  ground-­‐
breaking	  approach	  is	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length	  because	  of	  the	  brevity	  and	  clarity	  with	  
which	  it	  outlines	  Cox’s	  MHS:	  
First, action takes place within a ‘framework for action’ which 
limits and constitutes the world. Understanding this requires 
historical study. Second, theory is also shaped by this framework, in 
the sense that theorists must be aware of theory’s historical 
character and the continual need for its adjustment as the world 
changes. Third, the ‘framework for action’ necessarily changes and 
the main task of critical theory is understanding this change. Fourth, 
the framework for action is an historical structure or combination 
that brings together thought, material conditions, and institutions. 
An historical structure does not determine action but ‘constitutes the 
context’ within which action takes place. Cox’s structure can be 
read as a constraint but also more actively (but less clearly) as 
constituting action; so the historical structure does more than limit 
pre-given agents. Last, frameworks for action, or historical 
structures, should not be considered in terms of their need for 
equilibrium maintenance, but more dynamically, in terms of 
identifying the contradictions and conflicts within them which 
create the possibility for transformation of the framework for action. 
Sinclair (2016, pp. 512 – 513) 
Sinclair	  proceeds	  to	  describe	  the	  two	  ‘elements’	  that	  make	  up	  the	  MHS,	  the	  first	  of	  
which	  is	  the	  existing	  ‘historical	  structure’	  that	  provides	  the	  backdrop	  to	  the	  terrain	  of	  
social	  action.	  The	  components	  of	  historical	  structures	  are	  depicted	  graphically	  as	  a	  
‘triangle’	  of	  what	  Cox	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘Forces’	  and	  comprise	  ‘material	  capabilities,	  ideas,	  
and	  institutions,’	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1	  below.	  
sources of trouble’ (1996a, p. 88). Problem-solving theory is premised on holding constant all
other matters outside the area of concern. This gives it incisive but narrow analytical power,
which may exaggerate the veracity of problem-solving thinking in the minds of many.
So how do we explore state/society complexes as the ‘constituent entities of a world order’,
but avoid the static, timelessness of Neorealism, in which motivations are assumed to be fixed
(Cox, 1996a, p. 96)? Cox suggests the way to do this is by embracing an historical materialism
that actually enlarges the realist perspective through its concern with relationships between
structure, which he sees as economic relations, and superstructure (or the ‘ethico-political
sphere’). These relationships explain why state/society complexes differ, producing the
variety of historical forms we encounter in the world.
What are the basic premises of this approach? Cox identifies five main features (Cox, 1996a,
p. 97). First, action takes place within a ‘framework for action’ which limits and constitutes the
world. Understanding this requires historical study. Second, theory is also shaped by this frame-
work, in the sense that theorists must be aware of theory’s historical character and the continual
need for its adjustment as the world changes. Third, the ‘framework for action’ necessarily
changes and the main task of critical theory is understanding this change. Fourth, the framework
for action is an historical structure or combination that brings together thought, material con-
ditions, and institutions. An historical structure does not determine action but ‘constitutes the
context’ within which action takes place. Cox’s structure can be read as a constraint but also
more actively (but less clearly) as constituting action too; so the historical structure does
more than limit pre-given agents. Last, frameworks for action, or historical structures, should
not be considered in terms of their need for equilibrium maintenance, but more dynamically,
in terms of identifying the ontradictions and conflicts within them which create the possibility
for transformation of the framework for action.
There are two elements that make up the MHS. Each i organized by Cox in the form of a
graphic ‘triangle’, as he put it. These triangles may have greatly aided the communication of
the method, and the popularity of the approach. It is the first of these ‘triangles’ that allows
the analyst to map out a particular istorical structure (Figure 1). The structure does not deter-
mine action, ‘but imposes pressures and constraints’ creating and limiting what can be done in
the circumstances (Cox, 1996a, p. 98). Rival structures are possible, and may push back against a
specific structure.
Keeping in mind that Cox’s t inking developed i response to 1960s structural Marxism and
to the emergence of Neorealism in the 1970s, we need to be clear that Cox’s triangles are not
analogous to circuit diagrams. Cox did n t think of the ontology he laid out in the triangles
as fixed or immutable. Nor do they provide the basi for the infer nce of law-like axioms
about social life. They are intended t elp undertake more rigorous concrete investigations.
The concrete investigations are the things th t matter, but like any intellectual undertaking,
these are better when their guiding assumptions, in this case ontology, are made explicit.
Cox categorizes circumstances as material capabilities, ideas, and institutions. What deter-
mines the relationship between them are empirical conditions, and cannot be assumed in
Figure 1. Forces.
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Source:	  Sinclair	  (2016,	  p.	  512)	  
When	  using	  this	  framework	  of	  analysis,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  constantly	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  
implication	  of	  the	  arrows	  in	  Figure	  1:	  material	  capabilities,	  institutions	  and	  ideas	  are	  
Figure	  1:	  MHS	  Forces	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all	  interrelated	  and	  interact	  with,	  and	  influence,	  one	  another.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  
be	  constantly	  aware	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ‘ideal’	  or	  eternal	  ‘historical	  structure’:	  all	  
historical	  structures	  are	  both	  distinct	  and	  dynamic,	  and	  these	  features	  can	  only	  be	  
revealed	  through	  empirical	  study.	  The	  dynamic	  features	  of	  historical	  structures	  also	  
mean	  that	  history	  is	  never	  ‘settled’:	  historical	  structures	  contain	  contradictions	  that	  
give	  rise	  to	  ‘rival	  structures’	  (Sinclair	  2016,	  pp.	  512	  –	  513).	  Furthermore,	  in	  Cox’s	  
schema	  the	  contending	  forces	  within	  any	  given	  historical	  structure	  can	  be	  analysed	  
by	  applying	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  forces	  evident	  at	  any	  point	  in	  time	  in	  the	  historical	  
structure	  to	  the	  second	  element	  of	  the	  MHS,	  the	  three	  ‘levels’	  or	  ‘spheres	  of	  
activity’.	  
The	  ‘spheres	  of	  activity’	  are	  graphically	  depicted	  as	  another	  triangle,	  as	  shown	  in	  
Figure	  2	  below,	  and	  comprise	  ‘social	  forces,’	  ‘forms	  of	  state,’	  and	  ‘world	  orders.’	  Cox	  
(1981,	  1996b	  p.	  100)	  defines	  the	  spheres	  of	  activity	  as	  fluid,	  and	  as	  emerging	  from	  
the	  following	  processes:	  
(1) organization of production, more particularly with regard to the 
social forces engendered by the production process; (2) forms of 
state as derived from a study of state/society complexes; and (3) 
world orders, that is, the particular configurations of forces which 
successively define the problematic of war and peace for the 
ensemble of states. 
advance. Material capabilities are dynamic productive (and destructive) technologies, physical
plant, and natural resources. Ideas are intersubjectively shared notions such as diplomatic immu-
nity. These ideas are what Searle calls social or institutional facts (Searle, 2010, p. 10). Unlike
Searle, Cox suggests that although these ideas are durable they are historical. Ideas come and go,
albeit slowly. Cox also identifies a crucial second category of ideas. These are competing
‘images of social order’ held by different groups (1996a, p. 99). There may be several, and
they tend to be cast in opposition to each other. Institutions, or as Cox puts it, ‘institutionaliza-
tion’, is the way a particular order is stabilized and perpetuated. Institutions are a vehicle for
creating hegemony, but they may also take on a life of their own and may also become a ‘battle-
ground’ for opposing tendencies, or rival institutions may compete with each other. Historical
structures are limited and do not represent the whole world (1996a, p. 100). Their partiality
can be overcome by juxtaposing related structures. Rather than assuming equilibrium and an
abstract model of a smoothly functioning social system, the dialectical character of historical
structures can be highlighted by identifying them within historical circumstances and by detect-
ing rival structures.
A little confusingly, Cox suggests the MHS can then be ‘applied’ via a second triangle to
‘three levels, or spheres of activity’ (Cox, 1996a; Figure 2). These spheres consist of social
forces, or what he terms the ‘organization of production’, forms of state as derived from
the study of state/society complexes, and world orders, or the configuration of forces which
define the ‘problematic of war or peace for the ensemble of states’ (1996a). Like the elements
of the first structure, the sph res or l vels ar interrelated. He cites E.H. Carr’s discussion of
industrial workers as a new social force, and how this come to stimul te imperial acquisition
(1996a, pp. 100–101). The key to un erstanding the relation hip of the two triangles is that
the first triangl (the forces) is applied to each of the elements or spheres of the second tri-
angle. In order to understand forms of state, the analyst needs to consider the configuration of
material capabilities, ideas, and institutions it contains. The broader categories of the second
triangle of spheres can then be considered in relation to each other for a ‘fuller representation
of historical process’ (1996a, p. 101). Like the forces, the broader spheres do not exist in a
relationship linear to each other and we discover how they are linked by historical and empiri-
cal study.
The breadth of the approach is impressive. Contrast the wide scope of the MHS if you will
with what were then, and still are, the dominant model of social science, which seek law-
like understandings of small fields of uman beh v our. Cox’s ambition has been inspirational
to more than one generation of students who have found themselves studying international
relations but were frustrated by the limits of the orthodox view.
The non-deterministic character of Cox’s understanding of how things relate to each other in
an historical structure, and the necessity of empirical and historical research in order to see what
is important at specific times, is a great strength of the approach because it undermines
inadequate models of social life that assume a mechanistic and ahistorical understanding of
our world. Cox’s approach makes it quite clear that this sort of understanding is not enough.
Figure 2. Spheres.
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Source:	  Sinclair	  (2016,	  p.	  513)	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Again,	  Cox	  (1981,	  1996b	  pp.	  100	  -­‐	  101)	  emphasises	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  three	  levels	  
at	  which	  social	  action	  occurs	  interact	  with	  and	  influence	  one	  another,	  as	  well	  as	  
drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  arrows	  in	  Figure	  2:	  
The three levels are interrelated. Changes in the organization of 
production generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about 
changes in the structure of states; and the generalization of changes 
in the structure of states alters the problematic of world order.... The 
relationship among the three levels is not… simply unilinear. 
Transnational social forces have influenced states…. Particular 
structures of world order exert influence over the forms which states 
take…. Forms of state also affect the development of social forces 
through the kinds of domination they exert…  
What	  emerges	  is	  an	  analytical	  schema	  that	  seems	  more	  able	  to	  account	  for	  both	  the	  
complexity	  and	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  and	  to	  incorporate	  a	  
much	  wider	  range	  of	  actors	  than	  traditional	  IR	  and	  dominant	  IPE	  perspectives	  
provide	  tools	  for.	  While	  acknowledging	  the	  robustness	  of	  Cox’s	  MHS	  as	  an	  analytical	  
schema	  that	  is	  well	  equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  dynamic	  complexities	  of	  the	  real	  world	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  challenges	  that	  these	  complexities	  present	  to	  actors	  trying	  to	  create	  
socially	  just	  alternative	  futures,	  Sinclair	  (2016)	  also	  addresses	  some	  critiques	  levelled	  
against	  it	  and	  proposes	  modifications	  to	  address	  these	  critiques.52	  
Sinclair’s	  ‘Method	  of	  Historical	  Structures	  Redux’	  
After	  summarising	  criticisms	  related	  to	  some	  sources	  of	  confusion	  regarding	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  two	  ‘triangles’,	  ontological	  choices,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  
original	  analytical	  framework	  developed	  by	  Cox,	  Sinclair	  suggests	  a	  few	  modifications	  
that	  address	  these	  issues	  and	  are	  designed	  to	  strengthen	  the	  analytical	  potential	  of	  
the	  MHS.	  The	  ‘MHS	  Redux,’	  as	  Sinclair	  refers	  to	  the	  modified	  analytical	  framework,	  is	  
graphically	  depicted	  as	  a	  triangle	  of	  ‘Forces	  Redux’	  (Figure	  3)	  and	  a	  diamond	  of	  
‘Spheres	  Redux’	  (Figure	  4),	  with	  the	  different	  shapes	  helping	  to	  eliminate	  one	  of	  the	  
sources	  of	  confusion	  confronted	  by	  researchers	  who	  apply	  the	  methodology	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  and	  purpose	  of	  this	  dissertation	  to	  discuss	  more	  substantial	  critiques	  of	  the	  MHS.	  For	  examples	  of	  such	  critiques	  and	  responses	  to	  them,	  refer	  to	  Cox	  with	  Schechter	  (2002),	  Farrands	  &	  Worth	  (2005),	  Germain	  &	  Kenny	  (1998),	  Morton	  (2007b),	  and	  Robinson	  (2005).	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empirical	  research:	  having	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  how	  the	  two	  triangles	  relate	  to	  each	  
other.	  
As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3,	  Sinclair	  makes	  two	  modifications	  to	  Cox’s	  original	  schema	  of	  
‘forces’:	  he	  explicitly	  adds	  ‘reproductive	  capabilities’	  to	  Cox’s	  original	  ‘productive	  
capabilities’	  to	  address	  concerns	  about	  ontological	  choices	  that	  neglect	  gender	  and	  
reproduction	  and	  he	  disaggregates	  Cox’s	  ‘ideas’	  into	  ‘competing	  ideas’	  and	  ‘social	  
facts’,	  amalgamating	  the	  latter	  with	  Cox’s	  ‘institutions.’	  Sinclair’s	  (2016,	  pp.	  514	  -­‐	  
515)	  rationale	  for	  the	  second	  modification	  is	  that	  “intersubjectivity,	  or	  social	  facts,	  
do	  not	  sit	  well	  with	  class	  consciousness,	  and	  actually	  are	  more	  like	  institutions	  than	  
ideas,	  given	  that	  Cox	  considers	  institutions	  more	  broadly	  than	  mere	  organizations….	  
In	  the	  new	  schema,	  ideas	  will	  only	  refer	  to	  consciously	  held	  ideas,	  not	  social	  facts.”	  
Sinclair’s	  category	  of	  ‘competing	  ideas’	  is	  designed	  to	  “highlight	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  
conflict	  between	  different	  collectively	  held	  ideas”	  while	  the	  ‘social	  facts’	  include	  
those	  “norms	  and	  assumptions	  [that]	  structure	  our	  lives	  well	  away	  from	  the	  
competition	  and	  controversy	  of	  competing	  ideas”	  (Sinclair	  2016,	  pp.	  516	  -­‐	  517).	  
	  Source:	  Sinclair	  (2016,	  p.	  517)	  
Sinclair’s	  modification	  of	  Cox’s	  second	  triangle	  of	  ‘spheres’	  (Figure	  4)	  is	  more	  
extreme,	  transforming	  Cox’s	  triangular	  shape	  into	  a	  diamond	  by	  adding	  a	  fourth	  
sphere	  called	  ‘social	  dynamics’	  to	  complement	  Cox’s	  ‘narrow	  understanding’	  of	  
‘social	  forces’	  as	  those	  forces	  “engendered	  by	  the	  production	  process”	  (Cox	  with	  
Sinclair	  1996,	  p.	  100).	  ‘Social	  dynamics’	  are	  designed	  to	  encapsulate	  “…the	  vast	  
range	  of	  human	  conflict	  and	  cooperation	  not	  reducible	  to	  production.	  Struggles	  by	  
Figure	  3:	  MHS	  Forces	  Redux	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social	  movements	  about	  things	  such	  as	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  biosphere	  are	  
manifestly	  consequential	  and	  need	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  such”	  (Sinclair	  2016,	  p.	  515).	  
did this because intersubjective notions are not ideas in the classic sense but really operate as
what Searle calls social facts. These norms and assumptions structure our lives well away
from the competition and controversy of competing ideas. I have kept ‘institutions’ in the
title of this force even though social facts are really the same phenomenon in order to capture
the everyday understanding of institutions as organizations. Social facts alone might have
been abstruse. The last category of forces in the bottom left corner of Figure 3 has been modified
from Cox’s material capabilities to distinguish productive and reproductive matters. Reproduc-
tive issues have been teased out of their implicit location in ‘material capabilities’. Although
‘production’ and ‘material’ can be and are interpreted by Marxists in all-encompassing ways,
I think it is best to acknowledge the distinctiveness of household and gender dynamics, as
these are such large dimensions of our lives.
In Cox’s schema, Figure 3 provides any number of limited understandings of sets of forces.
This structure, let us call it Thatcherism say, can then be understood when applied to Figure
4 as a specific form of state (e.g. confrontational), as a social force (e.g. privatization), as a
social dynamic (e.g. conservative values) and as a feature of world order (e.g. reinforcement
of cold war competition).
How should we actually go about using the modified MHS in research? We need to be clear
about what it will be useful for, and where it will not be useful. It is unlikely to help us produce
law-like generalizations about social life. Apart from the obvious observation that Cox is hostile
to such knowledge in the absence of a critical theory context, the MHS Redux is best understood
as a framework for theorizing consequential phenomena. An example might be contemporary
China. We want to understand the rise of China and it is clearly so important we can justify
studying it in its own right. But the uniqueness of China as a phenomenon is not going to
help us create law-like theories that we can apply to other phenomena. But that does not
matter. It is important enough to understand China itself. So Cox’s MHS is an aid to theorizing
the world, but a world whose historical complexity and uniqueness is the starting (and ending)
point. In this sense the MHS is not seeking to produce highly parsimonious knowledge, although
Figure 4. Spheres redux.
Figure 3. Forces redux.
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 Source:	  Sinclair	  (2016,	  p.	  517)	  
Having	  modified	  Cox’s	  original	  framework,	  Sinclair	  (2016,	  p.	  518)	  clarifies	  how	  the	  
two	  schemas	  ‘fit	  together’	  and	  can	  be	  used	  by	  researchers	  analysing	  aspects	  of	  social	  
reality:	  “The	  first,	  the	  forces,	  is	  the	  static	  or	  synchronic	  understanding	  of	  how	  thing 	  
fit	  together	  (e.g.	  Thatcherism)	  while	  the	  spheres	  of	  Figure	  4	  allow	  for	  understanding	  
of	  the	  broader	  context	  and	  incorporates	  [sic]	  potential	  contradictions	  between	  
elements	  (e.g.	  Thatcherism	  vs.	  Soviet	  Communism,	  for	  example).”	  In	  my	  own	  
research,	  a	  more	  relevant	  example	  is	  how	  the	  neoliberalising	  forces	  dominating	  the	  
current	  historical	  structure	  generate	  contradictions	  that	  manifest	  as	  the	  organic	  
crisis	  of	  global	  capitalism	  (discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4)	  and	  provoke	  
opposition	  in	  various	  quarters,	  including	  from	  the	  ‘alter-­‐globalization’	  global	  justice	  
movement	  that	  gained	  prominence	  with	  the	  1999	  mass	  demonstrations	  in	  Seattle	  
against	  the	  WTO	  and	  other	  econ mic	  institutions	   ctively	  pr moting	  the	  neoliberal	  
agenda.	  
But	  the	  ecological	  crises	  inherent	  in	  the	  normal	  operations	  of	  capitalism	  that	  
neoliberalising	  globalisation	  processes	  greatly	  exacerbate	  are	  just	  as	  important	  as	  
the	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  crises	  leading	  to	  the	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  ideas	  and	  
activities	  of	  the	  global	  justice	  movement,	  and	  while	  Sinclair’s	  modified	  analyti al	  
Figure	  4:	  MHS	  Spheres	  Redux	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schema	  clarifies	  much	  and	  facilitates	  the	  more	  ready	  application	  of	  the	  neo-­‐
Gramscian	  perspective	  when	  analysing	  the	  current	  historical	  structure	  and	  its	  
framework	  for	  action,	  it	  continues	  to	  ‘collapse’	  the	  environment	  and	  ecological	  
issues	  within	  other	  categories.	  This	  is	  a	  serious	  shortcoming	  of	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  at	  a	  
time	  when	  human	  impacts	  on	  the	  Earth	  System	  are	  so	  extensive	  that,	  as	  discussed	  in	  
Chapter	  2,	  geologists	  are	  considering	  the	  formal	  declaration	  of	  a	  new	  geological	  
epoch,	  the	  Anthropocene,	  to	  succeed	  the	  Holocene	  that	  began	  about	  11	  700	  years	  
ago	  and	  has	  provided	  a	  stable	  biosphere	  amenable	  to	  building	  human	  civilizations	  
(Crutzen	  2002;	  Williams	  &	  Crutzen	  2013).	  At	  this	  historical	  conjuncture,	  when	  an	  
overwhelming	  consensus	  of	  scientists	  working	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  natural	  science	  
discipline	  areas	  warn	  that	  the	  ongoing	  deterioration	  of	  the	  Earth’s	  life-­‐support	  
system	  as	  a	  result	  of	  human	  activity	  threatens	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  all	  life	  depends	  
(Steffen	  et	  al.	  2011),	  the	  biosphere	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  or	  considered	  
only	  tangentially,	  and	  should	  be	  given	  special	  consideration	  and	  emphasis	  (Hamilton	  
2017).	  My	  own	  additional	  modification	  to	  Sinclair’s	  MHS	  Redux	  attempts	  to	  put	  the	  
Anthropocene	  more	  overtly	  and	  prominently	  into	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  analytical	  
schema	  by	  explicitly	  referencing	  the	  Biosphere.53	  	  
A	  critical	  analysis	  and	  modification	  of	  Sinclair’s	  MHS	  Redux:	  
Emphasising	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	  context	  of	  the	  Biosphere	  
When	  Robert	  Cox	  first	  published	  the	  description	  of	  the	  MHS	  analytical	  framework	  in	  
1981,	  ‘nature’	  was	  treated	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  category	  ‘material	  capabilities,’	  which	  
he	  defines	  as	  follows:	  
Material capabilities are productive and destructive potentials. In 
their dynamic form these exist as technological and organizational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Having	  considered	  ‘Earth	  System’	  instead	  of	  ‘Biosphere’	  as	  the	  ‘umbrella’	  label	  for	  ‘material	  capabilities,’	  I	  rejected	  this	  idea	  as	  Earth	  System	  scientists	  and	  authors	  such	  as	  Clive	  Hamilton	  point	  out	  that	  humans	  and	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  systems	  are	  now	  not	  only	  part	  of	  the	  Earth	  System	  but	  major	  forces	  that	  have	  changed	  what	  would	  have	  been	  its	  normal	  trajectory.	  In	  that	  sense,	  it	  is	  the	  MHS	  in	  its	  entirety	  that	  should	  be	  enclosed	  within	  a	  larger	  box,	  the	  ‘Earth	  System,’	  now.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  this	  would	  have	  served	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool,	  however,	  so	  I	  decided	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘Biosphere’	  and	  to	  trial	  the	  use	  of	  this	  category	  in	  my	  analysis.	  In	  this	  research,	  I	  therefore	  understand	  the	  Earth	  System	  as	  comprising	  of	  two	  key	  components:	  the	  biosphere,	  and	  humans	  operating	  within	  social	  systems	  (which	  are,	  however,	  embedded	  in	  the	  biosphere	  and	  dependent	  on	  it	  for	  their	  existence).	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capabilities, and in their accumulated forms as natural resources 
which technology can transform, stocks of equipment (for example, 
industries and armaments), and the wealth which can command 
these. 
(Cox 1996b, p. 98) 
	  Cox’s	  framework	  was	  developed	  before	  US	  scientist	  James	  Hansen’s	  1988	  
congressional	  testimony	  on	  global	  warming	  and	  the	  subsequent	  increasing	  public	  
awareness	  of	  the	  severity	  of	  its	  effects.	  Since	  then,	  however,	  not	  only	  has	  public	  
awareness	  of	  global	  warming,	  climate	  change	  and	  environmental	  degradation	  
increased,	  but	  much	  more	  scientific	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  Earth	  as	  a	  dynamic	  
complex	  system	  which	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  crossing	  physical	  ‘tipping	  points’	  that	  can	  propel	  it	  
into	  a	  new	  and	  unpredictable	  state	  (Biermann	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Hansen	  et	  al.	  2013;	  
Steffen	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Steffen	  et	  al.	  2015)	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  spread	  and	  intensification	  of	  
capitalist	  relations	  of	  production.	  
These	  developments	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  ‘nature’	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  
static	  force	  or	  as	  an	  accumulation	  of	  natural	  resources.	  In	  later	  publications,	  Cox	  
does	  emphasise	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  threats	  to	  the	  biosphere,	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  only	  
through	  pressure	  exerted	  from	  within	  civil	  society	  that	  the	  changes	  necessary	  to	  
protect	  its	  integrity	  can	  be	  initiated	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Cox	  2002).	  Sinclair’s	  
argument	  for	  deciding	  not	  to	  make	  a	  separate	  category	  for	  ‘the	  environment’	  is	  
similar	  to	  Cox’s	  observation	  that	  the	  changes	  required	  to	  protect	  the	  environment	  
will	  necessarily	  emanate	  from	  social	  struggles:	  “while	  we	  are	  material	  beings	  as	  well	  
as	  social	  ones,	  the	  struggle	  over	  how	  to	  address	  the	  environment	  is	  part	  of	  the	  social	  
dynamic,	  and	  how	  we	  resolve	  it	  will	  not	  be	  reducible	  to	  material	  necessity	  alone”	  
(Sinclair	  2016,	  p.	  515).	  Given	  the	  evident	  inability	  of	  capital	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  
the	  degrading	  of	  the	  biosphere,	  which	  Marxists	  and	  ecosocialists	  argue	  results	  from	  
a	  fundamental	  contradiction	  inherent	  in	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  production	  (as	  
discussed	  in	  later	  chapters),	  Cox	  and	  Sinclair	  are	  correct	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  planet	  remains	  habitable	  will	  be	  resolved	  through	  civil	  society	  
action	  (or	  what	  Sinclair	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘social	  dynamics’).	  However,	  as	  Earth	  System	  
scientists	  emphasise,	  the	  biosphere	  is	  a	  material	  physical	  system	  in	  its	  own	  right:	  it	  
reacts	  to	  physical	  inputs	  and	  also	  determines	  the	  physical	  limits	  underlying	  living	  
organisms’	  productive	  and	  reproductive	  ‘material	  capabilities.’	  While	  ecological	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economists	  such	  as	  Herman	  Daly	  and	  Joshua	  Farley	  (2004)	  recognised	  this	  fact	  and	  
incorporated	  their	  understanding	  of	  environmental	  limits	  and	  ‘the	  laws	  of	  
thermodynamics’	  in	  their	  economic	  models	  decades	  ago,	  standard	  IR	  and	  IPE	  
analyses	  of	  environmental	  politics	  fail	  to	  take	  such	  natural	  limits	  into	  account	  
(Williams	  1996).	  Williams	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  55-­‐56)	  argues	  that	  “contemporary	  analyses	  of	  
the	  political	  economy	  of	  global	  environmental	  change	  can	  be	  challenged	  on	  two	  
broad	  grounds”:	  firstly,	  their	  positivist	  epistemology	  (which	  Williams	  points	  out	  that	  
the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  perspective	  successfully	  challenges)	  and,	  	  secondly,	  their	  failure	  
“to	  incorporate	  the	  ecological	  perspective	  on	  political	  economy,	  a	  perspective	  which	  
starts	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  economics	  and	  the	  environment	  are	  inseparable.”	  
My	  modification	  of	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  aims	  to	  apply	  these	  crucial	  insights	  from	  
ecological	  economics	  and	  thereby	  to	  address	  Williams’s	  (ibid.,	  p.	  56)	  advice	  that	  
“…IPE	  should	  explore	  the	  prevailing	  assumptions	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  
between	  humans	  and	  the	  natural	  world.	  This	  critical	  task	  will	  not	  be	  accomplished	  if	  
ecological	  economics	  remains	  invisible	  in	  IPE.”	  My	  modification	  of	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  
schema	  is	  thus	  designed	  to	  emphasise	  the	  way	  in	  which	  social	  systems	  are	  
embedded	  within	  the	  biosphere	  and,	  ultimately,	  rely	  on	  it	  continuing	  to	  support	  life	  
for	  their	  existence.	  
One	  idea	  about	  how	  to	  fit	  the	  environment	  into	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  schema	  more	  
overtly	  is	  to	  add	  it	  to	  Sinclair’s	  already-­‐expanded	  category	  of	  ‘productive	  and	  
reproductive	  capabilities,’	  while	  a	  second	  idea	  is	  to	  enclose	  ‘productive	  and	  
reproductive	  capabilities’	  within	  an	  ‘umbrella’	  category,	  ‘Biosphere.’	  As	  we	  are	  
increasingly	  beginning	  to	  understand,	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  more	  realistic	  depiction	  of	  the	  
world	  we	  live	  in	  as	  the	  state	  of	  the	  biosphere	  determines	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  
both	  productive	  and	  reproductive	  activities	  occur,	  and	  scientists	  warn	  that	  its	  health	  
could	  deteriorate	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  no	  longer	  supports	  either	  production	  or	  
reproduction	  of	  many	  species	  (including	  humans).	  To	  emphasise	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  
biosphere	  in	  this	  analysis,	  I	  make	  a	  further	  modification	  to	  Sinclair’s	  ‘Forces	  Redux’	  
(Figure	  3),	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5	  (‘Forces	  Redux	  Version	  II’).	  The	  placement	  of	  
‘Material	  Capabilities:	  Biosphere’	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  triangle	  is	  intended	  to	  draw	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In	  Figure	  6	  (see	  below),	  I	  make	  a	  very	  minor	  modification	  to	  Sinclair’s	  ‘Spheres	  
Redux’	  by	  changing	  the	  format	  of	  the	  arrows	  in	  Figure	  4	  to	  depict	  more	  clearly	  that	  




Figure	  5:	  MHS	  Forces	  Redux	  Version	  II	  
Figure	  6:	  MHS	  Spheres	  Redux	  Version	  II	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The	  approach	  adopted	  when	  analysing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ecosocialist	  social	  movement	  
in	  the	  current	  historical	  structure’s	  framework	  for	  action	  involves	  applying	  the	  forces	  
represented	  in	  Figure	  5	  to	  the	  spheres	  and	  levels	  of	  action	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6.54	  This	  is	  
done	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  number	  of	  analytical	  concepts	  initially	  developed	  by	  Italian	  
Marxist	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  highlighted	  by	  Robert	  Cox	  in	  his	  second	  
ground-­‐breaking	  paper,	  Gramsci,	  hegemony,	  and	  international	  relations:	  an	  essay	  in	  
method	  (Cox	  1983),	  and	  whose	  meanings	  are	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  by	  Gramscian	  
experts	  such	  as	  Peter	  Thomas	  (2009,	  2013a,	  2013b)	  and	  Adam	  Morton	  (2007).55	  	  
As	  Peter	  Thomas’s	  and	  Adam	  Morton’s	  extremely	  detailed	  scholarly	  work	  focusing	  
on	  deep	  textual	  analyses	  of	  Gramsci’s	  writings	  demonstrate,	  the	  meanings	  of	  the	  
concepts	  outlined	  below	  and	  used	  in	  this	  study	  are	  both	  complex	  and	  contested.	  
Given	  the	  already	  extensive	  scope	  and	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  project,	  however,	  
the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  the	  use	  of	  selected	  Gramscian	  concepts,	  while	  drawing	  on	  
the	  expertise	  of	  Gramscian	  scholars	  within	  the	  limitations	  imposed	  by	  time	  
constraints,	  is	  similar	  to	  Cox’s,	  who	  wrote:	  “This	  essay	  sets	  forth	  my	  understanding	  
of	  what	  Gramsci	  meant	  by	  hegemony	  and	  these	  related	  concepts,	  and	  suggests	  how	  
I	  think	  they	  may	  be	  adapted,	  retaining	  his	  essential	  meaning,	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  
problems	  of	  world	  order.	  It	  does	  not	  purport	  to	  be	  a	  critical	  study	  of	  Gramsci’s	  
political	  theory,	  but	  merely	  a	  derivation	  from	  it	  of	  some	  [useful]	  ideas…”	  (Cox	  1996c,	  
p.	  124).	  The	  key	  analytical	  Gramscian	  concepts	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  my	  study	  are	  
hegemony;	  forms	  of	  state;	  integral	  state;	  historic	  blocs;	  world	  order;	  organic	  crises;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  changing	  biosphere	  might	  affect	  not	  only	  the	  material	  conditions	  of	  reproduction	  and	  production	  (and	  hence	  institutions,	  social	  facts,	  and	  competing	  ideas),	  but	  also	  the	  forms	  of	  state	  and	  world	  orders	  that	  are	  possible.	  55	  I	  emphasise	  Gramsci’s	  Marxism	  because	  this	  is	  the	  reading	  of	  Gramsci	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  my	  analysis.	  As	  Thomas	  (2013a,	  p.	  28)	  points	  out,	  “…it	  has	  often	  been	  claimed	  that	  Gramsci	  was	  fundamentally	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  cultural	  superstructures,	  one	  who	  was	  not	  only	  a	  strong	  critic	  of	  economic	  determinism	  but	  perhaps	  even	  ignorant	  of	  economic	  theory.	  Sometimes,	  it	  has	  even	  been	  asserted	  that	  Gramsci’s	  concept	  of	  hegemony	  represents	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  ‘post-­‐Marxism’,	  which	  logically	  should	  reject	  the	  Marxist	  critique	  of	  political	  economy	  and	  its	  emphasis	  upon	  class.	  Such	  readings,	  however,	  neglect	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  Prison	  Notebooks,	  which	  contain	  extensive	  notes	  dedicated	  to	  discussions	  of	  Marx’s	  Capital	  and	  economic	  history.	  They	  also	  neglect	  the	  context	  of	  Gramsci’s	  political	  activism,	  which	  remained	  fundamentally	  directed	  against	  what	  he	  repeatedly	  characterized	  as	  the	  ‘dictatorship’	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie,	  including	  and	  especially	  in	  its	  fascist	  variant.”	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counter-­‐hegemony;	  war	  of	  position	  and	  war	  of	  manoeuvre;	  passive	  revolution	  and	  
trasformismo;	  organic	  intellectuals;	  subaltern	  social	  groups;	  the	  modern	  Prince;	  
‘common	  sense’	  and	  ‘good	  sense’;	  and	  the	  ‘ethico-­‐political	  sphere’	  of	  struggle.	  These	  
concepts	  are	  used	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  historical	  materialist	  analysis	  that	  is	  
dialectical	  and	  aims	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  as	  it	  
unfolds	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  various	  groupings	  at	  a	  variety	  of	  levels	  (local,	  national,	  
global)	  and,	  importantly,	  within	  the	  overall	  context	  of	  the	  biosphere’s	  material	  
responses	  to	  these	  actions,	  while	  also	  taking	  into	  account	  how	  the	  material	  
manifestations	  of	  biophysical	  degradation	  generate	  new	  social	  forces.	  
Van	  der	  Pijl	  (2009,	  p.	  198)	  provides	  a	  concise	  explanation	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  historical	  
materialism	  as	  the	  premise	  that	  “people	  create	  their	  own	  world	  out	  of	  nature,	  but	  
the	  different	  forms	  of	  society	  that	  result,	  then	  constitute	  a	  second	  nature	  further	  
shaping	  their	  thoughts	  and	  actions.”	  The	  historical	  materialist	  method	  of	  analysis	  
begins	  with	  what	  Marx	  called	  “…‘the	  imagined	  concrete’	  (the	  world	  at	  first	  sight)	  to	  
ever-­‐more	  abstract	  determinations	  (which	  the	  thinker	  actively	  constructs	  from	  
his/her	  own	  contradictory	  experience….	  [and]	  from	  the	  abstract	  determinations,	  the	  
route	  is	  retraced	  back	  to	  more	  complex	  constellations,	  but	  now	  ‘enriched’	  by	  
understanding	  [that	  constitutes]….	  the	  thought-­‐concrete,	  the	  view	  of	  the	  totality	  as	  it	  
is	  at	  that	  moment…	  ”	  (Van	  der	  Pijl	  2009,	  pp.	  222	  -­‐	  223).	  Dialectical	  analysis	  seeks	  to	  
understand	  historical	  developments	  by	  identifying	  conflicting,	  mutually	  opposite	  
instances	  (or	  contradictions)	  within	  the	  social	  formation	  being	  studied,	  and	  how	  
these	  contradictions	  play	  out	  to	  create	  new	  social	  formations.	  For	  Marx,	  these	  
contradictions	  reside	  “in	  the	  tensions	  between	  humanity	  as	  a	  part	  of	  nature	  and	  as	  a	  
historical	  force;	  between	  the	  ruling	  classes	  and	  ideas,	  and	  those	  arising	  from	  other	  
sources	  in	  society;	  in	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  exploitation	  (of	  nature,	  in	  social	  
relations)	  and	  domination”	  (Van	  der	  Pijl	  2009,	  p.	  204).	  In	  addition	  to	  deploying	  the	  
Gramscian	  analytical	  concepts	  whose	  meanings	  are	  briefly	  outlined	  below,	  I	  use	  
historical	  materialism	  as	  the	  general	  approach	  informing	  my	  analysis	  of	  ecosocialist	  
contributions	  to	  the	  unfolding	  crises	  engendered	  by	  the	  expansion	  and	  
intensification	  of	  global	  capitalism.	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Gramscian	  analytical	  concepts	  
Hegemony	  is	  a	  key	  concept	  in	  traditional	  realist	  and	  liberal	  IR	  theories	  and	  in	  
Gramsci’s	  work	  and	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  GPE	  analyses,	  but	  IR	  and	  GPE	  theorists	  define	  
the	  concept	  in	  very	  different	  ways.	  While	  IR	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  IPE	  theorists	  
generally	  refer	  to	  ‘strong’	  states	  as	  being	  hegemonic	  in	  the	  ‘inter-­‐state	  system’	  
because	  their	  superior	  military	  or	  economic	  material	  power	  allows	  them	  to	  impose	  
policies	  that	  suit	  their	  own	  interests	  on	  other	  states,	  critical	  GPE	  theorists	  such	  as	  
Cox	  follow	  Gramsci’s	  usage	  in	  emphasising	  ‘the	  consensual	  aspect’	  of	  hegemonic	  
power	  (Cox	  1996c,	  p.	  127).	  In	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  GPE	  literature,	  ‘hegemony’	  refers	  
to	  a	  form	  of	  class	  rule	  based	  on	  consent	  (Cox	  1981,	  1983)	  that	  is	  “backed	  up	  only	  in	  
the	  last	  instance	  by	  the	  coercive	  apparatus	  of	  the	  state”	  (Overbeek	  2000,	  p.	  172).56	  
The	  consent	  derives	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which,	  in	  specific	  capitalist	  societies,	  there	  have	  
been	  historical	  periods	  when	  the	  ruling	  class	  truly	  represented	  the	  ‘general	  interest’	  
of	  leading	  subordinate	  classes	  or,	  in	  Gramscian	  terms,	  subaltern	  groups	  and	  classes,	  
by	  making	  important	  concessions	  that	  gave	  the	  subordinate	  groups	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  
status	  quo,	  and	  also	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  ruling	  class	  is	  able	  to	  exert	  its	  
influence	  over	  prevalent	  ideologies	  and	  ideas	  of	  morality	  through	  its	  control	  over	  
“the	  myriad	  of	  institutions	  and	  relationships	  in	  civil	  society”	  (Overbeek	  2000,	  p.	  
173).57	  	  
Gramsci’s	  notion	  of	  the	  integral	  state	  or	  the	  extended	  state	  encapsulates	  this	  
dynamic	  between	  the	  formal	  apparatus	  of	  the	  state	  (‘politics’)	  and	  institutions	  such	  
as	  schools,	  religious	  organisations,	  and	  the	  mass	  media	  within	  ‘civil	  society.’	  The	  
intellectual	  work	  of	  the	  ruling	  class’	  organic	  intellectuals,	  whose	  function	  it	  is	  to	  
develop	  and	  sustain	  “the	  mental	  images,	  technologies,	  and	  organizations	  which	  bind	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Refer	  to	  Thomas	  (2013a)	  for	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  explanation	  of	  Gramsci’s	  concept	  of	  ‘hegemony,’	  which	  evolved	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  development	  of	  other	  key	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘passive	  revolution’	  and	  the	  ‘modern	  Prince.’	  57	  Thomas	  (2013a,	  p.	  32)	  points	  out	  that	  the	  concept	  ‘subaltern	  social	  groups’	  constitutes	  a	  ‘novel	  addition	  to	  Marxist	  class	  analysis’	  and	  “…is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  classes	  exploited	  in	  the	  capitalist	  labour	  process,	  but	  includes	  all	  social	  groups	  oppressed	  and	  consigned	  to	  the	  ‘margins’	  of	  history.	  Green’s	  	  (2011)	  reading	  of	  Gramsci’s	  work	  also	  leads	  him	  to	  conclude	  that	  “Ultimately,	  for	  Gramsci,	  subalternity	  is	  not	  merely	  limited	  to	  class	  relations;	  subalternity	  is	  constituted	  through	  exclusion,	  domination,	  and	  marginality	  in	  their	  various	  forms…”	  (Green	  2011,	  p.	  388).	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together	  the	  members	  of	  a	  class	  and	  of	  an	  historic	  bloc	  into	  a	  common	  identity,”	  is	  
crucial	  in	  this	  respect	  (Cox	  1996a,	  p.	  132)	  as	  it	  helps	  to	  construct	  and	  maintain	  the	  
hegemony	  of	  historic	  blocs.	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  historic	  blocs	  are	  created	  when	  a	  
fundamental	  social	  class	  succeeds	  in	  integrating	  “a	  variety	  of	  different	  class	  interests	  
and	  forms	  of	  identity	  within	  a	  ‘national-­‐popular’	  alliance”	  (Morton	  2007a,	  p.	  97).	  The	  
extent	  to	  which	  hegemony	  exists,	  and	  what	  form	  it	  takes,	  is	  one	  important	  factor	  
shaping	  the	  particular	  form	  of	  a	  state	  (with	  examples	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  state	  
being	  ‘liberal-­‐democratic	  welfare	  states,’	  ‘neoliberal	  competition	  states,’	  and	  
dictatorships).	  Gramsci	  notes	  that	  international	  hegemony	  also	  constitutes	  “a	  form	  
of	  class	  rule	  based	  on	  consent	  more	  than	  on	  coercion,	  and	  on	  accommodation	  of	  
subordinate	  interests	  rather	  than	  on	  their	  repression”	  (Overbeek	  2000,	  p.	  174).	  Neo-­‐
Gramscian	  GPE	  perspectives	  see	  hegemony	  in	  the	  global	  system	  as	  a	  form	  of	  class	  
rule	  that	  integrates	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  structures	  (Overbeek	  2000,	  p.	  176).	  
As	  Cox	  (1983,	  p.	  171)	  argues:	  “The	  hegemonic	  concept	  of	  world	  order	  is	  founded	  not	  
only	  upon	  the	  regulation	  of	  inter-­‐state	  conflict,	  but	  also	  upon	  a	  globally-­‐conceived	  
civil	  society,	  i.e.,	  in	  a	  mode	  of	  production	  of	  global	  extent	  which	  brings	  about	  links	  
among	  social	  classes	  of	  the	  countries	  encompassed	  by	  it.”58	  The	  hegemony	  of	  
historic	  blocs	  is,	  however,	  vulnerable	  and	  must	  be	  continually	  constructed,	  
maintained	  and	  defended	  “in	  the	  face	  of	  constant	  resistance	  and	  pressures”	  which	  
present	  opportunities	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  movements	  that	  have	  
the	  potential	  to	  challenge	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  (Morton	  2007a,	  p.	  97).	  As	  
Gill	  (1993,	  p.	  44)	  notes,	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  GPE	  perspectives	  explain	  the	  causes	  of	  social	  
crises	  and	  transformations	  with	  reference	  to	  ”the	  disintegration	  of	  social	  
hegemonies,	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  counter-­‐hegemony	  in	  the	  global	  political	  
economy.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Cox	  (1996b,	  pp.	  116	  -­‐	  117)	  expands	  on	  his	  decision	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘world	  orders’	  as	  opposed	  to	  alternative	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘inter-­‐state	  system’	  or	  ‘world	  system’	  with	  reference	  to	  how	  the	  term	  ‘inter-­‐state’	  refers	  only	  to	  periods	  in	  history	  when	  ‘states’	  exist	  whereas	  ‘world	  orders’	  always	  exist.	  His	  preference	  of	  the	  word	  ‘order’	  instead	  of	  ‘system’	  is	  for	  similar	  reasons:	  the	  word	  ‘system’	  has	  connotations	  of	  equilibrium,	  whereas	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  he	  uses	  ‘order’	  is	  to	  describe	  “the	  way	  things	  usually	  happen	  (not	  the	  absence	  of	  turbulence)”.	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Hegemonic	  historic	  blocs	  face	  their	  greatest	  challenges	  during	  periods	  characterised	  
by	  what	  Gramsci	  refers	  to	  as	  an	  organic	  crisis,	  which	  heralds	  “relatively	  long-­‐term	  
and	  permanent	  changes,	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘conjunctural’	  [changes]”	  (Cox	  1996b,	  Note	  
25,	  p.	  120)	  that	  are	  temporary	  and	  can	  be	  overcome	  through	  ‘problem	  solving’.	  As	  
Forgacs	  (2000,	  p.	  427)	  explains:	  
An ‘organic crisis’ is a crisis of the whole system, in which 
contradictions in the economic structure have repercussions through 
the superstructures. One of its signs is when the traditional forms of 
political representation (parties or party leaders) are no longer 
recognized as adequate by the economic class or class fraction 
which they had previously served to represent. It is therefore a crisis 
of hegemony, since it occurs when a formerly hegemonic class is 
challenged from below and is no longer able to hold together a 
cohesive bloc of social alliances.59 
During	  an	  organic	  crisis,	  “the	  structures	  and	  practices	  that	  constitute	  or	  reproduce	  a	  
hegemonic	  order	  fall	  into	  chronic	  and	  visible	  disrepair,	  creating	  a	  new	  terrain	  of	  
political	  and	  cultural	  contention,	  and	  the	  possibility	  (but	  only	  the	  possibility)	  of	  social	  
transformation”	  (Carroll	  2010,	  pp.	  170	  –	  171).	  
The	  agents	  of	  social	  transformation	  take	  the	  organisational	  form	  of	  what	  Gramsci	  
refers	  to	  as	  ‘the	  modern	  Prince,’	  “a	  coalition	  of	  the	  rebellious	  subalterns,	  engaged	  in	  
acts	  of	  self-­‐liberation	  of	  hegemonic	  politics”	  (Thomas	  2013a,	  pp.	  33).	  The	  modern	  
Prince	  thus	  refers	  neither	  to	  a	  ‘concrete	  individual’	  nor	  to	  a	  ‘single	  centralized	  
entity,’	  but	  to	  ‘a	  dynamic	  collective	  process’	  from	  which	  a	  ‘distinctively	  new	  type’	  of	  
political	  party	  emerges	  (Thomas	  2013a,	  p.	  32).	  Gramsci’s	  conception	  of	  this	  new	  sort	  
of	  political	  party	  envisages	  it	  as	  a	  ‘collective	  organism’	  that	  represents	  “an	  expansive	  
revolutionary	  process	  in	  movement”	  and,	  rather	  than	  solidifying	  and	  deforming	  its	  
development	  with	  traditional	  constitutional	  forms,	  it	  represents	  “a	  pedagogical	  
laboratory	  for	  unlearning	  the	  habits	  of	  subalternity	  and	  discovering	  new	  forms	  of	  
conviviality,	  mutuality	  and	  collective	  self-­‐determination”	  (Thomas	  2013a,	  pp.	  32	  –	  
33).	  While	  organic	  crises	  present	  opportunities	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  counter-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  By	  these	  criteria,	  the	  ‘shock’	  outcome	  of	  the	  ‘Brexit’	  referendum,	  where	  a	  narrow	  majority	  of	  UK	  citizens	  voted	  for	  Britain	  to	  leave	  the	  EU	  (Kochan	  2016),	  and	  the	  US	  election	  results	  that	  have	  propelled	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  Republican	  Party	  nominee,	  Donald	  Trump,	  into	  power	  in	  what	  many	  see	  as	  a	  ‘protest	  vote’	  against	  ‘globalisation’	  by	  its	  ‘losers’	  (Eichengreen	  2016)	  are	  seen	  by	  some	  analysts	  as	  being	  signs	  of	  a	  current	  crisis	  of	  hegemony	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies.	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hegemonic	  historic	  blocs	  by	  subaltern	  classes	  and	  subaltern	  social	  groups	  working	  
together,	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  potential	  is	  realised	  depends	  on	  many	  factors.	  One	  
crucial	  variable	  that	  affects	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  bloc	  can	  take	  
advantage	  of	  an	  organic	  crisis	  to	  strengthen	  its	  position	  enough	  to	  effect	  real	  change	  
is	  how	  much	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  in	  what	  Gramsci	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘war	  of	  
position.’	  	  
Gramsci	  distinguishes	  between	  a	  war	  of	  manoeuvre	  (which	  entails	  an	  attempt	  to	  
overthrow	  the	  state	  or	  ruling	  class,	  as	  happened	  in	  1917	  in	  Russia	  when	  the	  
Bolsheviks	  overthrew	  the	  tsarist	  government)	  and	  a	  war	  of	  position	  (Rupert	  2003).	  
The	  war	  of	  position	  “is	  a	  strategy	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  construction	  of	  self-­‐conscious	  
social	  groups	  into	  a	  concerted	  emancipatory	  bloc	  within	  society”	  (Morton	  2007a,	  p.	  
105).	  The	  importance	  of	  an	  effective	  war	  of	  position	  cannot	  be	  overstated:	  “It	  is	  only	  
when	  the	  war	  of	  position	  has	  built	  up	  a	  combination	  of	  organized	  social	  forces	  strong	  
enough	  to	  challenge	  the	  dominant	  power	  in	  society	  that	  political	  authority	  in	  the	  
state	  can	  be	  effectively	  challenged	  and	  replaced”	  (Morton	  2007a,	  pp.	  105	  –	  106).	  	  
For	  Cox,	  too,	  the	  war	  of	  position	  is	  essential	  and	  constitutes	  “a	  long-­‐term	  task	  for	  
organic	  intellectuals	  working	  in	  constant	  interaction	  with	  the	  groups	  whose	  dissent	  
from	  the	  established	  order	  makes	  them	  candidates	  for	  inclusion”	  (Cox	  1987,	  p.	  390).	  
But,	  as	  history	  shows,	  the	  ruling	  class	  is	  adept	  at	  co-­‐opting	  key	  elements	  of	  
dissenting	  groups	  (such	  as	  the	  leaders	  of	  trades	  unions	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  
organisations	  that	  begin	  as	  oppositional	  and	  then	  enter	  ‘mainstream’	  institutions	  
that	  give	  them	  a	  stake	  in	  supporting	  and	  upholding	  the	  status	  quo),	  a	  tactic	  Gramsci	  
refers	  to	  as	  trasformismo.	  Another	  danger	  is	  the	  onset	  of	  what	  Gramsci	  refers	  to	  as	  
passive	  revolution,	  whereby	  the	  war	  of	  position	  strategy	  is	  stalled,	  being	  “strong	  
enough	  to	  provoke	  opposition,	  but	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  overcome”	  those	  in	  power	  
(Morton	  2007a,	  p.	  106).	  Thomas	  (2013a,	  p.	  23)	  explains	  that,	  “In	  its	  broadest	  sense,	  
the	  notion	  of	  passive	  revolution	  for	  Gramsci	  signified	  a	  distinctive	  process	  of	  
(political)	  modernization	  that	  lacked	  the	  meaningful	  participation	  of	  popular	  classes	  
in	  undertaking	  and	  consolidating	  social	  transformation.”60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current	  organic	  crisis	  of	  global	  capitalism,	  the	  more	  enlightened	  factions	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  could	  achieve	  a	  passive	  revolution	  if	  they	  succeed	  in	  their	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On	  the	  other	  hand,	  having	  to	  resort	  to	  retaining	  power	  by	  means	  of	  passive	  
revolution	  demonstrates	  the	  underlying	  weakness	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  as	  ‘revolutions	  
from	  above’	  indicate	  a	  failure	  to	  achieve	  hegemony	  through	  consent,	  which	  in	  turn	  
presents	  opportunities	  for	  counterhegemonic	  forces	  to	  ally	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  ‘modern	  
Prince’	  and	  develop	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  consensual	  politics	  in	  the	  process	  of	  engaging	  in	  
an	  ‘active	  revolution’	  (Thomas	  2013a,	  p.	  30).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  economic,	  social	  
and	  political	  changes	  wrought	  by	  the	  neoliberal	  globalisation	  project	  over	  the	  past	  
three	  decades,	  however,	  there	  are	  many	  challenges	  to	  overcome	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
building	  such	  a	  counterhegemonic	  movement.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  passive	  
revolution	  and	  trasformismo,	  subaltern	  classes	  and	  social	  groups	  trying	  to	  build	  a	  
counterhegemonic	  historic	  bloc	  face	  several	  other	  formidable	  challenges.	  As	  Cox	  
(1996a,	  pp.	  128	  –	  129)	  writes,	  the	  strategic	  implications	  of	  the	  need	  to	  win	  the	  war	  
of	  position	  before	  attempting	  to	  take	  state	  power	  are	  ‘fraught	  with	  difficulties’:	  
To build up the basis of an alternative state and society upon the 
leadership of the working class [or another subordinate group] 
means creating alternative institutions and alternative intellectual 
resources within existing societies and building bridges between 
workers and other subordinate classes. It means actively building a 
counter-hegemony within the established hegemony while resisting 
the pressures and temptations to relapse into pursuit of incremental 
gains for subaltern groups within the framework of bourgeois 
hegemony. 
Regardless	  of	  the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  task,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  the	  organic	  intellectuals	  of	  
subordinate	  groups	  and	  classes	  understand	  that	  they	  need	  to	  guide	  the	  evolution	  of	  
“…a	  clearly	  distinctive	  culture,	  organization,	  and	  technique,	  and	  do	  so	  in	  constant	  
interaction	  with	  the	  members	  of	  the	  emergent	  block”	  (Cox	  1996a,	  p.	  132).	  In	  the	  
process	  of	  building	  a	  new	  world	  within	  the	  existing	  one,	  working	  class	  consciousness	  
must	  also	  evolve.	  
At	  the	  time	  that	  Gramsci	  was	  writing,	  he	  distinguished	  between	  three	  levels	  of	  
working	  class	  consciousness,	  beginning	  with	  the	  ‘economico-­‐corporate’	  
consciousness	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  material	  interests	  of	  a	  particular	  group,	  such	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘green	  capitalism’	  project,	  whereby	  the	  current	  fossil-­‐fuel	  based	  global	  capitalism	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  renewable-­‐energy	  based	  global	  capitalism	  using	  market	  mechanisms	  that	  open	  up	  new	  avenues	  of	  capital	  accumulation	  by	  enforcing	  the	  further	  privatisation	  of	  the	  commons	  and	  transforming	  all	  of	  nature	  into	  tradeable	  commodities	  (as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  6,	  7	  and	  8).	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workers	  at	  a	  particular	  workplace	  (Cox	  1996a).	  At	  a	  more	  advanced	  level,	  class	  
consciousness	  extends	  to	  a	  whole	  social	  class	  and	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  class	  
solidarity,	  but	  remains	  limited	  in	  its	  focus	  on	  economic	  issues.	  The	  most	  advanced	  
level	  of	  consciousness,	  the	  ‘hegemonic,’	  harmonises	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  leading	  class	  
“with	  those	  of	  subordinate	  classes	  and	  incorporates	  these	  other	  interests	  into	  an	  
ideology	  expressed	  in	  universal	  terms”	  (Cox	  1996a,	  p.	  133).	  In	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  
twentieth	  centuries,	  historical	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  many	  workers	  in	  the	  advanced	  
capitalist	  societies	  had	  at	  least	  the	  most	  basic	  class	  conscious	  awareness	  that	  
Gramsci	  refers	  to	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Hyman	  1975);	  this	  situation	  was	  reversed	  
during	  the	  Reagan	  and	  Thatcher	  eras,	  with	  individualism	  having	  widely	  displaced	  
even	  this	  elementary	  level	  of	  ‘economico-­‐corporative’	  class	  consciousness	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  weakening	  of	  organised	  labour	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  societies	  and	  the	  
successes	  of	  the	  ideological	  work	  of	  capitalism’s	  organic	  intellectuals	  in	  vilifying	  the	  
labour	  movement	  (McIlroy	  2011;	  McIntyre	  &	  Hillard	  2012).61	  There	  is,	  however,	  one	  
aspect	  of	  people’s	  consciousness	  that	  could	  work	  in	  favour	  of	  progressive	  forces:	  the	  
contemporary	  wide-­‐ranging	  ‘common	  sense’	  awareness	  and	  discussion	  about	  the	  
injustices	  of	  ‘globalisation,’	  a	  system	  that	  is	  now	  widely	  acknowledged	  to	  favour	  
‘elites’	  (the	  ‘1	  per	  cent’)	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  ‘ordinary	  people’	  (the	  ’99	  per	  cent’).62	  
Gramsci	  identifies	  one	  crucial	  task	  of	  the	  organic	  intellectuals	  of	  subordinate	  groups	  
as	  being	  to	  draw	  attention	  to,	  emphasise,	  and	  elaborate	  on	  the	  “critical	  elements	  
and	  ‘good	  sense’	  which	  are	  already	  present	  within	  people’s	  ‘common	  sense’”	  
(Forgacs	  2000,	  p.	  323;	  see	  also	  Hyman	  1975).	  Because	  ‘common	  sense’	  is	  neither	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Stuart	  Hall	  (2011)	  provides	  a	  fascinating	  account	  of	  the	  2011	  ‘London	  Riots’	  sparked	  by	  the	  death	  of	  Mark	  Duggan,	  who	  was	  shot	  by	  police	  falsely	  claiming	  he	  was	  threatening	  them.	  Duggan’s	  killing	  provoked	  public	  protests	  that	  soon	  escalated	  into	  riots	  across	  a	  number	  of	  London	  boroughs	  and	  lasted	  for	  nearly	  a	  week	  (6	  –	  11	  August	  2011).	  Subsequent	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  participants	  in	  these	  riots	  were	  mostly	  poor,	  unemployed	  and	  young,	  and	  Hall	  explains	  their	  motivations	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  prevailing	  ideologies	  of	  individualism	  (that	  tears	  the	  social	  fabrics	  of	  communities)	  and	  material	  consumerism	  (which	  urges	  ‘consumers’	  to	  measure	  their	  own	  and	  others’	  worth	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  much	  ‘stuff’	  they	  have	  and	  how	  many	  brand-­‐name	  products	  they	  own).	  Keaney	  (2014,	  p.	  62)	  refers	  to	  the	  London	  ‘rioters’	  as	  “…the	  fruit	  of	  the	  deindustrialization	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  closing	  of	  opportunities	  for	  semi-­‐skilled	  and	  unskilled	  labor	  outside	  of	  low-­‐paying	  jobs	  in	  the	  retail	  and	  ancillary	  service	  sectors.”	  62	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  ‘We	  are	  the	  99	  per	  cent’	  was	  the	  popular	  slogan	  of	  the	  ‘Occupy	  Movement’	  that	  spread	  around	  the	  capitalist	  world	  in	  2012	  in	  reaction	  to	  government	  responses	  to	  the	  GFC	  (Graeber	  2013).	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‘monolithic’	  nor	  ‘univocal,’	  but	  is	  rather	  “a	  syncretic	  historical	  residue,	  fragmentary	  
and	  contradictory,	  open	  to	  multiple	  interpretations	  and	  potentially	  supportive	  of	  
very	  different	  kinds	  of	  social	  visions	  and	  political	  projects”	  (Rupert	  2003,	  p.	  185),	  
much	  of	  the	  war	  of	  position	  is	  fought	  on	  this	  ideological	  terrain	  and	  it	  is	  thus	  crucial	  
to	  “engage	  with	  what	  they	  actually	  think”	  if	  one	  is	  to	  “shift	  people’s	  common	  sense”	  
in	  progressive	  directions	  (Forgacs	  2000,	  p.	  324).63	  	  In	  this	  ideological	  ‘war,’	  another	  
important	  Gramscian	  concept	  that	  is	  crucial	  is	  the	  ethico-­‐political	  sphere:	  “the	  
ideological,	  moral	  and	  cultural	  cements	  which	  bond	  a	  society	  together”	  (Forgacs	  
2000,	  p.	  190).	  As	  discussed	  in	  later	  chapters,	  ethical	  and	  moral	  issues	  may	  become	  
more	  salient	  as	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  people	  and	  communities	  suffer	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  ecological,	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  crises	  that	  are	  already	  destabilising	  
many	  people’s	  lives	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  exacerbated	  as	  global	  warming	  continues	  to	  
manifest	  in	  more	  intense	  and	  frequent	  ‘extreme	  weather’	  events	  such	  as	  extensive	  
droughts,	  rising	  sea	  levels,	  and	  other	  unpredictable	  changes	  to	  the	  Earth	  System	  that	  
affect	  human	  productive	  and	  reproductive	  capabilities.	  	  
While	  there	  is	  as	  yet	  no	  indication	  that	  global	  warming	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  
Anthropocene	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  much	  concern,	  or	  even	  attracting	  much	  attention	  from	  
the	  general	  populace	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  societies	  (Hamilton	  2017),	  it	  is	  entirely	  
plausible	  that	  future	  catastrophic	  events	  related	  to	  these	  developments	  may	  
provoke	  such	  concerns	  -­‐	  as	  well	  as	  critiques	  of	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  system	  that	  has	  
caused	  these	  shifts	  in	  the	  Earth	  System	  and	  a	  willingness	  to	  experiment	  with	  other	  
ways	  of	  living.	  To	  date,	  elite	  responses	  to	  hardships	  experienced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
‘extreme	  weather’	  events	  have	  favoured	  the	  rich	  (as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  
Chapters	  4	  and	  8),	  and	  this	  tendency	  to	  ignore	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  poor	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  ‘natural	  catastrophes’	  is	  likely	  to	  continue;	  an	  awareness	  of	  this	  issue	  may	  make	  
people	  more	  receptive	  to	  questioning	  not	  only	  the	  ability	  of	  capitalism	  to	  stop	  
damaging	  the	  biosphere	  that	  all	  life	  forms	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  and	  depend	  on	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  The	  recent	  outcomes	  of	  the	  ‘Brexit’	  referendum	  (when	  the	  majority	  of	  British	  citizens	  voted	  to	  ‘exit’	  the	  Euro	  zone)	  (Curtice	  2016)	  and	  the	  US	  election	  (where	  nearly	  all	  predictions	  of	  the	  outcome	  were	  wrong	  and	  Donald	  Trump	  was	  voted	  into	  power)	  (Balnaves	  2016)	  are	  stark	  reminders	  of	  how	  important	  it	  is	  to	  engage	  with	  what	  people	  are	  actually	  thinking.	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their	  survival	  but	  also	  the	  morality	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production,	  so	  that	  social	  
justice	  issues	  become	  increasingly	  important	  in	  the	  war	  of	  position	  that	  global	  justice	  
actors	  and	  ecosocialists	  are	  engaged	  in	  as	  the	  organic	  crisis	  of	  global	  capitalism	  
continues	  to	  unfold.64	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  organic	  crisis	  is	  critically	  analysed	  in	  Chapter	  
4	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  modified	  MHS	  perspective	  whose	  features	  are	  outlined	  in	  
this	  chapter.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  It	  is	  precisely	  such	  social	  justice	  issues	  that	  are	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  ecosocialists,	  as	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  6,	  7	  and	  8.	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Chapter	  Four:	  The	  Biosphere	  and	  social	  forces	  in	  a	  non-­‐
hegemonic	  world	  order	  beset	  by	  organic	  crisis	  
“The true barrier of capitalist production is capital itself. It is that 
capital and its self-expansion appear as the starting and finishing 
point, as the motive and the purpose of production; production is 
only production for capital and not the reverse, i.e. the means of 
production are not simply means for a steadily expanding pattern of 
life for the society of the producers.” 
(Marx Capital Volume 3 [1981], p. 358)  
 
In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  analytical	  framework	  is	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  critically	  
analyse	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  ecological,	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  crises	  
that	  the	  extension	  and	  intensification	  of	  global	  capitalism	  engenders.	  I	  conduct	  this	  
analysis	  by	  referring	  to	  relevant	  academic	  literature	  from	  many	  different	  discipline	  
areas,	  including	  GPE,	  IR,	  Sociology,	  Political	  Science,	  Economics,	  Social	  Movement	  
Studies,	  Earth	  System	  Science,	  Climate	  Science,	  and	  ecosocialist	  literature.	  My	  main	  
objective	  in	  drawing	  on	  this	  wide	  range	  of	  academic	  literature	  is	  to	  verify	  ecosocialist	  
accounts	  that	  there	  are,	  indeed,	  crises	  in	  all	  these	  systems	  and	  that	  these	  crises	  are	  
interconnected.	  I	  apply	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  framework	  under	  sub-­‐headings	  that	  reflect	  
a	  dialectical	  analysis	  that	  shifts	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  discussion	  from	  how	  social	  systems	  
affect	  the	  biosphere	  to	  how	  the	  changed	  biosphere	  affects	  social	  systems.	  I	  begin	  
the	  chapter	  with	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  current	  world	  order.	  	  
Using	  Gramsci’s	  definition	  of	  hegemony	  to	  categorise	  different	  structures	  of	  world	  
order	  in	  the	  past	  one	  and	  a	  half	  centuries	  as	  hegemonic	  and	  non-­‐hegemonic,	  Cox	  
(1987)	  identifies	  the	  1789–1873	  liberal	  world	  order	  and	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  
capitalist	  world	  order	  as	  hegemonic.	  In	  Cox’s	  analysis,	  the	  ‘era	  of	  rival	  imperialisms’	  
(1873-­‐1945)	  was	  non-­‐hegemonic	  and	  was	  characterised	  by	  the	  instability	  in	  the	  
global	  order	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century’s	  two	  world	  wars.	  Writing	  in	  
1987,	  Cox	  refers	  to	  the	  first	  hegemonic	  world	  order	  as	  Pax	  Britannica	  because	  Britain	  
reigned	  supreme	  and	  shaped	  the	  global	  economy	  in	  its	  interests;	  the	  second	  
hegemonic	  world	  order,	  Pax	  Americana,	  began	  when	  the	  United	  States	  emerged	  as	  
the	  clear	  victor	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  This	  categorisation	  replaced	  Cox’s	  initial	  tentative	  
(1981,	  1983)	  proposal	  that	  1965	  signalled	  the	  relative	  decline	  of	  US	  power,	  and	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hence	  the	  end	  of	  Pax	  Americana.	  Commenting	  on	  developments	  that	  followed	  these	  
earlier	  writings,	  Cox	  adopted	  the	  view	  that	  US	  hegemony	  in	  world	  affairs	  still	  
prevailed	  into	  the	  early	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  after	  the	  transition	  that	  began	  in	  the	  
mid-­‐1970s	  from	  the	  earlier,	  post-­‐WWII	  form	  of	  Keynesian	  capitalism	  to	  the	  US-­‐led	  
neoliberal	  economic	  globalisation	  project	  (Cox	  with	  Schechter	  2002).	  In	  interviews	  
conducted	  after	  the	  2008	  GFC,	  however,	  Cox	  argues	  that	  this	  neoliberal	  project	  no	  
longer	  enjoys	  widespread	  support,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  the	  popular	  protests	  that	  
occurred	  both	  in	  the	  US	  and	  in	  European	  countries	  such	  as	  Italy	  and	  Greece	  in	  the	  
GFC’s	  aftermath	  (Martin	  2013).	  At	  the	  global	  level,	  Cox	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  also	  
much	  disquiet	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  US	  to	  continue	  its	  role	  as	  global	  hegemon,	  
with	  tensions	  between	  the	  US	  and	  an	  economically-­‐ascendant	  China,	  and	  between	  
the	  US	  and	  Russia,	  being	  indicators	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  declining	  power	  (Schouten	  
2009).	  
Despite	  the	  US	  still	  being	  militarily	  and	  economically	  dominant	  (Buzan	  &	  Lawson	  
2014;	  Starrs	  2013),	  and	  continuing	  to	  exert	  its	  influence	  and	  power	  globally	  in	  order	  
to	  ensure	  the	  survival	  and	  spread	  of	  US-­‐dominated	  global	  capitalism,	  the	  damaging	  
and	  destabilising	  effects	  of	  neoliberalising	  policies	  provoke	  widespread	  dissent	  
within	  global	  civil	  society	  (Bruff	  2014;	  Carroll	  &	  Jarvis	  2015).	  This	  is	  because,	  rather	  
than	  representing	  a	  ‘universal	  general	  interest’	  whereby	  a	  majority	  of	  classes	  and	  
social	  groups	  benefit,	  capitalism	  overwhelmingly	  favours	  a	  global	  elite	  comprising	  of	  
a	  TCC	  and	  an	  allied	  ‘transnational	  managerial	  class’	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  planet	  and	  
of	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people.	  In	  short,	  the	  current	  world	  order	  is	  
non-­‐hegemonic	  because	  the	  project	  of	  capitalist	  globalization	  that	  prevails	  cannot	  
make	  the	  concessions	  that	  would	  elicit	  the	  widespread	  support	  from	  global	  civil	  
society	  that	  is	  the	  prerequisite	  of	  hegemony.	  This	  understanding	  led	  Cox	  (1996e,	  p.	  
155)	  to	  conclude	  that	  “globalization	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  history	  but	  the	  initiation	  of	  a	  
new	  era	  of	  conflicts	  and	  reconciliations.”65	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  US	  political	  economist	  Frances	  Fukuyama	  wrote	  an	  influential	  article	  entitled	  ‘The	  end	  of	  history?’	  which	  was	  published	  in	  a	  US	  foreign	  policy	  magazine,	  The	  National	  Interest,	  in	  1989,	  and	  in	  which	  he	  notoriously	  declared	  that	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  shift	  to	  capitalist	  economies	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  to	  western	  consumer	  cultures	  in	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In	  the	  1990s,	  Cox	  (1996e,	  p.	  155)	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  that	  capitalist	  
globalisation	  could	  exacerbate,	  including	  migration,	  social	  polarisation,	  and	  
ecological	  issues	  such	  as	  pollution	  and	  the	  over-­‐exploitation	  of	  non-­‐renewable	  
resources.	  Since	  then,	  many	  of	  these	  issues	  have	  indeed	  combined	  to	  become	  
trigger-­‐points	  for	  social	  conflict	  and	  there	  is	  overwhelming	  evidence	  that	  the	  current	  
capitalist	  world	  order	  is	  experiencing	  an	  organic	  (permanent	  and	  system-­‐wide)	  crisis	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  serious	  and	  widespread	  ecological,	  economic	  and	  socio-­‐political	  
harms	  it	  engenders	  as	  it	  continues	  its	  ‘normal’	  operations.	  In	  my	  analysis,	  
ecosocialists	  within	  the	  wider	  climate	  justice	  and	  global	  justice	  movement	  are	  one	  
contingent	  of	  the	  contending	  groups	  involved	  in	  the	  resultant	  contemporary	  
conflicts.	  Using	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  framework	  of	  analysis	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	  this	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  early	  21st-­‐century	  
crises	  as	  identified	  and	  discussed	  by	  experts	  in	  the	  relevant	  discipline	  areas	  as	  well	  as	  
by	  ecosocialists.	  The	  references	  to	  the	  findings	  and	  assessments	  of	  experts	  who	  are	  
not	  ecosocialist	  theorists	  and	  activists	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  a	  means	  of	  
evaluating	  the	  relevance	  and	  accuracy	  of	  ecosocialist	  analyses	  of	  the	  current	  organic	  
crisis.	  
As	  noted	  previously,	  ecosocialists	  argue	  that	  the	  most	  serious	  of	  the	  crises	  
engendered	  by	  global	  capitalism	  –	  and	  those	  requiring	  immediate	  solutions	  –	  are	  the	  
ecological	  crises	  as	  they	  threaten	  not	  only	  the	  survival	  of	  many	  living	  species	  but	  also	  
the	  survival	  of	  humanity	  itself.	  While	  natural	  scientists	  try	  to	  present	  their	  findings	  
objectively	  and	  generally	  refrain	  from	  making	  comments	  about	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  
political	  systems	  (such	  as	  capitalism),	  they	  have	  been	  increasingly	  vocal	  about	  the	  
urgency	  of	  mitigating	  global	  warming	  and	  the	  need	  to	  stop	  GHG	  emissions.	  Given	  the	  
centrality	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  environmental	  degradation	  to	  ecosocialists,	  and	  following	  
the	  rationale	  of	  adding	  ‘Material	  capabilities:	  Biosphere’	  as	  a	  category	  that	  
encompasses	  the	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  ‘productive	  and	  reproductive	  capabilities’	  in	  the	  
MHS	  Redux	  II	  analytical	  schema	  used	  in	  this	  research,	  this	  chapter’s	  discussion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  former	  USSR	  and	  in	  China,	  signaled	  “the	  unabashed	  victory	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  liberalism”	  (Fukuyama	  1989,	  p.	  3).	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begins	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  scientific	  explanations	  of	  the	  current	  environmental	  
crises	  and	  their	  anthropogenic	  causes.	  
Material	  capabilities:	  The	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  production	  and	  
the	  Anthropocene’s	  unstable	  biosphere	  
As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  in	  this	  research	  project	  the	  Earth’s	  biosphere	  is	  considered	  
to	  be	  an	  ‘umbrella’	  analytical	  category	  because	  it	  provides	  the	  wider	  context	  and	  the	  
foundations	  on	  which	  all	  other	  material	  capabilities	  depend,	  including	  the	  material	  
productive	  and	  reproductive	  capabilities	  of	  all	  life	  forms.	  Reversing	  the	  dominant	  
classical	  economic	  view	  (which	  is	  also	  a	  normative	  perspective	  adopted	  by	  political	  
leaders,	  policymakers	  and	  many	  academics)	  that	  ‘nature’	  is	  a	  passive	  element	  and	  a	  
‘subset’	  of	  the	  economy,	  in	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  framework	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  its	  
capitalist	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  is	  understood	  as	  necessarily	  existing	  within	  
the	  Earth’s	  biosphere	  (or	  ‘nature’)	  and	  thus	  as	  being	  subject	  to	  the	  restrictions	  of	  the	  
objective	  laws	  of	  physics	  that	  living	  within	  a	  natural	  biosphere	  impose.	  Moreover,	  
the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Earth’s	  biosphere	  and	  human	  production	  and	  
reproduction	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  single	  complex	  and	  evolving	  dynamic	  system:	  
while	  the	  productive	  and	  reproductive	  capabilities	  of	  all	  life	  forms	  are	  embedded	  
within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  biosphere,	  a	  relatively	  small	  proportion	  of	  humans	  benefit	  
from	  productive	  activities	  dependent	  on	  deploying	  practices	  and	  technologies	  that	  
radically	  change	  this	  biosphere,	  and	  the	  transformed	  biosphere	  in	  turn	  affects	  the	  
productive	  and	  reproductive	  capabilities	  of	  all	  life	  forms	  (including	  the	  vast	  majority	  
of	  humans	  who	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  damage	  to	  the	  biosphere).	  As	  noted	  in	  
previous	  chapters,	  the	  impacts	  of	  human	  activities	  on	  the	  biosphere	  are	  now	  so	  
widespread	  and	  persistent	  that	  they	  have	  prompted	  Earth	  System	  scientists	  to	  
propose	  the	  formal	  demarcation	  of	  a	  new	  geological	  epoch:	  the	  Anthropocene	  
(Crutzen	  2002;	  Williams	  &	  Crutzen	  2013).	  Some	  theorists	  argue	  that	  because	  the	  
environmental	  damage	  is	  caused	  by	  specifically	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  
rather	  than	  by	  ‘humans’	  in	  general	  (Baskin	  2014),	  it	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  refer	  
to	  the	  new	  epoch	  as	  the	  ‘Capitalocene’	  (Moore	  2016).	  While	  there	  are	  significant	  
disagreements	  between	  analysts	  and	  activists	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  word	  
‘Anthropocene’	  should	  be	  replaced	  by	  the	  word	  ‘Capitalocene,’	  ecosocialists	  have	  for	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many	  years	  made	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  production	  has	  
particularly	  damaging	  effects	  on	  the	  environment	  because,	  among	  other	  reasons,	  
capitalism	  is	  motivated	  by	  competition	  and	  profit	  maximisation,	  which	  entail	  
minimising	  costs	  and	  focusing	  on	  short-­‐term	  financial	  gains.66	  This	  exploitation	  of	  
both	  people	  and	  nature	  spreads	  geographically	  as	  capital	  expands	  its	  operations	  into	  
‘underdeveloped’	  regions	  of	  the	  world.67	  However,	  the	  global	  expansion	  of	  
capitalism	  occurs	  unevenly	  and	  follows	  geographically-­‐	  and	  historically-­‐specific	  
trajectories	  that	  differ	  across	  space	  and	  time	  because	  “…once	  capitalism	  is	  
established	  in	  one	  part	  of	  the	  world	  it	  affects	  and	  changes	  the	  form	  of	  transition	  to	  
capitalist	  development	  elsewhere”	  (Ashman	  2009,	  p.	  36).	  In	  two	  seminal	  works,	  the	  
History	  of	  the	  Russian	  Revolution	  and	  The	  Permanent	  Revolution,	  Leon	  Trotsky	  
expands	  on	  and	  deploys	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘uneven	  and	  combined	  development’	  as	  an	  
analytical	  tool	  for	  understanding	  these	  characteristics	  of	  capitalism.68	  	  
Applying	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘uneven	  and	  combined	  development’	  to	  the	  environmental	  
issues	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  his	  analysis,	  ecosocialist	  James	  O’Connor	  discusses	  how	  
these	  features	  of	  the	  global	  expansion	  of	  capitalism	  not	  only	  spread	  but	  also	  
intensify	  the	  environmental	  degradation	  inherent	  in	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  
production.	  Emphasising	  unequal	  power	  relationships,	  O’Connor	  defines	  ‘uneven	  
development’	  with	  reference	  to	  development	  characterised	  by	  exploitative	  
relationships	  “between	  town	  and	  country	  (centre/periphery;	  developed/	  
underdeveloped	  country)”	  and	  ‘combined	  development’	  with	  reference	  to	  how	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Some	  ecosocialists	  argue	  that	  the	  term	  ‘Capitalocene’	  is	  both	  confusing	  and	  counter-­‐productive,	  constituting	  an	  unwarranted	  and	  unnecessary	  attack	  on	  the	  very	  scientists	  who	  should	  be	  applauded	  for	  their	  efforts	  to	  demarcate	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  expansion	  of	  global	  capitalism,	  which	  these	  scientists	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Great	  Acceleration,’	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  (Angus	  2016).	  67	  With	  the	  ‘underdevelopment’	  being	  measured	  against	  the	  ‘development’	  of	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies,	  and	  using	  crude	  indicators	  such	  as	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  that	  fail	  to	  consider	  either	  the	  environmental	  costs	  or	  the	  distributional	  outcomes	  of	  increases	  in	  GDP.	  68	  The	  understanding	  that	  capitalism	  develops	  unevenly	  has	  been	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels,	  and	  this	  understanding	  also	  informed	  Lenin’s	  analyses	  of	  imperialism	  (Löwy	  2010;	  Pröbsting	  2016).	  In	  the	  interests	  of	  not	  straying	  too	  far	  from	  the	  main	  concerns	  in	  this	  research	  project,	  I	  refer	  the	  reader	  to	  Desai,	  Freeman	  and	  Kagarlitsky	  (2016)	  for	  a	  concise	  overview	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  uneven	  and	  combined	  development	  explains	  the	  expansion	  of	  global	  capitalism	  after	  imperialism’s	  ‘Thirty	  Years’	  Crisis’	  (1914	  –	  1945)	  that	  began	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  I.	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geographical	  growth	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  combine	  “…the	  most	  
profitable	  features	  of	  development	  [such	  as	  ‘advanced	  technology,	  industrial	  
organisation	  and	  division	  of	  labour’]	  and	  underdevelopment	  [such	  as	  a	  disciplined	  
and	  cheap	  labour	  force]	  in	  a	  new	  unity	  which	  maximises	  profit	  increases”	  (O’Connor	  
1989,	  pp.	  1-­‐2).	  Some	  of	  the	  environmentally	  damaging	  effects	  of	  uneven	  
development	  that	  O’Connor	  identifies	  in	  rural,	  periphery	  and	  underdeveloped	  
regions	  include:	  deforestation	  (primarily	  as	  a	  result	  of	  clearing	  land	  to	  facilitate	  
agribusiness)	  and	  the	  associated	  environmental	  problems	  this	  causes	  (for	  example,	  
soil	  loss,	  aridity,	  and	  droughts);	  the	  intense	  exploitation	  of	  resources	  such	  as	  fossil	  
fuels	  and	  other	  minerals,	  and	  the	  pollution	  associated	  with	  mining	  and	  processing	  
these	  resources;	  and	  the	  degradation	  of	  land	  and	  waterways	  associated	  with	  
agribusiness	  practices	  of	  monoculture	  and	  the	  usage	  of	  polluting	  chemical	  fertilisers	  
and	  pesticides.	  ‘Combined	  development,’	  whereby	  capital	  relocates	  manufacturing	  
operations	  to	  underdeveloped	  regions	  with	  low	  wages	  and	  lax	  environmental	  
regulations,	  damages	  previously	  ‘underdeveloped’	  Global	  South	  environments	  by	  
exporting	  both	  dangerous	  products	  (such	  as	  chemicals	  banned	  in	  the	  advanced	  
capitalist	  countries)	  and	  pollution	  from	  the	  Global	  North.	  O’Connor	  (1989,	  pp.	  10	  –	  
11)	  concludes	  that:	  
When uneven and combined development of capital are themselves 
combined, it would appear that super-pollution in industrial zones 
may be explained by super-ecodestruction of land and resources in 
raw material zones, and vice versa. Depletion and exhaustion of 
resources and pollution depend on one another; they are the 
necessary result of the same universal process of capital 
‘valorisation’. Depletion/exhaustion and pollution are thus not 
independent issues. The natural wealth of the world is depleted and 
turned into garbage, often dangerous garbage, through global capital 
accumulation. And the unwanted by-products – pollution –have the 
effect of depleting/exhausting resources. Put formally, the greater 
the profit rate, the greater the accumulation rate, the greater the rate 
of depletion/exhaustion which indirectly leads to a greater rate of 
pollution. 
While	  the	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  destruction	  that	  are	  a	  natural	  part	  of	  
capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  take	  a	  variety	  of	  forms	  that	  affect	  all	  ecosystems,	  
ecosocialists	  have	  been	  receptive	  to,	  and	  fully	  support,	  the	  arguments	  of	  many	  
scientists	  that	  global	  warming,	  climate	  change	  and	  ocean	  acidification	  are	  the	  most	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pressing	  symptoms	  of	  the	  anthropogenic	  damage	  to	  the	  biosphere	  in	  the	  current	  
conjuncture	  and	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.69	  The	  primary	  cause	  of	  global	  warming	  
and	  ocean	  acidification	  is	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  that	  emit	  CO2,	  the	  
predominant	  GHG	  currently	  forcing	  global	  warming	  (Australian	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  
2015;	  IPCC	  2014c).70	  Fossil	  fuels	  are	  essential	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  global	  capitalism	  
as	  they	  are	  used	  not	  only	  for	  generating	  the	  energy	  required	  for	  the	  production	  of	  
goods	  and	  services	  but	  also	  for	  the	  transportation	  of	  goods	  and	  people	  around	  the	  
globe	  (Smith	  2013;	  Tanuro	  2013).	  In	  addition,	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  products	  derived	  from	  
them	  are	  essential	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  large-­‐scale	  agribusiness	  practices	  (Magdoff	  
2015),	  which	  also	  contribute	  substantially	  to	  the	  emission	  of	  two	  other	  extremely	  
potent	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  GHGs,	  methane	  and	  nitrous	  oxide	  (IPCC	  2014c).	  While	  the	  
energy	  derived	  from	  fossil	  fuels	  is	  central	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  global	  capitalism	  as	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  While	  ‘global	  warming’	  and	  ‘climate	  change’	  refer	  to	  different	  (albeit	  related)	  physical	  phenomena	  and	  are	  both	  used	  by	  scientists	  depending	  on	  the	  context,	  scientific	  bodies	  such	  as	  NASA	  use	  the	  term	  ‘climate	  change’	  in	  their	  public	  communications	  (Conway	  2008).	  ‘Climate	  change’	  is	  also	  the	  preferred	  term	  in	  mainstream	  media	  and	  orthodox	  accounts	  of	  the	  current	  anthropogenic	  changes	  to	  the	  Earth	  System,	  but	  this	  terminology	  has	  an	  ideological	  function	  as	  it	  can	  be	  (and	  has	  been)	  used	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  part	  of	  a	  natural	  cycle	  (‘climate	  has	  always	  changed’)	  and	  detracts	  attention	  from	  the	  more	  threatening	  issue	  that	  the	  global	  climate	  is,	  on	  average,	  warming,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  resultant	  energy	  imbalances	  within	  the	  overall	  Earth	  System	  that	  are	  causing	  climate	  change.	  Foster	  (2017)	  mentions	  the	  issue	  of	  terminology	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  his	  article	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  Donald	  Trump	  being	  the	  president	  of	  the	  US:	  “…to	  sum	  up,	  we	  should	  be	  grateful	  to	  Trump….	  Merely	  by	  re-­‐embracing	  the	  term	  ‘global	  warming’	  rather	  than	  its	  Bush-­‐edict	  replacement	  ‘climate	  change’	  –	  which	  was	  dutifully	  adhered	  to	  by	  Mr	  yes-­‐we-­‐could-­‐have	  Barack	  Obama	  throughout	  his	  8-­‐year	  term	  -­‐	  Trump	  has	  already	  done	  more	  to	  save	  the	  planet	  than	  Obama	  did.	  Framing	  is	  everything.	  Obama	  played	  the	  game	  and	  never	  went	  off	  script.	  Trump	  does	  not	  read	  scripts.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  first,	  and	  will	  not	  be	  the	  last,	  cat	  he	  lets	  out	  of	  the	  PR	  bag.”	  This	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  advice	  provided	  by	  a	  PR	  consultant	  to	  the	  Bush	  administration	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘climate	  change’	  rather	  than	  ‘global	  warming’	  because	  US	  citizens	  found	  the	  former	  term	  less	  alarming.	  The	  confidential	  memo	  with	  this	  advice	  was	  leaked	  and	  is	  available	  online	  (The	  Luntz	  Research	  Companies	  2002),	  and	  its	  general	  advice	  on	  how	  Republican	  politicians	  should	  approach	  environmental	  issues	  is	  also	  very	  revealing.	  70	  Some	  scientists	  are,	  however,	  concerned	  that	  concentrations	  of	  methane	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  more	  significant	  than	  CO2	  concentrations	  (Canadell	  et	  al.	  2016).	  According	  to	  Canadell	  et	  al.	  (2016),	  methane	  emissions	  have	  been	  increasing	  in	  the	  past	  twenty	  years,	  with	  the	  concentration	  of	  this	  gas	  “growing	  ten	  times	  faster”	  since	  2007	  than	  it	  did	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  and	  increasing	  “faster	  still	  in	  2014	  and	  2015.”	  Anthropogenic	  sources	  of	  methane	  emissions	  include	  agricultural	  activities	  and	  the	  mining	  and	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  such	  as	  coal,	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  (Canadell	  et	  al.	  2016).	  Schwietzke	  et	  al.	  (2016,	  p.	  88)	  argue	  that	  while	  methane	  emissions	  from	  fossil	  fuel	  extraction	  and	  use	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  increasing,	  previous	  accounting	  of	  these	  emissions	  was	  inaccurate	  and	  their	  measurements	  show	  that	  they	  “are	  20	  to	  60	  per	  cent	  greater	  than	  inventories.”	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has	  historically	  developed	  and	  currently	  operates	  (Brand	  &	  Wissen	  2013;	  Rickards,	  
Wiseman	  &	  Kashima	  2014),	  an	  overwhelming	  number	  of	  scientific	  findings,	  now	  
published	  on	  an	  almost	  daily	  basis	  in	  academic	  journals	  and	  in	  some	  newspapers,	  
confirm	  the	  urgency	  of	  decreasing	  GHG	  emissions	  that	  are	  the	  by-­‐products	  of	  
burning	  these	  fossil	  fuels.71	  	  
Increasing	  concentrations	  of	  GHGs	  in	  the	  Earth’s	  atmosphere	  as	  a	  result	  of	  human	  
activities	  have	  raised	  the	  Earth’s	  average	  global	  temperature	  by	  0.85°C	  over	  the	  
period	  1880	  to	  2012	  (IPCC	  2013;	  PIDCOCK	  2014)	  and	  by	  an	  additional	  approximately	  
0.35°C	  in	  the	  four	  years	  since	  2012,	  bringing	  the	  increase	  to	  approximately	  1.2°C	  
above	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2016	  (Rawlins	  2017;	  WMO	  2016a).72	  Apart	  
from	  raising	  the	  average	  global	  temperature,	  the	  energy	  imbalances	  that	  result	  from	  
a	  greater	  concentration	  of	  GHGs	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  have	  a	  variety	  of	  effects	  on	  the	  
complex	  and	  interconnected	  Earth	  System	  (Hansen	  et	  al.	  2016;	  Harrison	  et	  al.	  
2016).73	  An	  example	  of	  how	  changes	  due	  to	  rising	  temperatures	  in	  one	  part	  of	  the	  
Earth	  System	  affect	  other	  parts	  is	  evident	  if	  one	  considers	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  
melting	  of	  ice	  sheets	  not	  only	  results	  in	  sea	  level	  rise,	  but	  also	  increases	  the	  volume	  
of	  low-­‐density	  freshwater	  in	  the	  oceans	  (Hansen	  et	  al.	  2016).	  This	  change	  in	  the	  
composition	  of	  the	  water	  in	  the	  oceans	  affects	  global	  ocean	  circulation	  patterns	  
(Hansen	  et	  al.	  2016;	  Liu	  et	  al.	  2017),	  which	  in	  turn	  affect	  cloud	  formation	  (Norris	  et	  
al.	  2016)	  and	  thus	  precipitation	  patterns	  (Chadwick,	  Good,	  Martin	  &	  Rowell	  2016).	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  An	  example	  of	  one	  such	  alarming	  news	  report	  is	  from	  25	  November	  2016,	  when	  The	  
Guardian’s	  leading	  headline	  on	  the	  front	  page	  of	  its	  ‘International’	  website	  was	  (for	  a	  few	  hours)	  ‘Arctic	  ice	  melt	  could	  trigger	  uncontrollable	  climate	  change	  at	  global	  level’	  (Harvey	  2016).	  This	  article	  referenced	  a	  very	  worrying	  scientific	  Arctic	  Council	  (2016)	  report	  with	  details	  about	  this	  development	  and	  was	  an	  update	  on	  an	  article	  published	  the	  previous	  day	  about	  the	  same	  issue.	  The	  prominence	  given	  to	  the	  article	  was	  unusual	  (and	  therefore	  even	  more	  alarming	  than	  such	  articles	  normally	  are)	  in	  that	  while	  The	  
Guardian	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  diligent	  newspapers	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  reporting	  consistently	  and	  scientifically	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  environmental	  issues,	  very	  few	  such	  articles	  are	  given	  front	  page	  coverage.	  72	  The	  most	  recent	  IPCC	  report	  predicts	  increases	  in	  the	  average	  global	  temperature	  within	  a	  range	  of	  1.5°C	  and	  more	  than	  4°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels	  (depending	  on	  what	  action	  is	  taken	  to	  reduce	  GHG	  emissions)	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  (IPCC	  2013).	  Some	  climate	  science	  experts,	  such	  as	  Kevin	  Anderson	  (2015)	  and	  James	  Hansen	  (2016),	  argue	  that	  these	  predictions,	  dire	  as	  they	  are,	  err	  on	  the	  side	  of	  being	  conservative.	  73	  The	  energy	  imbalance	  is	  caused	  by	  more	  energy	  entering	  the	  Earth’s	  atmosphere	  than	  is	  re-­‐radiated	  into	  space	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  GHGs	  trapping	  the	  incoming	  heat.	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addition,	  as	  the	  oceans	  absorb	  CO2,	  ocean	  acidification	  has	  increased	  to	  
unprecedented	  levels.74	  Moreover,	  ocean	  acidification	  exacerbates	  other	  problems	  
arising	  from	  large-­‐scale	  capitalist	  economic	  activity,	  such	  as	  the	  commercial	  
depletion	  of	  fish	  stocks	  and	  the	  disruption	  of	  the	  nitrogen	  cycle	  as	  a	  result	  of	  large-­‐
scale,	  fertilizer-­‐intensive	  commercial	  agricultural	  practices	  (IGBP,	  IOC,	  &	  SCOR	  2013;	  
UNEP	  2016b).	  In	  summary,	  research	  unequivocally	  demonstrates	  that	  anthropogenic	  
GHG	  emissions	  and	  the	  resultant	  global	  warming,	  in	  addition	  to	  many	  other	  
environmentally	  damaging	  economic	  practices,	  are	  radically	  changing	  ecosystems,	  
oceans,	  and	  the	  biosphere	  of	  which	  these	  subsystems	  are	  a	  part.75	  These	  changes	  
have	  consequences	  (many	  of	  them	  adverse)	  for	  all	  life	  forms	  that	  have	  evolved	  to	  
live	  in	  the	  relatively	  stable	  climatic	  conditions	  of	  the	  pre-­‐Anthropocene	  biosphere	  
that	  existed	  during	  the	  Holocene	  (Williams	  &	  Crutzen	  2013).76	  	  
Neoliberal	  capitalist	  institutional	  responses	  to	  the	  need	  to	  
reduce	  GHG	  emissions	  and	  maintain	  a	  habitable	  planet	  
Despite	  even	  neoliberal	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  (2014)	  and	  the	  World	  
Economic	  Forum	  (WEF	  2016)	  identifying	  global	  warming	  as	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  issue	  of	  
concern	  among	  their	  lists	  of	  ‘threats’	  to	  the	  global	  economy,	  the	  neoliberal	  agenda	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Recent	  research	  indicates	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  ocean	  acidification	  (in	  2013,	  this	  was	  estimated	  to	  be	  a	  26	  percent	  increase	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  industrial	  revolution)	  may	  be	  faster	  than	  at	  any	  time	  in	  the	  last	  300	  million	  years.	  Oceanographers	  predict	  that	  this	  will	  decrease	  the	  ocean’s	  capacity	  to	  absorb	  CO2	  and	  thus	  negatively	  impact	  on	  its	  role	  in	  moderating	  climate	  change.	  Marine	  scientists	  are	  also	  concerned	  about	  how	  ocean	  acidification	  will	  interact	  with	  multiple	  other	  stressors,	  such	  as	  overfishing	  and	  pollution,	  and	  what	  the	  outcomes	  of	  such	  interaction	  will	  be.	  Some	  predicted	  effects	  include	  adverse	  impacts	  on	  biodiversity,	  aquaculture,	  food	  webs,	  and	  people	  —	  especially	  vulnerable	  people	  who	  rely	  on	  the	  oceans	  for	  their	  subsistence	  (IGPB,	  IOC,	  SCOR	  2013;	  Laffoley	  &	  Baxter	  2016).	  75	  The	  IPCC’s	  Climate	  Change	  2013	  Physical	  Science	  Basis	  Summary	  for	  Policymakers	  (p.	  2)	  states	  that	  “Warming	  of	  the	  climate	  system	  is	  unequivocal,	  and	  since	  the	  1950s,	  many	  of	  the	  observed	  changes	  are	  unprecedented	  over	  decades	  to	  millennia.	  The	  atmosphere	  and	  ocean	  have	  warmed,	  the	  amounts	  of	  snow	  and	  ice	  have	  diminished,	  sea	  level	  has	  risen,	  and	  the	  concentration	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  have	  increased,”	  and	  the	  IPCC	  warns	  that	  “Continued	  emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  will	  cause	  further	  warming	  and	  changes	  in	  all	  components	  of	  the	  climate	  system.	  Limiting	  climate	  change	  will	  require	  substantial	  and	  sustained	  reductions	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions”	  (IPCC	  2013,	  p.	  17).	  76	  For	  examples	  of	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  these	  changes,	  refer	  to	  Duarte’s	  (2014)	  paper	  on	  changes	  to	  marine	  systems;	  Hüttl	  et	  al.’s	  (2014)	  paper	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  ecosystems	  are	  changing;	  McCallum’s	  (2015)	  paper	  on	  biodiversity	  loss	  and	  the	  ‘sixth	  great	  extinction’;	  and	  Ostberg	  et	  al.’s	  (2015)	  paper	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  land	  use	  on	  the	  biosphere.	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of	  further	  developing	  a	  global	  political	  economy	  with	  minimal	  restrictions	  on	  capital	  
accumulation	  continues	  to	  encourage	  practices	  that	  cause	  serious	  environmental	  
damage	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly.	  Examples	  of	  such	  practices	  include	  the	  building	  
of	  new	  fossil	  fuel	  power	  plants	  (Davis	  &	  Socolow	  2014;	  Shearer	  et	  al.	  2016),	  the	  
implementation	  of	  environmentally	  damaging	  trade	  treaties	  (Aykut	  2016;	  Gallagher	  
2016;	  Sierra	  Club	  2016)	  and,	  more	  generally,	  the	  relentless	  promotion	  of	  a	  narrowly-­‐
conceived	  ‘economic	  growth’	  ideology	  that	  relies	  on	  ever-­‐increasing	  consumerism	  
(Foster,	  Clark	  &	  York,	  2010).	  While	  many	  ordinary	  people	  around	  the	  world	  are	  
concerned	  about	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  and	  want	  policymakers	  to	  address	  
this	  issue,	  two	  decades	  of	  negotiations	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  COPs	  have	  failed	  to	  agree	  on	  
decisive	  and	  effective	  measures	  to	  mitigate	  it	  (Buxton	  2016;	  Rickards,	  Wiseman	  &	  
Kashima	  2014).77	  The	  most	  recent	  intergovernmental	  agreement	  negotiated	  in	  2015	  
at	  COP-­‐21	  in	  Paris	  –	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  -­‐	  has	  even	  regressed,	  replacing	  the	  Kyoto	  
Protocol’s	  nominally	  mandatory	  GHG	  reduction	  targets	  with	  the	  purely	  voluntary	  
INDCs	  of	  GHG	  reductions	  (UNFCCC	  2015).	  Scientists	  such	  as	  Rockström	  et	  al.	  (2016,	  
p.	  469)	  argue	  that	  “each	  day	  without	  a	  zero	  carbon	  roadmap	  increases	  the	  stakes	  in	  
our	  global	  climate	  gamble,”	  and	  leading	  climate	  scientist	  and	  prominent	  climate	  
movement	  activist	  James	  Hansen	  has	  gone	  as	  far	  as	  calling	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  a	  
‘fake’	  and	  a	  ‘fraud’	  (Milman	  2015).	  
Material	  capabilities:	  The	  biosphere’s	  responses	  to	  
capitalist	  profit-­‐maximising	  practices	  
In	  turn,	  the	  physical	  responses	  to	  ‘business	  as	  usual’	  in	  the	  actually-­‐existing	  Earth	  
System	  conform	  entirely	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  (Nuccitelli	  2017b)	  and	  include:	  ice	  
sheets	  melting	  and	  causing	  sea	  levels	  to	  rise	  (Arctic	  Council	  2016;	  WMO	  2016c);	  
ocean	  acidification	  and	  warmer	  oceans	  bleaching	  coral	  reefs	  (Laffoley	  &	  Baxter	  
2016);	  and	  ‘extreme	  weather’	  events	  in	  the	  form	  of	  excessive	  precipitation	  and	  
flooding,	  extreme	  and	  prolonged	  heatwaves,	  prolonged	  droughts	  (WMO	  2016b)	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Citizen	  concerns	  about	  global	  warming	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  results	  of	  surveys,	  such	  as	  the	  US	  survey	  analysed	  by	  Stanford	  University	  Professor	  Jon	  Krosnik,	  who	  found	  that	  at	  least	  65%	  of	  respondents	  thought	  humans	  were	  causing	  it	  and	  that	  most	  respondents	  supported	  government	  action	  to	  curb	  GHG	  emissions	  (Cook	  2013).	  The	  growing	  climate	  activist	  movement,	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  is	  another	  indicator	  of	  peoples’	  concerns	  about	  global	  warming	  and	  other	  anthropogenic	  threats	  to	  ecosystems.	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the	  increasing	  frequency	  of	  widespread	  and	  poorly-­‐understood	  ‘extreme	  wildfires’	  
(Sharples	  2016).78	  These	  physical	  manifestations	  of	  the	  Earth’s	  changing	  biosphere	  
devastate	  natural	  ecosystems	  (Arctic	  Council	  2016;	  Feldpausch	  et	  al.	  2016)	  and	  
communities	  that	  live	  in	  them	  and	  rely	  on	  them	  for	  their	  livelihoods	  and	  survival	  
(Hughes	  et	  al.	  2016;	  Nolt	  2015;	  UNISDR	  2016;	  WHO	  2016).79	  Given	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  
‘non-­‐negotiability’	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  physics,	  how	  is	  one	  to	  understand	  the	  failure	  of	  
authorities	  to	  take	  decisive	  and	  effective	  action?	  	  
While	  many	  climate	  movement	  actors	  argue	  that	  one	  important	  reason	  for	  this	  
failure	  is	  the	  immense	  power	  and	  influence	  that	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  has	  within	  
the	  global	  political	  economy	  (Bruno,	  Karliner	  &	  Brotsky	  1999:	  InfluenceMap	  2015;	  
McKibben	  2012b),	  ecosocialists,	  while	  agreeing	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  fossil	  
fuel	  industry	  has	  great	  power	  and	  influence,	  present	  a	  much	  more	  profound	  and	  far-­‐
reaching	  analysis	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  inaction	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  unfolding	  crisis.	  
Ecosocialists	  argue	  that	  beyond	  the	  power	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry,	  wider	  issues	  of	  
capitalist	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  and	  of	  class	  dynamics	  are	  the	  underlying	  
reasons	  for	  the	  inaction	  of	  policymakers	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  
human	  capabilities	  to	  address	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  threats	  humanity	  has	  ever	  faced	  as	  
a	  species	  (Angus	  2016;	  Foster,	  Clark	  &	  York	  2010;	  Kovel	  2007;	  Weston	  2014;	  Williams	  
2010).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  So	  unprecedented	  are	  some	  of	  these	  ‘extreme’	  weather	  events,	  the	  new	  terminology	  being	  used	  to	  describe	  them	  is	  almost	  incomprehensible,	  with	  the	  unexpected	  2017	  Montana	  and	  North	  Dakota	  drought	  in	  the	  US	  now	  being	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘flash	  drought’	  (McLauchlin	  2017).	  79	  Studies	  linking	  ‘extreme	  weather’	  events	  such	  as	  prolonged	  droughts	  and	  flooding	  to	  global	  warming	  is	  a	  current	  focus	  of	  several	  research	  projects,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  summarized	  by	  Stott	  (2015)	  and	  the	  WMO	  (2016b).	  Importantly,	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  WMO	  (2016b)	  report	  on	  natural	  disasters	  point	  out	  that	  while	  it	  was	  true	  that	  individual	  weather	  events	  could	  not	  be	  attributed	  to	  climate	  change	  before	  the	  1990s,	  such	  attribution	  claims	  are	  now	  possible	  but	  are	  either	  ignored	  or	  publicly	  disputed	  by	  policymakers	  and	  are	  also	  being	  ignored	  by	  mainstream	  media.	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Material	  capabilities:	  Class	  and	  reproductive	  capabilities	  in	  
the	  Anthropocene	  
As	  ecosocialist	  Ian	  Angus	  (2016)	  bluntly	  points	  out,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  
global	  warming	  and	  climate	  change	  “we	  are	  not	  all	  in	  this	  together.”80	  In	  the	  short	  
term	  at	  least,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  in	  the	  medium	  term,	  affluent	  people	  with	  sufficient	  
resources	  can	  insulate	  and	  protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  worst	  immediate	  effects	  of	  
global	  warming	  and	  climate	  change	  (Angus	  2016;	  see	  also	  di	  Muzio	  2015).	  However,	  
given	  the	  uncertainties	  involved,	  it	  is	  highly	  likely	  that	  even	  the	  wealthiest	  and	  most	  
privileged	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  ‘buy’	  their	  way	  out	  of	  the	  longer-­‐term	  effects	  of	  a	  
changing	  biosphere	  if	  it	  shifts	  to	  a	  different	  state.	  Scientists	  warn	  that	  changes	  within	  
complex	  systems	  are	  non-­‐linear	  and	  unpredictable,	  and	  that	  sudden	  shifts	  within	  the	  
physical	  Earth	  System	  could	  take	  everyone	  by	  surprise	  if	  poorly-­‐understood,	  
planetary-­‐tipping	  boundaries	  are	  crossed	  (Cai,	  Lenton	  &	  Lontzek	  2016;	  Lenton	  et	  al.	  
2008;	  Rockström	  2009).81	  A	  graphical	  depiction	  of	  some	  potential	  tipping	  points,	  as	  
well	  as	  some	  of	  the	  possible	  interactions	  between	  them,	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7	  
below.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  “We	  are	  not	  all	  in	  this	  together”	  is	  the	  title	  of	  Chapter	  11	  in	  Angus’	  (2016)	  book,	  
Facing	  the	  Anthropocene:	  Fossil	  capitalism	  and	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  earth	  system.	  81	  According	  to	  Rockström	  (2015,	  p.	  5),	  four	  out	  of	  nine	  planetary	  boundaries	  have	  been	  transgressed:	  biosphere	  integrity,	  interference	  with	  the	  nitrogen	  and	  phosphorous	  cycles,	  climate	  change	  and	  land	  use	  change.	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Source:	  Cai,	  Lenton	  &	  Lontzek	  (2016,	  p.	  521)	  
Despite	  the	  currently	  dominant	  factions	  of	  global	  elites	  and	  policymakers	  choosing	  
to	  limit	  their	  responses	  to	  these	  unfolding	  ecological	  disasters	  to	  woefully	  
inadequate,	  voluntary	  and	  incremental	  measures	  that	  are	  not	  legally	  binding	  and	  
that	  experts	  calculate	  will	  result	  in	  rising	  average	  temperatures	  of	  3.2°C	  even	  if	  fully	  
implemented	  (UNEP	  2016a),	  Naomi	  Klein	  is	  correct	  to	  conclude	  that	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	  climate	  change,	  ‘this	  changes	  everything’	  (Klein	  2014):	  no	  amount	  of	  politicking	  
can	  change	  the	  reality	  of	  how	  the	  actually	  existing	  Earth	  System	  responds	  to	  physical	  
inputs	  and	  outputs.82	  As	  Steffen	  et	  al.	  (2011,	  p.	  862)	  point	  out	  when	  comparing	  the	  
ideologically-­‐informed	  rejection	  of	  Darwinian	  evolution	  to	  a	  similarly	  ideologically-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Refer	  to	  Farrell	  (2016)	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  corporate	  links	  to	  sources	  of	  misinformation	  about	  the	  reality	  and	  severity	  of	  climate	  change.	  
Figure	  7:	  Map	  of	  five	  potential	  climatic	  tipping	  points	  and	  possible	  effects	  on	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  
Earth	  System	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based	  denial	  of	  the	  urgency	  of	  reducing	  anthropogenic	  GHG	  emissions	  in	  order	  to	  
mitigate	  climate	  change83:	  
Darwin’s insights into our origins provoked outrage, anger and 
disbelief but did not threaten the material existence of society of the 
time. The ultimate drivers of the Anthropocene, on the other hand, if 
they continue unabated through this century, may well threaten the 
viability of contemporary civilization and perhaps even the future 
existence of Homo sapiens. 
While	  many	  of	  those	  with	  the	  wealth	  and	  power	  to	  control	  world	  affairs	  apparently	  
feel	  themselves	  to	  be	  exempt	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  and	  believe	  themselves	  to	  be	  
invincible	  (perhaps	  because	  they	  rely	  on	  some	  future,	  as	  yet	  undiscovered	  or	  
undeveloped,	  technological	  innovation	  to	  save	  the	  day),	  ecosocialists	  and	  climate	  
justice	  movement	  actors	  are	  concerned	  about	  how	  many	  of	  the	  least	  powerful,	  
poorest	  and	  most	  vulnerable	  people	  who	  do	  not	  even	  contribute	  to	  global	  warming	  
are	  the	  first	  to	  suffer	  from	  its	  effects	  (Harrington	  et	  al.	  2016;	  Savo	  et	  al.	  2016)	  
Damaging	  effects	  of	  global	  warming	  range	  from	  changing	  weather	  patterns	  
disrupting	  normal	  agricultural	  production	  and	  threatening	  food	  supplies	  (IPCC	  
2014a)	  to	  increasingly	  powerful	  typhoons	  killing	  thousands	  and	  leave	  millions	  
homeless	  (Campbell	  2013).	  It	  is	  not	  only	  disadvantaged	  people	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  
that	  suffer	  the	  consequences	  of	  ‘business	  as	  usual’:	  poor	  and	  vulnerable	  people	  and	  
communities	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘advanced’	  capitalist	  countries,	  who	  can	  ill	  afford	  to	  
deal	  with	  additional	  crises,	  also	  face	  the	  devastating	  effects	  of	  changing	  weather	  
patterns	  and	  ‘extreme	  weather	  events’	  that	  result	  from	  global	  warming.	  The	  lack	  of	  
resources	  and	  preparedness	  of	  poor	  communities	  when	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  struck	  
New	  Orleans	  in	  2005	  greatly	  exacerbated	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  disaster	  (Schlosberg	  &	  
Collins	  2014),	  and	  poorer	  people	  also	  suffered	  worse	  consequences	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
Hurricane	  Sandy	  seven	  years	  later.84	  These	  examples	  illustrate	  that	  whether	  they	  live	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  UNEP	  (n.d.)	  explains	  the	  meaning	  of	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  as	  follows:	  “Climate	  change	  mitigation	  refers	  to	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  or	  prevent	  emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases.	  Mitigation	  can	  mean	  using	  new	  technologies	  and	  renewable	  energies,	  making	  older	  equipment	  more	  energy	  efficient,	  or	  changing	  management	  practices	  or	  consumer	  behavior.”	  84	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Hurricane	  Sandy,	  the	  realities	  of	  capitalist	  social	  relations	  asserted	  themselves	  in	  how	  	  “reconstruction	  assistance	  was	  allocated	  disproportionately	  to	  homeowners	  rather	  than	  tenants,	  even	  though	  the	  latter	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  the	  lower-­‐income	  bracket”	  (IDMC	  2015,	  p.	  51),	  and	  how	  over	  39	  000	  people	  who	  had	  to	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in	  the	  Global	  North	  or	  in	  the	  Global	  South,	  the	  already-­‐precarious	  existence	  of	  
disadvantaged	  and	  poor	  communities	  further	  exacerbates	  their	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  
effects	  of	  global	  warming	  and	  the	  resultant	  ‘extreme	  weather’	  (Leichenko	  &	  Silva	  
2014).	  Given	  the	  evidence,	  ecosocialists	  argue	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  not	  a	  Global	  
North/Global	  South	  issue:	  it	  is	  a	  class	  issue	  because	  in	  a	  capitalist	  system	  the	  
material	  resources	  that	  individuals	  and	  communities	  have	  access	  to	  determine	  their	  
life	  chances	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  including	  in	  how	  effectively	  they	  can	  cope	  with	  the	  
ravages	  of	  ‘extreme’	  weather	  events.	  These	  ‘extreme’	  weather	  events	  are,	  
moreover,	  occurring	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  material	  forces	  of	  
production	  and	  the	  shifting	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  social	  forces	  of	  production	  (that	  
is,	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  capital	  and	  labour)	  result	  in	  more	  and	  more	  
Global	  North	  workers	  joining	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  disadvantaged	  communities	  of	  the	  
Global	  South	  as	  they	  ‘fall’	  into	  precarious	  existences	  and	  poverty	  as	  unemployment	  
rises	  due	  to	  the	  relocation	  of	  manufacturing	  and	  other	  industries	  to	  cheaper	  labour	  
havens	  in	  the	  Global	  South,	  and	  as	  governments	  continue	  to	  implement	  ‘flexible	  
labour	  market’	  and	  wage	  repression	  policies	  that	  lead	  to	  underemployment	  and	  the	  
casualisation	  of	  work	  (Heyes,	  Lewis	  &	  Clark	  2012).	  	  
The	  balance	  of	  social	  forces	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  
reproductive	  capabilities	  of	  labour	  and	  subaltern	  groups	  in	  
a	  global	  capitalist	  world	  order	  
The	  uneven	  and	  combined	  development	  that	  characterises	  the	  geographical	  
expansion	  and	  intensification	  of	  capitalist	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  has	  
important	  outcomes	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  global	  capital	  and	  global	  labour.	  
The	  labour	  movement	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  is	  now	  relatively	  weaker	  
than	  it	  used	  to	  be	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  because	  of	  the	  greatly	  enlarged	  global	  
reserve	  army	  of	  labour,	  which	  is	  a	  consequence	  not	  only	  of	  the	  increasing	  
proletarianisation	  of	  populations	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  (Bieler	  2012)	  but	  also	  of	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  China	  and	  the	  previous	  Eastern	  Bloc	  countries	  into	  the	  global	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  evacuate	  their	  homes	  in	  2012	  because	  of	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  ‘Superstorm	  Sandy’	  were	  still	  in	  need	  of	  housing	  assistance	  in	  2015.	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capitalist	  economy	  (Jefferies	  2015).85	  Technological	  and	  managerial	  innovations	  
facilitating	  changes	  in	  the	  organisation	  of	  how	  and	  where	  goods	  are	  produced,	  
together	  with	  policies	  implemented	  by	  national	  governments	  to	  create	  ‘flexible	  
labour	  markets’	  and	  facilitate	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  capital	  across	  borders,	  shift	  the	  labour	  
force	  to	  countries	  where	  organised	  labour	  is	  weak	  while	  simultaneously	  greatly	  
compromising	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  working	  class	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  
to	  defend	  their	  jobs,	  wages	  and	  working	  conditions	  (Harvey	  2010).The	  role	  of	  
institutions	  and	  social	  facts	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  changes	  should	  not	  be	  
underestimated:	  as	  many	  theorists	  point	  out,	  the	  changes	  are,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  the	  
result	  of	  a	  globally-­‐conceived	  and	  implemented	  neoliberalising	  project	  which	  takes	  
specific	  forms	  in	  different	  places	  and	  at	  different	  times,	  depending	  on	  the	  
historically-­‐shaped	  ‘local’	  national	  conditions.	  Overall,	  however,	  the	  United	  Nations	  
Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  (UNCTAD)	  2016	  Trade	  and	  Development	  
Report	  states	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  general	  global	  increase	  in	  inequality	  of	  income	  
distribution	  since	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  rising	  trend	  of	  
profit	  seeking	  by	  depressing	  wages	  and	  financial	  rent-­‐seeking	  rather	  than	  through	  
innovation	  and	  investment.	  In	  addition,	  privatisation,	  deregulation	  and	  lower	  public	  
expenditures	  on	  essential	  social	  services	  such	  as	  healthcare	  and	  education	  further	  
impoverish	  wage	  earners	  (especially	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  who	  depend	  on	  state	  
programmes),	  while	  simultaneously	  increasing	  profit	  opportunities	  in	  the	  private	  
sector	  by	  providing	  new	  areas	  for	  capital	  investment	  (UNCTAD	  2016).	  While	  
UNCTAD’s	  focus	  is	  primarily	  on	  ‘developing’	  countries,	  the	  report	  also	  refers	  to	  
‘stagnant	  demand’	  for	  the	  commodities	  produced	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  due	  to	  
austerity	  policies	  implemented	  in	  some	  countries	  after	  the	  2007/8	  GFC	  and	  rising	  
unemployment	  and	  precarious	  employment	  in	  the	  Global	  North	  (UNCTAD	  2016),	  
trends	  confirmed	  by	  several	  other	  analysts	  (for	  example,	  Cronin	  2013;	  Piketty	  2014;	  
Piketty	  &	  Zucman	  2014).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  The	  reserve	  army	  of	  labour	  is	  a	  Marxist	  concept	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  ranks	  of	  currently	  unemployed	  workers	  whose	  mere	  existence	  gives	  employers	  greater	  bargaining	  power	  when	  determining	  the	  wages	  and	  working	  conditions	  for	  those	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  be	  employed.	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Drawing	  on	  evidence	  gleaned	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  official	  statistical	  data	  sources,	  
economist	  Thomas	  Piketty	  (2014,	  p.	  471)	  points	  out	  that	  “…in	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  
the	  twentieth	  century,	  inequalities	  of	  wealth	  that	  had	  supposedly	  disappeared	  [in	  
the	  twentieth	  century	  after,	  and	  largely	  due	  to,	  the	  two	  world	  wars]	  are	  close	  to	  
regaining	  or	  even	  surpassing	  their	  historical	  highs.”86	  More	  importantly,	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  his	  historical	  investigation,	  Piketty	  (2014,	  p.	  571)	  concludes	  that	  while	  there	  are	  
mechanisms	  that	  could	  diminish	  inequality	  (which	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  “powerful	  forces	  
for	  convergence”),	  inequality	  is	  an	  inherent	  feature	  of	  capitalism:	  
The overall conclusion of this study is that a market economy based 
on private property, if left to itself, contains powerful forces of 
convergence, associated in particular with the diffusion of 
knowledge and skills; but it also contains powerful forces of 
divergence, which are potentially threatening to democratic societies 
and to the values of social justice on which they are based. The 
principal destabilizing force has to do with the fact that the private 
rate of return on capital, r, can be significantly higher for long 
periods of time than the rate of growth of income and output, g. The 
inequality r > g implies that wealth accumulated in the past grows 
more rapidly than output and wages. This inequality expresses a 
fundamental logical contradiction. The entrepreneur inevitably tends 
to become a rentier, more and more dominant over those who own 
nothing but their labor. Once constituted, capital reproduces itself 
faster than output increases. The past devours the future. The 
consequences for the long-term dynamics of the wealth distribution 
are potentially terrifying, especially when one adds that the return 
on capital varies directly with the size of the initial stake and that 
the divergence in the wealth distribution is occurring on a global 
scale. 
In	  short,	  Piketty	  points	  out	  that	  an	  initially	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  results	  in	  
increasing	  wealth	  inequalities,	  both	  logically	  and	  in	  practice.87	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  A	  January	  2017	  briefing	  paper	  published	  by	  Oxfam	  claims	  that	  only	  eight	  men	  own	  as	  much	  wealth	  as	  the	  poorest	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  global	  population	  (Oxfam	  2017).	  Another	  staggering	  statistic	  in	  the	  same	  briefing	  paper	  is	  that	  the	  richest	  1%	  has	  owned	  more	  wealth	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  global	  population	  (the	  99%)	  since	  2015.	  Evaluating	  the	  integrity	  of	  these	  claims,	  Australian	  National	  University	  Professor	  Peter	  Whiteford	  concludes	  that	  they	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  best	  available	  data	  and	  that,	  even	  if	  the	  disparities	  between	  the	  wealthiest	  minority	  and	  the	  poorest	  majority	  are	  not	  as	  great	  as	  reported	  in	  the	  briefing	  paper,	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  ‘massive’	  (Whiteford	  2017).	  87	  While	  Piketty	  has	  been	  widely	  praised	  for	  his	  empirical	  research,	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  of	  his	  analysis	  (particularly	  the	  way	  in	  which	  he	  defines	  ‘capital’	  and	  the	  way	  his	  analysis	  omits	  any	  considerations	  of	  class)	  and	  the	  solutions	  he	  proposes,	  have	  been	  critiqued	  by	  many	  analysts	  (for	  example,	  Peet	  2015;	  Reitz	  2016;	  Thompson	  2014).	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Piketty	  (2014)	  largely	  ignores	  ecological	  economics	  in	  his	  brief	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Rising	  inequality	  is	  a	  concern	  to	  some	  mainstream	  economists	  (the	  organic	  
intellectuals	  of	  the	  ruling	  class,	  in	  Gramscian	  terminology)	  because	  it	  can	  contribute	  
to	  economic	  crises,	  and	  hence	  also	  to	  political	  crises	  and	  social	  instability	  that	  could	  
threaten	  global	  capitalism	  as	  a	  system.	  For	  example,	  Piketty	  argues	  that	  rising	  
inequality	  was	  a	  contributing	  factor	  leading	  to	  the	  2007/8	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  
(GFC).	  While	  praising	  governments	  and	  central	  banks	  for	  ‘saving’	  the	  global	  financial	  
system	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  GFC	  by	  injecting	  liquidity,	  Piketty	  (2014,	  p.	  473)	  also	  
points	  out	  that	  “…they	  did	  not	  really	  provide	  a	  durable	  response	  to	  the	  structural	  
problems	  that	  made	  the	  crisis	  possible	  including	  the	  crying	  lack	  of	  financial	  
transparency	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  inequality.”	  Economists	  such	  as	  Piketty	  are	  well	  aware	  
of	  the	  political	  dangers	  of	  this	  situation,	  as	  the	  following	  extract	  that	  discusses	  
taxation	  as	  a	  proposed	  solution	  to	  capitalism’s	  structural	  tendency	  to	  precipitate	  
financial	  crises	  and	  growing	  inequalities	  demonstrates:	  
Taxation is not a technical matter. It is pre-eminently a political and 
philosophical issue, perhaps the most important of all political 
issues. Without taxes, society has no common destiny, and 
collective action is impossible. This has always been true. At the 
heart of every major political upheaval lies a fiscal revolution. The 
Ancien Régime was swept away when the revolutionary assemblies 
voted to abolish the fiscal privileges of the nobility and clergy and 
establish a modern system of universal taxation. The American 
Revolution was born when subjects of the British colonies decided 
to take their destiny in hand and set their own taxes. (“No taxation 
without representation”). Two centuries later the context is different, 
but the heart of the issue remains the same. 
Piketty (2014, pp. 492 – 493) 
Using	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  approach,	  Piketty	  thus	  argues	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  
reformist	  policies	  such	  as	  progressive	  taxation	  and	  a	  global	  tax	  on	  capital	  because	  of	  
his	  keen	  awareness	  of	  the	  role	  of	  political	  democracy	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  capitalism	  
–	  for	  example,	  he	  states	  the	  following	  as	  an	  ‘essential	  truth’:	  “…defining	  the	  meaning	  
of	  inequality	  and	  justifying	  the	  position	  of	  the	  winners	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  vital	  
importance,	  and	  one	  can	  expect	  to	  see	  all	  sorts	  of	  misrepresentations	  of	  the	  facts	  in	  
service	  of	  the	  cause”	  (Piketty	  2014,	  p.	  487).	  He	  candidly	  points	  out	  that	  “…in	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  discussion	  on	  climate	  change,	  which	  is	  confined	  to	  a	  few	  observations	  about	  how	  climate	  change	  will	  negatively	  affect	  GDP	  and	  a	  few	  statements	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  ‘natural	  capital.’	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democracy,	  the	  professed	  equality	  of	  rights	  of	  all	  citizens	  contrasts	  sharply	  with	  the	  
very	  real	  inequality	  of	  living	  conditions,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  this	  contradiction	  
it	  is	  vital	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  social	  inequalities	  derive	  from	  rational	  and	  universal	  
principles	  rather	  than	  arbitrary	  contingencies.	  Inequalities	  must	  therefore	  be	  just	  
and	  useful	  to	  all,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  discourse	  and	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  in	  reality	  as	  
well”	  (Piketty	  2014,	  p.	  422,	  emphasis	  added).	  The	  role	  of	  the	  organic	  intellectual	  of	  
the	  ruling	  class	  as	  justifier	  of	  class	  inequalities	  is	  transparent	  in	  this	  particular	  
statement:	  even	  if	  social	  inequalities	  themselves	  cannot	  be	  avoided,	  they	  must	  be	  
seen	  as	  being	  ‘just	  and	  useful	  to	  all,’	  even	  if	  only	  ‘in	  the	  realm	  of	  discourse’!	  This	  
exhortation	  perhaps	  constitutes	  an	  implicit	  acknowledgement	  by	  Piketty	  that	  the	  
structural	  ‘problems’	  he	  refers	  to	  are	  deeply	  embedded	  within	  the	  global	  capitalist	  
economy’s	  operations	  and	  may	  prove	  impossible	  to	  reform	  given	  existing	  power	  
relationships.	  As	  Heyes,	  Lewis	  and	  Clark	  (2012)	  argue,	  governments	  now	  depend	  on	  
‘finance-­‐led	  growth’	  both	  directly	  (because	  of	  the	  jobs	  and	  tax	  revenues	  the	  finance	  
sector	  generates)	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  indirectly:	  finance	  capital	  provides	  
‘cheap,	  unsecured	  credit’	  that	  boosts	  effective	  demand	  in	  economies	  that	  would	  
otherwise	  stagnate	  because	  of	  the	  low	  wages	  imposed	  on	  workers.88	  	  
Forms	  of	  state	  and	  social	  forces	  in	  a	  neoliberalising	  
capitalist	  world	  order	  	  
The	  reasons	  for	  governments’	  dependence	  on	  finance-­‐led	  growth	  are	  deeply	  
structural	  and	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  financialisation	  of	  capitalist	  
economies	  since	  the	  early	  1980s	  (Lapavitsas	  &	  Mendieta-­‐Muñoz	  2016).	  Lapavitsas	  
(2013)	  argues	  that	  because	  large	  corporations	  frequently	  use	  retained	  profits	  to	  
finance	  their	  investments	  and	  also	  engage	  in	  independent	  financial	  operations	  and	  
trading,	  the	  finance	  sector	  has	  positioned	  itself	  to	  find	  alternative	  sources	  of	  profits:	  
transactions	  in	  financial	  markets,	  fees	  and	  commissions	  they	  charge	  as	  
intermediaries	  in	  financial	  transactions,	  and	  transactions	  with	  households	  and	  
individuals.	  Financialised	  capitalism	  relies	  on	  the	  deep	  penetration	  of	  finance	  into	  
household	  and	  individual	  revenues	  that	  enable	  what	  Lapavitsas	  (2014,	  p.	  37)	  refers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Harvey	  (2010,	  p.	  107)	  explains	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  ‘effective	  demand’,	  “defined	  as	  wants,	  needs	  and	  desires	  backed	  by	  ability	  to	  pay,”	  results	  in	  capitalist	  economic	  crises	  of	  ‘underconsumption.’	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to	  as	  the	  ‘financial	  expropriation’	  of	  profits	  “directly	  from	  wages	  and	  salaries”	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  interest	  made	  on	  household	  mortgages	  and	  on	  individuals’	  unsecured	  
consumer	  loans.	  Not	  only	  are	  individuals	  forced	  to	  borrow	  to	  meet	  basic	  needs	  in	  
order	  to	  supplement	  low	  incomes	  and	  because	  of	  the	  state’s	  retreat	  from	  public	  
provisioning	  of	  health,	  education	  and	  other	  essential	  services,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  
forced	  to	  hold	  ‘substantial	  financial	  assets’	  themselves	  because	  of	  the	  privatisation	  
of	  previously	  public	  pension	  funds	  (Lapavitsas	  2013).	  	  
By	  implementing	  ideologically	  informed	  neoliberal	  financial	  and	  labour	  market	  
deregulation	  policies,	  and	  by	  restructuring	  tax	  regimes	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  rich	  and	  thus	  
eroding	  the	  revenue	  base	  with	  which	  social	  provisioning	  can	  be	  funded,	  national	  
governments	  have	  been	  complicit	  in	  the	  central	  position	  that	  finance	  capital	  now	  
enjoys	  in	  national	  economies	  (Bruff	  2014;	  Heyes,	  Lewis	  &	  Clark	  2012;	  Keaney	  2014;	  
Lapavitsas	  2013,	  2014).	  States	  also	  back	  powerful	  independent	  central	  banks	  that	  set	  
‘benchmark	  interest	  rates’	  and	  use	  public	  money	  to	  provide	  liquidity	  to	  the	  finance	  
industry	  in	  times	  of	  crisis,	  thus	  giving	  “a	  vast	  public	  subsidy	  to	  the	  capitalist	  class	  as	  a	  
whole”	  (Lapavitsas	  &	  Mendieta-­‐Muñoz	  2016,	  p.	  51;	  see	  also	  Bin	  2015).	  These	  
features	  of	  capitalism	  imply	  that	  despite	  concerns	  about	  the	  political	  fallout	  of	  rising	  
inequality	  raised	  by	  economists	  such	  as	  Piketty,	  who	  try	  to	  defend	  liberal	  democratic	  
ideals	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  save	  the	  capitalist	  system	  from	  itself,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  
the	  system	  can	  be	  ‘reformed’	  given	  the	  power	  of	  corporate	  and	  financial	  interests	  
and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  interests	  successfully	  counter	  any	  attempts	  to	  regulate	  
or	  control	  their	  operations	  	  –	  attempts	  that	  government	  officials	  and	  policymakers	  in	  
any	  case	  make	  only	  half-­‐heartedly	  (Desai,	  Freeman	  &	  Kagarlitsky	  2016;	  Helleiner	  
2013;	  Keaney	  2014;	  Peck	  2013;	  Stiglitz	  2009;	  Wade	  2009).	  Despite	  the	  historical	  
evidence	  he	  has	  amassed	  and	  discusses	  at	  length	  in	  his	  book,	  Piketty	  remains	  
‘optimistic’	  that	  democracy	  can	  ‘regain	  control	  over	  capitalism,’	  although	  he	  admits	  
that	  there	  is	  no	  basis	  for	  this	  optimism:	  
Has the US political process been captured by the 1 percent? This 
idea has become increasingly popular among observers of the 
Washington political scene. For reasons of natural optimism as well 
as professional predilection, I am inclined to grant more influence to 
ideas and intellectual debate. 
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The	  evidence	  that	  Piketty	  himself	  refers	  to	  in	  Capital	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐first	  Century	  
indicates	  that	  ‘representative	  democracy’	  is	  little	  more	  than	  a	  hollow	  concept	  since	  
it	  represents	  the	  interests	  of	  wealthy	  elites	  and	  the	  well-­‐paid	  and	  powerful	  
managers	  that	  manage	  their	  affairs	  rather	  than	  the	  general	  interest.	  Moreover,	  
there	  is	  much	  evidence	  that	  people	  suffering	  the	  effects	  of	  policies	  that	  favour	  ‘the	  
1%’	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  situation	  and	  no	  longer	  trust	  mainstream	  politicians	  and	  the	  
major	  political	  parties	  to	  represent	  their	  interests	  (Keaney	  2014;	  Peck	  2013):	  the	  
economic	  crisis	  has	  become	  a	  political	  crisis	  of	  legitimacy,	  which	  provides	  further	  
evidence	  that	  the	  current	  crisis	  is	  organic	  (in	  the	  Gramscian	  sense)	  rather	  than	  
conjunctural	  and	  presents	  a	  system-­‐wide	  weakness	  that	  erodes	  the	  consensus	  on	  
which	  hegemony	  depends.	  
Forms	  of	  state,	  institutions	  and	  social	  facts:	  Liberal	  
representative	  democracy	  as	  a	  ‘hollow	  concept’	  in	  a	  
neoliberalising	  capitalist	  world	  order	  
With	  governments	  implementing	  policies	  that	  have,	  over	  the	  years,	  favoured	  large	  
and	  powerful	  financial	  institutions	  and	  multinational	  corporations,	  national	  
economies	  have	  become	  increasingly	  intermeshed	  and	  dependent	  on	  these	  firms	  
and	  institutions.	  As	  a	  result,	  government	  representatives	  and	  policymakers	  declare	  
themselves	  unable	  to	  secure	  their	  citizens’	  social	  and	  economic	  wellbeing	  except	  in	  
the	  limited	  way	  of	  accommodating	  capital	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  investment	  to	  
‘strengthen’	  the	  economy	  and	  thereby	  to	  secure	  jobs	  (Bruff	  2014;	  Carroll	  &	  Jarvis	  
2015),	  and	  for	  many	  years	  large	  segments	  of	  the	  populations	  of	  Global	  North	  
societies	  seemed	  to	  have	  accepted	  this	  ‘truth’	  that	  ‘there	  is	  no	  alternative’	  so	  that	  it	  
became	  what	  Sinclair	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  ‘social	  fact’.	  But	  social	  facts	  are	  not	  immutable,	  
and	  the	  2007/8	  GFC	  initiated	  a	  widespread	  questioning	  of	  the	  expansion	  and	  
intensification	  of	  global	  capitalism	  (Brands	  &	  Feaver	  2016).	  As	  the	  economic	  and	  
social	  effects	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  that	  originated	  within	  US	  financial	  institutions	  
worked	  their	  way	  throughout	  the	  global	  economy	  (Karanikolos	  et	  al.	  2013),	  the	  
unwillingness	  of	  governments	  (with	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  Iceland)	  to	  discipline	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the	  financial	  sector	  became	  particularly	  evident.89	  To	  many	  people,	  governments’	  
unilateral	  decisions	  to	  use	  taxpayer	  money	  and	  to	  put	  taxpayers	  into	  further	  debt	  in	  
order	  to	  bail	  out	  the	  rich,	  when	  the	  same	  governments	  have	  been	  arguing	  for	  
decades	  (and	  continue	  to	  argue)	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  money	  to	  support	  
essential	  social	  programs	  that	  many	  working	  class	  and	  poor	  people	  rely	  on	  just	  to	  get	  
by,	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  major	  political	  parties	  are	  themselves	  responsible	  for	  
implementing	  and	  defending	  policies	  that	  favour	  the	  rich	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  everyone	  
else	  (Keane	  2013;	  Ortiz,	  Burke,	  Berrada	  &	  Cortés	  2013;	  Taibbi	  2012,	  2013).	  
Recent	  academic	  research	  provides	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  widely-­‐recognised	  
popular	  understanding	  that	  economically	  powerful	  elites	  and	  organised	  business	  
groups	  strongly	  influence	  United	  States	  (US)	  government	  policy	  “while	  average	  
citizens	  and	  mass-­‐based	  interest	  groups	  have	  little	  or	  no	  independent	  influence”	  
(Gilens	  &	  Page	  2014,	  p.	  564).	  This	  systemic	  deficit	  in	  political	  representation	  for	  
‘average	  citizens’	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  United	  States;	  it	  is	  a	  widespread	  
phenomenon	  characterising	  many	  western	  democracies	  (Chou	  2015;	  Cox	  2015;	  
Matthjis	  2014).	  One	  response	  by	  ordinary	  people	  has	  increasingly	  manifested	  as	  a	  
tendency	  to	  use	  the	  political	  institutions	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  vote	  against	  global	  elites	  
whenever	  they	  get	  an	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so,	  with	  the	  ‘Brexit’	  outcome	  of	  the	  June	  
2016	  UK	  referendum	  on	  European	  Union	  membership	  and	  the	  November	  2016	  
election	  of	  populist	  Republican	  maverick	  Donald	  Trump	  as	  US	  president	  being	  the	  
most	  recent	  examples	  (Brands	  &	  Feaver	  2016;	  Desai,	  Freeman	  &	  Kagarlitsky	  2016;	  
Waddock	  2016).	  
Populist	  politicians	  such	  as	  Trump	  are	  elected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  nationalist	  and	  
anti-­‐immigrant	  rhetoric,	  jingoism	  and	  promises	  that	  they	  will	  create	  local	  jobs	  or	  
implement	  other	  policies	  to	  protect	  national	  populations	  against	  the	  ravages	  of	  
neoliberal	  globalisation	  (Fouskas	  2016),	  but	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  they	  will	  meet	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Widespread	  and	  persistent	  protests	  against	  the	  Icelandic	  government’s	  acceptance	  of	  IMF	  conditions	  for	  a	  loan	  needed	  to	  bail	  out	  the	  banks	  that	  crashed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  GFC	  resulted	  in	  the	  government’s	  resignation	  and	  the	  election	  of	  a	  new	  government	  that	  temporarily	  nationalized	  the	  banks	  and	  implemented	  measures	  that	  reduced	  household	  and	  non-­‐financial	  business	  debts	  (Hart-­‐Landsberg	  2013).	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election	  promises	  once	  in	  power	  (Widmaier	  2016).90	  An	  illustrative	  example	  of	  the	  
powerlessness	  of	  voters	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  political	  systems	  to	  effect	  systemic	  
change	  through	  formal	  democratic	  institutions	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  ongoing	  drama	  of	  
the	  continuing	  economic	  crisis	  in	  Greece.	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Greek	  people	  
clearly	  voted	  SYRIZA	  —	  which	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  Radical	  Left	  Coalition	  formed	  in	  2004	  
and	  emerged	  as	  an	  electoral	  political	  party	  in	  2012	  —	  into	  power	  with	  the	  mandate	  
to	  end	  austerity	  policies	  (Witte	  2015),	  the	  SYRIZA	  government	  has	  proved	  unwilling	  
or	  unable	  to	  follow	  the	  people’s	  mandate	  and	  continues,	  instead,	  to	  impose	  the	  
increasingly	  severe	  and	  socially	  damaging	  austerity	  policies	  dictated	  by	  what	  Greek	  
people	  disparagingly	  call	  ‘the	  Troika’	  (the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  the	  
European	  Union,	  and	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank).91	  The	  inability	  or	  unwillingness	  of	  
official	  political	  representatives	  to	  address	  the	  economic,	  environmental,	  and	  social	  
damage	  caused	  by	  the	  expansion	  and	  intensification	  of	  global	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  
production	  has	  forced	  many	  to	  turn	  to	  alternative	  means	  of	  expressing	  their	  
frustration.	  As	  Robert	  Cox	  put	  it,	  “people	  don’t	  believe	  in	  politics	  any	  more”	  (Cox	  
cited	  in	  Martin	  2013,	  p.	  221).	  
The	  social	  dynamics	  of	  protest	  in	  a	  non-­‐hegemonic	  
neoliberalising	  capitalist	  world	  order	  
Unable	  to	  achieve	  meaningful	  change	  through	  legal	  political	  institutions,	  an	  
increasing	  number	  of	  people	  have	  resorted	  to	  participating	  in	  civil	  disobedience	  
mass	  actions	  such	  as	  the	  2011/12	  Occupy	  Movement	  protests	  (della	  Porta	  2012).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  As	  many	  political	  analysts	  note,	  however,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  forms	  of	  populism:	  while	  Donald	  Trump	  in	  the	  US,	  Marine	  le	  Pen	  in	  France,	  and	  Pauline	  Hanson	  in	  Australia	  represent	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  politicians	  who	  advocate	  socially	  damaging	  policies,	  some	  left-­‐leaning	  politicians	  such	  as	  Jeremy	  Corbyn	  in	  the	  UK,	  Bernie	  Sanders	  in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  late	  Venezuelan	  president,	  Hugo	  Cháves,	  are	  often	  similarly	  derided	  in	  the	  media	  as	  ‘populist’	  while,	  in	  reality,	  their	  policies	  represent	  progressive	  ideals	  (albeit	  to	  varying	  degrees).	  	  91	  For	  detailed	  discussions	  outlining	  conditions	  leading	  to	  SYRIZA’s	  rise,	  refer	  to	  Bournous	  and	  Karatsioubanis	  (2015);	  Spourdalakis	  (2014);	  Stavrakakis	  and	  Katsambekis	  (2014);	  and	  Verney	  (2014).	  The	  impasse	  between	  the	  Greek	  government	  and	  its	  creditors	  (Inman	  2015),	  which	  saw	  the	  SYRIZA	  government	  completely	  capitulate	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  ‘the	  Troika’	  in	  July	  2015	  and	  split	  (with	  the	  Left	  Faction	  forming	  a	  separate	  party,	  Popular	  Unity,	  in	  August	  2015),	  is	  a	  clear	  demonstration	  that	  even	  relatively	  ‘radical’	  elected	  governments	  have	  negligible	  power	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  implementing	  progressive	  policies	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  people	  they	  represent	  if	  these	  policies	  threaten	  elite	  interests.	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While	  the	  relatively	  long-­‐lasting	  Occupy	  camps	  in	  US	  and	  UK	  public	  squares	  and	  
parks	  were	  forcibly	  disbanded	  in	  what	  appeared,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  US,	  to	  be	  a	  co-­‐
ordinated	  action	  by	  authorities	  (Ramsey	  2012),	  protests	  over	  a	  variety	  of	  economic,	  
environmental	  and	  social	  issues	  continue	  to	  occur	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  (Caraus	  
&	  Parvu	  2016;	  Carothers	  &	  Youngs	  2015;	  CIVICUS	  2016;	  Koukouzelis	  2016;	  Ortiz,	  
Burke,	  Berrada	  &	  Cortés	  2013;	  Youngs	  2017).	  The	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Trump	  
administration’s	  ascension	  to	  power	  in	  particular	  heralded	  a	  renewal	  of	  mass	  protest	  
activities	  both	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  worldwide	  (Jamieson	  2017).	  	  
The	  first	  mass	  action	  against	  the	  Trump	  administration	  was	  the	  Women’s	  March	  on	  
Washington,	  that	  aimed	  to	  include	  people	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  groups	  threatened	  
by	  its	  policies	  by	  organising	  under	  the	  principle	  that	  ‘Women’s	  Rights	  are	  Human	  
Rights	  and	  Human	  Rights	  are	  Women’s	  Rights’	  (Women’s	  March	  on	  Washington	  
2017).	  Taking	  place	  on	  21	  January	  2017,	  the	  day	  after	  the	  inauguration	  of	  Donald	  
Trump	  as	  president	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Women’s	  March	  has	  been	  described	  as	  
an	  ‘anti-­‐Trump	  protest’	  to	  demonstrate	  resistance	  against	  policies	  such	  as	  Trump’s	  
“…plans	  to	  repeal	  the	  2010	  Affordable	  Care	  Act,	  which	  among	  other	  things	  requires	  
health	  insurers	  to	  cover	  birth	  control”	  (Khomami	  2017).	  It	  included	  several	  solidarity	  
marches	  in	  other	  US	  cities	  as	  well	  as	  in	  cities	  around	  the	  world	  that	  were	  organised	  
by	  “Women’s	  March	  Global,	  the	  international	  arm	  of	  the	  Washington	  arm”	  
(Khomami	  2017)	  and	  is	  estimated	  to	  have	  attracted	  between	  3,200,000	  and	  
5,200,000	  participants	  in	  the	  US	  and	  between	  260,000	  and	  360,000	  participants	  in	  
other	  countries	  (Pressman	  &	  Chenoweth	  cited	  in	  Bridges	  &	  Tober	  2017).	  Another	  
significant	  mass	  civil	  disobedience	  action	  involving	  thousands	  of	  participants	  
occurred	  at	  airports	  across	  the	  United	  States	  on	  29	  January	  2017	  to	  protest	  against	  
Trump’s	  executive	  order	  to	  impose	  “a	  freeze	  on	  refugee	  admissions	  and	  a	  ban	  on	  
travel	  from	  seven	  Muslim-­‐majority	  countries”	  (Gambino	  et	  al.	  2017).	  These	  protests	  
also	  spread	  globally,	  with	  one	  example	  of	  a	  solidarity	  action	  being	  the	  marches	  
attended	  by	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  participants	  across	  the	  UK	  protesting	  Prime	  
Minister	  Theresa	  May’s	  state	  visit	  invitation	  to	  President	  Trump	  (Gayle	  &	  Slawson	  
2017).	  Other	  notable	  mass	  protest	  actions	  against	  President	  Trump	  and	  his	  
administration’s	  policies	  included	  the	  15	  April	  2017	  Tax	  March	  demanding	  that	  he	  
	   109	  
release	  his	  tax	  returns	  (Stevens	  2017),	  the	  22	  April	  2017	  March	  for	  Science	  to	  
counter	  the	  Trump	  administration’s	  repeal	  of	  environmental	  protection	  laws	  and	  its	  
funding	  cuts	  to	  environmental	  protection	  agencies	  and	  research	  projects	  on	  crucial	  
issues	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  (Milman	  2017b),	  the	  29	  April	  2017	  People’s	  Climate	  
March	  demanding	  socially	  just	  action	  on	  climate	  change	  (Fandos	  2017),	  and	  the	  12	  
August	  2017	  Charlottesville	  (Virginia)	  protest	  against	  the	  rise	  of	  US	  right-­‐wing	  
extremism	  which	  is	  perceived	  as	  being	  fuelled	  by	  the	  Trump	  administration’s	  policies	  
(Alpher	  2017).	  At	  the	  transnational	  level,	  an	  estimated	  200,000	  anti-­‐capitalist	  
protesters	  gathered	  in	  force	  in	  Hamburg	  on	  7	  and	  8	  July	  2017	  to	  protest	  against	  the	  
G20	  Summit	  (Oltermann	  2017)	  in	  an	  action	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  1999	  alter-­‐
globalization	  anti-­‐WTO	  protests	  in	  Seattle	  (Price	  2016).	  
Ongoing	  sporadic	  protests	  such	  as	  these	  demonstrate	  that	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  
people	  belonging	  to,	  or	  supporting,	  subordinate	  groups	  that	  include	  large	  segments	  
of	  the	  working	  class,	  refugees,	  migrants,	  minority	  groups,	  students,	  and	  people	  with	  
disabilities,	  are	  becoming	  concerned	  enough	  to	  take	  action	  in	  the	  form	  of	  protests	  
against	  the	  negative	  material	  and	  social	  outcomes	  that	  they	  have	  to	  suffer	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  policies	  that	  favour	  elites	  (CIVICUS	  2016).	  Few	  of	  the	  protests	  have	  resulted	  in	  
changes	  that	  benefit	  ordinary	  people;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  ruling	  elites	  respond	  with	  
thinly-­‐veiled	  disdain	  for	  the	  concerns	  of	  their	  citizens,	  as	  they	  did	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  
the	  2003	  global	  anti-­‐war	  demonstrations,	  in	  which	  millions	  of	  people	  participated	  
both	  in	  the	  US	  and	  in	  many	  cities	  around	  the	  world	  (Carty	  2009;	  Hil	  2008).92	  These	  
global	  anti-­‐war	  demonstrations	  signalled	  people’s	  opposition	  to	  the	  2003	  military	  
invasion	  of	  Iraq	  by	  the	  ‘Coalition	  of	  the	  Willing’	  –	  an	  invasion	  led	  by	  the	  US	  Bush	  
administration	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  intelligence	  reports	  that	  Iraq	  had	  secret	  
“weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction”	  (Fawcett	  2013;	  Herring	  &	  Robinson	  2014-­‐15;	  
Western	  2005).	  The	  2003	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  is	  just	  one	  of	  the	  many	  conflicts	  affecting	  
the	  lives	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  around	  the	  world	  as	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Estimates	  of	  how	  many	  people	  participated	  in	  these	  protests	  vary:	  Hil	  (2008)	  reports	  an	  estimated	  total	  of	  10	  million	  people	  in	  over	  800	  cities,	  while	  Carty	  (2009)	  reports	  an	  estimated	  total	  of	  15	  million	  people	  in	  75	  cities.	  As	  McPhail	  and	  McCarthy	  (2004)	  point	  out,	  attendance	  numbers	  at	  such	  mass	  protest	  events	  are	  often	  disputed,	  with	  authorities	  tending	  to	  downplay	  the	  numbers	  and	  organisers	  and	  supporters	  tending	  to	  exaggerate	  them.	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attempt	  to	  control	  the	  development	  of	  global	  capitalism	  in	  a	  way	  that	  best	  suits	  their	  
economic	  interests	  and	  the	  US	  desire	  to	  retain	  its	  status	  as	  the	  world’s	  sole	  global	  
hegemon.	  The	  geopolitical	  instability	  this	  engenders	  results	  in	  many	  needless	  deaths,	  
much	  suffering,	  and	  immense	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  environmental	  damage.	  
Destructive	  material	  capabilities	  in	  an	  unstable	  world	  
order:	  21st	  century	  military	  conflicts	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  the	  
Biosphere	  and	  people’s	  productive	  and	  reproductive	  
capabilities	  	  
The	  year	  2003	  heralded	  a	  significant	  development	  in	  global	  politics,	  with	  the	  United	  
States	  bypassing	  the	  international	  legal	  requirement	  of	  obtaining	  UN	  Security	  
Council	  authorisation	  for	  its	  proposed	  military	  action	  in	  Iraq	  (Franck	  2003,	  2006;	  
Kramer,	  Michalowski	  &	  Rothe	  2005).93	  The	  millions	  of	  people	  around	  the	  world	  
protesting	  against	  military	  action	  were	  also	  ignored	  (Anderson,	  Bennis	  &	  Cavanagh	  
2003;	  Anderson,	  Bennis,	  Cavanagh	  &	  Leaver	  2003)	  and	  the	  invasion	  proceeded.	  The	  
invasion	  of	  Iraq	  set	  off	  a	  chain	  of	  events	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  deaths	  of	  “tens	  if	  not	  
hundreds	  of	  thousands”	  of	  Iraqi	  civilians	  (Fawcett	  2013)	  and	  the	  rapid	  rise	  of	  Islamic	  
State	  (IS)	  (Arbatova	  &	  Dynkin	  2016),	  thereby	  triggering	  off	  the	  massive	  (and	  ongoing)	  
destabilisation	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Barton	  2016;	  Ezrow	  2016;	  Fawcett	  2013;	  
Newsinger	  2015).	  The	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  continue	  to	  unfold	  
throughout	  the	  world	  in	  the	  form	  of	  terrorist	  attacks	  that	  are	  met	  by	  further	  
repression	  by	  authorities,	  which	  leads	  to	  more	  terrorism	  and	  creates	  a	  vicious	  circle	  
of	  escalating	  violence	  (Keane	  2015;	  Stern	  &	  McBride	  2013).	  The	  armed	  conflicts	  that	  
have	  subsequently	  erupted	  in	  the	  destabilised	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (MENA)	  
region	  have	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  ‘record-­‐high’	  numbers	  of	  ‘displaced’	  people	  
worldwide	  (ICRC	  2016),	  many	  of	  them	  seeking	  refuge	  in	  Europe	  (UNHCR	  2016;	  WEF	  
2016).94	  This	  unprecedented	  displacement	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  has	  prompted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  US	  policymakers	  decided	  to	  bypass	  the	  UN	  procedures	  because	  France,	  Russia	  and	  Germany	  opposed	  war	  with	  Iraq	  (Kramer	  &	  Michalowski	  2005),	  and	  a	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  authorising	  it	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  vetoed	  (Anderson,	  Bennis	  &	  Cavanagh	  2003;	  Anderson,	  Bennis,	  Cavanagh	  &	  Leaver	  2003).	  94	  According	  to	  a	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees	  report,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015	  “…	  65.3	  million	  individuals	  were	  forcibly	  displaced	  worldwide	  as	  a	  result	  of	  persecution,	  conflict,	  generalized	  violence,	  or	  human	  rights	  violations.	  This	  is	  5.8	  million	  more	  than	  the	  previous	  year	  (59.5	  million)”	  (UNHCR	  2016,	  p.	  2).	  The	  total	  number	  of	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not	  only	  a	  refugee	  crisis	  but	  also	  very	  dangerous	  nationalist,	  xenophobic	  and	  racist	  
reactions	  from	  some	  European	  politicians	  and	  citizens	  (CIVICUS	  2016;	  Saull	  2015).	  
Another	  effect	  of	  the	  spiral	  of	  violence	  is	  the	  loss	  of	  many	  fundamental	  civil	  rights	  
that	  were	  previously	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  western	  liberal	  democratic	  societies	  (Cox	  
cited	  in	  Martin	  2013;	  Jarvis	  &	  Lister	  2013),	  including	  the	  right	  to	  privacy:	  as	  revealed	  
by	  Edward	  Snowden,	  ordinary	  people	  all	  over	  the	  world	  are	  now	  subjected	  to	  
widespread	  and	  indiscriminate	  surveillance	  (Altschuler	  2015;	  Brevini	  2015)	  publicly	  
justified	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  ‘War	  on	  Terror.’	  
The	  effects	  of	  the	  2003	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  illustrate	  how	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  its	  allies,	  particularly	  in	  the	  MENA	  region,	  but	  also	  in	  their	  dealings	  
with	  China	  and	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  generates	  an	  increasingly	  unstable	  world	  
order	  that	  further	  delegitimises	  global	  ruling	  elites	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  people	  -­‐	  
especially	  those	  living	  in	  the	  affected	  regions.	  The	  US-­‐led	  attack	  on	  Iraq	  occurred	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  second	  Bush	  Administration’s	  response	  to	  the	  September	  2001	  al-­‐
Qaeda	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  US	  territory,	  which	  was	  to	  declare	  a	  ‘War	  on	  Terror’	  
(Krebs	  &	  Lobasz	  2007).	  This	  ‘War	  on	  Terror’	  was	  to	  be	  conducted	  through	  what	  has	  
come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Bush	  Doctrine,’	  a	  policy	  characterised	  by	  unilateralism,	  
‘pre-­‐emptive	  war’	  and	  ‘regime	  change’	  (Jervis	  2016)	  coupled	  with	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  
Geneva	  Conventions.95	  Afghanistan	  was	  the	  first	  target	  of	  the	  ‘War	  on	  Terror,’	  and	  
the	  US	  and	  its	  allies	  invaded	  the	  country	  in	  2001,	  launching	  a	  long-­‐term	  conflict	  that	  
spilled	  over	  into	  Pakistan	  (Shaw	  2013;	  Roberts	  2009)	  and	  is	  still	  ongoing.	  This	  was	  
followed	  by	  the	  illegal	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  (Kramer	  &	  Michalowski	  2005)	  and	  the	  
arrest,	  show	  trial	  (Peterson	  2007),	  and	  execution	  of	  its	  president,	  Saddam	  Hussein.	  
The	  next	  target	  of	  ‘regime	  change’	  was	  Libyan	  president	  Muammar	  Gaddafi,	  who	  
was	  killed	  by	  the	  US-­‐	  and	  NATO-­‐supported	  anti-­‐government	  National	  Transitional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  refugees	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2015	  was	  estimated	  to	  be	  16.1	  million	  people,	  “…the	  highest	  level	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  and	  approximately	  1.7	  million	  [people]	  more	  than	  the	  total	  reported	  12	  months	  earlier”	  (UNHCR	  2016,	  p.	  13).	  95	  The	  Geneva	  Conventions	  are	  part	  of	  a	  body	  of	  international	  law	  that	  stipulates	  that	  “parties	  to	  armed	  conflict	  protect	  civilians	  and	  non-­‐combatants,	  limit	  the	  means	  or	  methods	  that	  are	  permissible	  during	  warfare	  and	  conform	  to	  rules	  governing	  the	  behaviour	  of	  occupying	  forces”	  (Kramer	  &	  Michalowski	  2005,	  p.	  451)	  and	  some	  legal	  experts	  argue	  that	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  failure	  to	  conform	  to	  these	  stipulations	  in	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  war	  constitute	  state	  crimes	  (Kramer	  &	  Michalowski	  2005;	  Kramer,	  Michalowski	  &	  Rothe	  2005).	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Council	  in	  2011	  (Karniel,	  Lavie-­‐Dinur	  &	  Azran	  2015).	  US	  foreign	  policy	  is	  also	  involved	  
in,	  or	  provides	  support	  to,	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  military	  attacks	  against	  the	  successor	  to	  
al-­‐Qaeda,	  IS,	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Syria	  (Guerlain	  2014)	  and	  Yemen	  (Borger	  &	  Jacobs	  
2017;	  Clausen	  2015;	  Mazzetti,	  Hubbard	  &	  Rosenberg	  2016).	  These	  military	  actions	  
have	  further	  destabilised	  the	  MENA	  region,	  killing	  and	  maiming	  an	  unknown	  number	  
of	  innocent	  civilians	  and	  causing	  much	  ongoing	  suffering	  in	  the	  region	  (Crawford	  
2013,	  2016;	  Dehghan	  &	  Algohbary	  2017;	  Shaw	  2013).	  The	  instability	  is	  compounded	  
by	  US	  support	  for	  Israeli	  enmity	  against	  Iran	  (Pillar	  2016),	  which	  is	  also	  a	  regional	  
rival	  of	  another	  US	  ally,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  (Guerlain	  2014;	  Mazzetti,	  Hubbard	  &	  Rosenberg	  
2016).	  Adding	  further	  complexities	  to	  the	  unstable	  MENA	  region	  is	  the	  US	  rivalry	  
with	  China,	  which	  has	  become	  “the	  second-­‐largest	  trading	  partner	  in	  the	  Arab	  world,	  
and	  the	  first	  trading	  partner	  of	  nine	  Arab	  states”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Gulf’s	  main	  oil	  client	  
since	  2014	  (Kausch	  2015).	  US	  conflicts	  with	  Russia	  are	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  war	  in	  
Syria,	  where	  Russia’s	  only	  remaining	  external	  naval	  base	  is	  located	  in	  the	  
Mediterranean	  port	  of	  Tartus,	  and	  where	  Russia	  has	  intervened	  against	  US	  efforts	  to	  
achieve	  regime	  change	  (Kausch	  2015).	  
Tensions	  between	  the	  US	  and	  its	  NATO	  allies	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  Russia	  on	  the	  
other	  are	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  Ukraine,	  a	  potential	  flashpoint	  for	  a	  conflict	  that	  could	  
escalate	  to	  dangerous	  levels.	  As	  Desai,	  Freeman	  and	  Kagarlitsky	  (2016,	  p.	  490)	  point	  
out,	  the	  2013	  ‘Maidan	  protests’	  in	  the	  Ukraine	  occurred	  “…under	  the	  usual	  banners	  
of	  democracy	  and	  self-­‐determination,	  [and]	  the	  West	  sponsored	  regime	  change	  to	  
install	  a	  new	  government	  friendlier	  [than	  the	  deposed	  Yanukovich	  government]	  to	  
the	  West	  and	  more	  open	  to	  EU	  and	  NATO	  membership...”	  US	  relations	  with	  Russia	  
deteriorated	  rapidly	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Russia’s	  subsequent	  annexation	  of	  Crimea	  in	  
2014.	  While	  Russian	  President	  Vladimir	  Putin’s	  ‘ambitious,’	  ‘power-­‐hungry,’	  
‘dictatorial	  personality’	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  annexation	  (MacFarlane	  
2016),	  more	  nuanced	  (albeit	  Realist)	  analyses	  of	  the	  situation	  explain	  the	  Russian	  
government’s	  actions	  in	  the	  Ukraine	  with	  reference	  to	  its	  “genuine	  national	  interest	  
in	  preventing	  outside	  powers	  from	  acquiring	  a	  foothold	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	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former	  Soviet	  Union”	  (Götz	  2015,	  p.	  5).96	  Götz	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Russian	  
government	  had	  three	  compelling	  geostrategic	  reasons	  to	  annex	  the	  Crimea	  after	  
the	  overthrow	  of	  Ukraine	  President	  Viktor	  Yanukovych	  in	  2014:	  the	  geographical	  
location	  of	  the	  Ukraine	  and	  its	  proximity	  to	  the	  Volga	  region,	  “the	  industrial	  and	  
political	  heartland	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation”;	  attempts	  by	  the	  EU	  to	  not	  only	  
threaten	  the	  market	  share	  of	  many	  Russian	  exporters	  in	  the	  Ukraine	  through	  
enticing	  the	  Ukrainian	  government	  to	  sign	  an	  association	  agreement,	  but	  also	  to	  
threaten	  Russia	  militarily	  as	  this	  agreement	  “includes	  clauses	  to	  integrate	  Ukraine	  
into	  the	  EU’s	  common	  security	  and	  defence	  policy”;	  and	  the	  generally	  pro-­‐Western	  
orientation	  of	  the	  new	  Ukranian	  government.	  As	  Götz	  argues,	  given	  similar	  
circumstances,	  the	  US	  would	  react	  similarly	  (as,	  indeed,	  it	  has	  on	  several	  occasions,	  
even	  under	  conditions	  that	  were	  much	  less	  provocative	  than	  those	  faced	  by	  the	  
Russian	  government	  in	  the	  Ukraine).	  Burke-­‐White	  (2014)	  emphasises	  these	  double	  
standards	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Russian	  government’s	  legal	  justifications	  
for	  its	  intervention	  in	  Crimea	  took	  “a	  card	  straight	  from	  America’s	  playbook”	  (pp.	  65	  
–	  66):	  	  
Russia’s international legal actions in Crimea are similar to those of 
the US throughout most of the past 70 years. America, too, has 
sought to expand the right to self-determination in Kosovo and, 
more recently, South Sudan. And Washington has been happy to 
exploit, and even expand, the lax standards of attribution in 
international law in places ranging from Nicaragua in the 1980s to 
Libya in 2011. 
(Burke-White 2014, p. 73)  
While	  Burke-­‐White’s	  argument	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  view	  that	  the	  international	  state-­‐
system	  emerging	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  is	  multi-­‐polar	  and	  that	  the	  US	  should	  
be	  aware	  of	  the	  dangerous	  precedents	  its	  ‘international	  legal	  exceptionalism’	  set,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Refer,	  also,	  to	  Desai,	  Freeman	  &	  Kagarlitsky	  (2016),	  who	  reference	  Mearsheimer	  as	  another	  Realist	  scholar	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  conflict	  in	  the	  Ukraine	  was	  provoked	  by	  the	  West.	  Desai,	  Freeman	  and	  Kagarlitsky	  provide	  their	  own	  detailed	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  US-­‐led	  conflict	  against	  Russia	  in	  the	  Ukraine.	  They	  point	  out	  that	  “…many	  Western	  myths	  about	  Ukraine…	  typically	  lack	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  region…	  or	  of	  the	  volatile	  geopolitical	  economy	  of	  imperialism	  in	  an	  age	  of	  increasing	  multipolarity”,	  and	  argue	  that	  “unless	  the	  confrontation	  in	  Ukraine	  is	  placed	  in	  these	  contexts,	  it	  is	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  grasp	  the	  causes	  and	  dynamics	  of	  the	  social	  and	  military	  evolution	  of	  the	  crisis	  or	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  confrontation	  over	  Ukraine	  and	  the	  potential	  it	  contains	  for	  war”	  (Desai,	  Freeman	  &	  Kagarlitsky	  2016,	  p.	  490).	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Jervis	  (2016)	  argues	  that	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  heralded	  the	  ‘emergence	  of	  
unipolarity’	  and	  that	  US	  power	  is	  such	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  challenged	  in	  the	  
foreseeable	  future.	  Furthermore,	  Jervis	  adds,	  US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  era	  
is	  defined	  by	  the	  ‘Bush	  doctrine,’	  according	  to	  which:	  	  
…there are no universal norms or rules governing all states. On the 
contrary, order can be maintained only if the dominant power 
behaves quite differently from the others. Thus the administration is 
not worried that its preventive war doctrine or attacking Iraq without 
Security Council endorsement will set a precedent for others 
because the dictates do not bind the United States. 
(Jervis 2016, p. 297) 
Such	  assertions	  of	  US	  hegemonic	  dominance	  in	  a	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  unipolar	  world	  
system	  are	  refuted	  by	  critical	  GPE	  accounts	  such	  as	  that	  presented	  by	  Desai,	  
Freeman	  and	  Kagarlitsky	  (2016,	  p.	  499),	  who	  argue	  that	  analyses	  presenting	  the	  US	  
as	  a	  hegemon	  are	  ‘misleading	  scholarship’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  504)	  and	  point	  to	  the	  many	  
indicators	  demonstrating	  that	  “…the	  US’s	  victory	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  had	  been	  largely	  
pyrrhic”:	  
By the early 1990s, a decade of neoliberalism had failed to revive its 
productive economy and resulted only in an increasingly 
financialised pattern of weak growth. The increasing economic 
closeness between the Anglo-American and continental West 
European economies also rested on volatile foundations as 
Eurozone financial institutions were drawn into the maelstrom of 
dollar-denominated capital flows and asset bubbles. Such benefits as 
the Europeans derived from this brief financial dalliance soon 
proved costly as, outside the US, the costs of the 2008 financial 
crisis fell most heavily on the Eurozone, also laying the basis of its 
separate crisis two years later. 
(Desai, Freeman & Kagarlitsky 2016, pp. 499 – 500) 
Furthermore,	  Desai,	  Freeman	  and	  Kagarlitsky	  (2016,	  p.	  498)	  argue	  that	  analyses	  
“positing	  more	  or	  less	  inevitable	  aggrandisement	  and	  conflict	  between	  powerful	  
actors”	  facilitate	  the	  “demonization	  of	  leaders	  who	  challenge	  Western	  dominance	  as	  
dictators”	  and	  exacerbate	  the	  dangers	  of	  military	  conflict	  because	  they	  are	  used	  by	  
US	  policy-­‐makers	  to	  ‘give	  theoretical	  dignity’	  to	  their	  ambitions	  and	  to	  legitimise	  
military	  adventurism,	  whether	  this	  outcome	  is	  intended	  or	  not.	  Furthermore,	  while	  
facilitating	  the	  legitimisation	  of	  military	  conflicts,	  such	  analyses	  simultaneously	  
obscure	  ‘the	  real	  drivers	  of	  capitalist	  international	  relations,’	  and	  particularly	  the	  
current	  conflicts,	  which	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  “…the	  US	  lead	  in	  the	  size	  of	  its	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economy,	  on	  which	  its	  power	  rested,	  is	  now	  threatened	  as	  is	  Western	  pre-­‐eminence	  
generally”	  as	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  shifts	  to	  China	  and	  other	  emerging	  
economies	  (Desai,	  Freeman	  &	  Kagarlitsky	  2016,	  p.	  498).	  In	  light	  of	  these	  
developments	  in	  the	  global	  economy,	  successive	  US	  administrations	  try	  to	  maintain	  
US	  dominance	  in	  global	  affairs	  using	  all	  means	  at	  their	  disposal,	  and	  this	  could	  
perhaps	  even	  include	  deploying	  the	  US’s	  overwhelming	  military	  power	  in	  a	  major	  
conflict	  (Trautsch	  2015).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  conflicts	  discussed	  above,	  US	  reactions	  to	  
the	  perceived	  threats	  presented	  by	  China	  to	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  East-­‐Asian	  
region	  constitutes	  another	  key	  ‘pressure	  point’	  that	  may	  result	  in	  military	  conflict	  
that	  could	  potentially	  escalate	  dangerously.	  	  
Under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Obama	  Administration’s	  2011	  ‘Pivot	  to	  Asia’	  policy	  
initiative,	  the	  US	  is	  poised	  to	  intervene	  militarily	  in	  China’s	  maritime	  and	  sea-­‐
territorial	  disputes	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  East	  and	  South	  China	  
seas	  (Krause	  2014;	  Morton	  2016;	  Xinbo	  2016),	  with	  the	  Trump	  administration’s	  
emerging	  policies	  greatly	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  such	  military	  intervention	  
(Greene	  2016;	  Haas	  2017;	  McCurry	  2017).	  As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  Russia	  and	  the	  Ukraine,	  
China’s	  attempts	  to	  secure	  its	  ‘near	  neighbourhood’	  in	  the	  South	  and	  East	  China	  seas	  
can	  be	  seen,	  from	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  perspective,	  as	  
…natural and justified in light of [the] geographic location and the 
importance of those waters to China’s strategic interests. Command 
of the near seas concerns not merely the security of China’s most 
prosperous cities along the coastland; such command is also 
intimately tied to reunification with Taiwan and the struggle for 
sovereignty over the disputed land features in the East and South 
China Seas. 
(Wu 2016, p. 405) 
Despite	  the	  plausibility	  of	  such	  ‘defensive’	  motivations,	  China	  (like	  Russia)	  is	  
presented	  in	  Western	  media,	  and	  in	  many	  Western	  foreign	  policy	  analyses,	  as	  
adopting	  an	  ‘assertive’	  or	  ‘aggressive’	  stance	  in	  its	  neighbourhood	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  
claimed,	  directly	  challenging	  ‘Western	  interests’	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Buszynski	  
2017	  and	  Panda	  2016).	  This	  argument	  serves	  to	  justify	  the	  US	  ‘Pivot	  to	  Asia’	  which,	  in	  
military	  terms,	  involves	  redeploying	  some	  of	  its	  ‘military	  assets’	  such	  as	  aircraft	  
carriers,	  submarines,	  and	  warships	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Europe	  to	  the	  Asia	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Pacific	  region	  (Kamp	  2015).	  The	  ‘pivot’	  or	  ‘rebalancing’	  also	  involves	  the	  US	  
establishing	  more	  military	  bases	  in	  the	  region	  as	  well	  as	  entering	  agreements	  that	  
give	  it	  access	  to	  military	  bases	  in	  allied	  territories	  (Carter	  2016)	  in	  preparation	  for	  
potential	  military	  confrontations	  with	  China.	  As	  noted	  previously,	  however,	  critical	  
GPE	  theorists	  argue	  that	  US	  confrontations	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  are	  largely	  
motivated	  by	  economic	  concerns;	  Hudson	  (2016,	  p.	  557),	  for	  instance,	  argues	  that	  
China’s	  rising	  economic	  power	  is	  threatening	  to	  US	  interests	  in	  many	  ways:	  
It provides other countries, rich as well as poor, with alternative 
trade and financial options. And it threatens US control over 
international economic governance, undermining the legitimacy of 
its power in existing institutions via the deadlocked WTO… and the 
increasingly isolated IMF and World Bank. Building alternative 
economic institutions in the face of US and Western resistance 
reflects the emerging multipolar reality.97 
The	  abundant	  natural	  gas	  and	  fishery	  resources	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  maritime	  disputes	  are	  
additional	  economic	  factors	  informing	  the	  US	  challenge	  to	  China’s	  dominance	  in	  this	  
region	  (Morton	  2016).	  Along	  similar	  lines,	  the	  US	  is	  keen	  to	  ensure	  that	  US-­‐based	  
corporations	  acquire	  access	  to	  Russia’s	  gas	  markets	  in	  Europe,	  where	  they	  intend	  to	  
sell	  their	  shale	  gas	  (Chanis	  2012;	  Dunn	  &	  McClelland	  2013;	  Ebinger,	  Massy	  &	  
Avasarala	  2012;	  Kausch	  2015;	  Ratner	  et	  al.	  2015),	  and	  the	  provocation	  leading	  to	  
Russia’s	  annexation	  of	  the	  Crimea	  (Cypher	  2016)	  presented	  a	  perfect	  excuse	  for	  the	  
US	  to	  press	  its	  European	  allies	  to	  stop	  importing	  natural	  gas	  from	  Russia	  (Davenport	  
&	  Erlanger	  2014;	  Goldenberg	  2014).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  broader	  economic	  interests	  
that	  contribute	  to	  US	  military	  interventions	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  there	  are	  
many	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  conflict	  benefits	  US	  corporations.	  The	  fact	  that	  US	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Hudson’s	  (2016b)	  discussion	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  IMF	  broke	  its	  own	  rules	  when	  it	  lent	  money	  to	  the	  Ukraine	  constitutes	  an	  interesting	  example	  of	  how	  this	  institution	  works	  and	  whose	  interests	  it	  protects.	  The	  IMF	  also	  changed	  one	  of	  its	  rules,	  the	  rule	  specifying	  “that	  the	  IMF	  respect	  inter-­‐sovereign	  debt,”	  so	  that	  the	  Ukraine	  could	  receive	  the	  IMF	  loan	  despite	  repudiating	  its	  debt	  to	  Russia	  (Hudson	  2016b,	  p.	  560).	  But	  perhaps	  the	  most	  interesting	  and	  revealing	  aspect	  of	  this	  incident	  is	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  change	  of	  the	  IMF	  rule:	  “Part	  of	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  United	  States	  waited	  until	  the	  last	  minute	  to	  change	  the	  rule	  was	  the	  need	  to	  use	  the	  old	  set	  of	  rules	  against	  Greece	  before	  changing	  them	  for	  Ukraine.	  A	  waiver	  for	  Ukraine	  would	  have	  provided	  a	  precedent	  for	  Greece	  to	  ask	  for	  a	  similar	  waiver	  on	  paying	  the	  ‘troika’…	  which	  was	  pushing	  its	  economy	  into	  a	  depression	  worse	  than	  the	  Great	  Depression	  in	  the	  United	  States….	  Only	  after	  the	  Greek	  capitulation	  could	  Russia	  be	  safely	  isolated”	  (Hudson	  2016b,	  pp.	  561	  –	  562).	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companies	  such	  as	  former	  Halliburton	  subsidiary,	  KBR,	  profit	  immensely	  from	  
government	  contracts	  to	  build	  and	  maintain	  military	  bases	  (Vine	  2015)	  is	  also	  
significant.	  These	  corporations	  are,	  moreover,	  not	  the	  only	  economic	  beneficiaries	  of	  
conflict,	  with	  the	  sale	  of	  weaponry	  itself	  constituting	  a	  lucrative	  industry	  that	  
generates	  billions	  of	  dollars	  in	  annual	  sales	  (Rufanges	  2016;	  Guay	  2015)	  and	  partly	  
drives	  what	  Cypher	  (2016)	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  US	  governments’	  “relentless	  pursuit	  of	  
global	  militarism.”98	  War,	  and	  the	  tools	  of	  war	  that	  generate	  enormous	  profits,	  are	  
not	  only	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  capitalist	  economies	  but	  also	  constitute	  yet	  another	  way	  
in	  which	  wealth	  is	  transferred	  from	  taxpayers	  to	  private	  corporations	  (Vine	  2015)	  
and	  a	  particularly	  perverse	  cause	  of	  unnecessary,	  severe,	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  ecological	  
damage.	  
Material	  capabilities:	  The	  effects	  of	  capitalist	  militarism	  on	  
the	  biosphere	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  economic	  drain	  on	  scarce	  public	  resources	  that	  could	  be	  better	  
spent	  on	  measures	  addressing	  climate	  change	  and	  on	  social	  programs	  that	  advance	  
the	  development	  of	  humanity,	  the	  many	  negative	  consequences	  of	  the	  current	  
militarism,	  which	  is	  driven	  by	  capitalist	  rivalries,	  include	  the	  immense	  environmental	  
damage	  that	  is	  caused	  both	  by	  the	  ‘normal’	  operations	  of	  military	  bases	  (Vine	  2015)	  
and	  by	  wars	  (Al-­‐Azzawi	  	  2016;	  Collins	  2015;	  Kiernan	  2015;	  Lawrence	  et	  al.	  2015;	  
Mathieson	  2014),	  issues	  which	  security	  analysts	  generally	  ignore.	  Traditional	  IR	  
theorists	  and	  security	  analysts	  limit	  their	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  environment	  to	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  ‘resource	  scarcity’	  and	  climate	  change	  can	  serve	  as	  ‘threat	  multipliers’	  
that	  can	  contribute	  to	  future	  conflicts	  (Livingstone	  2015;	  Milman	  2016),	  or	  to	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  might	  damage	  military	  infrastructure	  
(Milman	  2016).	  In	  addition,	  while	  some	  traditional	  IR	  theorists	  and	  security	  analysts	  
theorise	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  nuclear	  war	  (Frühling	  &	  O’Neil	  	  2017),	  their	  concerns	  
are	  generally	  confined	  to	  geostrategic	  issues	  and	  seldom	  extend	  to	  the	  
environmental	  damage	  and	  human	  deaths	  and	  suffering	  that	  would	  result	  from	  such	  
a	  conflict.	  Conversely,	  analysts	  of	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  costs	  of	  wars	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Six	  American	  corporations,	  which	  rank	  among	  the	  top	  eight	  firms	  with	  earnings	  based	  on	  ‘defense-­‐related	  revenues’,	  dominate	  the	  global	  defense	  industry	  (Guay	  2015).	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nuclear	  weapons	  fail	  to	  include	  discussions	  of	  the	  wider	  context	  within	  which	  these	  
weapons	  are	  manufactured,	  tested,	  sold,	  and	  deployed:	  for	  example,	  while	  
Kristensen	  and	  McKinzie	  (2015)	  discuss	  the	  environmental	  and	  social	  costs	  of	  
detonating	  nuclear	  weapons,	  and	  Crowley	  and	  Ahearne	  (2002)	  discuss	  how	  the	  
ensuing	  environmental	  damage	  can	  be	  ‘managed,’	  the	  authors	  of	  both	  papers	  
neglect	  the	  role	  of	  the	  wider	  economic	  and	  geostrategic	  interests	  that	  constitute	  the	  
underlying	  causes	  of	  these	  problems.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  approaches	  dominating	  analyses	  of	  the	  
geostrategic	  issues	  discussed	  above,	  ecosocialist	  Ian	  Angus	  (2016)	  situates	  his	  
discussion	  of	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  global	  warming	  and	  climate	  change	  within	  the	  
wider	  context	  of	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  capitalism.	  As	  part	  of	  his	  critique,	  Angus	  
explains	  that	  the	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  detonating	  nuclear	  weapons,	  contrary	  to	  
any	  notions	  that	  they	  can	  be	  ‘managed,’	  are	  so	  severe	  and	  so	  long-­‐lasting	  that	  
geologists	  working	  in	  the	  Anthropocene	  Working	  Group	  are	  considering	  “Residues	  
from	  hydrogen	  bomb	  explosions	  that	  began	  in	  1952	  [and]	  peaked	  in	  1961-­‐62,	  leaving	  
a	  clear	  worldwide	  signature”	  (Angus	  2016,	  p.	  57)	  as	  a	  potential	  ‘stratigraphic	  
signature’	  marking	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Holocene	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Anthropocene.	  
This	  reference	  to	  debates	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  constitutes	  part	  of	  
Angus’s	  wider	  discussion	  that	  critically	  analyses	  capitalism	  as	  the	  underlying	  cause	  of	  
the	  current	  and	  interrelated	  ecological,	  economic	  and	  socio-­‐political	  crises	  –	  that	  is,	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  discussion	  that	  ‘connects	  the	  dots’	  between	  these	  issues	  and	  thus	  
better	  reflects	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  real	  world	  than	  analyses	  that	  adopt	  single-­‐issue	  
problem-­‐solving	  approaches.	  
‘Connecting	  the	  dots’:	  A	  prelude	  to	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  
the	  role	  of	  ecosocialist	  theory	  
It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  many	  of	  the	  discipline	  experts	  whose	  work	  is	  cited	  in	  this	  
chapter	  adopt	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  approach,	  focusing	  narrowly	  on	  some	  issues	  while	  
neglecting	  others.	  Ecosocialist	  John	  Bellamy	  Foster	  points	  out	  that:	  
…as a rule, the social sciences are compromised from the start. As 
shown in particular by the discipline of economics, they are 
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ideologically compelled to answer all concrete issues in terms set by 
capitalism, excluding any perspective that seriously challenges that 
system or its boundaries. Social scientists are thus discouraged from 
questioning – or indeed even naming – the fundamental structures 
and workings of the historical system in which we live. It follows 
that the social-scientific contributions most relevant to our 
understanding of the causes and imperatives of climate change have 
originated outside the mainstream of academic social science, in 
critical analyses of capitalism. 
(Foster 2017b) 
One	  of	  the	  greatest	  strengths	  of	  ecosocialist	  critical	  analyses	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  
current	  ecological,	  economic	  and	  socio-­‐political	  crises	  is	  their	  ability	  to	  ‘connect	  the	  
dots’	  and	  illuminate	  the	  interrelationships	  between	  all	  the	  issues	  outlined	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  Before	  discussing	  ecosocialist	  theory	  and	  analysis	  in	  more	  detail,	  however,	  
in	  Chapter	  5	  I	  critically	  analyse	  official	  institutional	  responses	  to	  global	  warming	  and	  
climate	  change	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  establishment,	  evolution	  and	  outcomes	  of	  the	  
primary	  international	  and	  intergovernmental	  institutions	  designed	  to	  facilitate	  these	  
responses:	  the	  IPCC	  and	  the	  UNFCCC.	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Chapter	  Five:	  Institutional	  responses	  to	  a	  changing	  
Biosphere	  –	  The	  IPCC	  and	  the	  UNFCCC	  
 “The IPCC is what it is. It isn’t an activist organization, and it 
doesn’t include the full range of climate change possibilities in its 
reports. It produces summaries on the scientific consensus about 
global warming – and it is a profound commentary on how badly 
capitalism has damaged our world that the IPCC’s conservative 
statements of fact constitute a powerful indictment of the capitalist 
system.” 
(Ian Angus 2007a) 
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  present	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  discovery	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  
warming	  and	  of	  official	  responses	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  set	  of	  
institutions	  to	  address	  the	  dangers	  it	  poses.	  The	  origins	  and	  evolution	  of	  the	  two	  
primary	  institutions	  established	  to	  deal	  with	  climate	  change,	  the	  IPCC	  and	  the	  
UNFCCC,	  are	  discussed	  at	  the	  ‘world	  order’	  and	  ‘forms	  of	  state’	  levels	  in	  this	  chapter	  
(refer	  to	  Chapter	  3,	  Figure	  6:	  Spheres	  Redux	  Version	  II),	  and	  constitute	  necessary	  
background	  information	  to	  my	  overview	  of	  the	  ‘social	  dynamics,’	  the	  climate	  
movement	  operating	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  civil	  society,	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  My	  analyses	  in	  
both	  this	  chapter	  and	  the	  next	  also	  include	  some	  discussion	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  different	  
factions	  of	  capital	  and	  of	  labour	  (Cox’s	  ‘social	  forces’).	  This	  analysis	  is	  furthermore	  
conducted	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  material	  capabilities	  of	  different	  actors,	  dominant	  
institutions,	  social	  facts,	  and	  competing	  ideas	  (refer	  to	  Chapter	  3,	  Figure	  5:	  Forces	  
Redux	  Version	  II).	  The	  analysis	  in	  this	  chapter	  demonstrates	  the	  validity	  of	  
ecosocialist	  claims	  that	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  making	  up	  the	  official	  climate	  
change	  ‘regime’	  are	  incapable	  of	  achieving	  their	  stated	  aim	  of	  avoiding	  dangerous	  
climate	  change	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  the	  ecosocialist	  positions	  represented	  in	  the	  
writings	  of	  Angus	  2016;	  Foster	  2017b;	  Klein	  2014;	  Kovel	  2007;	  Longo,	  Clausen	  &	  
Clark	  2015;	  Löwy	  2015;	  Tanuro	  2013;	  Tokar	  2014;	  Williams	  2010).99	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  ‘Regimes’	  are	  central	  to	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalist	  IR	  theories,	  which	  build	  on	  the	  work	  developed	  by	  Robert	  Keohane	  and	  Joseph	  Nye	  (Burchill	  2013).	  Citing	  Stephen	  Krasner’s	  definition	  of	  a	  regime	  as	  a	  set	  ‘of	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  principles,	  norms,	  rules,	  and	  decision-­‐making	  procedures,’	  Zelli	  (2011,	  pp.	  255	  –	  256)	  points	  out	  that	  “a	  regime	  can	  be	  identical	  with	  a	  single	  treaty,	  but	  usually	  embraces	  a	  larger	  set	  of	  agreements	  under	  the	  same	  legal	  umbrella	  and	  associated	  policy	  processes,”	  including	  not	  only	  treaties	  such	  as	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  but	  also	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  regulations	  of	  other	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Ecosocialists	  and	  other	  climate	  justice	  activists	  and	  advocates	  focus	  most	  of	  their	  
critique	  of	  the	  formal	  climate	  change	  regime	  mechanisms	  on	  the	  serious	  
inadequacies	  of	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  outcomes	  (particularly	  since	  COP-­‐15	  in	  Copenhagen	  in	  
2009,	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  6).	  Like	  other	  analysts	  writing	  
about	  official	  responses	  to	  climate	  change,	  ecosocialists	  widely	  (and	  appropriately)	  
cite	  the	  content	  of	  IPCC	  reports	  on	  the	  physical	  science	  of	  climate	  change	  to	  
corroborate	  their	  evaluations	  of	  the	  severity	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  and	  
the	  urgent	  need	  to	  take	  immediate	  effective	  action	  in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  further	  
warming.	  Ecosocialist	  discussions	  of	  the	  IPCC	  include	  critiques	  of	  this	  institution,	  
particularly	  related	  to	  its	  inherent	  tendencies	  to	  err	  on	  the	  side	  of	  conservatism	  
(Angus	  2007a).	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  build	  on	  ecosocialist	  critiques	  of	  this	  
intergovernmental	  scientific	  body	  by	  discussing	  its	  origins	  and	  evolution	  and	  
demonstrating	  that	  the	  entire	  climate	  change	  regime	  (including	  the	  IPCC)	  was	  
designed	  to	  forestall	  and	  prevent	  socially	  just	  and	  ecologically	  benign	  solutions	  to	  
anthropogenic	  global	  warming.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  emphasise	  that,	  far	  from	  seeking	  to	  
criticise	  the	  many	  scientists	  who	  volunteer	  their	  time	  and	  services	  (often	  at	  great	  
personal	  cost)	  to	  produce	  the	  IPCC	  assessment	  reports,	  my	  aim	  is	  rather	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  these	  scientists	  work	  within	  a	  context	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  constrain	  
the	  use	  of	  scientific	  evidence	  to	  support	  rational	  policymaking	  in	  achieving	  GHG	  
emission	  reductions	  and	  reorganising	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  appropriately.100	  
By	  way	  of	  introducing	  the	  key	  issues	  and	  actors	  involved,	  my	  discussion	  begins	  with	  
how	  the	  first	  US	  Bush	  Administration	  responded	  to	  a	  prominent	  scientist’s	  testimony	  
about	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  organisations	  which	  also	  regulate	  policies	  relevant	  for	  climate	  change	  (for	  example,	  the	  WTO).	  De	  Lucia	  (2009,	  Note	  5,	  p.	  240)	  similarly	  refers	  to	  the	  climate	  regime	  as	  comprising	  “primarily	  of	  the	  climate	  regime	  proper	  (UNFCCC,	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  and	  related	  organs	  and	  bodies),	  but	  also	  of	  other	  UN	  agencies	  and	  institutions	  such	  as	  UNEP,	  UNDP,	  other	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  etc.”	  100	  This	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  at	  least	  some	  IPCC	  scientists	  seem	  to	  be	  aware	  of,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  comments	  one	  of	  the	  IPCC	  authors	  made	  at	  a	  February	  2017	  Expert	  Meeting	  on	  
Communications	  organised	  by	  the	  IPCC	  to	  discuss	  its	  communication	  strategies	  for	  AR6.	  In	  response	  to	  a	  colleague	  who	  argued	  that	  the	  IPCC	  had	  failed	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  communicate	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  situation,	  one	  of	  the	  participant	  scientists	  said:	  “The	  mandate	  of	  the	  IPCC	  is	  to	  be	  relevant	  without	  being	  prescriptive….	  This	  is	  very	  [restricting]…	  In	  a	  sense,	  we	  are	  like	  a	  physician	  who	  is	  allowed	  to	  diagnose	  a	  sickness,	  to	  comment	  on	  a	  list	  of	  potential	  treatments,	  but	  who	  is	  prevented…	  [from]	  prescrib[ing]	  a	  specific	  treatment”	  (IPCC	  2017a).	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Official	  responses:	  constructing	  social	  facts	  about	  
anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  
On	  23	  June	  1988	  Dr	  James	  Hansen,	  the	  then	  head	  of	  the	  US	  National	  Aeronautics	  
and	  Space	  Administration	  (NASA)	  Goddard	  Institute	  for	  Space	  Studies,	  made	  a	  
landmark	  testimony	  before	  the	  United	  States	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Energy	  and	  
Natural	  Resources.	  In	  this	  testimony,	  Hansen	  informed	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  
that	  the	  accumulation	  of	  anthropogenic	  GHGs	  in	  the	  Earth’s	  atmosphere	  was	  causing	  
dangerous	  global	  warming	  due	  to	  the	  greenhouse	  effect,	  and	  that	  this	  was	  leading	  to	  
climate	  change	  (Baer	  2014).101	  While	  Hansen	  was	  not	  the	  first	  scientist	  to	  link	  global	  
warming	  to	  the	  accumulation	  of	  anthropogenic	  GHG	  emissions	  in	  the	  Earth’s	  
atmosphere,	  this	  testimony	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  pivotal	  point	  in	  contemporary	  
environmental	  politics	  in	  that	  it	  brought	  the	  issues	  of	  global	  warming	  and	  climate	  
change	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  policy	  makers,	  the	  media,	  and	  the	  public	  (Hecht	  &	  Tirpak	  
1995;	  Holmes	  2015;	  Milman	  2015).102	  	  By	  restricting	  media	  access	  to	  climate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  A	  conjuncture	  of	  extreme	  weather	  events	  in	  1988,	  including	  that	  this	  was	  the	  hottest	  US	  summer	  on	  record,	  made	  Hansen’s	  testimony	  particularly	  salient	  (Armitage	  2005;	  Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999;	  Bodansky	  2001).	  As	  Armitage	  (2005,	  p.	  420)	  recounts:	  “The	  world	  seemed	  to	  get	  a	  glimpse	  of	  its	  climate	  future	  in	  1988.	  Heat	  and	  drought	  caused	  severe	  crop	  losses	  in	  the	  American	  Midwest,	  the	  worst	  since	  the	  Dust	  Bowl	  of	  the	  1930s.	  The	  USSR	  suffered	  drought,	  as	  did	  China.	  Unexpected	  floods	  ravaged	  Africa,	  Brazil,	  Bangladesh	  and	  India.	  Hurricanes	  struck	  the	  Caribbean,	  along	  with	  a	  cyclone	  in	  New	  Zealand	  and	  a	  typhoon	  in	  the	  Philippines.	  These	  disasters	  provided	  compelling	  background	  to	  the	  political	  events	  of	  1988,	  the	  most	  dramatic	  year	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  climate	  change.”	  102	  Scientific	  investigations	  into	  the	  relationship	  between	  GHGs	  and	  the	  Earth’s	  average	  temperature	  date	  back	  to	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  In	  1824	  Joseph	  Fourier	  first	  proposed	  that	  the	  Earth’s	  atmosphere	  traps	  some	  of	  the	  heat	  radiating	  back	  into	  space	  from	  the	  Earth’s	  surface	  and	  in	  1861	  John	  Tyndall	  identified	  the	  gases	  responsible	  for	  this	  effect;	  in	  1896	  Svante	  Arrhenius’	  calculations	  estimated	  that	  a	  doubling	  of	  CO2	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  from	  burning	  fossil	  fuels	  would	  raise	  average	  global	  temperatures	  by	  5°C	  to	  6°C	  (which	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  range	  estimated	  by	  today’s	  climate	  scientists)	  although	  he	  did	  not	  foresee	  the	  exponential	  rate	  at	  which	  CO2	  concentrations	  would	  increase	  –	  a	  fact	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  now-­‐famous	  ‘Keeling	  Curve’	  that	  plots	  the	  continuous	  measurements	  of	  CO2	  levels	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  that	  began	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Charles	  David	  Keeling	  in	  the	  1950s	  (Bodansky	  2001;	  Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists	  2012;	  World	  Bank	  2014).	  In	  1965,	  when	  US	  President	  Johnson	  asked	  his	  President’s	  Science	  Advisory	  Committee	  to	  report	  on	  the	  potential	  problems	  of	  environmental	  pollution,	  the	  Committee’s	  report	  included	  a	  23-­‐page	  appendix	  providing	  the	  first	  official	  warning	  that	  CO2	  emissions	  from	  the	  burning	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  ‘could	  rapidly	  reshape	  Earth’s	  climate’	  (Peterson,	  Connolley	  &	  Fleck	  2008;	  see	  also	  Agrawala	  1998a).	  One	  major	  uncertainty	  debated	  amongst	  climate	  scientists	  after	  1965	  was	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  aerosol	  cooling	  from	  pollutant	  particles	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  was	  counteracting	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scientists	  and	  by	  editing	  major	  reports	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  systematically	  
ensuring	  that	  information	  from	  such	  reports	  was	  not	  used	  in	  other	  government	  
policy	  documents,	  the	  incoming	  administration	  of	  George	  HW	  Bush	  (1989	  -­‐	  1993)	  
attempted	  to	  prevent	  Hansen	  and	  other	  US	  climate	  scientists	  from	  communicating	  
their	  results	  (Armitage	  2005;	  Rich	  &	  Merrick	  2007).103	  	  Legal	  scholars	  Rich	  and	  
Merrick	  (2007,	  pp.	  243	  -­‐	  244)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  George	  HW	  Bush	  Administration’s	  
control	  of	  information	  about	  climate	  science	  did	  not	  violate	  US	  federal	  laws	  and	  
regulations,	  and	  that	  they	  used	  three	  key	  legal	  frameworks	  to	  more	  directly	  control	  
the	  dissemination	  of	  scientific	  information	  to	  the	  public:	  they	  implemented	  the	  Data	  
Quality	  Control	  Act	  in	  2001,	  established	  a	  centralised	  peer	  review	  process	  directly	  
under	  White	  House	  control	  in	  2004,	  and	  gave	  greater	  powers	  to	  federal	  agencies	  “to	  
designate	  material	  as	  ‘classified’	  and	  ‘sensitive	  but	  unclassified’”	  (Rich	  &	  Merrick	  
2007,	  pp.	  243	  –	  244).	  
Like	  the	  Bush	  Administration,	  the	  conservative	  Harper	  Government	  (2006-­‐2015)	  in	  
Canada	  also	  “gutted	  environmental	  legislation,	  terminated	  environmental	  
monitoring	  programs,	  muzzled	  government	  scientists,	  and	  laid	  off	  over	  2000	  
researchers	  from	  federal	  labs”	  (Pelley	  2015,	  p.	  528).	  While	  the	  current	  Trudeau	  
Liberal	  Party	  government	  has	  reversed	  some	  of	  these	  measures,	  other	  policies	  (such	  
as	  the	  Harper	  Government’s	  20%	  reduction	  of	  government	  science	  department	  
budgets)	  present	  a	  longer-­‐term	  erosion	  of	  the	  Canadian	  climate	  science	  research	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  greenhouse	  warming,	  but	  by	  1978	  James	  Hansen	  and	  his	  team	  of	  researchers	  had	  concluded	  that	  ‘greenhouse	  warming	  had	  become	  the	  dominant	  forcing’	  (Peterson,	  Connolley	  &	  Fleck	  2008,	  p.	  1329),	  a	  result	  confirmed	  by	  numerous	  subsequent	  scientific	  investigations.	  	  103	  The	  Trump	  administration	  (January	  2017	  –	  present)	  also	  plans	  to	  censor	  climate	  scientists	  (Glenza	  2017;	  Nuccitelli	  2017a)	  in	  addition	  to	  adopting	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  measures	  that	  will	  reverse	  such	  meagre	  gains	  for	  environmental	  protection	  as	  were	  achieved	  by	  the	  Obama	  Administration	  (Dotson	  2017;	  Selin	  2017).	  By	  2030,	  Obama’s	  Clean	  Power	  Plan	  would	  only	  have	  reduced	  CO2	  emissions	  by	  32%	  below	  2005	  levels	  in	  the	  US	  power	  sector,	  a	  very	  low	  and	  ‘unambitious’	  target	  given	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  problem	  (Böhm	  &	  Pearse	  2015).	  Overall,	  Greenblatt	  and	  Wei	  (2016)	  calculate	  that	  even	  if	  all	  of	  Obama’s	  policies	  were	  implemented	  they	  would	  not	  meet	  the	  US	  Paris	  Agreement	  INDC	  of	  reducing	  GHG	  emissions	  by	  26	  –	  28%	  below	  2005	  emissions	  by	  2025.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  his	  2016	  Presidential	  Memorandum	  banning	  oil	  and	  gas	  drilling	  in	  large	  areas	  of	  the	  Arctic	  and	  Atlantic	  oceans	  signifies	  important	  environmental	  gains	  although	  these,	  too,	  are	  at	  risk	  in	  a	  Trump	  presidency	  (Parenteau	  2017).	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effort	  (ibid.).	  In	  Australia,	  the	  conservative	  Coalition	  Howard	  Government	  (1996	  –	  
2007)	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  and	  Labor	  Party	  Rudd/Gillard	  Government	  
(2007	  –	  2013)	  measures	  supporting	  climate	  science	  and	  renewable	  energy	  research	  
and	  pursuing	  GHG	  reduction	  targets	  by	  implementing	  a	  carbon	  pricing	  mechanism	  
were	  aggressively	  reversed	  by	  the	  conservative	  Abbot	  and	  Turnbull	  Governments	  
(2013	  –	  present).	  The	  Abbott	  Government	  (2013	  –	  2015)	  dismantled	  and	  defunded	  
organisations	  conducting	  climate	  change	  research	  and	  repealed	  the	  carbon	  pricing	  
legislation	  implemented	  by	  the	  Labor	  Government	  in	  2012	  (Beeson	  &	  McDonald	  
2013;	  Crowley	  2017).	  The	  Turnbull	  Government	  (2015	  –	  present)	  continues	  to	  
defund	  climate	  research	  and	  to	  both	  defund	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  and	  use	  
regulations	  to	  block	  their	  development	  (Bainbridge	  2017;	  Hudson	  2016a;	  Swann	  
2016);	  it	  simultaneously	  supports	  large-­‐scale	  fossil	  fuel	  projects	  through	  its	  
“aggressive	  promotion	  of	  coal”	  (Morgan	  2017)	  and	  its	  policies	  that	  facilitate	  the	  
expansion	  of	  natural	  gas	  and	  coal-­‐seam	  gas	  industries	  (Baer	  2016;	  Curran	  2017;	  
Jackson	  2017).	  	  
The	  legality	  of	  the	  Bush	  Administration’s	  measures	  to	  restrict	  the	  dissemination	  of	  
information	  about	  climate	  change	  demonstrates	  the	  way	  in	  which	  liberal	  democratic	  
institutions	  provide	  tools	  that	  can	  be	  (and	  frequently	  are)	  used	  to	  prevent	  
addressing	  serious	  issues	  that	  threaten	  vested	  interests.	  The	  Bush	  Administration’s	  
use	  of	  legislation	  to	  restrict	  the	  dissemination	  of	  information	  about	  climate	  change	  
also	  demonstrates	  the	  validity	  of	  ecosocialist	  arguments	  that	  addressing	  the	  threat	  
posed	  by	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  calls	  for	  the	  radical	  reorganization	  of	  
society.	  This	  argument	  is	  further	  strengthened	  when	  one	  considers	  that	  the	  US	  has	  
not	  been	  alone	  in	  responding	  to	  scientific	  findings	  that	  threaten	  business	  interests	  
by	  restricting	  funding	  for	  climate	  science	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  public’s	  right	  to	  
information	  about	  the	  findings	  of	  publicly-­‐funded	  science	  on	  the	  other:	  as	  discussed	  
above,	  conservative	  Canadian	  and	  Australian	  governments	  have	  responded	  similarly	  
(Thompson	  2006).	  Government	  regulations	  obstructing	  effective	  action	  to	  mitigate	  
climate	  change	  and	  promoting	  fossil	  fuel	  industries	  are	  complemented	  by	  a	  variety	  
of	  other	  tactics	  that	  some	  officials,	  policymakers,	  media	  outlets	  and	  other	  
representatives	  of	  powerful	  vested	  interests	  have	  long	  resorted	  to.	  These	  tactics	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include	  denying	  the	  reality	  of	  global	  warming,	  downplaying	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  
effects	  of	  GHG	  emissions	  or	  even	  claiming	  that	  these	  effects	  are	  beneficial,	  and	  
casting	  doubt	  on	  whether	  global	  warming	  is	  anthropogenic	  –	  claiming,	  instead,	  that	  
it	  is	  part	  of	  a	  ‘natural	  cycle’	  (Beck	  2012;	  Lewandowsky	  2011;	  Levy	  &	  Egan	  1998;	  
Oreskes	  &	  Conway	  2010;	  Peterson,	  Connolley	  &	  Fleck	  2008).	  Despite	  these	  
misrepresentations	  of	  the	  evidence,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  growing	  scientific	  consensus	  
since	  at	  least	  the	  1980s	  that	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  is	  real	  and	  that	  its	  
dangerous	  effects	  are	  already	  playing	  out.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  widespread	  scientific	  
consensus	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  decarbonise	  the	  global	  economy	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  
(Åhman,	  Nilsson	  &	  Johansson	  2016)	  while	  planning	  adaptation	  strategies	  for	  dealing	  
with	  the	  warming	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  that	  are	  now	  inevitable.	  These	  
concerns	  about	  global	  warming	  and	  climate	  change	  initially	  arose	  within	  the	  context	  
of	  growing	  awareness	  and	  concerns	  about	  a	  wider	  environmental	  crisis	  that	  had	  
prompted	  the	  convening	  of	  the	  1972	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  the	  Human	  
Environment	  in	  Stockholm,	  the	  first	  of	  many	  ‘megasummits’	  emphasising	  the	  need	  
for	  ‘sustainable	  development’	  (Biermann	  2013).	  Ineffective	  international	  
institutional	  responses	  to	  this	  wider	  environmental	  degradation	  are	  summarised	  
below	  and	  again	  confirm	  ecosocialist	  arguments	  that	  global	  capitalism	  and	  its	  
political	  institutions	  cannot	  be	  reformed	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  environmental	  and	  climate	  
change	  crises	  that	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  and	  relations	  of	  production	  engender	  in	  their	  
normal	  operations.	  
International	  institutional	  responses	  to	  environmental	  
degradation:	  1972	  -­‐	  present	  
According	  to	  several	  analysts,	  the	  publication	  of	  Rachel	  Carson’s	  Silent	  Spring	  in	  1962	  
found	  a	  receptive	  audience	  among	  the	  public	  both	  in	  the	  US	  and	  worldwide	  and	  
signalled	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  modern	  environmental	  movement	  in	  the	  Global	  North	  
(Sale	  1993;	  Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999).104	  Widespread	  public	  concern	  about	  
environmental	  degradation	  was	  prompted	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  issues,	  including	  fears	  of	  
nuclear	  fallout	  from	  the	  atmospheric	  testing	  of	  nuclear	  bombs,	  a	  growing	  awareness	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  This	  perception	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  modern	  environmental	  movement	  is,	  however,	  inaccurate	  and	  simplistic,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6.	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of	  the	  dangers	  to	  human	  health	  and	  security	  posed	  by	  the	  pollution	  caused	  by	  the	  
post-­‐war	  economic	  boom,	  several	  highly-­‐publicised	  environmental	  disasters,	  and	  
early	  predictions	  of	  an	  approaching	  ‘doomsday’	  scenario	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ecological	  
collapse	  if	  industrialisation	  continued	  on	  a	  trajectory	  of	  infinite	  growth	  on	  a	  finite	  
planet	  (Sale	  1993).	  Sale	  (1993,	  pp.	  39	  -­‐	  40)	  identifies	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Club	  of	  
Rome	  in	  1968	  as	  “the	  first	  significant	  international	  recognition	  of	  the	  environmental	  
crisis.”	  The	  Club	  of	  Rome	  commissioned	  a	  Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology	  
(MIT)	  team	  to	  conduct	  a	  research	  project	  that	  used	  a	  complex	  computer	  model	  to	  
analyse	  global	  economic	  and	  environmental	  trends.	  Publishing	  their	  findings	  ‘to	  
considerable	  fanfare’	  in	  the	  report	  Limits	  to	  Growth	  in	  March	  1972,	  the	  MIT	  
researchers	  predicted	  catastrophe	  sometime	  during	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century:	  
If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, 
pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue 
unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached 
sometime within the next 100 years. The most probable result will 
be a rather sudden and uncontrolled decline in both population and 
industrial capacity. 
(Meadows, Randers & Meadows 2004, front pages) 
While	  the	  Club	  of	  Rome	  was	  a	  private	  coalition	  of	  prominent	  scientists,	  politicians,	  
technocrats	  and	  businessmen	  from	  twenty-­‐five	  countries,	  the	  first	  official	  
international	  response	  to	  environment	  concerns	  by	  the	  UN	  was	  the	  Biosphere	  
Conference	  in	  Paris	  in	  1968,	  where	  it	  was	  agreed	  to	  hold	  a	  UN	  Conference	  on	  the	  
Human	  Environment	  (UNCHE)	  in	  1972	  (Sale	  1993).	  One	  important	  outcome	  of	  this	  
meeting,	  which	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Stockholm	  Conference’,	  was	  the	  decision	  
to	  establish	  the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Program	  (UNEP),	  albeit	  as	  a	  body	  
coordinating	  its	  work	  through	  other	  agencies	  (rather	  than	  as	  a	  specialized	  agency).	  
The	  UNEP’s	  ‘paltry	  budget’	  and	  subordinate	  role	  within	  the	  UN	  system	  meant	  that	  it	  
had	  no	  enforcement	  powers	  with	  which	  to	  act	  on	  its	  mandate	  of	  coordinating	  “all	  
matters	  on	  global	  ecosystems”	  (ibid.	  pp.	  42	  –	  43).	  In	  addition	  to	  establishing	  the	  
UNEP,	  another	  UNCHE	  outcome	  was	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Stockholm	  Declaration,	  
containing	  twenty-­‐six	  principles	  concerning	  the	  environment	  and	  development	  
(UNGA	  1972).	  Despite	  this	  declaration,	  and	  the	  Stockholm	  Action	  Plan	  with	  its	  109	  
recommendations,	  the	  global	  spread	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  (generally	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referred	  to	  as	  ‘development’	  in	  official	  documents	  and	  popular	  accounts)	  continued	  
to	  damage	  the	  environment	  and	  in	  1983	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  UN	  requested	  
Gro	  Brundtland,	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Norway,	  to	  establish	  and	  chair	  an	  
independent	  commission	  on	  environmentally	  sustainable	  development	  (WCED	  
1987).105	  The	  official	  title	  of	  this	  organisation	  was	  the	  World	  Commission	  on	  
Environment	  and	  Development	  (WCED),	  but	  it	  is	  also	  widely	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  
‘Brundtland	  Commission’.	  Our	  Common	  Future	  (1987),	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
Brundtland	  Commission,	  is	  a	  key	  document	  often	  cited	  in	  the	  sustainability	  literature	  
for	  its	  emphasis	  on	  inter-­‐generational	  equity	  (the	  need	  to	  protect	  the	  environment	  
that	  future	  generations	  will	  inherit)	  and	  the	  view	  that	  ‘sustainable	  development’	  can	  
be	  achieved	  through	  a	  balance	  between	  economic	  growth,	  environmental	  
protection,	  and	  social	  equity	  –	  the	  three	  ‘key	  pillars’	  of	  sustainable	  development	  
(Brundtland	  1987;	  WCED	  1987).	  
These	  initial	  attempts	  to	  mobilise	  the	  ‘global	  community’	  of	  the	  world’s	  
governments	  to	  take	  effective	  action	  on	  addressing	  the	  many	  issues	  of	  
environmental	  degradation	  posed	  by	  the	  global	  expansion	  of	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  
production	  were	  followed	  by	  numerous	  other	  initiatives	  and	  conferences,	  including	  
the	  1992	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development	  (UNCED)	  
convened	  in	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  first	  ‘Earth	  Summit’	  or	  the	  ‘Rio	  
Summit’.106	  	  The	  first	  Earth	  Summit	  was	  followed	  by	  another	  World	  Summit	  on	  
Sustainable	  Development	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Rio+10	  Summit’	  or	  ‘Earth	  Summit	  2’)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Sale	  (1993)	  notes	  that	  despite	  the	  Stockholm	  Conference’s	  ‘notable	  achievements,’	  its	  marked	  limitations	  included	  ‘pushing	  aside’	  the	  divergent	  interests	  of	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  and	  the	  developmental	  aspirations	  of	  the	  less-­‐industrialised	  economies.	  More	  generally,	  Sale	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  41	  –	  42)	  argues	  that	  Stockholm	  Conference	  participants	  had	  a	  “single-­‐minded	  focus	  on…	  earth	  entities	  as	  ‘resources’”	  and	  were	  “…unwilling	  to	  take	  up	  the	  broader	  issue	  posed	  by	  industrial	  societies	  anywhere	  or	  to	  consider	  whether	  industrial	  systems	  by	  their	  very	  nature	  might	  be	  incompatible	  with	  stable	  and	  renewable	  ecosystems;	  instead,	  the	  entire	  thrust	  of	  the	  meeting	  was	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘stewardship’	  of	  the	  earth,	  managing	  it	  successfully	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  future	  economic	  growth	  both	  North	  and	  South	  with	  minimal	  environmental	  costs”.	  	  106	  Refer	  to	  Strong	  (1972)	  and	  Bolin	  (1974)	  for	  early	  accounts	  of	  the	  developing	  understanding	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  different	  natural	  systems	  are	  connected	  and	  of	  the	  need	  to	  take	  measures	  to	  address	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  polluting	  industrial	  activities.	  Brockris’	  (1974)	  article	  represents	  an	  early	  example	  of	  discussions	  about	  non-­‐fossil	  fuel-­‐based	  technologies	  that	  could	  have	  been	  developed	  and	  adopted	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  as	  well	  as	  obstacles	  to	  the	  development	  and	  adoption	  of	  such	  technologies.	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convened	  in	  Johannesburg	  in	  2002,	  and	  then	  the	  2012	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  
Sustainable	  Development	  (UNCSD)	  held	  in	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  and	  also	  known	  as	  ‘Rio	  
2012’,	  ‘Rio+	  20’	  and	  ‘Earth	  Summit	  2012’	  (Biermann	  2013).107	  Since	  the	  Brundtland	  
Commission’s	  findings,	  climate	  change	  has	  also	  featured	  explicitly	  as	  an	  issue	  to	  be	  
addressed	  at	  these	  environmental	  summits	  (Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  1994b),	  but	  while	  
there	  have	  been	  many	  ‘statements	  of	  principles’	  and	  ‘action	  plans’,	  the	  goal	  of	  
‘sustainable	  development’	  remains	  elusive	  (Hadden	  &	  Seybert	  2016)	  and	  the	  global	  
spread	  and	  intensification	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  continues	  to	  degrade	  
the	  environment	  and	  compromise	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  biosphere	  at	  an	  ever-­‐
increasing	  rate	  nearly	  five	  decades	  after	  the	  emergence	  of	  these	  issues.108	  US	  
President	  GWH	  Bush’s	  statement	  that	  “the	  American	  way	  of	  life	  is	  not	  negotiable”	  
(cited	  in	  Harris	  2009,	  p.	  968)	  at	  the	  first	  Earth	  Summit	  clarified	  that	  US	  policy	  on	  
international	  environmental	  protection	  measures	  took	  a	  backseat	  to	  US	  economic	  
interests,	  and	  successive	  US	  administrations	  (whether	  Republican	  or	  Democrat)	  
continue	  to	  protect	  the	  short-­‐term	  interests	  of	  US	  capital	  (Bang,	  Hovi	  &	  Sprinz	  2012;	  
Falkner	  2005).	  
The	  2012	  Earth	  Summit	  outcome	  was	  particularly	  disappointing	  to	  the	  scientists	  who	  
had	  participated	  in	  the	  preparatory	  2012	  Planet	  Under	  Pressure:	  New	  Knowledge	  
Towards	  Solutions	  conference	  held	  in	  London.	  This	  London	  conference	  was	  
organised	  by	  the	  International	  Council	  for	  Science	  (ICSU)	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Some	  of	  the	  formal	  but	  non-­‐binding	  outcomes	  from	  the	  Rio	  Summits	  are:	  Agenda	  21	  (UNGA	  1992),	  the	  Johannesburg	  Declaration	  on	  Sustainable	  Development	  (UNGA	  2002),	  and	  The	  Future	  We	  Want	  (UNGA	  2012).	  108	  While	  the	  wording	  only	  implicitly	  refers	  to	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  Principle	  6	  of	  the	  1972	  ‘Stockholm	  Declaration’	  may	  perhaps	  be	  interpreted	  as	  constituting	  the	  first	  UN	  reference	  to	  this	  issue:	  “The	  discharge	  of	  toxic	  substances	  or	  of	  other	  substances	  and	  the	  release	  of	  heat,	  in	  such	  quantities	  or	  concentrations	  as	  to	  exceed	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  environment	  to	  render	  them	  harmless,	  must	  be	  halted	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  serious	  or	  irreversible	  damage	  is	  not	  inflicted	  upon	  ecosystems.	  The	  just	  struggle	  of	  the	  peoples	  of	  all	  countries	  against	  pollution	  should	  be	  supported”	  (UNGA	  1972).	  Several	  other	  principles	  in	  this	  document	  are	  also	  relevant,	  albeit	  less	  directly,	  to	  important	  issues	  related	  to	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  –	  for	  example,	  Principle	  1	  refers	  to	  the	  “responsibility	  to	  protect	  and	  improve	  the	  environment	  for	  present	  and	  future	  generations”	  and	  Principle	  21	  refers	  to	  the	  responsibility	  of	  states	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  activities	  “do	  not	  cause	  damage	  to	  the	  environment…	  of	  areas	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  national	  jurisdiction”	  (Principle	  21).	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scientific	  leadership	  for	  the	  Rio+20	  Summit	  (Biermann	  2013).109	  The	  scientists’	  
urgent	  statements	  about	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  environmental	  emergency	  humanity	  
now	  faces	  are	  published	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  London	  conference,	  the	  State	  of	  the	  
Planet	  Declaration	  (DIVERSITAS	  &	  ICSU	  2012).	  Due	  to	  resistance	  from	  a	  number	  of	  
countries,	  but	  particularly	  from	  the	  United	  States	  (Biermann	  2013),	  like	  all	  previous	  
scientists’	  warnings	  these,	  too,	  failed	  to	  initiate	  the	  structural	  changes	  required	  
within	  the	  UN	  system	  to	  strengthen	  the	  ‘environmental	  pillar’	  of	  sustainability,	  or	  to	  
produce	  a	  binding	  agreement	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  effective	  action	  that	  may	  avert	  
planetary	  disaster	  as	  a	  result	  of	  global	  warming.	  Siding	  with	  some	  developing	  nations	  
(a	  tactic	  often	  resorted	  to	  by	  US	  government	  representatives),	  the	  United	  States	  
rejected	  the	  “notion	  of	  planetary	  boundaries”	  at	  the	  Rio+20	  Conference,	  and	  thus	  
also	  the	  related	  reform	  proposal	  that	  NGOs	  put	  forward	  to	  establish	  a	  ‘United	  
Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Future	  Generations’	  (Biermann	  2013).	  Other	  reforms	  
proposed	  to	  strengthen	  the	  UN’s	  ability	  to	  protect	  the	  environment,	  such	  as	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  ‘World	  Environmental	  Organisation’	  as	  a	  Specialised	  Agency	  to	  
eliminate	  the	  inconsistencies	  between	  different	  environmental	  programmes	  and	  
organisations	  working	  on	  specific	  issues	  often	  at	  odds	  with	  one	  another	  and	  the	  
integration	  of	  UN	  environmental,	  economic,	  and	  social	  policies	  under	  a	  body	  such	  as	  
a	  ‘Sustainable	  Development	  Council’,	  were	  also	  resisted	  by	  some	  governments,	  and	  
were	  strongly	  resisted	  by	  US	  representatives	  (Biermann	  2013;	  Georgeson	  2014).110	  
This	  response	  is	  no	  different	  to	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  official	  responses	  to	  the	  
climate	  change	  crisis:	  the	  restricted	  mandates,	  limited	  autonomy,	  and	  lack	  of	  
enforcement	  powers	  of	  the	  formal	  international	  and	  intergovernmental	  institutions	  
nominally	  established	  to	  address	  the	  issues	  of	  GHG	  emissions,	  global	  warming	  and	  
climate	  change	  ensure	  that	  ‘business	  as	  usual’	  —	  particularly	  a	  world	  economy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  The	  ICSU,	  an	  international	  non-­‐governmental	  organisation	  previously	  named	  the	  International	  Council	  of	  Scientific	  Unions,	  was	  founded	  in	  1931	  with	  the	  stated	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  international	  cooperation	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  (ICSU	  n.d.).	  110	  Refer	  to	  Zelli	  (2011)	  for	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  how	  some	  policy	  proposals	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change	  (such	  as	  Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Forest	  Degradation	  [REDD]	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  biofuel	  production)	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  regime	  to	  protect	  biodiversity	  (the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity),	  while	  the	  hydrofluorocarbons	  (HFCs)	  and	  perflurocarbons	  (PFCs)	  promoted	  as	  ‘safe’	  substances	  in	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Ozone	  Layer	  are	  greenhouse	  gases	  that	  need	  to	  be	  phased	  out	  under	  the	  climate	  regime.	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based	  on	  the	  burning	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  —	  continues	  irrespective	  of	  the	  environmental	  
and	  social	  costs	  of	  this	  trajectory.	  	  
Many	  analysts	  identify	  the	  United	  States	  as	  being	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  efforts	  by	  
various	  governments	  and	  groups	  representing	  vested	  interests	  to	  ensure	  that	  global	  
institutions	  have	  no	  legislative	  or	  executive	  authority	  and	  power	  to	  take	  the	  
measures	  required	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change.111	  However,	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  the	  US	  has	  shaped	  the	  international	  institutions	  dealing	  with	  climate	  change	  
are	  not	  widely	  discussed	  in	  contemporary	  accounts;	  this	  history	  is	  significant	  and	  can	  
be	  reclaimed	  if	  one	  refers	  to	  work	  published	  in	  the	  1990s,	  soon	  after	  these	  
institutions	  had	  been	  created.112	  In	  particular,	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  US	  role	  in	  
establishing	  and	  shaping	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  IPCC	  in	  very	  specific	  ways	  is	  
important	  if	  one	  is	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  came	  to	  be	  that	  scientific	  advice	  plays	  such	  
a	  subsidiary	  role	  in	  climate	  change	  policy-­‐making	  (and	  how	  things	  could	  have	  been	  
otherwise).	  
As	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below,	  the	  IPCC’s	  lack	  of	  effective	  agenda-­‐setting	  power	  
in	  the	  policy	  arena	  is	  due	  to	  a	  determined	  effort	  by	  the	  first	  Bush	  Administration	  to	  
bypass	  the	  earlier	  independent,	  scientific	  Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gases	  
(AGGG).	  This	  decision	  ensured	  that	  the	  IPCC,	  the	  primary	  officially	  recognised	  
institution	  reporting	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  about	  global	  
warming	  and	  climate	  change,	  was	  established	  in	  a	  way	  that	  effectively	  ‘quarantines’	  
technical	  and	  scientific	  understandings	  of	  the	  physical	  science	  of	  climate	  change	  
from	  the	  social	  effects	  of	  these	  changes	  and	  also	  from	  the	  field	  of	  policymaking.	  The	  
IPCC’s	  terms	  of	  reference	  explicitly	  forbid	  it	  to	  even	  make	  policy	  recommendations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Many	  analysts	  use	  a	  Realist	  perspective	  to	  explain	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  with	  the	  US	  using	  its	  power	  as	  the	  sole	  global	  hegemon	  (defined	  in	  realist	  terms)	  to	  obstruct	  action	  on	  climate	  change;	  most	  analysts	  also	  refer	  to	  domestic	  US	  politics	  (specifically	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  powerful	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  and	  associated	  industry	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  automobile	  lobby)	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  peculiarity	  of	  domestic	  constitutional	  legal	  constraints	  on	  the	  power	  of	  US	  administrations	  to	  commit	  the	  US	  to	  legally	  binding	  international	  agreements	  (Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999;	  Bang,	  Hovi	  &	  Sprinz	  2012;	  Depledge	  2005;	  Falkner	  2005;	  Givens	  2014;	  Glicksman	  &	  Levy	  2008;	  Gupta	  2010;	  Kemp	  2017b;	  Thompson	  2006;	  Wirth	  2016).	  112	  Shardul	  Agrawala	  (1998a,	  1998b,	  1999)	  provides	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  the	  origins	  and	  early	  evolution	  of	  the	  Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gases	  (AGGG)	  and	  the	  IPCC,	  and	  I	  refer	  to	  these	  works	  extensively	  in	  relevant	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter.	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(never	  mind	  formulate	  actual	  policies),	  and	  its	  work	  is	  further	  restricted	  by	  attempts	  
by	  US-­‐based	  conservative	  think	  tanks	  such	  as	  the	  Heritage	  Foundation	  and	  the	  Cato	  
Institute	  to	  discredit	  both	  the	  scientists	  working	  on	  the	  assessment	  reports	  and	  the	  
reports	  themselves	  (Armitage	  2005;	  McGee	  &	  Steffek	  2016).	  In	  addition,	  as	  is	  
discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  all	  successive	  US	  administrations,	  
either	  acting	  unilaterally	  or	  with	  the	  support	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  allies	  that	  are	  selected	  
opportunistically,	  have	  consistently	  worked	  to	  undermine	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  its	  
treaties	  and	  to	  shape	  them	  in	  ways	  that,	  while	  favouring	  US	  business	  interests	  in	  
particular	  and	  global	  capital	  in	  general,	  simultaneously	  present	  obstacles	  to	  the	  
adoption	  and	  implementation	  of	  effective	  and	  socially	  benign	  measures	  to	  mitigate	  
and	  adapt	  to	  global	  warming	  and	  climate	  change.113	  A	  review	  of	  the	  establishment	  
and	  subsequent	  development	  of	  current	  international	  and	  intergovernmental	  
climate	  change	  institutions	  and	  regimes	  thus	  demonstrates	  the	  politicisation	  of	  the	  
issue	  of	  climate	  change	  as	  well	  as	  the	  influence	  that	  successive	  US	  administrations	  
and	  other	  governments	  have	  had	  in	  shaping	  these	  institutions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  renders	  
them	  relatively	  powerless	  to	  address	  the	  issues	  central	  to	  their	  operations.	  The	  
analyses	  of	  the	  origins	  and	  development	  of	  the	  current	  climate	  change	  regime	  
architecture	  provided	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  demonstrate	  the	  relevance	  of	  
ecosocialist	  arguments	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  reform	  the	  current	  system	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  effectively	  mitigates	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  and	  protects	  the	  
biosphere’s	  ability	  to	  support	  current	  life	  as	  it	  evolved	  throughout	  the	  Holocene.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  US	  representatives	  at	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  COPs	  have	  often	  allied	  themselves	  with	  other	  states	  whose	  ‘national	  interests’	  align	  with	  the	  US	  (McGee	  &	  Steffek	  2016)	  –	  Canada	  and	  Australia,	  with	  vast	  reserves	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  such	  as	  coal	  and	  tar	  sand	  oil,	  are	  notable	  examples	  of	  such	  states	  (Thompson	  2006).	  The	  US	  has,	  however,	  also	  acted	  unilaterally	  to	  undermine	  international	  collaboration	  on	  mitigating	  climate	  change	  (Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999;	  Armitage	  2005),	  as	  it	  did	  in	  2001	  when	  it	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  COP-­‐6	  and	  COP-­‐7	  and	  sent	  a	  delegation	  of	  ‘observers’	  instead,	  thereby	  forcing	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  ‘flexible	  mechanisms’	  it	  wanted	  implemented	  before	  it	  returned	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  ‘negotiation	  table’	  in	  2002.	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World	  order,	  material	  capabilities,	  institutions	  and	  
competing	  ideas:	  The	  origins,	  establishment	  and	  evolution	  
of	  international	  and	  intergovernmental	  institutions	  to	  
address	  global	  warming	  
Concerns	  provoked	  by	  a	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  potential	  danger	  of	  accumulating	  
GHGs	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  are	  reflected	  in	  numerous	  collaborations	  between	  scientists	  
that	  began	  as	  early	  as	  1967	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Global	  Atmospheric	  
Research	  Program	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  World	  Meteorological	  Organisation	  
(WMO)	  and	  the	  ICSU	  (Agrawala	  1998a;	  ICSU	  2015).114	  These	  collaborations	  were	  
initially	  mobilised	  through	  loose	  research	  networks	  and	  a	  number	  of	  conferences	  in	  
the	  1970s	  before	  the	  WMO,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Program	  (UNEP)	  and	  
the	  ICSU	  organised	  and	  convened	  the	  first	  World	  Climate	  Conference	  (WCC)	  in	  1979	  
(Agrawala	  1998a;	  Gupta	  2010).115	  	  
While	  the	  first	  WCC	  did	  not	  call	  for	  any	  action	  from	  policymakers,	  it	  provided	  the	  
groundwork	  for	  a	  series	  of	  international	  atmospheric	  science	  workshops	  in	  Villach	  
(Austria)	  in	  the	  1980s	  (Agrawala	  1998a;	  Gupta	  2010).116	  In	  the	  third	  workshop	  
(1985),	  widely	  known	  as	  the	  Villach	  Conference,	  the	  majority	  consensus	  amongst	  the	  
participating	  scientists	  was	  that	  by	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  the	  
Earth’s	  mean	  global	  temperature	  would	  be	  greater	  than	  at	  any	  time	  in	  human	  
history,	  and	  they	  recommended	  further	  research	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
threat	  (Zillman	  2009).	  The	  Villach	  Conference	  findings	  were	  summarised	  in	  a	  report	  
entitled	  The	  Greenhouse	  Effect,	  Climatic	  Change	  and	  Ecosystems	  (1986),	  which	  the	  
ICSU	  (2015,	  p.	  15)	  describes	  as	  “the	  first	  comprehensive	  international	  assessment	  of	  
the	  environmental	  impact	  of	  atmospheric	  greenhouse	  cases.”	  This	  report,	  published	  
more	  than	  three	  decades	  ago,	  concluded	  that	  the	  accumulation	  of	  CO2	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  The	  WMO	  was	  formally	  established	  as	  a	  UN	  Specialized	  Agency	  in	  1951,	  replacing	  the	  International	  Meteorological	  Organization	  that	  had	  been	  established	  in	  1873	  in	  large	  part	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  maritime	  shipping	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  international	  trade	  (Davies	  1990).	  	  115	  A	  second	  WCC	  was	  convened	  in	  1990,	  and	  the	  third	  was	  held	  in	  2009	  (Zillman	  2009).	  116	  The	  international	  character	  of	  these	  meetings	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  scientists	  came	  from	  29	  different	  countries,	  although	  they	  attended	  as	  individual	  participants	  rather	  than	  as	  representatives	  of	  their	  countries	  of	  origin	  (Agrawala	  1998a).	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atmosphere	  is	  caused	  by	  ‘human	  activities’	  and	  warned	  that	  a	  doubling	  of	  CO2	  would	  
cause	  ‘substantial	  warming’,	  recommending	  international	  cooperation	  on	  ‘a	  variety	  
of	  specific	  policy	  actions’	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  (ICSU	  2015).	  	  The	  Villach	  Conference	  
also	  led	  to	  the	  WMO,	  the	  UNEP	  and	  the	  ICSU	  establishing	  the	  first	  body	  of	  
international	  experts	  to	  guide	  climate	  policy,	  the	  AGGG.	  The	  AGGG’s	  history	  and	  
swift	  demise	  are	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  below	  as	  this	  case	  study	  illustrates	  the	  US	  
government’s	  activism,	  facilitated	  by	  its	  vast	  material	  capabilities	  and	  its	  leading	  
position	  in	  maintaining	  the	  current	  neoliberalising	  capitalist	  world	  order,	  in	  blocking	  
any	  measures	  to	  effectively	  address	  global	  warming	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  widespread	  awareness	  of	  this	  issue.117	  	  
The	  Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gases	  (AGGG)	  
It	  is	  significant	  that	  it	  was	  UNEP	  Director,	  Mostafa	  Tolba,	  who	  had	  played	  a	  central	  
role	  in	  the	  development	  and	  adoption	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  
of	  the	  Ozone	  Layer,	  who	  first	  introduced	  the	  idea	  of	  establishing	  an	  advisory	  panel	  to	  
guide	  climate	  policy	  (Agrawala	  1999).	  Following	  Tolba’s	  suggestion	  in	  his	  opening	  
address	  at	  the	  1985	  Villach	  Conference,	  the	  WMO,	  UNEP	  and	  the	  ICSU	  established	  
the	  AGGG	  for	  this	  purpose	  in	  July	  1986	  (Agrawala	  1999).	  The	  AGGG’s	  terms	  of	  
reference	  ranged	  from	  monitoring	  climate	  related	  research	  undertaken	  by	  its	  
sponsor	  organisations	  to	  advising	  governments	  on	  policies	  they	  could	  implement	  to	  
reduce	  the	  rate	  of	  GHG	  concentrations	  or	  to	  adapt	  to	  its	  effects.	  The	  AGGG’s	  seven	  
members	  were	  all	  respected	  scientists	  who	  had	  other	  pressing	  commitments	  that	  
took	  up	  much	  of	  their	  time,	  and	  this	  was	  one	  factor	  that	  negatively	  impacted	  on	  
their	  ability	  to	  fulfil	  their	  broad	  and	  vaguely	  defined	  AGGG	  mandate	  (ibid.).	  Another	  
factor	  constraining	  the	  AGGG’s	  ability	  to	  perform	  its	  task	  was	  the	  inadequate	  
funding	  allocated	  to	  its	  activities	  by	  its	  sponsor	  organisations.	  This	  situation	  led	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  what	  Agrawala	  (1999)	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  ‘de	  jure	  and	  de	  facto	  AGGG’.	  
The	  de	  facto	  AGGG	  operated	  between	  1987	  and	  1990	  and	  was	  led	  by	  one	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  According	  to	  Agrawala	  (1999),	  policymakers	  soon	  sidelined	  the	  AGGG	  by	  refusing	  to	  fund	  it	  and	  generally	  ignoring	  it,	  and	  creating	  an	  alternative	  institution	  instead:	  the	  IPCC.	  Boehmer-­‐Christiansen’s	  (1994b,	  p.	  189)	  account	  of	  the	  AGGG’s	  demise	  differs,	  claiming	  that	  the	  this	  body	  “was	  disbanded	  under	  pressure	  from	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  and	  presumably	  with	  the	  support	  of	  WMO	  and	  oil	  exporting	  countries.”	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seven	  original	  AGGG	  members,	  Gordon	  Goodman,	  who	  was	  also	  the	  head	  of	  the	  
Stockholm	  Environment	  Institute	  (SEI).	  	  	  
Goodman	  “attracted	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  experts	  holding	  similar	  beliefs	  that	  scientists	  
needed	  to	  play	  a	  more	  policy-­‐proactive	  role	  to	  initiate	  international	  responses	  on	  
climate	  change”	  (Agrawala	  1999,	  p.	  161).	  It	  was	  the	  de	  facto	  AGGG	  that	  convened	  
the	  workshops	  at	  Villach	  in	  September-­‐October	  1987	  and	  at	  Bellagio	  in	  November	  
1987,	  with	  the	  latter	  workshop	  proposing	  that	  the	  AGGG	  “design	  policies	  aimed	  at	  
limiting	  increases	  in	  temperature	  and	  sea	  level	  to	  within	  ‘tolerable	  rates’”	  –	  a	  
proposal	  that	  constitutes	  what	  Agrawala	  (1999,	  p.	  162)	  identifies	  as	  “the	  first	  explicit	  
policy	  debate	  on	  climate	  change”	  [emphasis	  in	  original].	  Several	  de	  facto	  AGGG	  
actors	  were	  subsequently	  recruited	  into	  the	  steering	  committee	  organising	  the	  
Toronto	  Conference	  on	  the	  Changing	  Atmosphere	  that	  was	  held	  in	  June	  1988	  (ibid.).	  
The	  outcome	  of	  this	  conference	  was	  the	  Toronto	  Declaration,	  which	  was	  
unprecedented	  and	  “made	  it	  the	  most	  significant	  policy	  initiative	  of	  its	  time	  on	  
climate	  change”:	  it	  called	  for	  a	  20%	  reduction	  in	  OECD	  GHG	  emissions	  from	  1988	  
levels	  by	  2005	  (Agrawala	  1999).	  The	  rapid	  succession	  of	  policy	  messages	  on	  action	  to	  
address	  climate	  change	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	  Bellagio	  workshop,	  the	  Brundtland	  
Report,	  and	  the	  Toronto	  Conference	  drew	  international	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  
climate	  change,	  and	  it	  was	  at	  about	  this	  time	  (in	  1988)	  that	  the	  US	  government	  
“began	  to	  flex	  its	  muscle	  on	  the	  international	  arena,	  although	  efforts	  in	  that	  
direction	  had	  begun	  at	  least	  two	  years	  earlier”	  (Agrawala	  1999,	  p.	  164).	  
Agrawala	  (1999)	  notes	  the	  complex	  and	  contradictory	  role	  of	  the	  US	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  issue:	  while	  US	  scientists	  and	  scientific	  
institutions	  and	  agencies	  produced	  most	  of	  the	  scientific	  knowledge	  about	  
anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  interests	  threatened	  by	  
taking	  the	  action	  necessary	  to	  stop	  the	  GHG	  emissions	  causing	  it	  were	  ‘huge’	  for	  the	  
US	  (see	  also	  Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999,	  Depledge	  2005,	  Falkner	  2005,	  and	  Hecht	  &	  
Tirpak	  1995).	  At	  that	  time	  the	  US	  was	  the	  largest	  GHG	  emitter,	  and	  the	  powerful	  
fossil	  fuel	  and	  car	  manufacturing	  lobbies	  had	  the	  active	  support	  of	  a	  Republican	  
White	  House	  to	  prevent	  the	  adoption	  of	  binding	  agreements	  limiting	  fossil	  fuel	  use	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(Agrawala	  1999;	  see	  also	  McAdam	  2017).118	  In	  addition	  to	  government	  and	  industry	  
resistance	  to	  taking	  actions	  that	  could	  ‘damage’	  the	  US	  economy,	  government	  
agencies	  had	  different	  views	  on	  the	  severity	  of	  global	  warming	  and	  on	  whether	  or	  
not	  the	  issue	  warranted	  a	  policy	  response	  (Hecht	  &	  Tirpak	  1995).	  This	  was	  evident	  
already	  in	  1986,	  when	  the	  US	  National	  Climate	  Program	  Policy	  Board	  was	  convened	  
to	  discuss	  a	  letter	  addressed	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Schultz	  by	  UNEP	  Director	  
Mostafa	  Tolba,	  who	  had	  requested	  help	  in	  initiating	  the	  process	  for	  a	  climate	  
convention.	  The	  government	  agency	  representatives	  participating	  in	  these	  
discussions	  agreed	  to	  the	  US	  recommending	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  
“‘intergovernmental	  mechanism’	  …	  to	  conduct	  scientific	  assessment	  of	  climate	  
change”	  (Agrawala	  1999,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  Agrawala	  (1999,	  p.	  164)	  notes	  that	  all	  
parties	  at	  this	  meeting	  shared	  “a	  common	  concern	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  international	  
policy	  initiative	  that	  had	  begun	  with	  the	  1985	  Villach	  workshop.”	  	  While	  those	  who	  
thought	  that	  climate	  change	  was	  a	  serious	  issue	  were	  opposed	  to	  “a	  small	  set	  of	  
‘free	  wheeling	  experts’”	  (in	  other	  words,	  scientists)	  formulating	  international	  policy,	  
advocates	  of	  delaying	  the	  adoption	  of	  any	  measures	  to	  restrict	  GHG	  emissions	  were	  
concerned	  that	  pressure	  from	  expert	  groups	  like	  the	  AGGG	  might	  force	  the	  US	  
government	  into	  ‘premature	  policy	  commitments’	  (Agrawala	  1999,	  pp.	  164-­‐	  165;	  see	  
also	  Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  1994b	  and	  Hecht	  &	  Tirpak	  1995).119	  Agrawala	  (1998a)	  
thus	  makes	  the	  important	  point	  that	  analysts	  who	  present	  sequential	  accounts	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  While	  China	  overtook	  the	  US	  as	  the	  largest	  CO2	  emitter	  in	  2005	  (Gregg,	  Andres	  &	  Marland	  2008;	  Olivier	  et	  al.	  2016,	  p.	  43),	  the	  role	  of	  ‘pollution	  havens’	  (whereby	  emissions-­‐intensive	  production	  processes	  are	  ‘offshored’	  from	  developed	  to	  developing	  countries	  such	  as	  China)	  substantially	  contributes	  to	  these	  emissions;	  accounting	  methods	  that	  incorporate	  the	  consumption	  of	  CO2	  embedded	  in	  the	  measurement	  of	  Chinese	  exports	  reveal	  that	  the	  GHG	  emissions	  associated	  with	  the	  production	  of	  these	  goods	  have	  effectively	  been	  ‘exported’	  to	  China	  by	  US	  and	  other	  multinational	  corporations	  based	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  (Aichele	  &	  Felbermayr	  2015;	  Malik	  &	  Lan	  2016).	  In	  addition,	  when	  measured	  on	  a	  per	  capita	  basis,	  Chinese	  GHG	  emissions	  are	  much	  lower	  than	  those	  of	  many	  other	  countries,	  with	  Canadian,	  Australian	  and	  US	  per	  capita	  emissions	  from	  fossil	  fuel	  use	  and	  cement	  production	  being	  the	  highest	  and	  China’s	  per	  capita	  emissions	  in	  these	  sectors	  ranking	  fourteenth	  on	  the	  list	  (Olivier	  et	  al.	  2016,	  p.	  40;	  refer	  also	  to	  Falkner	  2005	  p.	  591	  for	  more	  details	  about	  per	  capita	  US	  consumption	  patterns).	  119	  Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  (1994b,	  p.	  187)	  explains	  that	  “In	  the	  USA	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  climate	  treaty	  based	  on	  scientific	  advice	  was	  soon	  hotly	  debated.	  After	  all,	  the	  AGGG	  proposals	  and	  claims	  had	  come	  from	  institutions	  which,	  to	  the	  US	  government,	  represented	  a	  lobby	  it	  deeply	  distrusted.”	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IPCC’s	  establishment	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  findings	  and	  discussions	  at	  the	  1987	  AGGG	  
workshops	  and	  the	  1988	  Toronto	  Conference	  are	  mistaken,	  and	  that	  the	  IPCC	  was	  
established	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  AGGG	  and	  to	  its	  prior	  activities	  and	  
recommendations:	  
… the process to set up the IPCC was in motion as early as 1986, 
and the WMO Executive Council resolution to this effect was 
passed in June 1987, a few months before the Villach/Bellagio 
workshops, and a full year before the Toronto Conference and the 
hot summer of 1988. These events clearly had no role in the 
decision to set up the IPCC, though they might have influenced the 
level of interest the institution subsequently generated. Instead, the 
trigger for the IPCC was the activism by Mostafa Tolba, the 
dissatisfaction in the US about the AGGG, and sharply different 
views on climate change amongst various US government agencies 
and the White House administration. The subsequent shape the 
IPCC took reflected a common denominator agreement between 
various US agencies. Reportedly there were also strategic attempts 
both by WMO and the US to prevent Mostafa Tolba from 
‘capturing’ climate, the way he had, ozone. 
(Agrawala 1998a, p. 612, emphasis in original) 
US	  negotiations	  in	  the	  Montreal	  Protocol	  on	  Substances	  that	  Deplete	  the	  Ozone	  
Layer	  had	  provoked	  the	  ire	  of	  the	  US	  Departments	  of	  Energy,	  Commerce	  and	  the	  
Interior,	  the	  Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisers,	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  
Budget,	  with	  advisers	  in	  these	  departments	  claiming	  that	  the	  Environmental	  
Protection	  Authority	  (EPA)	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  had	  acted	  ‘too	  aggressively’	  in	  
the	  ozone	  treaty	  negotiations,	  and	  without	  consulting	  other	  agencies	  (Agrawala	  &	  
Andresen	  1999,	  pp.	  471	  –	  472).120	  To	  curb	  the	  power	  of	  the	  EPA	  and	  the	  State	  
Department,	  the	  White	  House	  Domestic	  Policy	  Council	  was	  given	  direct	  control	  over	  
all	  international	  environmental	  negotiations	  in	  1987	  (ibid.).	  White	  House	  advisers	  
representing	  economic	  and	  business	  interests	  thus	  ‘outmuscled’	  the	  EPA	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Refer	  to	  Ruckelshaus	  (1985)	  for	  an	  interesting	  account	  of	  how	  the	  EPA	  was	  similarly	  established	  in	  a	  way	  that	  limited	  its	  power	  to	  fulfill	  its	  mandate	  effectively.	  As	  Ruckelshaus	  (1985,	  pp.	  460	  -­‐	  461)	  explains,	  US	  environmental	  laws	  “…greatly	  restrict	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  administrator,	  the	  untrusted	  administrator	  of	  the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency,	  to	  apply	  laws	  flexibly	  to	  the	  widely	  varying	  problems	  existing	  in	  a	  complicated	  nation	  such	  as	  ours….	  The	  laws	  all	  follow	  the	  same	  pattern:	  they	  set	  standards….	  The	  statutes	  set	  deadlines,	  usually	  unreasonable,	  in	  which	  those	  standards	  or	  goals	  are	  to	  be	  achieved.	  Then,	  when	  the	  deadlines	  are	  missed	  or	  the	  standards	  are	  not	  achieved,	  they	  provide	  citizens	  with	  the	  right	  to	  sue….	  All	  of	  this	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  creating	  an	  agency	  which	  cannot	  do	  precisely	  what	  the	  Congress	  has	  told	  it	  to	  do.	  In	  many	  instances	  it	  is	  physically	  impossible.”	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State	  Department	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  George	  HW	  Bush	  Administration	  deciding	  
what	  to	  do	  about	  global	  warming	  in	  1989,	  with	  the	  Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisers	  
projecting	  “significant	  costs	  of	  various	  policy	  measures	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change”	  
and	  other	  senior	  advisers	  expressing	  concerns	  “about	  potential	  US	  financial	  
obligations	  toward	  developing	  countries	  under	  a	  climate	  convention”	  (Agrawala	  &	  
Andresen	  1999,	  p.	  472).	  While	  these	  domestic	  pressures	  explain	  the	  first	  Bush	  
Administration’s	  decision	  to	  establish	  an	  intergovernmental	  mechanism	  rather	  than	  
a	  group	  of	  scientific	  experts	  to	  investigate	  and	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change,	  
this	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  other	  actors	  acquiesced	  in	  this	  proposal.	  
Agrawala	  (1998a)	  identifies	  several	  reasons	  that	  led	  to	  WMO	  and	  UNEP	  member	  
governments	  supporting	  the	  US	  in	  establishing	  the	  IPCC:	  ‘US	  clout’	  in	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  of	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  WMO	  and	  UNEP;	  the	  widespread	  
economic	  implications	  of	  the	  policies	  needed	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  (see	  also	  
Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  1994b);	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  was	  
already	  politicized:	  
… the international environmental arena was already politicized 
because climate change came in the wake of ozone. Peter Usher, 
Tolba’s key advisor during the ozone negotiations, admits that the 
ad-hoc, low key, science-driven (if politically undemocratic) nature 
of the early ozone assessments which led to the Vienna Convention 
could not be duplicated in climate change. This is because while 
‘politics caught up with ozone, climate change was born in politics’ 
(Usher, 1997). 
(Agrawala 1998a, p. 614; emphasis in original) 
To	  summarise,	  the	  IPCC	  acquired	  its	  present	  form	  as	  the	  result	  of	  what	  Agrawala	  
describes	  as	  “a	  back-­‐room	  effort	  of	  design,	  negotiation	  and	  compromise”	  between	  
US	  agencies	  in	  a	  process	  much	  of	  which	  ‘is	  still	  shrouded	  in	  mystery’;	  it	  “was	  the	  
product	  of	  an	  intensely	  political	  process	  within	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UN	  system”	  (Agrawala	  
1998,	  p.	  615,	  p.	  617,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  US	  determination	  to	  play	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  
shaping	  the	  IPCC	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  US	  government	  sent	  24	  delegates	  
to	  its	  first	  meeting	  in	  November	  1988,	  greatly	  outnumbering	  the	  number	  of	  
delegates	  from	  other	  countries	  -­‐	  for	  example,	  Germany	  only	  sent	  two	  delegates	  
(Boehmer-­‐Christiansen,	  1994b).	  The	  US	  government	  and	  its	  allies	  thus	  ensured	  that	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the	  IPCC	  was	  established	  in	  a	  way	  that	  suits	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  powerful	  
corporate	  interests,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
The	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC)	  
The	  IPCC’s	  evolution	  after	  1988	  increasingly	  marginalised	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  WMO	  and	  
UNEP	  while	  US	  influence	  increased	  considerably	  through	  its	  scientists	  and	  
bureaucrats	  as	  well	  as	  through	  new	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  Global	  Climate	  Coalition	  and	  
the	  Climate	  Council,	  which	  represented	  US	  fossil	  fuel	  interests	  and	  also	  aligned	  with	  
the	  interests	  of	  other	  oil-­‐producing	  economies	  (Agrawala	  1998b;	  see	  also	  Hoppe,	  
Wesselink	  &	  Cairns	  2013).	  The	  IPCC’s	  role	  in	  providing	  scientific	  data	  informing	  
international	  climate	  change	  treaties	  led	  to	  attempts	  by	  these	  actors	  to	  discredit	  the	  
IPCC	  and	  its	  reports	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  1992	  Rio	  Conference,	  where	  the	  UNFCCC	  
was	  due	  to	  be	  adopted	  (Agrawala	  1998b).	  These	  events	  resulted	  in	  the	  IPCC	  
overhauling	  its	  processes	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  protect	  its	  legitimacy.121	  The	  first	  round	  of	  
changes	  gave	  representatives	  of	  governments	  and	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  
the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  OECD	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  selecting	  report	  contributors	  and	  
reviewers	  (Agrawala	  1998b).	  The	  1993	  changes	  also	  opened	  up	  the	  review	  of	  IPCC	  
assessments	  to	  participating	  countries’	  “national	  experts	  and	  other	  interested	  
parties”	  and	  stipulated	  that	  government	  representatives	  had	  to	  approve	  the	  newly-­‐
introduced	  ‘Summary	  for	  Policymakers’	  (SPM)	  by	  agreeing	  on	  its	  contents	  line-­‐by-­‐
line	  (Agrawala	  1998b;	  IAC	  2010).122	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  Skodvin	  (2000)	  identifies	  two	  major	  revisions	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  rules	  of	  procedure	  between	  its	  inception	  in	  1988	  and	  the	  year	  2000,	  one	  in	  1993	  and	  the	  other	  in	  1999.	  Skodvin’s	  critique	  of	  these	  revisions	  focuses	  on	  how	  they	  led	  to	  further	  bureaucratisation	  within	  the	  IPCC	  and	  how	  time-­‐consuming	  they	  were	  to	  implement.	  The	  second	  revision	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  rules	  of	  procedure	  in	  1999	  established	  a	  system	  of	  review	  editors	  whose	  responsibility	  it	  was	  to	  evaluate	  and	  incorporate	  comments	  from	  reviewers	  into	  the	  reports	  and	  new	  procedures	  for	  the	  endorsement	  of	  the	  Synthesis	  Report,	  requiring	  this	  document	  to	  be	  ‘adopted’	  (rather	  than	  ‘approved’)	  subject	  to	  a	  ‘section-­‐by-­‐section’	  approval	  (Skodvin	  2000)	  122	  Contrasting	  this	  approach	  of	  trying	  ‘to	  buy	  global	  credibility	  amongst	  governments’	  with	  ‘the	  distinctly	  activist	  stance’	  taken	  by	  some	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  predecessors	  in	  order	  to	  ‘effect	  prompt	  policy	  outcomes,’	  Agrawala	  (1998b,	  p.	  629,	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  reaches	  the	  surprising	  conclusion	  that	  “Neither	  approach	  is	  implicitly	  superior”	  as	  both	  catalyzed	  policymakers.	  With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  however,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  IPCC	  approach	  has	  not	  been	  effective,	  having	  had	  very	  little	  impact	  on	  reducing	  GHG	  emissions.	  It	  is	  therefore	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  stronger	  policy	  advocacy	  by	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Now	  an	  established	  intergovernmental	  mechanism	  that	  has	  been	  operational	  for	  
nearly	  two	  decades,	  the	  IPCC	  describes	  its	  main	  task	  as	  being	  to	  provide	  “assessment	  
reports	  on	  the	  state	  of	  knowledge	  on	  climate	  change”	  at	  regular	  intervals,	  and	  its	  
restricted	  mandate	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  statement	  that	  one	  of	  its	  most	  important	  
principles	  is	  to	  produce	  reports	  that	  are	  ‘policy	  relevant’	  but	  not	  ‘policy	  prescriptive’	  
(IPCC	  2010).123	  Rather	  than	  conducting	  new	  research,	  IPCC	  reports	  assess	  the	  most	  
recently	  published	  and	  peer-­‐reviewed	  scientific	  literature	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  
related	  issues,	  but	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  literature	  (which	  often	  is	  the	  case	  on	  issues	  
such	  as	  adaptation),	  they	  also	  include	  information	  obtained	  from	  ‘grey	  literature’,	  
which	  refers	  to	  government	  reports	  and	  work	  published	  by	  international	  
organisations	  (IPCC	  2010).	  The	  volunteer	  scientists	  and	  experts	  conducting	  the	  
assessments	  and	  writing	  the	  reports	  are	  organised	  into	  three	  Working	  Groups	  
(WGs):	  WGI	  assesses	  and	  reports	  on	  the	  physical	  science	  basis	  of	  climate	  change,	  
“including	  attribution	  of	  past	  change	  and	  projections	  of	  future	  change”;	  WGII	  builds	  
on	  the	  information	  assessed	  by	  WGI	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  expected	  impacts	  of	  global	  
warming	  on	  socioeconomic	  and	  natural	  systems;	  and	  WGIII	  reports	  on	  possible	  
policy	  responses	  to	  the	  effects	  identified	  by	  WGII	  (IAC	  2010,	  p.	  6;	  Luton	  2015).	  This	  
separation	  between	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  sciences	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  the	  IPCC	  can	  
be	  controlled	  by	  governments	  and	  various	  other	  stakeholders:	  the	  physical	  science	  
that	  provides	  proof	  that	  global	  warming	  is	  accelerating	  and	  that	  action	  to	  mitigate	  it	  
is	  urgently	  required	  is	  the	  domain	  of	  WGI,	  while	  the	  social	  science	  discipline	  of	  
economics	  dominates	  both	  the	  possible	  ‘socioeconomic’	  impacts	  and	  the	  ‘policy	  
relevant’	  information	  presented	  in	  WGII	  and	  WGIII	  assessment	  reports	  (Corbera	  et	  
al.	  2015;	  Hulme	  &	  Mahoney	  2010).124	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  scientists,	  if	  it	  could	  have	  been	  achieved,	  may	  have	  at	  least	  partially	  helped	  mitigate	  some	  of	  the	  additional	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  locked	  in	  by	  the	  increasing	  GHG	  emissions	  in	  the	  three	  decades	  since	  scientists	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  severity	  of	  this	  issue.	  123	  Refer	  to	  Luton	  (2015)	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  argument	  against	  this	  claim	  of	  ‘policy	  neutrality’	  within	  the	  IPCC.	  124	  Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  (1994a,	  p.	  10)	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  label	  “‘socio-­‐economic’	  system”	  as	  “it	  indicated	  that	  this	  group	  [WGII]	  too	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  society	  but	  in	  that	  vague	  and	  undefined	  apolitical	  entity	  called	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  ‘system’.”	  In	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  practical	  and	  political	  decisions	  involved	  when	  the	  IPCC	  was	  being	  established,	  Hecht	  &	  Tirpak	  (1995,	  p.	  385)	  identify	  WGIII’s	  work	  as	  ‘the	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Aligned	  with	  this	  division	  of	  labour	  between	  the	  natural	  and	  the	  social	  sciences,	  the	  
IPCC’s	  assessment	  results	  are	  published	  in	  three	  WG	  reports	  that	  include	  “chapters	  
on	  specific	  topics;	  a	  Technical	  Summary	  of	  the	  chapter	  contents;	  and	  a	  Summary	  for	  
Policymakers,	  which	  highlights	  the	  key	  findings	  of	  the	  assessment	  (IAC	  2010,	  p.	  8).125	  
As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  SPMs	  are	  subject	  to	  line-­‐by-­‐line	  approval	  by	  
government	  representatives.126	  This	  is	  a	  crucial	  mechanism	  that	  government	  
representatives	  use	  to	  control	  the	  dissemination	  of	  information	  to	  the	  media	  (and	  
through	  them,	  to	  the	  public)	  as	  these	  summaries	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  read	  given	  the	  
length	  and	  complexity	  of	  IPCC	  reports	  (Schrope	  2001;	  Hajer	  2012).127	  But	  
government	  control	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  work	  is	  far	  more	  extensive	  even	  than	  this,	  as	  
evidenced	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  Figure	  8	  below,	  which	  summarises	  IPCC	  processes	  
and	  procedures	  and	  shows	  how	  government	  representatives	  exert	  an	  influence	  at	  
almost	  every	  stage	  of	  the	  IPCC	  process,	  including	  setting	  its	  mandate,	  establishing	  
the	  scope	  of	  its	  investigations,	  electing	  an	  IPCC	  Bureau	  and	  Chair	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  
the	  assessment,	  and	  nominating	  authors	  and	  review	  editors.	  As	  Ravindranath	  (2010,	  
p.	  27),	  who	  participated	  in	  producing	  eight	  IPCC	  reports,	  explains:	  “The	  most	  
powerful	  body	  of	  the	  IPCC	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  making	  all	  the	  crucial	  decisions,	  
starting	  from	  the	  contents	  and	  procedures	  to	  the	  final	  approval	  of	  the	  reports,	  is	  the	  
‘IPCC	  panel’	  that	  consists	  of	  representatives	  of	  all	  the	  governments	  under	  the	  UN….	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  most	  contentious’	  as	  it	  controls	  which	  ‘policy	  relevant’	  information	  is	  selected	  for	  inclusion.	  They	  also	  draw	  attention	  to	  how	  competing	  views	  within	  and	  between	  US	  scientific	  and	  other	  state	  agencies	  about	  which	  WG	  the	  US	  should	  chair	  in	  the	  first	  IPCC	  meeting	  were	  resolved	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  chairing	  WGIII.	  125	  The	  IPCC	  has	  published	  five	  major	  assessment	  reports	  to	  date:	  the	  First	  Assessment	  Report	  (FAR)	  in	  1990,	  while	  policymakers	  were	  negotiating	  the	  UNFCCC;	  the	  Second	  Assessment	  Report	  (SAR)	  in	  1995,	  which	  was	  used	  to	  inform	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  negotiations;	  the	  Third	  Assessment	  Report	  (TAR)	  in	  2001;	  the	  Fourth	  Assessment	  Report	  (AR4)	  in	  2007;	  and	  the	  Fifth	  Assessment	  Report	  (AR5)	  in	  2013/2014	  (IPCC	  n.d.).	  The	  IPCC	  plans	  to	  complete	  the	  Sixth	  Assessment	  Report	  (AR6)	  in	  2021/2022	  (IPCC	  website).	  126	  There	  are	  three	  levels	  of	  endorsement	  of	  IPCC	  reports,	  the	  strongest	  of	  which	  is	  ‘approval’	  and	  involves	  ‘detailed	  line	  by	  line	  discussion	  and	  agreement’	  by	  government	  representatives	  while	  ‘adoption’,	  which	  is	  used	  for	  the	  Synthesis	  Report	  is	  subject	  to	  ‘section	  by	  section’	  agreement.	  ‘Acceptance’	  is	  the	  weakest	  form	  of	  endorsement	  and	  signifies	  that	  the	  material	  “presents	  a	  comprehensive,	  objective	  and	  balanced	  view	  of	  the	  subject	  matter”	  (IPCC,	  n.d.).	  127	  According	  the	  Hajer	  (2012,	  p.	  459),	  “IPCC	  reports	  are	  3000-­‐plus	  pages	  of	  summaries	  of	  the	  state	  of	  knowledge	  on	  selected	  topics.”	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So	  [the]	  IPCC	  is	  not	  an	  organization	  with	  its	  own	  agenda	  to	  promote	  or	  make	  its	  own	  
rules,	  it	  is	  continuously	  controlled	  and	  supervised	  by	  this	  panel.”	  
10  Climate change assessments  |  Review of the processes and procedures of the IPCC
Figure 1.2 Process for preparing an IPCC Assessment Report. The initial steps 
(scoping and Bureau election) take place over a few years and several meetings. In 
this diagram, ‘governments’ are representatives of ministries or federal agencies 
and ‘experts’ are generally scientists from academia, government agencies, the 
private sector, and nongovernmental organizations. In general, the IPCC Secretariat 
facilitates the work of the Panel and supports scoping, Bureau election, government 
nominations, and report approval. The Technical Support Units assist the Working 
Group Co-chairs and Synthesis Report writing team and support author selection 
and report writing and review.
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Working Group Co-chairs invite experts 
nominated by governments, organizations, and 
other experts to review the first draft
Governments agree on the mandate of the Working Groups and the 
time frame for the report, and elect an IPCC Bureau and Chair for the 
duration of the assessment 
CLAs and LAs consider reviewer comments with 
assistance of REs and prepare the final draft
Circulation of final draft; governments are invited 
to comment on Summary for Policy Makers
Line-by-line approval of Summary for Policy 
Makers and acceptance of report by governments
Governments and experts identify 
policy relevant topics; governments 
agree on the outline
Circulation of final draft; governments 
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Source:	  IAC	  (2010,	  p.	  10)	  
Figure	  8:	  IPCC	  Processes	  and	  Procedures	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Despite	  its	  limited	  mandate	  and	  all	  the	  other	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  IPCC	  authors,	  the	  
research	  results	  on	  anthropogenic	  GHG	  emissions	  causing	  global	  warming,	  climate	  
change,	  and	  ocean	  acidification	  cannot	  be	  denied	  and	  are	  published	  in	  the	  WGI	  
reports.	  The	  tactic	  of	  designing	  the	  IPCC	  so	  that	  it	  has	  no	  role	  in	  recommending	  
policies	  has	  nevertheless	  succeeded	  in	  delaying	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  effective	  policies	  
required	  to	  mitigate	  global	  warming.	  Given	  the	  concern	  raised	  within	  civil	  society	  by	  
the	  irrefutable	  scientific	  evidence	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  that	  is	  published	  
in	  IPCC	  reports,	  however,	  US	  fossil	  fuel	  interests	  and	  their	  domestic	  and	  
international	  allies	  have	  had	  to	  resort	  to	  other	  tactics	  to	  block	  action	  on	  climate	  
change.128	  These	  tactics	  include	  sustained	  and	  sometimes	  even	  psychologically	  
damaging	  attempts	  to	  discredit	  IPCC	  science	  and	  scientists.	  
Constructing	  competing	  ideas:	  Climate	  change	  denialist	  attacks	  on	  
IPCC	  climate	  science	  and	  climate	  scientists	  
The	  tactic	  of	  discrediting	  IPCC	  reports	  was	  already	  evident	  with	  the	  GHW	  Bush	  
Administration’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  First	  Assessment	  Report	  in	  1990,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  
fossil-­‐fuel	  funded	  Global	  Climate	  Coalition’s	  (GCC)	  extensive	  lobbying	  against	  climate	  
change	  legislation	  and	  its	  “large-­‐scale	  advertising	  blitz	  [which	  was]	  meant	  to	  assuage	  
any	  trepidation	  the	  [US]	  public	  might	  have	  had	  about	  the	  climate	  change	  issue”	  in	  
the	  late	  1990s	  (Armitage	  2005,	  p.	  422).	  There	  are	  many	  instances	  of	  manufactured	  
‘climate	  change	  skepticism’	  or,	  as	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  open	  letter	  ‘Deniers	  are	  not	  
Skeptics’	  (CSI	  2015)	  more	  accurately	  describe	  it,	  ‘climate	  change	  denialism’;	  
however,	  three	  ‘controversies’	  reported	  on	  extensively	  in	  the	  media	  and	  debated	  on	  
social	  media	  are	  particularly	  noteworthy.	  These	  manufactured	  controversies	  have	  
succeeded	  both	  in	  damaging	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  IPCC	  science	  and	  scientists	  and	  in	  
delaying	  taking	  the	  action	  required	  to	  mitigate	  additional	  global	  warming	  (Biddle	  &	  
Leuschner	  2015;	  Brulle	  2014;	  Leuschner	  2016;	  McAdam	  2017;	  Ravindranath	  2010)	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  try	  to	  secure	  what	  Rockström	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  ‘safe	  operating	  
space’	  for	  humanity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  While	  there	  are	  politicians,	  policymakers	  and	  representatives	  of	  business	  who	  also	  share	  these	  civil	  society	  concerns	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  they	  have,	  to	  date,	  been	  unable	  to	  counter	  powerful	  vested	  interests	  whose	  business	  models	  would	  be	  challenged	  by	  the	  required	  changes	  to	  the	  working	  of	  the	  global	  economy.	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Since	  one	  of	  the	  central	  functions	  of	  IPCC	  reports	  is	  to	  inform	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  	  
(Adler	  &	  Hadorn	  2014),	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  these	  three	  controversies	  occurred	  
just	  before	  important	  UNFCCC	  milestone	  events.	  The	  first	  controversy	  occurred	  in	  
the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  and	  involved	  the	  ‘hockey	  stick’	  
graph	  published	  in	  the	  2001	  Third	  Assessment	  Report	  (TAR);	  the	  ‘climategate’	  
controversy,	  involving	  ‘leaked’	  private	  emails	  between	  scientists	  whose	  work	  had	  
been	  published	  in	  IPCC	  reports,	  coincided	  with	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  COP-­‐15	  climate	  
summit	  in	  Copenhagen	  (where	  there	  were	  high	  expectations	  that	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  
would	  be	  extended	  and	  strengthened,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  in	  this	  
chapter);	  and	  the	  public	  debates	  that	  greatly	  exaggerated	  the	  severity	  of	  a	  few	  
errors	  in	  the	  regional	  chapters	  of	  the	  AR4	  report	  occurred	  soon	  after	  the	  
controversial	  and	  disappointing	  outcome	  of	  COP-­‐15.	  In	  effect,	  because	  IPCC	  reports	  
threaten	  powerful	  vested	  interests,	  they	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  climate	  science	  they	  report	  
on,	  and	  the	  climate	  scientists	  who	  work	  on	  them)	  are	  subject	  to	  attacks	  by	  climate	  
change	  deniers	  who	  are	  ideologically	  opposed	  to	  regulating	  GHG	  emissions.	  This	  is	  
reflected	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  subsequent	  inquiries	  into	  these	  controversies	  have	  
vindicated	  both	  the	  science	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  scientists	  who	  were	  attacked,	  as	  
briefly	  discussed	  below.	  
The	  ‘hockey-­‐stick’	  graph	  controversy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  
Climate	  scientist	  Jerry	  Mahlman	  coined	  the	  term	  ‘hockey-­‐stick	  graph’	  (Hamblyn	  
2009)	  to	  describe	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  curve	  depicting	  changes	  in	  the	  Earth’s	  temperature	  
over	  several	  centuries	  (refer	  to	  Figure	  9	  below:	  the	  ‘hockey-­‐stick’	  shape	  is	  evident	  on	  
the	  right-­‐hand	  side	  of	  the	  curve).	  	  Since	  there	  are	  no	  recorded	  temperatures	  
extending	  back	  for	  a	  thousand	  years,	  climate	  scientists	  Michael	  Mann,	  Raymond	  
Bradley	  and	  Malcolm	  Hughes	  used	  a	  standard	  scientific	  procedure	  –	  temperature	  
proxies	  obtained	  primarily	  from	  tree	  ring	  data	  -­‐	  to	  estimate	  the	  missing	  data	  in	  the	  
northern	  hemisphere	  temperature	  records	  and	  published	  their	  findings	  in	  Nature	  in	  
1998	  (this	  work	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  MBH98)	  and	  in	  Geophysical	  Research	  
Letters	  in	  1999	  (MBH99)	  (Connolly	  &	  Connolly	  2014).	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SCIENCE: EVIDENCE, MECHANISMS, AND SCENARIOS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
The long-period, northern hemisphere, ‘hockey stick’ chart 
Reconstruction of global temperatures over the past millennium suggests that in recent 
decades there has been a sharp upturn in Earth’s mean temperature. In one large-scale 
exercise, Mann et al. (1998, 1999) used historical data from tree rings, ice cores, and 
other ‘proxies’ to reconstruct the northern hemisphere’s mean temperature over the past 
1,000 years. This resulted in the ‘hockey stick’ chart (Figure 1), made famous by the 
2001 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  
The exercise sparked considerable debate1. However, it appears that the basic message of 
the chart, that Earth has already become unprecedentedly warm for modern times, and 
that this process is continuing apace, is now accepted by most scientists, including, 
importantly, by a specially convened committee of the US National Academy of 
Sciences. The committee's chair is reported as saying that it has a “high level of 
confidence” that the second half of the 20th century was warmer than any other period in 
the past four centuries, although it considers that claims for the earlier period covered by 
the study, from AD 900 to 1600, are less certain2.  
According to the IPCC, over the 20th century, the global average surface temperature has 
increased by about 0.6ºC. The year 2005 has recently been reported as having been the 
warmest year in several thousand years, and 2007 is expected to be the warmest year on 
record3. Furthermore, Shaw (2006) reports that, in the past 10 years, nine were the 
warmest since temperature records started, i.e. around the end of the 19th century.  
A shorter-period, global, mean land-ocean-air temperature index 
Another exercise, conducted by NASA and covering only the past 125 years, but using 
fewer indirect, and mainly instrumental, measurements also indicates global warming. 
Initially, the evidence was inconclusive: balloons showed day temperatures falling over 
time, but night temperatures rising. However, early sensors were inadequately insulated 
against sunlight, and hence were over-stating day temperatures. Furthermore, initial 
satellite observations were subject to calculation errors concerning the orbits of satellites 
around Earth. Once adjusted for these errors, the data show a consistent story of warming 
over the period, in four phases (Figure 2). 
                                                                 
1  See for example McIntyre et al. (2003, 2005a, 2005b); Mann, M.E. et al. (2003); and Jones and Mann (2004). 
2  See Brumfiel, G. (2006), and the National Academies website, <http://www.national-academies.org>. 
3  See The Independent, 1 January 2007. 
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global warming 
	  
Source:	  Llewellyn	  (2007,	  p.	  6)	  
After	  its	  publication	  in	  the	  TAR	  WGI	  SPM,	  the	  MBH1999	  graph	  “featured	  prominently	  
in	  both	  scientific	  reports	  and	  popular	  public	  presentations,	  and	  generated	  
considerable	  scientific	  and	  public	  concern	  over	  atmospheric	  CO2	  concentrations”	  
(Connolly	  &	  Connolly	  2014,	  p.	  2).	  The	  graph’s	  clear	  representation	  of	  the	  late	  
twentieth-­‐century’s	  unprecedented	  increasing	  rate	  of	  global	  warming	  made	  it	  (and	  
the	  scientists	  who	  developed	  it)	  the	  target	  of	  sustained	  attacks	  by	  climate	  change	  
deniers	  (Biddle	  &	  Leuschner	  2015;	  Hicks	  2017).	  Prominent	  critics	  of	  the	  graph	  
included	  Stephen	  McIntyre	  (who	  spent	  his	  career	  in	  the	  mining	  industry	  and	  is	  not	  a	  
climate	  scientist),	  Ross	  McKitrick	  (an	  economist),	  and	  conservative	  US	  politicians	  
such	  as	  Senator	  James	  Inhofe	  and	  Congressman	  Joe	  Barton	  (Biddle	  &	  Leuschner	  
2015;	  Hicks	  2017).	  Although	  some	  technical	  flaws	  have	  been	  found	  in	  the	  ‘hockey	  
stick	  study,’	  many	  subsequent	  investigations	  by	  individual	  researchers	  as	  well	  as	  by	  
national	  and	  international	  scientific	  institutions	  confirm	  the	  hockey-­‐stick	  graph’s	  
main	  message:	  the	  overall	  trend	  of	  a	  rapid	  increase	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  global	  warming	  in	  
the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  These	  investigations	  also	  clear	  the	  scientists	  
Figure	  9:	  The	  hockey	  stick	  graph	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involved	  of	  any	  wrongdoing	  (Biddle	  &	  Leuschner	  2015;	  Connolly	  &	  Connolly	  2014;	  
Hicks	  2017;	  Llewellyn	  2007).129	  As	  Hicks	  (2017)	  points	  out,	  technical	  disagreements	  
such	  as	  this	  one	  about	  the	  ‘science’	  of	  global	  warming	  are	  proxies	  that	  conceal	  much	  
deeper	  political	  and	  economic	  ideological	  disputes	  (see	  also	  Beck	  2012	  and	  
Lewandowsky,	  Cook	  &	  Lloyd	  2016).	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  regarding	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘climategate	  scandal’	  and	  the	  media	  publicity	  surrounding	  errors	  in	  the	  IPCC’s	  AR4.	  
COP-­‐15,	  ‘climategate’	  and	  AR4	  errors	  
The	  timing	  of	  the	  leak	  of	  emails	  hacked	  from	  the	  University	  of	  East	  Anglia’s	  Climate	  
Research	  Unit,	  which	  occurred	  a	  few	  weeks	  prior	  to	  COP-­‐15	  in	  Copenhagen,	  makes	  it	  
reasonable	  to	  suspect	  that	  this	  leak	  may	  have	  been	  politically	  motivated	  (Nerlich	  
2010;	  Skrydstrup	  2013).	  A	  political	  agenda	  having	  potentially	  informed	  the	  leak	  is	  
also	  perhaps	  evident	  in	  how,	  on	  BBC	  News,	  the	  lead	  climate	  negotiator	  of	  Saudi	  
Arabia	  stated	  an	  expectation	  that	  this	  incident	  would	  “derail	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  
[COP-­‐15]	  summit	  to	  reach	  a	  binding	  agreement	  on	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions”	  
(Skrydstrup	  2013).130	  Widely-­‐publicised	  allegations	  that	  the	  contents	  of	  some	  of	  the	  
leaked	  private	  emails	  between	  the	  scientists	  revealed	  that	  data	  had	  been	  
manipulated	  to	  overstate	  the	  case	  of	  global	  warming	  and	  that	  scientific	  dissenting	  
views	  on	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  had	  been	  suppressed	  were	  refuted	  by	  
several	  official	  investigations	  in	  the	  period	  that	  followed,	  vindicating	  both	  the	  
scientists	  and	  the	  science	  (Leuschner	  2016;	  Skydstrup	  2013).	  The	  damage	  to	  climate	  
science	  in	  public	  perceptions	  had,	  however,	  already	  been	  achieved	  with	  these	  
allegations,	  and	  it	  was	  compounded	  with	  the	  revelation	  of	  some	  AR4	  errors	  that	  
followed	  ‘on	  the	  heels’	  of	  this	  controversy	  (IAC	  2010,	  p.	  2).	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  Refer	  to	  Connolly	  and	  Connolly	  (2014)	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  technical,	  scientific	  controversies	  over	  the	  use	  of	  proxy	  data	  in	  the	  MBH	  studies,	  and	  to	  Hicks	  (2017)	  for	  an	  account	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘inductive	  risk’	  and	  of	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  ‘false	  negatives’	  and	  ‘false	  positives’	  in	  scientific	  investigations	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming.	  130	  While	  Saudi	  Arabia	  is	  frequently	  (and	  justifiably)	  criticized	  for	  its	  obstructionist	  role	  in	  the	  climate	  change	  negotiations,	  these	  tactics	  are	  best	  understood	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  its	  ruling	  class’s	  alliances	  “to	  powerful	  oil	  and	  coal	  lobbies	  within	  industrialized	  countries,	  primarily	  the	  US,	  and	  also	  Australia”	  (Depledge	  2008,	  p.	  17).	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One	  of	  the	  AR4	  (WGII)	  errors	  was	  traced	  back	  to	  information	  from	  a	  ‘grey	  literature’	  
source,	  A	  World	  Wildlife	  Fund	  (WWF)	  report	  that	  erroneously	  claimed	  that	  
Himalayan	  glaciers	  were	  likely	  to	  disappear	  by	  2035	  (IAC	  2010).131	  What	  is	  most	  
controversial	  about	  this	  error	  is	  that	  the	  statement	  was	  questioned	  in	  peer	  
reviewers’	  comments	  but	  Review	  Editors	  failed	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  (IAC	  2010).	  As	  
the	  InterAgency	  Council	  (IAC)	  charged	  with	  reviewing	  the	  IPCC	  subsequent	  to	  these	  
controversies	  points	  out,	  “This	  oversight	  is	  perhaps	  understandable	  given	  the	  fact	  
that	  there	  were	  a	  total	  of	  37,078	  review	  comments	  to	  deal	  with	  in	  the	  two	  rounds	  of	  
peer	  review”	  (IAC	  2010,	  p.	  20).	  Another	  perspective	  on	  the	  question	  of	  the	  AR4	  
errors	  is	  suggested	  by	  Hajer	  (2012,	  p.	  460),	  who	  argues	  that:	  
The very notion of ‘errors’ was, of course, not innocent in itself. 
That there would be some mistakes in a three volume, 3000-page-
long, assessment report is not in itself necessarily a reason to 
problematize the quality of the science. But there was also the 
question of what the IPCC assessment was for. Implicit in the media 
outrage was the accusation that climate scientists were ‘stealth issue 
advocates’ (Piehlke 2007): scientists working for a political cause 
but using science as a ‘fig leaf’. 
To	  restore	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  work,	  the	  IAC	  was	  charged	  with	  conducting	  an	  
independent	  international	  review	  of	  IPCC	  policies	  and	  procedures	  (Beck	  2012),	  
making	  recommendations	  that	  further	  entrench	  external	  controls	  on	  how	  it	  
functions.	  Importantly,	  these	  recommendations	  include	  “guidelines	  on	  who	  can	  
speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  IPCC	  and…	  how	  the	  organization	  can	  most	  appropriately	  be	  
represented”	  (IAC	  2010,	  p.	  62),	  which	  constitutes	  another	  mechanism	  for	  controlling	  
the	  dissemination	  of	  scientific	  information	  to	  the	  public.132	  The	  attacks	  on	  the	  IPCC’s	  
alleged	  ‘left-­‐wing	  activism’	  from	  the	  right	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  are	  compounded	  
by	  politically	  liberal	  critiques	  arguing	  that	  its	  work	  is	  compromised	  in	  various	  ways,	  
as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  That	  the	  incorporation	  of	  ‘grey	  literature’	  into	  IPCC	  reports	  presented	  dangers	  that	  such	  errors	  would	  occur	  and	  could	  be	  used	  to	  undermine	  the	  IPCC’s	  legitimacy	  was	  both	  predictable	  and	  foreseen	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Skodvin	  2000)	  132	  Refer	  to	  the	  IAC	  (2010)	  report,	  Climate	  change	  assessments:	  Review	  of	  the	  processes	  
and	  procedures	  of	  the	  IPCC,	  which	  is	  available	  online,	  for	  details	  of	  its	  recommendations,	  which	  constitute	  an	  even	  tighter	  control	  on	  IPCC	  operations.	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Competing	  ideas:	  Liberal	  critiques	  of	  IPCC	  processes	  and	  policies	  
Early	  liberal	  critiques	  of	  IPCC	  processes	  and	  outputs	  included:	  the	  predominance	  of	  
the	  physical	  sciences	  (Luton	  2015)	  and	  of	  scientists	  and	  other	  experts	  from	  the	  
Global	  North	  (Sagar	  &	  Kandlikar	  1997;	  Hulme	  &	  Mahoney	  2010;	  Siebenhüner	  2003);	  
“an	  unnecessary	  amplification	  of	  essentially	  minority	  opinions”	  used	  by	  US	  industry	  
lobby	  groups	  to	  influence	  IPCC	  report	  content	  (Agrawala	  1998b);	  and	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  acting	  on	  review	  comments	  is	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  writing	  teams,	  who	  
“could	  get	  away	  with	  ignoring	  some	  or	  a	  majority	  of	  all	  critical	  review	  comments”	  
(Agrawala	  1998b).133	  Additional	  critiques	  include:	  biased	  reports	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
authors’	  own	  environmental	  views	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SPMs,	  because	  of	  government	  
representatives’	  input	  (Schrope	  2001);	  the	  subsidiary	  role	  accorded	  to	  knowledge	  
from	  social	  science	  discipline	  areas	  other	  than	  economics	  in	  WGII	  and	  WGIII	  (Corbera	  
et	  al.	  2015;	  Hulme	  &	  Mahoney	  2010;	  Luton	  2015)134;	  the	  tendency	  of	  IPCC	  reports	  to	  
understate	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  situation	  by	  limiting	  the	  timespan	  of	  research	  to	  the	  
end	  of	  2100,	  and	  by	  adopting	  conservative	  estimates	  of	  the	  changes	  and	  the	  risks	  
these	  pose	  (Leuschner	  2016;	  Risbey	  2008);	  the	  treatment	  of	  uncertainty,	  both	  in	  
general	  and	  across	  the	  WGs	  (Adler	  &	  Hadorn	  2014;	  IAC	  Council	  2010);	  the	  positivist	  
and	  global	  framings	  of	  climate	  change	  that	  exclude	  traditional	  indigenous	  and	  local	  
knowledges	  	  (Ford	  et	  al.	  2016;	  Obermeister	  2017);	  and	  the	  ‘virtual	  invisibility’	  of	  the	  
main	  victims	  of	  climate	  change	  -­‐	  and	  especially	  of	  the	  poorest	  children	  (Fløttum,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  A	  particularly	  unjust	  (and	  arguably	  also	  offensive)	  example	  of	  how	  the	  writing	  team’s	  discretion	  to	  ignore	  comments	  was	  how	  this	  enabled	  WGIII	  of	  the	  Second	  Assessment	  Report	  to	  assign	  a	  cash	  value	  of	  $1.5	  million	  to	  a	  human	  life	  in	  the	  OECD	  “against	  a	  mere	  $150	  000	  in	  the	  developing	  countries”	  when	  calculating	  the	  ‘social	  costs’	  of	  climate	  change	  (Meyer	  &	  Cooper	  1995,	  cited	  in	  Agrawala	  1998b,	  p.	  626).	  134	  Economists	  comprised	  half	  of	  the	  social	  scientists	  in	  AR5’s	  WGII	  and	  nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  coordinating	  lead	  authors	  of	  AR5’s	  WGIII	  (Obermeister	  2017).	  This	  predominance	  of	  economists	  in	  WGII	  and	  WGIII	  dates	  back	  to	  1990,	  when	  the	  WGII	  SPM	  raised	  “a	  need	  to	  develop	  a	  methodology	  to	  assess	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  ‘socio-­‐economic’	  systems	  to	  climate	  change”	  and	  WGIII,	  reflecting	  “the	  decision	  criteria	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  government	  [the	  US],	  [identified	  a	  need	  to	  collect]…	  economic	  data	  for	  use	  in	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses”	  (Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  1994a,	  p.	  149).	  Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  (ibid.)	  concludes	  that	  in	  this	  period	  (between	  1990	  and	  1992)	  “[t]he	  ground	  was	  …	  prepared	  for	  mainstream	  economics	  to	  join	  the	  IPCC	  research	  agenda,	  as	  demanded	  by	  the	  US	  government	  and	  well	  organized	  social	  science	  research	  interests.”	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Gasper	  &	  St	  Clair	  2016).135	  In	  addition,	  critics	  point	  out	  that	  some	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  
bias	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  IPCC	  are	  not	  immediately	  evident.	  Analysing	  the	  
educational	  background	  and	  institutional	  links	  of	  the	  AR5	  Working	  Group	  III	  authors,	  
Corbera	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  find	  that	  while	  the	  IPCC	  has	  succeeded	  somewhat	  in	  including	  
the	  participation	  of	  scientists	  from	  the	  Global	  South,	  most	  of	  these	  scientists	  are	  
trained	  in	  Global	  North	  institutions	  (particularly	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  UK),	  with	  participants	  
from	  some	  Global	  South	  countries	  (such	  as	  India	  and	  Brazil)	  being	  more	  integrated	  
into	  the	  IPCC	  research	  network	  than	  others.	  They	  thus	  conclude	  that:	  
Although geographic representation has increased, our analysis 
makes apparent that actors and institutions in the North continue to 
play a dominant role in constructing the IPCC’s assessment of 
mitigation and thus their influence on the UNFCCC process. These 
findings combined might also suggest why the WGIII AR5 presents 
a fairly strong harmonization of views, compared with the diversity 
one finds across the social sciences of climate change more broadly, 
and explain why WGIII finds it difficult to effectively incorporate 
many important questions into its discourse, notably questions of 
justice or governance, because the disciplines dominating the WGIII 
author team do not have these questions at their core and frame 
important questions narrowly. For example, referring to 
‘behavioural change’ instead of ‘consumption practices’ ignores 
important insights from disciplines (in this case sociology) that 
remain largely excluded from the process. 
(Corbera et al. 2015, pp. 98 - 99). 
While	  such	  liberal	  critiques	  of	  IPCC	  practices	  are	  clearly	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  
address	  the	  need	  to	  incorporate	  alternative	  world	  views	  in	  climate	  change	  reports,	  
as	  discussed	  previously	  many	  critiques	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  work	  are	  motivated	  by	  the	  
desire	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  influential	  industry	  lobby	  groups.	  Indeed,	  a	  critique	  
of	  the	  IPCC’s	  work	  can	  sometimes	  even	  be	  motivated	  by	  diametrically	  opposed	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  Obermeister	  (2017,	  p.	  82)	  cites	  Berkes’	  (1999)	  definition	  of	  indigenous	  knowledge	  as	  ‘a	  cumulative	  body	  of	  knowledge,	  practice	  and	  belief	  evolving	  by	  adaptive	  processes	  and	  handed	  down	  through	  generations	  by	  cultural	  transmission,	  about	  the	  relationship	  of	  living	  beings	  (including	  humans)	  with	  one	  another	  and	  with	  their	  environment,’	  and	  Stevensons’	  (1996)	  definition	  of	  Traditional	  Ecological	  Knowledge	  as	  comprising	  ‘three	  interrelated	  components:	  i)	  specific	  environmental	  knowledge,	  ii)	  knowledge	  of	  eco-­‐system	  relationships,	  and	  iii)	  a	  code	  of	  ethics	  governing	  appropriate	  human-­‐environmental	  relationships.’	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  knowledge	  systems	  are	  ignored	  in	  IPCC	  reports	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  how	  only	  nine	  (2.9%)	  of	  the	  309	  chapter	  authors	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  AR5	  WGII	  report	  had	  published	  on	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  climate	  change	  (Obermeister	  2017,	  p.	  84).	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agendas	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  critics,	  and	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  reporting	  of	  
uncertainties	  in	  IPCC	  reports	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this.	  
Drawing	  on	  the	  example	  of	  how	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  1970s	  scientific	  models	  of	  
the	  processes	  involved	  in	  ozone	  depletion	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  oversimplified	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  they	  failed	  to	  predict	  the	  large	  ‘ozone	  hole’	  observed	  over	  the	  Antarctic	  
in	  the	  1980s,	  Oppenheimer	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  argue	  that	  uncertainties	  in	  climate	  change	  
models	  should	  be	  reported	  on	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  taking	  action	  on	  reducing	  GHG	  
emissions.136	  The	  danger	  that	  the	  uncertainties	  involved	  in	  climate	  change	  research	  
that	  the	  IPCC	  assesses	  and	  reports	  on	  is	  being	  similarly	  downplayed	  leads	  the	  
authors	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  emphasis	  on	  consensus	  when	  finalising	  climate	  change	  
reports	  is	  misguided,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  “important	  that	  policy-­‐makers	  understand	  the	  
more	  extreme	  possibilities	  that	  consensus	  may	  exclude	  or	  downplay”	  (Oppenheimer	  
et	  al.	  2007,	  p.	  1505).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  achieving	  the	  diametrically	  
opposite	  aim	  of	  delaying	  taking	  action	  on	  reducing	  fossil	  fuel	  based	  GHG	  emissions,	  
the	  representatives	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  interest	  groups	  “try	  to	  steer	  the	  IPCC	  message	  
toward	  emphasizing	  uncertainties	  and	  greenhouse	  gases	  other	  than	  carbon-­‐dioxide”	  
(Agrawala	  1998b,	  emphasis	  in	  original;	  see	  also	  Armitage	  2005).	  This	  example	  points	  
to	  the	  validity	  of	  Hajer’s	  argument	  that	  criticisms	  of	  the	  IPCC	  for	  not	  being	  “’purely’	  
scientific”	  miss	  the	  point	  since,	  as	  shown	  throughout	  the	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter,	  
“the	  essence	  of	  its	  organizational	  practice	  …	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  political	  framing	  in	  itself”	  
(Hajer	  2012,	  p.	  458).	  	  
Evaluation	  of	  the	  IPCC:	  It	  works	  exactly	  as	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  work	  
As	  argued	  above,	  liberal	  critiques	  of	  the	  IPCC	  miss	  the	  point:	  rather	  than	  this	  
institution	  embodying	  “the	  long-­‐term	  liberal	  dream	  of	  using	  dispassionate	  scientific	  
research	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  transnational	  policy”	  (Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999,	  p.	  471),	  it	  
was	  consciously	  established	  and	  then	  consciously	  shaped	  in	  a	  way	  that	  facilitates	  the	  
agenda	  of	  what	  Agrawala	  and	  Andresen	  (ibid.)	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘liberalism’s	  enemies.’	  Thus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  The	  ‘various	  heterogeneous	  chemical	  reactions’	  contributing	  to	  ozone	  depletion	  were	  ‘discounted’	  by	  most	  research	  modellers	  before	  this	  discovery,	  although	  some	  scientists	  had	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  potential	  implications	  of	  excluding	  these	  reactions	  –	  concerns	  that	  were	  “generally	  downplayed	  in	  assessments	  until	  the	  ozone	  hole	  was	  reported”	  (Oppenheimer	  et	  al.	  2007,	  p.	  1506).	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‘trapped’	  between	  criticisms	  from	  climate	  change	  deniers	  and	  criticisms	  from	  
political	  liberals,	  climate	  scientists	  —	  who	  are	  notoriously	  naïve	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
politics	  and	  try	  to	  avoid	  political	  issues	  (Appenzeller;	  Holt	  2017;	  Luton	  2015)	  —	  are	  in	  
an	  unenviable	  position.	  The	  psychological	  stress	  they	  experience	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  
awareness	  of	  the	  uncompromising	  reactions	  of	  the	  physical	  Earth	  System	  to	  further	  
GHG-­‐induced	  radiative	  forcing	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  psychological	  stress	  caused	  by	  
the	  attacks	  on	  their	  personal	  integrity	  (Biddle	  &	  Leuschner	  2015;	  Holmes	  2015a;	  
Oreskes	  &	  Conway	  2010).	  These	  psychological	  stresses,	  and	  demands	  to	  continually	  
respond	  to	  criticisms	  they	  have	  already	  addressed,	  also	  detract	  from	  the	  ability	  of	  
climate	  scientists	  to	  focus	  on	  their	  scientific	  work	  (Biddle	  &	  Leuschner	  2015;	  
Leuschner	  2016)	  –	  work	  which	  is,	  in	  itself,	  overwhelmingly	  complex	  given	  the	  multi-­‐
faceted	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Earth	  System.137	  	  As	  Luton	  (2015,	  p.	  157)	  points	  out,	  
however,	  “[t]he	  establishment	  of	  the	  IPCC	  was	  a	  political	  act	  that	  was	  politically	  
motivated,”	  and	  the	  individual	  scientists	  volunteering	  to	  work	  within	  this	  institution	  
need	  to	  develop	  a	  deeper	  awareness	  of	  this	  as	  do	  their	  liberal	  critics.138	  In	  the	  final	  
analysis,	  and	  as	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  origins,	  structures,	  and	  
disciplining	  of	  the	  IPCC	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  disagree	  with	  ecosocialist	  arguments	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Empathy	  with	  the	  difficulty	  climate	  scientists	  face	  as	  a	  result	  of	  climate	  denier	  attacks,	  coupled	  with	  concerns	  about	  the	  physical	  ramifications	  of	  ‘business-­‐as-­‐usual’	  and	  of	  the	  ‘insidious	  effect	  on	  research’	  as	  climate	  scientists	  understate	  the	  extent	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  global	  climate	  change	  or	  try	  to	  avoid	  doing	  certain	  kinds	  of	  research	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  harassment,	  even	  leads	  some	  theorists	  to	  argue	  that	  climate	  scientists	  should	  consider	  not	  conducting	  ‘dissenting’	  research	  that	  could	  be	  used	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  ‘epistemically	  detrimental’.	  Refer	  to	  Biddle	  &	  Leuschner	  2015	  and	  Leuschner	  (2016)	  for	  very	  interesting	  discussions	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  dissenting	  research	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  epistemically	  detrimental.	  Refer	  to	  Balint’s	  (2003)	  discussion	  of	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  Bjørn	  Lomborg’s	  2001	  book,	  The	  Skeptical	  Environmentalist,	  which	  summarises	  some	  scientists’	  perspectives	  on	  how	  such	  work	  is	  epistemically	  damaging	  as	  well	  potentially	  contributing	  to	  negative	  practical	  outcomes.	  	  138	  Scientists	  who	  are	  being	  harassed	  by	  ideologically	  motivated	  climate	  change	  deniers	  may	  also	  benefit	  from	  an	  understanding	  of	  their	  attackers’	  motivations	  as	  this	  could	  save	  time	  (arguing	  with	  these	  people	  is	  pointless)	  as	  well	  as	  help	  the	  scientists	  protect	  themselves	  against	  the	  psychological	  damage	  these	  attacks	  cause.	  Lewandowsky,	  Cook	  and	  Lloyd	  (2016)	  develop	  an	  interesting	  argument	  that	  climate	  change	  deniers	  may	  be	  motivated	  by	  what	  psychologists	  refer	  to	  ‘identity-­‐protective-­‐cognition’	  which	  could	  provoke	  reactions	  ranging	  from	  moderating	  their	  perceptions	  of	  the	  risks	  involved	  to	  adopting	  incoherent	  conspiratorial	  arguments	  to	  justify	  their	  contrarian	  positions.	  The	  authors	  of	  this	  paper	  make	  the	  interesting	  point	  that	  “[c]limate	  science	  denial	  is…	  perhaps	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  rational	  activity	  that	  replaces	  a	  coherent	  body	  of	  science	  with	  an	  incoherent	  and	  conspiracist	  body	  of	  pseudo-­‐science	  for	  political	  reasons	  and	  with	  considerable	  political	  coherence	  and	  effectiveness”	  (ibid.,	  no	  page	  number).	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the	  political	  institutions	  of	  capitalism	  are	  incapable	  of	  solving	  the	  environmental	  
problems	  that	  capitalist	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  engender.	  These	  institutions	  
are	  especially	  incapable	  of	  addressing	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  GHG	  emissions	  that	  are	  the	  
by-­‐product	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuels	  underpinning	  the	  global	  capitalist	  economy	  as	  it	  has	  
developed	  historically.	  This	  point	  is	  further	  underscored	  by	  considerations	  of	  what	  
progress	  has	  been	  made	  in	  reducing	  GHG	  emissions	  since	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
UNFCCC	  in	  1990,	  which	  is	  briefly	  discussed	  below,	  while	  the	  contentious	  events	  at	  
COP-­‐15	  in	  2009	  and	  the	  outcomes	  of	  COP-­‐21	  in	  2015	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  
later	  chapters.	  
The	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  
(UNFCCC)	  
The	  UNFCCC	  (also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Framework	  Convention’)	  was	  signed	  at	  UNCED	  
(the	  first	  Rio	  Earth	  Summit)	  in	  1992	  and	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  1994	  (UNFCCC	  2006).	  
The	  Framework	  Convention	  constitutes	  the	  ‘basic	  framework’	  of	  climate	  change	  
governance	  and	  is	  ‘largely	  procedural’;	  as	  Bodansky	  (2001,	  p.	  32)	  explains,	  its	  “main	  
value	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  legal	  and	  institutional	  framework	  for	  future	  work	  through	  
regular	  meetings	  of	  the	  parties	  and	  the	  possible	  adoption	  of	  more	  substantive	  
protocols.”	  The	  UNFCCC	  took	  this	  form	  because	  negotiations	  during	  its	  drafting	  were	  
contentious,	  with	  the	  US	  and	  allied	  governments	  refusing	  to	  countenance	  binding	  
‘targets	  and	  timetables’	  for	  reducing	  GHG	  emissions	  (Bodansky	  2001).139	  Other	  
contested	  issues	  during	  the	  initial	  negotiations	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  centred	  around	  the	  
concept	  of	  ‘common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibilities’	  (CBDR),	  which	  acknowledges	  
the	  historical	  responsibility	  of	  the	  developed	  countries	  for	  the	  accumulation	  of	  most	  
historical	  GHG	  emissions	  and	  was	  intended	  to	  accommodate	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  
development	  needs	  of	  the	  Global	  South	  countries	  by	  requiring	  developed	  countries	  
to	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  reducing	  GHG	  emissions	  (Bodansky	  2001;	  McGee	  &	  Steffek	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  US	  allies	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  climate	  change	  have	  varied	  over	  time,	  depending	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  on	  how	  it	  aligns	  with	  other	  negotiating	  parties’	  agendas.	  Their	  most	  frequent	  allies	  have	  been	  oil-­‐producing	  states	  in	  both	  the	  Global	  North	  and	  the	  Global	  South	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Depledge	  2008).	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2016).140	  The	  US	  has,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  been	  particularly	  insistent	  on	  the	  need	  for	  all	  
countries	  (including	  those	  in	  the	  Global	  South,	  and	  irrespective	  of	  historical	  
responsibility)	  to	  limit	  their	  GHG	  emissions	  (Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999).	  US	  
policymakers	  have	  also	  insisted	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  strong	  implementation	  
mechanisms,	  detailed	  reporting	  requirements,	  and	  a	  noncompliance	  procedure	  
(Bodansky	  2001);	  as	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  such	  accounting	  measures	  are	  
prerequisites	  for	  commodifying	  carbon	  and	  using	  market	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  
carbon	  trading	  to	  act	  on	  climate	  change.	  Bodansky	  (2001)	  concludes	  that	  the	  
Framework	  Convention	  adopted	  in	  1992	  ‘papers	  over’	  rather	  than	  resolves	  the	  
Global	  North/Global	  South	  divisions.	  In	  liberal	  terms,	  then,	  the	  UNFCCC	  is	  best	  
described	  as	  aspirational	  and,	  at	  the	  insistence	  of	  US	  negotiators,	  contains	  only	  
‘ambiguous	  language’	  regarding	  GHG	  emission	  reduction	  commitments	  (see	  also	  
Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999;	  Boisson	  de	  Chazournes	  2008).141	  Since	  the	  UNFCCC	  did	  
not	  demand	  any	  binding	  commitments,	  the	  governments	  of	  all	  developed	  countries	  
other	  than	  Turkey	  ratified	  it	  quickly	  (Gupta	  2010,	  p.	  640).	  The	  George	  HW	  Bush	  
administration,	  too,	  signed	  the	  UNFCCC	  at	  the	  Earth	  Summit	  in	  1992	  and	  the	  US	  
Senate	  ratified	  it	  later	  that	  year	  (Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999).	  Being	  a	  party	  to	  the	  
UNFCCC	  allowed	  the	  US	  to	  attend	  meetings	  held	  under	  its	  auspices	  and	  thus	  to	  
shape	  its	  evolution,	  as	  discussed	  below.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  influential	  actors,	  
including	  representatives	  of	  large	  fossil	  fuel	  corporations	  such	  as	  ExxonMobil,	  
expressed	  opposition	  to	  the	  Trump	  administration’s	  recent	  decision	  to	  withdraw	  
from	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  (Milman,	  Smith	  &	  Carrington	  2017);	  as	  ConocoPhillips	  
spokesperson	  put	  it,	  being	  party	  to	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  “…gives	  the	  U.S.	  the	  ability	  
to	  participate	  in	  future	  climate	  discussions	  to	  safeguard	  its	  economic	  and	  
environmental	  best	  interests”	  (Lui	  2017).	  It	  is	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  ANU	  
Environmental	  Policy	  academic	  Luke	  Kemp	  maintains	  that	  “A	  US	  withdrawal	  would	  
be	  the	  best	  outcome	  for	  international	  climate	  action”	  because	  “…the	  US	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Pre-­‐empting	  being	  held	  financially	  liable	  for	  its	  share	  of	  historical	  emissions,	  US	  interpretations	  of	  CBDR	  insist	  that	  this	  principle	  does	  not	  allocate	  responsibility	  for	  past	  GHG	  emissions	  (McGee	  &	  Steffek	  2016).	  141	  According	  to	  Agrawala	  and	  Andresen	  (1999,	  p.	  461),	  “[it]	  was	  solely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  U.S.	  adamancy	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  complete	  isolation	  that	  the	  final	  text	  of	  the	  UN	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  contains	  only	  ambiguous	  language	  with	  regard	  to	  commitments.”	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Trump	  administration	  can	  do	  more	  damage	  inside	  the	  agreement	  than	  outside	  it”	  
(Kemp	  2017a;	  see	  also	  Kemp	  2017b).	  US	  influence	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  
has	  been	  evident	  since	  its	  initial	  establishment,	  as	  several	  analysts	  point	  out.	  
Gupta	  (2010,	  p.	  640)	  identifies	  five	  sets	  of	  principles	  in	  the	  UNFCCC:	  CBDR	  and	  
respective	  capabilities;	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  particularly	  vulnerable	  countries;	  
adoption	  of	  the	  precautionary	  approach	  subject	  to	  cost-­‐effectiveness;	  the	  right	  of	  all	  
countries	  to	  pursue	  sustainable	  development;	  and	  the	  need	  to	  support	  an	  open	  
international	  economic	  system.142	  The	  contested	  issues	  and	  the	  neoliberal	  economic	  
principles	  enshrined	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  have	  continued	  to	  block	  progress	  at	  the	  annual	  
COPs,	  which	  Orr	  (2006,	  p.	  148)	  describes	  as	  “the	  highest	  decision-­‐making	  body	  for	  
the	  climate	  change	  negotiation	  process.”	  The	  first	  COP	  was	  held	  in	  1995	  in	  Berlin,	  
and	  its	  outcome	  was	  the	  ‘Berlin	  Mandate’	  to	  develop	  a	  protocol	  requiring	  developed	  
countries	  to	  decrease	  their	  GHG	  emissions	  (Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999).	  More	  than	  
two	  decades	  later,	  twenty-­‐two	  COPs	  have	  been	  convened	  resulting	  in	  several	  
agreements,	  declarations,	  accords,	  plans	  of	  action,	  and	  even	  a	  protocol	  (the	  Kyoto	  
Protocol,	  which	  came	  into	  force	  in	  2005)	  -­‐	  all	  with	  little	  (if	  any)	  effect	  on	  reducing	  
GHG	  emissions.	  Even	  within	  the	  narrow	  confines	  of	  a	  liberal	  reformist	  vision,	  Vihma’s	  
(2010,	  p.	  6)	  argument	  that	  “The	  major	  challenge	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  UN-­‐based	  
climate	  regime	  has	  been	  the	  lack	  of	  substantive	  decisions,	  in	  other	  words	  its	  lack	  of	  
effectiveness”	  is	  even	  more	  valid	  today	  than	  it	  was	  when	  it	  was	  written	  given	  that	  all	  
plans	  of	  agreeing	  to	  binding	  GHG	  emission	  reduction	  targets	  and	  timetables	  for	  
achieving	  such	  reductions	  have	  now	  been	  successfully	  defeated	  by	  successive	  US	  
administrations	  and	  their	  allies,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  
Citing	  US	  negotiators’	  success	  in	  removing	  any	  mention	  of	  targets	  and	  timetables	  in	  
the	  UNFCCC,	  and	  its	  success	  in	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol’s	  inclusion	  of	  ‘flexible’	  market	  
mechanisms	  such	  as	  emissions	  trading,	  Joint	  Implementation	  (JI)	  and	  the	  Clean	  
Development	  Mechanism	  (CDM),	  Thompson	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  the	  US	  influence	  
over	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  evolving	  climate	  regime	  has	  been	  ‘disproportionate’	  (see	  also	  
Agrawala	  &	  Andresen	  1999).	  By	  refusing	  to	  ratify	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  (Givens	  2014;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘respective	  capabilities’	  refers	  to	  the	  different	  capabilities	  that	  countries	  have	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  (Gupta	  2010).	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McAdam	  2017),	  initiating	  a	  shift	  to	  ‘voluntary’	  GHG	  emission	  targets	  and	  pushing	  
forcefully	  for	  ‘developing	  country	  participation’	  in	  GHG	  emission	  reductions	  at	  COP-­‐
15	  and,	  most	  recently,	  by	  entrenching	  this	  so-­‐called	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  approach	  while	  also	  
ensuring	  a	  very	  weak	  outcome	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  ‘Paris	  Agreement’	  drafted	  at	  the	  
2015	  COP-­‐21,	  the	  US	  has	  effectively	  taken	  the	  lead	  in	  blocking	  effective	  climate	  
action.	  As	  Wirth	  (2016,	  p.	  169)	  notes,	  because	  the	  US	  INDCs	  in	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  
are	  non-­‐binding	  and	  because	  all	  INDCs	  under	  this	  agreement	  “have	  the	  same	  
international	  legal	  character,”	  none	  of	  the	  participating	  country’s	  INDCs	  are	  legally	  
binding.	  	  
Material	  capabilities:	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  official	  
climate	  change	  ‘regime’	  to	  reduce	  GHG	  concentrations	  on	  
the	  biosphere	  
The	  neoliberal	  ideology	  of	  ‘open’	  and	  ‘free’	  global	  markets	  informing	  the	  
determination	  of	  the	  US	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  maintain	  conditions	  conducive	  to	  ‘business	  
as	  usual’	  has	  resulted	  in	  increasing	  global	  CO2	  concentrations	  from	  363.3ppm	  since	  
COP-­‐1	  in	  1995	  to	  409.01ppm	  in	  2017	  (carbonify.com).143	  The	  steady	  rise	  in	  annual	  
CO2	  concentrations	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  is	  clearly	  evident	  in	  Figure	  10	  below.	  
	  
Source:	  SCRIPPS	  Institution	  of	  Oceanography	  (2017)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  These	  figures	  are	  CO2	  averages	  for	  the	  month	  of	  April	  (carbonify.com)	  
Figure	  10:	  CO2	  Concentrations	  1960	  -­‐	  2017	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Moreover,	  research	  by	  Foster,	  Royer	  and	  Lunt	  (2017)	  shows	  that	  contemporary	  CO2	  
concentrations	  are	  not	  only	  higher	  than	  they	  have	  been	  at	  any	  time	  in	  the	  past	  two	  
hundred	  million	  years	  but	  are	  also	  increasing	  more	  rapidly	  than	  at	  any	  point	  in	  at	  
least	  the	  past	  sixty-­‐six	  million	  years.	  Average	  global	  temperatures	  in	  2016	  were	  1.1°C	  
higher	  than	  the	  pre-­‐industrial	  (1880-­‐1900)	  average,	  while	  Arctic	  and	  Antarctic	  sea-­‐ice	  
extent	  were	  simultaneously	  at	  record	  low	  levels	  (AMAP	  2017;	  WMO	  2017).	  This	  is	  
despite	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  many	  dedicated	  scientists	  and	  other	  experts	  who	  volunteer	  
their	  time	  to	  work	  within	  the	  IPCC,	  and	  despite	  a	  more	  ‘enlightened’	  faction	  of	  
capital	  arguing	  for	  ‘green	  economic	  growth’	  and	  the	  activism	  of	  a	  large,	  albeit	  
divided,	  climate	  movement	  that	  has	  developed	  within	  civil	  society	  to	  exert	  pressure	  
on	  policymakers	  to	  take	  action	  on	  climate	  change,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  
In	  accordance	  with	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  analytical	  perspective	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  
Chapter	  6	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  social	  dynamics	  of	  the	  current	  climate	  
movement,	  tracing	  its	  origins	  not	  only	  to	  the	  earlier	  environmental	  movement	  but	  
also	  to	  changes	  within	  the	  US	  state	  that	  led	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  particular	  sort	  of	  
environmentalism,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  official	  climate	  change	  ‘regime’	  established	  
under	  the	  influence	  of	  US	  dominance,	  and	  the	  alter-­‐globalization	  anti-­‐capitalist	  
movement	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  1990s	  in	  reaction	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  
neoliberalising	  policies	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  US.	  The	  composition	  of	  the	  
climate	  movement	  is	  analysed	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  two	  major	  ‘wings’:	  the	  reformist	  
climate	  action	  movement	  that	  supports	  incremental	  changes	  to	  the	  current	  system	  
in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  further	  global	  warming,	  and	  the	  more	  radical	  climate	  justice	  
movement	  that	  argues	  for	  widespread	  system	  change	  in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  further	  
global	  warming	  and	  adapt	  to	  the	  warming	  that	  is	  now	  inevitable	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  
socially	  just.	  These	  two	  extreme	  positions	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  are	  
exemplified	  by	  the	  reformist	  ‘Climate	  Action	  Network	  International’	  (CAN-­‐I)	  and	  the	  
radical	  ‘Climate	  Justice	  Now!’	  (CJN!)	  coalition,	  and	  the	  location	  of	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  
within	  the	  latter	  wing	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  events	  
leading	  to	  the	  split	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  into	  these	  two	  ‘camps’	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
the	  ideological	  differences	  leading	  to	  this	  split.	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Chapter	  Six:	  Social	  dynamics	  and	  the	  climate	  movement	  
 “To fully understand how and why Americans came to look at 
wilderness and other aspects of the American Earth in new and 
more comprehensive ways, we must look more comprehensively at 
how they began to see the whole planet – the Earth itself – as in 
some ways American.” 
Robertson (2008, p. 584). 
Introduction	  
Having	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  official	  climate	  regime	  and	  its	  limitations	  and	  
ineffectiveness	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  the	  climate	  movement	  that	  
developed	  within	  civil	  society	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  to	  
demand	  effective	  action	  to	  address	  it.	  Using	  the	  adapted	  analytical	  schema	  outlined	  
in	  Chapter	  3,	  my	  analysis	  incorporates	  discussions	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  social	  
dynamics	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  relate	  to	  formal	  institutional	  responses	  to	  
climate	  change	  and	  how	  these	  play	  out	  at	  global,	  state	  and	  local	  levels.	  I	  also	  discuss	  
how	  different	  factions	  of	  capital	  and	  labour	  (Cox’s	  ‘social	  forces’)	  impact	  on,	  and	  are	  
influenced	  by,	  the	  social	  dynamics	  unfolding	  within	  the	  climate	  movement.	  This	  
analysis	  is	  furthermore	  conducted	  with	  reference	  to	  material	  capabilities,	  dominant	  
institutions,	  social	  facts,	  and	  competing	  ideas.	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  in	  the	  years	  following	  Hansen’s	  1988	  
testimony,	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  scientific	  reports	  were	  being	  published	  
emphasising,	  with	  ever-­‐greater	  urgency,	  the	  need	  to	  take	  swift	  and	  effective	  action	  
to	  mitigate	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming.	  Much	  of	  the	  scientific	  evidence	  of	  this	  
warming	  and	  its	  effects	  is	  summarised	  in	  the	  IPCC’s	  Assessment	  Reports,	  and	  the	  
widespread	  publicity	  accompanying	  the	  release	  of	  these	  reports	  attracts	  attention	  
from	  concerned	  individuals	  and	  groups	  within	  civil	  society	  (Carpenter	  2001).	  
Importantly,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  scientific	  reports	  that	  attract	  public	  attention:	  
direct	  experiences	  and	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  
environmental	  degradation	  also	  sometimes	  provoke	  public	  concern	  (Carpenter	  
2001).	  As	  weather	  patterns	  change	  because	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  
‘extreme’	  weather	  events	  increase	  in	  duration	  and	  intensity	  around	  the	  world	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(Steffen	  et	  al.	  2017;	  WMO	  2016b)	  and	  many	  communities	  are	  directly	  impacted	  
when	  their	  lives	  are	  disrupted	  by	  unusually	  intense	  floods,	  droughts,	  and	  wildfires.144	  	  
The	  concrete	  evidence	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  global	  warming	  and	  environmental	  
degradation,	  and	  of	  the	  dangers	  these	  pose	  to	  human	  societies	  as	  well	  as	  to	  other	  
life-­‐forms,	  has	  become	  more	  difficult	  to	  ignore.	  However,	  while	  research	  evidence	  
suggests	  that	  people	  affected	  by	  some	  types	  of	  extreme	  weather	  events	  in	  the	  
advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  climate	  change	  than	  they	  did	  
before	  these	  experiences,	  this	  is	  only	  for	  a	  brief	  period	  after	  the	  event	  (Sisco,	  Bosetti	  
&	  Weber	  2017).	  A	  recent	  survey	  of	  the	  literature	  by	  Drews	  and	  van	  den	  Bergh	  (2016,	  
p.	  865)	  shows	  that	  evidence	  linking	  increased	  concern	  about	  climate	  change	  to	  direct	  
experiences	  with	  extreme	  weather	  events	  is	  ‘anything	  but	  conclusive’	  (Drews	  and	  
van	  den	  Bergh	  2016,	  p.	  865).	  While	  it	  seems	  counterintuitive	  that	  people	  suffering	  
the	  consequences	  of	  extreme	  weather	  events	  fail	  to	  engage	  more	  actively	  with	  the	  
issue	  of	  climate	  change,	  which	  scientific	  investigations	  increasingly	  cite	  as	  a	  
contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  increased	  frequency	  and	  severity	  of	  such	  events,	  the	  
general	  and	  widespread	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  issue	  becomes	  even	  more	  perplexing	  
if	  one	  considers	  the	  current	  state	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  about	  the	  causes,	  current	  
trajectory,	  and	  likely	  outcomes	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  and	  the	  
widespread	  availability	  of	  this	  knowledge	  to	  the	  public	  (Spence,	  Poortinga	  &	  Pidgeon	  
2012).	  
The	  apparent	  incongruity	  between	  the	  knowledge	  available	  about	  global	  warming	  
and	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  and	  response	  to	  this	  knowledge	  has	  prompted	  an	  increasing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  The	  IPCC	  (2007,	  p.	  875)	  defines	  an	  ‘extreme	  weather	  event’	  as	  “An	  event	  that	  is	  rare	  within	  its	  statistical	  reference	  distribution	  at	  a	  particular	  place.	  Definitions	  of	  ‘rare’	  vary,	  but	  an	  extreme	  weather	  event	  would	  normally	  be	  as	  rare	  as	  or	  rarer	  than	  the	  10th	  or	  90th	  percentile.	  By	  definition,	  the	  characteristics	  of	  what	  is	  called	  ‘extreme	  weather’	  may	  vary	  from	  place	  to	  place.	  Extreme	  weather	  events	  may	  typically	  include	  floods	  and	  droughts.”	  Scientists	  have	  been	  warning	  for	  many	  years	  that	  what	  mainstream	  media	  report	  as	  ‘extreme	  weather	  events’	  is	  becoming	  the	  ‘new	  normal’	  (Harvey	  2011;	  IPCC	  2012;	  Hedegaard	  2012).	  Defining	  the	  ‘new	  normal’	  “as	  the	  point	  in	  time	  when	  at	  least	  half	  the	  following	  twenty	  years	  are	  warmer	  than	  2015’s	  record	  breaking	  global	  temperatures,”	  Lewis	  (2016)	  describes	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  research	  team	  she	  worked	  with	  as	  ‘straightforward’:	  in	  Australia,	  which	  is	  ‘the	  canary	  in	  the	  coal	  mine,’	  “2015’s	  record-­‐breaking	  temperatures	  will	  be	  the	  new	  normal	  between	  2020	  and	  2030	  according	  to	  most	  of	  the	  climate	  models	  we	  analysed.”	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number	  of	  investigations	  trying	  to	  identify	  possible	  barriers	  at	  play	  	  (for	  example,	  
Adams	  2014,	  2017;	  Blühdorn	  2017;	  Hausknost	  2017;	  Leahy,	  Bowden	  &	  Threadgold	  
2010;	  McAdam	  2017;	  McCright	  et	  al.	  2016;	  Weber	  2010;	  Whitmarsh	  2008).	  Not	  
surprisingly,	  many	  of	  these	  investigations	  focus	  on	  individuals’	  psychological	  
dispositions,	  and	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  some	  of	  the	  main	  findings	  in	  the	  discipline	  area	  
of	  psychology	  helps	  to	  clarify	  why	  the	  climate	  change	  crisis	  —	  a	  crisis	  caused	  by	  
economic,	  political	  and	  social	  systems	  and	  practices	  that	  can	  be	  changed	  to	  address	  
it	  —	  is	  being	  largely	  ignored.	  
Why	  individuals	  fail	  to	  respond	  to	  climate	  change:	  A	  brief	  
detour	  through	  the	  discipline	  of	  psychology	  
The	  website	  Climate	  State	  (2017)	  hosts	  a	  short	  youtube	  clip	  from	  Cosmos:	  A	  
Spacetime	  Odyssey,	  a	  2014	  documentary	  in	  which	  US	  astrophysicist,	  author	  and	  
popular	  science	  communicator,	  Neil	  deGrasse	  Tyson,	  makes	  	  ‘visible’	  the	  CO2	  
emissions	  resulting	  from	  everyday	  activities.	  Tyson	  does	  this	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  such	  
visualisation	  will	  help	  people	  better	  understand	  how	  current	  human	  activities	  cause	  
global	  warming;	  as	  Jones,	  Hine	  &	  Marks	  (2017,	  p.	  332)	  point	  out,	  “incremental	  rises	  
in	  CO2	  –	  an	  invisible,	  intangible	  gas	  –	  are	  hard	  for	  many	  people	  to	  comprehend.”	  
There	  are	  several	  other	  challenging	  features	  of	  the	  current	  climate	  change	  crisis	  that	  
present	  additional	  barriers	  to	  peoples’	  understanding	  of	  its	  severity,	  and	  hence	  that	  
also	  present	  obstacles	  to	  their	  willingness	  to	  take	  action	  to	  address	  it.	  These	  features	  
include	  that	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  time	  lag	  between	  the	  emission	  of	  GHGs	  and	  when	  
their	  effects	  become	  more	  explicitly	  evident.	  There	  are	  also	  uncertainties	  about	  
exactly	  what	  the	  effects	  of	  accumulating	  GHGs	  are	  now	  and	  what	  they	  will	  be	  in	  
future,	  and	  precisely	  how	  and	  where	  they	  will	  affect	  climate	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  
biosphere	  (Rogelj	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Schleussner	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  a	  
mismatch	  between	  the	  minority	  of	  the	  people	  most	  responsible	  for	  causing	  the	  
problem	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  who	  have	  to	  suffer	  the	  consequences,	  both	  
now	  and	  in	  the	  future	  –	  discrepancies	  that	  are	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  former	  having	  
resources	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  while	  the	  latter	  do	  not	  (Rogelj	  et	  
al.	  2015).	  These	  features	  of	  global	  warming	  elicit	  responses	  from	  individuals	  that	  are	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encapsulated	  in	  the	  concept	  ‘psychological	  distance’	  (Jones,	  Hine	  &	  Marks	  2017;	  
Spence,	  Poortinga	  &	  Pidgeon	  2012).	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  climate	  change,	  ‘psychological	  distance’	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
many	  people	  living	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  societies	  perceive	  it	  as	  “…a	  set	  of	  
uncertain	  events	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  occur	  far	  in	  the	  future,	  affecting	  distant	  places	  
and	  people	  dissimilar	  to	  themselves”	  (Jones,	  Hine	  &	  Marks	  2017,	  p.	  340).	  Another	  
feature	  of	  this	  psychological	  distance	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  people	  “clearly	  distinguish	  
between	  personal	  and	  societal	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change,	  with	  several	  studies	  
finding	  that	  personal	  risks	  of	  climate	  change	  are	  judged	  to	  be	  lower	  than	  societal	  
risks”	  (Spence,	  Poortinga	  and	  Pidgeon	  2012,	  p.	  959).	  One	  such	  study,	  conducted	  by	  
Leahy,	  Bowden	  and	  Threadgold	  (2010,	  p.	  857),	  found	  that	  people	  they	  interviewed	  
engaged	  in	  what	  the	  researchers	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘two-­‐track	  thinking’	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
issues	  such	  as	  climate	  change:	  
…there is one track in which the critical nature of environmental 
problems is acknowledged, within which people see the future as 
apocalyptic, and another in which people envisage their own 
personal future and make decisions about political action, [a line of 
thinking where] ‘business as usual’ reigns and there is no 
acknowledgement of the environmental crisis. 
These	  studies,	  and	  similar	  investigations	  of	  cognitive	  barriers	  to	  climate	  action,	  are	  
motivated	  by	  attempts	  to	  frame	  communications	  about	  climate	  change	  in	  ways	  that	  
will	  prompt	  individuals	  to	  change	  their	  behaviour	  so	  that	  it	  is	  ‘sustainable’	  (Spence,	  
Poortinga,	  Pidgeon	  2012)	  or,	  more	  generally,	  to	  encourage	  individuals	  ‘to	  engage	  in	  
behaviors	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change’	  (Jones,	  Hine	  &	  Marks	  2017,	  p.	  339).	  People	  
are,	  however,	  embedded	  within	  larger	  social	  and	  institutional	  contexts	  that	  both	  
shape	  the	  individualistic	  modes	  of	  thinking	  that	  result	  in	  ‘psychological	  distancing’	  
and	  simultaneously	  limit	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  any	  individual’s	  attempts	  to	  achieve	  a	  
more	  sustainable	  lifestyle,	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  these	  contexts	  is	  crucial	  if	  one	  is	  
to	  identify	  the	  underlying	  sources	  of	  the	  problem	  that	  must	  be	  addressed	  instead	  of	  
seeking	  solutions	  that	  are	  limited	  to	  attempting	  to	  change	  the	  way	  individual	  people	  
think	  and	  behave.	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Limiting	  the	  rise	  in	  average	  global	  temperatures	  to	  1.5°C,	  or	  even	  to	  what	  some	  
scientists	  see	  as	  a	  very	  dangerous	  2°C,	  will	  at	  the	  very	  least	  require	  rapid	  large-­‐scale	  
and	  comprehensive	  transformations	  of	  the	  global	  energy	  system	  as	  well	  as	  of	  energy	  
use	  related	  to	  the	  transportation,	  production	  and	  construction	  sectors	  (Rogelj	  et	  al.	  
2015).	  It	  will	  also	  involve	  implementing	  policies	  to	  facilitate	  the	  large-­‐scale	  removal	  
of	  CO2	  from	  the	  atmosphere	  (ibid.).145	  These	  are	  not	  things	  that	  individuals	  have	  
either	  the	  resources	  or	  the	  authority	  to	  do,	  no	  matter	  how	  committed	  they	  are	  to	  
living	  sustainably.146	  Yet,	  as	  journalist	  Martin	  Lukacs	  (2017)	  notes	  in	  his	  aptly-­‐titled	  
article,	  Neoliberalism	  has	  conned	  us	  into	  fighting	  climate	  change	  as	  individuals,	  
“corporate	  ads,	  school	  textbooks,	  and	  the	  campaigns	  of	  mainstream	  environmental	  
groups,	  especially	  in	  the	  west”	  exhort	  individuals	  to	  change	  their	  light-­‐bulbs,	  buy	  
‘eco-­‐appliances’	  and	  install	  solar	  panels	  while	  the	  GHG	  emissions	  and	  widespread	  
environmental	  damage	  caused	  by	  the	  normal	  operations	  of	  global	  capitalism	  render	  
these	  individual	  efforts	  irrelevant.	  
While	  individuals	  cannot	  address	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  global	  warming	  crisis	  by	  changing	  
their	  personal	  behaviour	  given	  that	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  changes	  far	  surpasses	  what	  can	  
be	  achieved	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  what	  they	  can	  do	  is	  work	  collectively	  with	  others	  
in	  order	  to	  change	  the	  economic,	  political,	  and	  social	  systems	  and	  institutions	  that	  
are	  responsible	  for	  the	  current	  interrelated	  environmental,	  economic,	  political	  and	  
social	  crises.	  It	  is	  therefore	  the	  barriers	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  action	  that	  are	  important	  to	  
identify	  and	  counter.	  The	  balance	  of	  prevailing	  social	  forces	  (particularly	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  strength	  and	  influence	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  
organised	  labour	  and	  civil	  society),	  the	  dogged	  determination	  to	  further	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  While	  Rogelj	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  emphasise	  large-­‐scale	  technological	  innovations	  for	  removing	  CO2	  from	  the	  atmosphere,	  more	  environmentally	  safe	  and	  socially	  just	  and	  benign	  solutions	  are	  supported	  in	  this	  thesis,	  as	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  146	  Discussing	  the	  way	  in	  which	  ‘city	  people’	  have	  no	  understanding	  of	  what	  life	  is	  like	  for	  poor	  people	  living	  in	  rural	  areas	  in	  the	  US,	  one	  of	  Cramer’s	  (2017)	  interviewees	  gives	  an	  example	  of	  how	  exhortations	  by	  rich	  liberal	  critics	  not	  to	  ‘drive	  as	  much’	  are	  meaningless:	  “You	  gotta	  drive	  20	  miles	  to	  work?	  You	  can’t	  cut	  that	  in	  half.”	  This	  is	  just	  one	  example	  of	  how	  realistic	  solutions	  for	  reducing	  CO2	  emissions	  involve	  large,	  systemic	  changes	  that	  transcend	  individual	  values	  and	  choices:	  in	  this	  case,	  people	  either	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  a	  living	  or	  sustain	  themselves	  close	  to	  the	  places	  where	  they	  live,	  or	  they	  must	  have	  access	  to	  affordable	  and	  effective	  public	  transport	  systems	  to	  commute	  to	  work.	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neoliberalising	  project	  of	  extending	  and	  intensifying	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  
by	  existing	  global	  and	  national	  institutions	  and	  governance	  structures,	  and	  the	  
dominance	  of	  social	  facts	  that	  favour	  individualistic,	  capitalist	  economic	  values	  all	  
present	  formidable	  barriers	  in	  this	  respect,	  and	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
Social	  forces	  and	  prevailing	  social	  facts	  informing	  individual	  
responses	  to	  climate	  change	  
Taking	  a	  wider	  view	  than	  the	  studies	  discussed	  above,	  Blühdorn	  (2017)	  proposes	  
that	  because	  people	  living	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  are	  reluctant	  to	  give	  
up	  their	  consumer	  lifestyles,	  a	  new	  de	  facto	  ‘social	  contract	  for	  sustaining	  the	  
unsustainable’	  is	  emerging	  in	  order	  to	  ‘adapt’	  and	  develop	  ‘resilience’.	  Disturbingly,	  
Blühdorn	  (2017,	  p.	  57)	  contends	  that	  an	  important	  component	  of	  this	  resilience	  is	  
“the	  development	  of	  coping	  strategies	  for	  ever	  increasing	  levels	  of	  social	  inequality,	  
injustice	  and	  exclusion”	  that	  are	  the	  inevitable	  outcome	  of	  the	  choices	  of	  the	  
relatively	  affluent.	  Hausknost	  (2017,	  p.	  64)	  goes	  even	  further	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  
social	  contract	  that	  Blühdorn	  (2017)	  refers	  to	  as	  newly	  emergent	  has	  been	  evident	  
since	  the	  1950s:	  
The priority of the mainstream consumer-citizen since the 1950s has 
always been (I claim) to maximise their material standard of living 
and to trust in the state to deal with the ensuing environmental 
problems in terms of technological and regulatory solutions. The 
‘limits to growth’ challenge remained unresolved both in 1972 and 
in 2016. 
Hausknost’s	  (2017,	  p.	  65)	  conclusion	  is	  apocalyptic:	  
The bleak prospect implied here is that public support for radical 
change will emerge only once the global problems turn into painful 
local ones that severely affect the quality of life in affluent societies. 
Needless to say that at that point it will be too late to solve them. 
Leahy,	  Bowden	  and	  Threadgold	  (2010,	  p.	  865)	  also	  maintain	  that	  while	  social	  
collapse	  is	  ‘not	  inevitable’,	  on	  current	  trajectories	  it	  is	  ‘the	  most	  likely	  outcome’	  
[emphasis	  in	  original].	  Writing	  along	  similar	  lines,	  Adelman	  (2015,	  p.	  208)	  observes	  
that:	  
The rule of markets has trumped the rule of law, growth and 
fetishism has trumped environmental protection, and profit has 
trumped the human rights of peoples. As a consequence, three 
planetary environmental boundaries have been transgressed – 
biodiversity loss, climate change, and the nitrogen cycle – and a 
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further six are under threat (Rockström et al., 2009). The triumph of 
neoliberalism and green governmentality are Pyrrhic victories. 
Like	  Blühdorn	  (2017),	  Hausknost	  (2017)	  and	  Leahy,	  Bowden	  and	  Threadgold	  (2010),	  
Adelman’s	  (2015,	  p.	  208)	  final	  prognosis	  is	  also	  pessimistic:	  
The fact that we persistently refuse to do what is required, feasible 
and achievable to save ourselves, our fellow species and our 
descendants – decarbonising the global political-economy – raises 
the disturbing prospect that human beings are, uniquely, a species 
too stupid to survive. 
While	  such	  pessimistic	  conclusions	  are	  common,	  and	  while	  they	  may	  also	  be	  realistic	  
and	  logical	  (at	  least	  as	  things	  stand	  at	  the	  moment),	  it	  is	  both	  practically	  and	  morally	  
untenable	  to	  allow	  such	  thinking	  to	  destabilise	  efforts	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  changes	  
that	  the	  science	  dictates	  if	  the	  average	  global	  temperature	  increase	  is	  to	  be	  limited	  
to	  1.5°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels.147	  While	  an	  additional	  0.5°C	  rise	  in	  average	  
global	  temperatures	  does	  not	  sound	  like	  much,	  emergent	  research	  indicates	  that	  
outcomes	  for	  the	  two	  scenarios	  will	  be	  profoundly	  different.	  Some	  examples	  of	  the	  
differences	  in	  likely	  outcomes	  include:	  
For heat-related extremes, the additional 0.5°C increase in global-
mean temperature marks the difference between events at the upper 
limit of present-day natural variability and a new climate regime, 
particularly in tropical regions [emphasis added]. Similarly, this 
warming difference is likely to be decisive for the future of tropical 
coral reefs…. Best estimate sea-level rise projections… indicate a 
50 cm rise by 2100 relative to year 2000-levels for a 2°C scenario, 
and about 10 cm lower levels for a 1.5°C scenario. In a 1.5°C 
scenario, the rate of sea-level rise in 2100 would be reduced by 
about 30% compared to a 2°C scenario. 
(Schleussner, C-F et al., 2016, p. 327) 
In	  addition,	  and	  as	  the	  graph	  below	  shows,	  the	  warming	  effects	  of	  the	  increasing	  
concentration	  of	  GHG	  emissions	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  are	  already	  evident;	  contrary	  to	  
popular	  beliefs,	  they	  are	  not	  located	  in	  some	  distant	  future.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Failing	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  is	  morally	  inexcusable	  because,	  as	  discussed	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  this	  thesis:	  disadvantaged	  people	  are	  already	  suffering	  the	  worst	  effects	  of	  the	  unfolding	  multiplicity	  of	  crises;	  we	  are	  currently	  witnessing	  the	  sixth	  mass	  extinction	  as	  a	  result	  of	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  climate	  change;	  and	  the	  longer	  we	  take	  to	  make	  the	  necessary	  changes,	  the	  more	  the	  dangers	  of	  destabilising	  the	  Earth	  System	  increase	  so	  that	  we	  may	  reach	  a	  point	  (if	  we	  have	  not	  reached	  this	  already)	  when	  it	  becomes	  too	  late	  to	  do	  anything,	  thus	  dooming	  future	  generations	  to	  an	  even	  more	  uncertain	  and	  challenging	  future	  than	  they	  already	  face.	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Source:	  Joshi	  (2017)	  
The	  graph	  showing	  possible	  futures	  for	  different	  generations	  was	  developed	  by	  
Australian	  biology	  professor	  and	  climate	  change	  researcher	  Lesley	  Hughes,	  and	  it	  
shows	  not	  only	  that	  average	  global	  temperatures	  are	  already	  increasing	  but	  also	  the	  
possible	  future	  warming	  trajectories	  that	  today’s	  young	  people	  and	  their	  children	  
will	  have	  to	  deal	  with.	  Which	  of	  these	  possible	  scenarios	  current	  and	  future	  	  
generations	  will	  face	  depends	  on	  what	  actions	  are	  taken	  (or	  not	  taken)	  now	  (Joshi	  
2017;	  Rogelj	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Schleussner	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  Climate	  movement	  activists	  and	  
many	  academics	  working	  within	  the	  social	  sciences	  who	  are	  concerned	  about	  the	  
consequences	  of	  global	  warming	  are	  therefore	  focusing	  their	  attention	  on	  trying	  to	  
identify	  and	  address	  the	  barriers	  to	  a	  more	  active	  civil	  society	  engagement	  with	  the	  
issue.	  	  
Research	  suggests	  that	  personal	  psychological	  dispositions	  such	  as	  those	  identified	  
previously	  are	  often	  constructed	  and/or	  compounded	  by	  successful	  climate	  change	  
denialist	  strategies	  designed	  to	  delay	  the	  adoption	  of	  measures	  that	  will	  adversely	  
affect	  their	  industries	  (McCright	  et	  al.	  2016;	  Stoutenborough	  et	  al.’s	  2014	  study	  cited	  
in	  Drews	  &	  van	  den	  Bergh	  2016).	  Climate	  change	  denialist	  narratives	  work	  together	  
Figure	  11:	  Graph	  showing	  possible	  futures	  for	  different	  generations	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with	  conservative	  political	  beliefs	  and	  the	  hegemonic	  and	  politically	  charged	  
neoliberalising	  discourse	  that	  regulating	  capital	  will	  impact	  negatively	  on	  ‘economic	  
growth’	  and	  hence	  on	  jobs	  (Corner	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Heath	  &	  Gifford	  2006;	  Hornsey	  et	  al.	  
2016).148	  Widespread	  economic	  insecurities	  among	  working	  people	  in	  the	  advanced	  
capitalist	  economies	  since	  the	  1980s,	  which	  have	  become	  even	  more	  pronounced	  in	  
the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  2008	  GFC,	  and	  the	  related	  (and	  very	  understandable)	  general	  
tendency	  of	  people	  living	  in	  precarious	  circumstances	  to	  prioritise	  immediate	  
concerns	  such	  as	  jobs,	  housing,	  and	  career	  prospects	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  future	  
possible	  catastrophes	  (Corner	  et	  al.,	  2015),	  make	  them	  susceptible	  to	  arguments	  
that	  dealing	  with	  climate	  change	  will	  damage	  the	  economy	  and	  make	  it	  more	  
difficult	  to	  find	  work.	  However,	  even	  people	  who	  claim	  to	  be	  both	  very	  
knowledgeable	  and	  very	  concerned	  about	  climate	  change	  often	  fail	  to	  take	  action	  to	  
try	  to	  influence	  public	  policy,	  and	  Doherty	  and	  Webler	  (2016)	  identify	  several	  
possible	  reasons	  for	  this,	  including	  that	  many	  people	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  their	  
actions	  can	  make	  a	  difference	  and	  that	  ‘similar	  others’	  (their	  peers)	  are	  not	  taking	  
action	  either.	  
Perceived	  self-­‐efficacy	  is	  a	  particularly	  important	  determinant	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  
young	  people	  engage	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change:	  “Feelings	  of	  powerlessness	  in	  
the	  face	  of	  global	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  sense	  that	  personal	  actions	  would	  not	  
make	  a	  difference	  have	  been	  reported	  in	  several	  youth	  studies”	  (Corner	  et	  al.	  2015,	  
p.	  527).	  In	  addition,	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population,	  young	  people	  living	  in	  advanced	  
capitalist	  economies	  also	  prioritise	  more	  immediate	  issues	  such	  as	  finding	  work	  and	  
establishing	  careers	  (Corner	  et	  al.	  2015).	  Moreover,	  while	  they	  do	  not	  trust	  
politicians	  and	  are	  generally	  dissatisfied	  with	  formal	  political	  processes,	  “young	  
people	  tend	  to	  see	  governments	  as	  having	  the	  greatest	  responsibility	  for	  catalysing	  a	  
response	  to	  climate	  change”	  (Corner	  et	  al.	  2015,	  p.	  530).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  Hoffarth	  &	  Hodson	  (2016)	  find	  that	  conservatives’	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  about	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  US	  are	  frequently	  less	  motivated	  by	  economic	  concerns	  than	  by	  a	  more	  general	  antagonism	  to	  environmentalists,	  who	  are	  perceived	  as	  ‘green	  on	  the	  outside,	  red	  on	  the	  inside.’	  In	  their	  meta-­‐analyses	  of	  studies	  examining	  determinants	  of	  belief	  in	  climate	  change,	  Hornsey	  et	  al.	  (2016,	  p.	  622)	  find	  that	  while	  there	  are	  links	  between	  political	  ideology	  and	  climate	  change	  beliefs,	  these	  beliefs	  are	  “more	  aligned	  to	  specific	  identification	  with	  political	  parties	  than	  to	  underlying	  political	  ideologies.”	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Despite	  the	  general	  lack	  of	  active	  public	  engagement	  in	  formal	  political	  processes,	  
there	  are	  nevertheless	  some	  people	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  who	  are	  
not	  only	  concerned	  about	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  official	  responses	  to	  climate	  change	  
and	  the	  many	  other	  current	  crises	  but	  also	  try	  to	  engage	  with	  these	  issues	  in	  a	  
variety	  of	  ways,	  including	  by	  participating	  in	  the	  heterogeneous	  climate	  movement	  
that	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  I	  precede	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  
with	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement,	  elements	  of	  which	  started	  paying	  
attention	  to	  global	  warming	  from	  the	  early	  days	  of	  its	  emergence	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  
global	  concern.	  I	  then	  discuss	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  official	  
institutional	  responses	  to	  the	  climate	  change	  crisis	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  overtly	  
political	  disagreements	  within	  the	  climate	  movement,	  which	  has	  grown	  in	  both	  
numbers	  and	  complexity	  over	  the	  more	  than	  two	  decades	  of	  failed	  official	  climate	  
change	  negotiations.	  Ecosocialist	  contributions	  to	  the	  social	  dynamics	  and	  
contending	  ideas	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  are	  extensive	  and,	  while	  referred	  to	  
briefly	  at	  various	  points	  in	  this	  chapter,	  are	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  7	  and	  8.	  
A	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  analysis	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  modern	  
environmental	  movement	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  
economies	  
The	  modern	  environmental	  movement	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  dates	  
back	  to	  at	  least	  the	  1960s,	  with	  its	  origins	  attributed	  to	  a	  growing	  public	  awareness	  
of	  issues	  that	  extended	  beyond	  the	  dominant	  concerns	  of	  the	  earliest	  (pre-­‐World	  
War	  II)	  ‘nature	  preservationist’	  and	  ‘nature	  conservationist’	  environmental	  thinkers	  
and	  organisations	  (Callaghan	  1990;	  Cohen	  et	  al.	  1998;	  Elliott	  2004;	  Hutton	  &	  Connors	  
1999;	  Johnson	  &	  Frickel	  2011;	  Sale	  1993;	  Sessions	  1987).149	  	  Many	  analysts	  refer	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  Refer	  to	  Sale	  (1993)	  for	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  to	  Hutton	  and	  Connors	  (1999)	  for	  a	  history	  of	  the	  Australian	  environmental	  movement.	  Johnson	  and	  Frickel	  (2011)	  provide	  an	  interesting	  empirical	  analysis	  whose	  results	  present	  a	  more	  nuanced	  relationship	  between	  the	  establishment	  and	  activity	  of	  environmental	  organisations	  focused	  on	  nature	  conservation	  issues	  and	  those	  focused	  on	  ecological	  issues	  in	  the	  US	  between	  1962	  and	  1998.	  Their	  study	  confirms	  their	  hypothesis	  that	  conservation	  NGOs	  were	  established	  when	  public	  perceptions	  focused	  on	  threats	  to	  the	  environment	  while	  ecological	  organisations	  developed	  when	  threats	  to	  human	  health	  were	  salient	  in	  public	  perceptions.	  Dreiling,	  Lougee	  and	  Nakamura	  (2017)	  describe	  some	  of	  the	  features	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement	  in	  Japan,	  and	  their	  case	  study	  demonstrates	  the	  constraints	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the	  1962	  publication	  of	  Rachel	  Carson’s	  Silent	  Spring,	  which	  provided	  scientific	  
evidence	  of	  the	  damaging	  effects	  of	  pesticides	  on	  both	  natural	  ecosystems	  and	  
human	  health,	  as	  marking	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  new	  environmental	  movement	  (for	  
example,	  refer	  to	  Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999,	  Sale	  1993,	  and	  Sessions	  1987).	  
While	  Carson’s	  book	  may	  have	  been	  used	  by	  environmental	  movement	  actors	  to	  
promote	  their	  cause,	  Meyer	  and	  Rohlinger	  (2012)	  caution	  against	  such	  
oversimplified	  ‘big	  book	  myths,’	  which	  they	  describe	  as	  one	  version	  of	  ‘immaculate	  
conception’	  stories	  used	  by	  both	  social	  movement	  actors	  and	  academics	  studying	  
them	  to	  explain	  the	  origins	  of	  social	  movements.	  Not	  only	  are	  such	  mythical	  
accounts	  historically	  inaccurate,	  they	  are	  also	  counterproductive	  in	  that	  they	  ignore	  
the	  wider	  context	  within	  which	  social	  movements	  arise,	  flourish	  and	  succeed	  (or	  
fail).150	  Moreover,	  these	  simplified	  accounts	  promote	  the	  false	  perception	  that	  the	  
power	  of	  ideas	  arising	  from	  within	  civil	  society	  alone	  can	  effect	  social	  change,	  editing	  
out	  crucial	  facts	  such	  as	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  required	  to	  build	  effective	  social	  
movements	  and	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  role	  of	  prevailing	  material	  conditions	  and	  
ideologies	  in	  shaping	  the	  emergence	  and	  evolution	  of	  these	  movements.	  In	  neo-­‐
Gramscian	  terms,	  simple	  stories	  with	  linear	  timelines	  and	  a	  single,	  identifiable	  
‘origin’	  fail	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  complex	  interactions	  between	  the	  prevailing	  
world	  order,	  forms	  of	  state,	  material	  capabilities,	  institutions,	  social	  facts,	  and	  the	  
social	  forces	  shaping	  the	  emergence	  and	  evolution	  of	  social	  movements.	  Analysed	  in	  
these	  latter	  terms,	  the	  modern	  environmental	  movement	  emerged	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
‘American	  Empire’	  (Robertson	  2008),	  when	  US	  policymakers	  increasingly	  began	  to	  
link	  the	  global	  management	  of	  natural	  resources	  with	  issues	  of	  what	  they	  defined	  as	  
‘US	  national	  security.’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  that	  environmental	  organisations	  operate	  in	  when	  they	  collaborate	  with	  government	  and	  business	  institutions.	  	  150	  The	  historical	  inaccuracy	  of	  claiming	  Carson’s	  Silent	  Spring	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  modern	  environmental	  movement	  is	  clear	  when	  one	  considers	  that	  geologist	  Fairfield	  Osborn’s	  Our	  Plundered	  Planet	  and	  ornithologist	  William	  Vogt’s	  Road	  to	  Survival,	  both	  bestsellers	  published	  in	  1948	  and	  both	  promoting	  Malthusian	  arguments	  that	  developed	  links	  between	  US	  national	  security	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  problems	  caused	  by	  environmental	  degradation,	  put	  a	  ‘spotlight’	  on	  ecology	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  before	  the	  publication	  of	  Carson’s	  book	  (Robertson	  2008).	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The	  modern	  environmental	  movement	  also	  developed	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  advanced	  
capitalist	  countries	  were	  organised	  as	  liberal	  welfare	  states	  and	  the	  prevailing	  
ideology	  (that	  constituted	  the	  ‘social	  facts’)	  was	  that	  governments	  had	  some	  
responsibility	  for	  protecting	  ‘public	  goods’	  (Meyer	  and	  Rohlinger	  2012).	  Whatever	  
‘wins’	  the	  environmental	  movement	  may	  have	  achieved	  in	  pushing	  government	  
institutions	  to	  legislate	  for	  environmental	  protection	  should	  therefore	  be	  
understood	  in	  the	  context	  that	  national	  governments	  were	  not	  as	  ideologically	  
opposed	  to	  introducing	  such	  legislation	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  as	  they	  are	  
today	  (Kraft	  2000):	  as	  Meyer	  and	  Rohlinger	  (2012,	  p.	  148)	  emphasise,	  while	  “activist	  
government	  was	  a	  critical	  factor	  in	  spurring	  social	  mobilization	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  
movements	  of	  the	  1960s”	  [emphasis	  in	  original],	  support	  for	  limited	  government	  
intervention	  in	  ‘public	  affairs’	  has	  grown	  ‘tremendously’	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
1970s.	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  persuade	  governments	  to	  regulate	  for	  
environmental	  protection	  in	  the	  current	  era	  of	  neoliberalising	  global	  capitalism.	  In	  
the	  following	  discussion,	  elements	  of	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  conceptual	  schema	  are	  
systemically	  deployed	  to	  analyse	  the	  development	  of	  the	  modern	  environmental	  
movement.	  
American	  hegemony,	  welfare-­‐statism	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  
modern	  environmental	  movement	  in	  the	  1960s	  
In	  their	  critique	  of	  ‘big	  book	  myth’	  accounts	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  environmentalism	  and	  
other	  social	  movements	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  1960s,	  Meyer	  and	  Rohlinger	  
(2012)	  highlight	  evidence	  that	  the	  US	  federal	  government	  had	  started	  addressing	  
some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  the	  new	  social	  movements	  were	  concerned	  about	  even	  prior	  
to	  the	  movements’	  emergence	  (see	  also	  Kraft	  2000).	  For	  example,	  Meyer	  and	  
Rohlinger	  point	  out	  that	  the	  US	  government	  had	  commenced	  Congressional	  hearings	  
about	  the	  pollution	  caused	  by	  pesticides	  in	  the	  1950s.	  Rather	  than	  sparking	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement,	  they	  argue	  that	  Silent	  Spring	  ‘articulated	  
and	  amplified	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  concern,’	  and	  that	  the	  federal	  government’s	  
environmental	  protection	  measures,	  having	  begun	  prior	  to	  the	  book’s	  publication,	  
continued	  after	  it	  was	  published,	  “but	  not	  directly	  in	  response	  to	  Carson’s	  text”	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(Meyer	  &	  Rohlinger	  2012,	  p.	  143;	  see	  also	  Kraft	  2000	  and	  Podhora	  2015).151	  While	  
Meyer	  and	  Rohlinger	  do	  not	  discuss	  why	  the	  US	  government	  was	  so	  concerned	  
about	  environmental	  issues	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  Robertson	  (2008)	  focuses	  on	  
this	  question,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  how	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  ‘American	  Empire’	  (Pax	  
Americana,	  in	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  Robert	  Cox’s	  terms)	  shaped	  the	  form	  of	  the	  US	  
environmental	  movement	  that	  emerged	  at	  this	  time.	  	  
Robertson	  (2008)	  begins	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  environmental	  
movement	  by	  referring	  to	  conditions	  leading	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  earlier	  forms	  of	  
environmentalism	  in	  the	  Global	  North.	  Citing	  studies	  that	  link	  the	  rise	  of	  this	  earlier	  
environmental	  movement	  to	  the	  colonial	  expansion	  commencing	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  
century	  (which	  culminated,	  in	  Cox’s	  analysis,	  with	  Pax	  Brittanica),	  Robertson	  
recounts	  arguments	  that	  environmentalism	  constituted	  a	  form	  of	  ‘green	  imperialism’	  
during	  this	  period.	  Two	  key	  points	  emerging	  from	  these	  analyses	  of	  ‘green	  
imperialism’	  are	  that	  “economic	  and	  political	  dominance	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  required	  a	  
degree	  of	  planning	  that	  helped	  promote	  conservationism”	  and	  that	  “European	  
conservation	  actually	  emerged	  from	  the	  [natural	  resource]	  management	  
requirements	  of	  colonial	  empires”	  (Robertson	  2008,	  p.	  563,	  emphasis	  added;	  see	  
also	  Dalby	  2004).	  The	  importance	  of	  developing	  such	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  
environmentalism	  is	  that	  it	  focuses	  attention	  on	  how	  environmental	  concerns	  “often	  
emerge	  from	  and	  reinforce	  hierarchies	  of	  power”	  and,	  relatedly,	  that	  while	  
environmental	  concerns	  can	  serve	  as	  issues	  around	  which	  to	  mobilises	  anti-­‐
imperialist	  forces,	  they	  can	  also	  be	  used	  “as	  a	  handmaiden	  to	  empire,	  providing	  
imperial	  officials	  with	  another	  way	  to	  regulate	  and	  control	  far-­‐off	  lands	  and	  peoples”	  
(Robertson	  2008,	  pp.	  563	  -­‐	  564).152	  Following	  the	  logic	  of	  these	  earlier	  accounts	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  conservationism	  and	  European	  colonialism,	  Robertson	  
(2008,	  p.	  564)	  develops	  an	  argument	  that	  growing	  US	  global	  power	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Podhora	  (2015,	  p.	  26)	  notes	  that	  “efforts	  to	  address	  pollution	  had	  been	  afoot	  for	  more	  than	  two	  decades	  in	  1969”;	  however,	  he	  nevertheless	  credits	  the	  environmental	  movement	  with	  providing	  “the	  political	  conditions	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  meaningful	  legal	  protections.”	  152	  In	  the	  context	  of	  climate	  change	  negotiations,	  global	  South	  fears	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  global	  warming	  is	  being	  used	  as	  an	  excuse	  by	  powerful	  global	  North	  governments	  to	  control	  their	  resources	  and	  to	  prevent	  their	  economic	  development	  has	  caused	  much	  distrust	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  (Gupta	  2010).	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years	  similarly	  “…created	  new	  imperatives	  to	  manage	  resources,	  new	  sciences	  with	  
which	  to	  do	  so,	  new	  forms	  of	  environmental	  crises,	  new	  anti-­‐modern	  doubts,	  and	  
ultimately	  new	  policy	  frameworks,”	  and	  that	  these	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  
explanations	  of	  why	  the	  modern	  environmental	  movement	  ‘exploded’	  on	  the	  scene	  
when	  it	  did,	  and	  why	  it	  took	  the	  forms	  it	  took.	  	  
While	  the	  US	  government	  tried	  to	  secure	  resources	  for	  its	  ‘global-­‐spanning	  military’	  
by	  “researching	  and	  planning	  natural	  resources	  on	  a	  new	  global	  scale	  and	  with	  new	  
urgency”	  during	  and	  after	  WWII,	  ideas	  that	  would	  later	  be	  further	  developed	  within	  
the	  environmental	  movement	  of	  the	  1960s	  were	  disseminated	  and	  popularised	  from	  
as	  early	  as	  the	  1940s	  by	  public	  intellectuals	  such	  as	  the	  bestselling	  author	  Fairfield	  
Osborn,	  the	  entertainer	  Walt	  Disney,	  and	  the	  celebrity	  Charles	  Lindbergh	  (Robertson	  
2008,	  pp.	  564	  -­‐	  567).153	  Government-­‐commissioned	  reports	  such	  as	  Resources	  for	  
Freedom	  (1952),	  as	  well	  as	  NGOs	  such	  as	  Resources	  for	  the	  Future	  (privately	  funded	  
by	  the	  Ford	  Foundation	  and	  acting	  as	  a	  ‘clearinghouse’	  of	  environmental	  
information)	  further	  “helped	  to	  lay	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  environmental	  
movement”	  by	  raising	  awareness	  of	  the	  need	  to	  manage	  resource	  scarcities.	  
Robertson	  (2008,	  p.	  576)	  argues	  that	  US	  government-­‐sponsored	  research,	  concerned	  
primarily	  with	  ‘national	  security’	  issues	  after	  WWII,	  contributed	  in	  many	  ways	  (which	  
are	  not	  always	  acknowledged	  within	  histories	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement)	  to	  
the	  ideas	  of	  interconnection	  that	  characterised	  the	  ecological	  thinking	  of	  the	  time,	  
such	  as	  “…the	  idea	  that	  no	  species,	  including	  Homo	  sapiens,	  could	  live	  in	  isolation	  
from	  its	  surroundings.”154	  This	  emerging	  perspective,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  issues	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  An	  illustrative	  concrete	  example	  supporting	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  emerging	  links	  between	  access	  to	  natural	  resources	  and	  US	  national	  security	  is	  the	  “list	  of	  sixty	  strategic	  resources	  the	  United	  States	  needed,	  of	  which	  thirty	  came	  entirely	  from	  overseas”	  compiled	  by	  US	  government	  planners,	  who	  then	  “took	  measures	  to	  guarantee	  their	  supply”	  (Robertson	  2008,	  p.	  568).	  Conca	  (2004,	  p.	  14)	  notes	  that	  this	  project	  has	  succeeded,	  identifying	  the	  1980s	  debt	  crisis	  as	  having	  been	  instrumental	  in	  “lock[ing]	  in	  steady	  resource	  supplies	  at	  favourable	  prices”	  and	  the	  1990s	  ‘trade	  liberalization	  initiatives’	  as	  further	  deepening	  US	  capacity	  to	  access	  these	  resources.	  154	  One	  example	  of	  how	  government-­‐sponsored	  research	  contributed	  to	  ideas	  later	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  environmental	  movement	  was	  the	  funding	  it	  gave	  to	  ‘the	  father	  of	  modern	  ecosystem	  ecology’,	  Eugene	  Odum,	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  to	  conduct	  environmental	  studies	  at	  a	  site	  earmarked	  for	  building	  atomic	  weapons	  and	  to	  study	  the	  effects	  of	  nuclear	  fallout	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific	  where	  the	  US	  government	  had	  tested	  atomic	  weapons.	  Refer	  to	  Robertson	  (2008)	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  overview	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
	   170	  
informing	  the	  environmental	  movement’s	  development	  in	  some	  of	  the	  advanced	  
capitalist	  societies	  in	  the	  1960s,	  are	  summarised	  below.	  My	  discussion	  focuses	  
primarily	  on	  the	  rise	  and	  evolution	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	  and	  also	  refers	  to	  one	  illustrative	  example	  of	  its	  development	  in	  another	  
advanced	  capitalist	  society	  (Australia);	  while	  the	  European	  environmental	  
movements	  are	  also	  very	  important,	  because	  of	  time	  and	  space	  constraints	  they	  are	  
not	  discussed	  in	  any	  detail	  in	  this	  dissertation.155	  	  
Material	  capabilities,	  institutions,	  social	  facts,	  social	  forces,	  and	  
social	  dynamics	  shaping	  the	  developing	  environmental	  
movement	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  
In	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement’s	  development	  in	  the	  advanced	  
capitalist	  economies,	  issues	  that	  galvanised	  public	  concern	  ranged	  from	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  industrial	  pollution	  threatened	  human	  health	  at	  the	  local	  level	  to	  wider	  
existential	  threats	  to	  human	  survival	  posed	  by	  new	  technologies	  such	  as	  the	  nuclear	  
technology	  developed	  during	  and	  after	  WWII.	  In	  the	  US,	  widespread	  public	  concerns	  
about	  the	  potential	  dangers	  of	  radioactive	  fallout	  from	  nuclear	  bomb	  tests	  and	  of	  
radiation	  released	  from	  nuclear	  power	  reactors	  prompted	  the	  establishment	  of	  anti-­‐
nuclear	  NGOs	  such	  as	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  (FoE)	  in	  1969	  and	  Greenpeace	  in	  1971	  
(Elliott	  2004;	  Sale	  1993;	  Thomson	  2017).156	  While	  a	  number	  of	  high-­‐profile	  
environmental	  disasters	  in	  the	  1960s	  provoked	  public	  outcry,	  Sale	  (1993)	  points	  out	  
that	  the	  more	  immediate	  threats	  posed	  by	  pollution	  at	  local	  levels	  were	  also	  
important	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  new	  US	  environmental	  movement.157	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  US	  government	  and	  business	  agendas	  helped	  to	  shape	  environmental	  ideas	  emerging	  in	  the	  1960s.	  155	  The	  US	  environmental	  movement	  is	  important	  in	  that	  it	  influenced	  the	  development	  of	  environmentalism	  in	  other	  advanced	  capitalist	  societies	  (Falkner	  2005).	  	  156	  Refer	  to	  Thomson	  (2017)	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  FoE	  from	  a	  system-­‐critical	  environmental	  NGO	  of	  decentralized	  grassroots	  groups	  into	  a	  hierarchically	  organized	  organisation	  which	  became	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  members	  of	  the	  ‘Group	  of	  Ten’,	  the	  US	  ‘environmental	  majors’	  that	  adopted	  a	  ‘pragmatic	  approach’	  of	  seeking	  gradual	  reform	  rather	  than	  ‘system	  change.’	  157	  The	  disasters	  Sale	  (1993,	  p.	  19)	  refers	  to	  were	  the	  deaths	  of	  ‘some	  eighty	  people’	  in	  New	  York	  City	  during	  an	  ‘air	  inversion’	  (1966),	  and	  oils	  spills	  in	  the	  English	  Channel	  (1967)	  and	  along	  the	  Californian	  coastline	  (1969).	  These	  events	  followed	  another	  widely-­‐publicised	  tragedy	  in	  1964:	  “the	  deaths	  and	  incapacitation	  of	  Japanese	  [people]	  who	  had	  eaten	  mercury-­‐contaminated	  fish	  from	  the	  Agano	  River”	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	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Expanding	  industrial	  activity	  during	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  economic	  boom	  produced	  
pollution	  and	  toxic	  wastes	  threatening	  people’s	  health	  and	  prompted	  the	  creation	  of	  
a	  number	  of	  NGOs	  such	  as	  the	  Environmental	  Defense	  Fund	  (1967),	  as	  well	  as	  
smaller	  local	  grassroots	  movements	  concerned	  about	  the	  pollution	  that	  posed	  
health	  hazards	  to	  their	  communities	  (Sale	  1993).	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  growing	  US	  
environmental	  movement	  during	  this	  period	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
participants	  at	  the	  first	  Earth	  Day	  (in	  1970)	  —	  twenty	  million	  people,	  according	  to	  
Time	  estimates	  —	  and	  in	  how,	  according	  to	  some	  accounts,	  pressure	  from	  this	  
movement	  forced	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  to	  pass	  several	  laws	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  
early	  1970s	  (Sale	  1993;	  see	  also	  Cahn	  &	  Cahn	  1990	  and	  Ruckelshaus	  1985).158	  The	  
significance	  of	  Earth	  Day	  is	  interpreted	  differently	  by	  other	  analysts	  such	  as	  
Woodhouse	  (2008,	  p.	  77),	  who	  argues	  that	  this	  event	  signaled	  the	  co-­‐optation	  of	  the	  
environmental	  movement	  (or	  its	  trasformismo,	  in	  Gramscian	  terms):	  it	  now	  
“associated	  itself	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  liberal	  reform,	  as	  mainstream	  environmental	  
groups	  settled	  into	  a	  tacit	  partnership	  with	  the	  federal	  government.”	  
Australian	  environmentalism	  in	  the	  1960s	  was	  also	  motivated	  by	  concerns	  related	  to	  
the	  pollution	  caused	  by	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  expansion	  of	  capitalist	  industrial	  activity;	  
however,	  these	  early	  concerns	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  the	  effects	  on	  human	  health	  than	  
with	  the	  damage	  to	  non-­‐human	  natural	  ecosystems	  caused	  by	  the	  ‘expansion	  of	  
resource	  extraction	  industries’	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999,	  pp.	  90-­‐91).	  According	  to	  
Hutton	  and	  Connors	  (1999),	  the	  first	  major	  environmental	  campaign	  in	  Australia	  
since	  the	  1930s	  was	  the	  campaign	  that	  began	  in	  1968	  to	  protect	  the	  Great	  Barrier	  
Reef	  (GBR)	  from	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  oil	  exploration.	  The	  environmentalists’	  
extensive	  education	  campaign	  paid	  off,	  generating	  ‘overwhelming	  public	  hostility	  to	  
drilling’	  and	  thereby	  winning	  ‘the	  first	  reprieve	  for	  conservation’,	  with	  the	  Reef’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1999,	  p.	  90).	  Robertson	  (2008,	  pp.	  578	  -­‐	  580)	  emphasises	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Indian	  monsoon	  rains	  in	  1965	  and	  1966,	  which	  “sent	  shock	  waves	  of	  concern	  about	  ecological	  problems	  around	  the	  globe,”	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  popularity	  of	  Paul	  Ehrlich’s	  1968	  book,	  
The	  Population	  Bomb,	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  how	  Americans	  worried	  that	  political	  instability	  resulting	  from	  ecological	  disasters	  in	  far-­‐off	  places	  could	  threaten	  their	  own	  security	  and	  living	  standards.	  158	  The	  new	  environmental	  laws	  included	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  (1960),	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  (1963),	  the	  Solid	  Waste	  Act	  (1965)	  and,	  most	  significantly,	  the	  1970	  National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act	  (NEPA)	  that	  created	  the	  EPA	  in	  1970	  (Sale	  1993).	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protection	  from	  business	  interests	  later	  strengthened	  by	  the	  new	  Whitlam	  Labor	  
government’s	  legislation	  establishing	  it	  as	  a	  national	  marine	  park	  under	  the	  
management	  of	  the	  Great	  Barrier	  Reef	  Marine	  Park	  Authority	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	  
1999,	  pp.	  105	  –	  106).159	  
Another	  notable	  Australian	  environmental	  campaign	  during	  the	  1960s	  was	  the	  
attempt	  to	  stop	  the	  development	  of	  a	  hydroelectric	  power	  station	  on	  the	  Gordon	  
River	  in	  Tasmania	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  flooding	  of	  Lake	  Pedder	  (Hobday	  &	  
McDonald	  2014).	  Despite	  a	  hard-­‐fought	  campaign	  that	  spanned	  several	  years	  and	  
was	  widely	  supported	  by	  Australians,	  and	  despite	  the	  hope	  for	  its	  success	  generated	  
by	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Whitlam	  Labor	  government	  in	  1972,	  dam	  construction	  
proceeded.	  Hutton	  and	  Connors	  (1999)	  nevertheless	  argue	  that	  the	  Lake	  Pedder	  
campaign	  also	  had	  positive	  outcomes	  for	  the	  environmental	  movement	  as	  it	  led	  to	  
the	  formation	  of	  the	  United	  Tasmania	  Group,	  which	  subsequently	  became	  the	  
world’s	  first	  Green	  Party	  and	  inspired	  the	  establishment	  of	  green	  political	  parties	  in	  
other	  countries	  (see	  also	  Hobday	  &	  McDonald	  2014).160	  According	  to	  Hutton	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  The	  GBR’s	  reprieve	  is	  now	  decisively	  over,	  with	  both	  Labor	  state	  and	  Coalition	  federal	  governments	  approving	  plans	  for	  port	  expansions	  in	  the	  World	  Heritage-­‐listed	  Great	  Barrier	  Reef	  Marine	  Park	  (Hobday	  &	  McDonald	  2014;	  Horn	  &	  Ford	  2015)	  as	  well	  as	  plans	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Adani	  Carmichael	  Coal	  Mine	  in	  the	  Galilee	  Basin	  in	  Queensland.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  burning	  coal	  from	  this	  mine	  will	  emit	  4.6	  billion	  tonnes	  of	  additional	  CO2	  into	  the	  atmosphere	  and	  lock	  in	  more	  global	  warming	  (Brown	  2017).	  Anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  has	  already	  contributed	  to	  the	  extensive	  bleaching	  events	  in	  2016	  and	  2017	  that	  damaged	  1,500km	  of	  the	  GBR,	  and	  scientists	  worry	  that	  it	  is	  now	  beyond	  saving	  (Knaus	  &	  Evershed	  2017);	  emitting	  unnecessary	  additional	  GHGs	  into	  the	  atmosphere	  can	  only	  exacerbate	  the	  dangers	  to	  an	  already-­‐fragile	  GBR	  (Ritter	  2017).	  For	  these	  reasons,	  and	  fifty	  years	  after	  the	  first	  campaign	  to	  save	  it,	  the	  ‘Stop	  Adani	  Alliance’	  was	  launched	  by	  thirteen	  community	  groups	  to	  challenge	  these	  current	  industry	  threats	  to	  the	  GBR	  (Brown	  2017)	  which	  are,	  once	  more,	  being	  not	  only	  facilitated	  but	  also	  actively	  pursued	  by	  government	  policies	  that	  overwhelmingly	  favour	  business	  interests	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  environment	  (O’Brien	  2016;	  Ritter	  2017).	  160	  Refer	  to	  Callaghan	  (1990)	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  history,	  ideology,	  and	  electoral	  performance	  of	  the	  Green	  Party	  UK,	  and	  for	  a	  concise	  overview	  of	  the	  levels	  of	  public	  support	  that	  the	  other	  newly	  established	  European	  Green	  parties	  attracted	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  Müller-­‐Rommel	  (1985)	  provides	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  establishment	  and	  characteristics	  of	  the	  European	  Green	  parties,	  categorising	  them	  into	  two	  main	  groups:	  ‘pure	  green	  reformist	  parties’	  and	  ‘alternative	  green	  radical	  parties’	  –	  a	  division	  that	  is	  also	  evident	  within	  both	  the	  environmental	  movement	  and	  the	  climate	  movement	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Writing	  two	  decades	  after	  Müller-­‐Rommel,	  Poguntke	  (2002)	  discusses	  the	  evolution	  of	  European	  Green	  parties,	  including	  the	  compromises	  they	  had	  to	  make	  once	  in	  government	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  compromises	  on	  their	  support	  base.	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Connors	  (1999,	  p.	  124),	  another	  important	  outcome	  of	  the	  Lake	  Pedder	  campaign	  
was	  that	  it	  taught	  Australian	  environmentalists	  that	  they	  could	  not	  rely	  on	  
‘gentlemanly	  agreements’	  to	  protect	  the	  environment	  from	  business	  interests,	  and	  
that	  they	  “had	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  fight	  and	  fight	  with	  commitment”	  as	  they	  entered	  the	  
environmental	  battles	  of	  the	  1970s.	  
Sale	  (1993)	  and	  Hutton	  and	  Connor	  (1999)	  identify	  the	  1970s	  as	  a	  new	  phase	  in	  the	  
development	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  modern	  environmental	  movement,	  with	  the	  
publication	  of	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  and	  media	  reports	  popularising	  the	  dangers	  of	  a	  
potentially	  global	  ecological	  collapse.	  The	  growing	  public	  awareness	  of	  the	  global	  
and	  interconnected	  nature	  of	  environmental	  problems	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  popularity	  
of	  publications	  such	  as	  A	  Blueprint	  for	  Survival	  (1972)	  and	  Limits	  to	  Growth	  (1972),	  
both	  warning	  that	  a	  finite	  planet	  could	  not	  support	  infinite	  economic	  growth	  
(Callaghan1990;	  Eckersley	  2007;	  Strong	  1972).161	  Concerns	  about	  the	  health	  of	  the	  
ozone	  layer	  also	  entered	  the	  public	  domain	  in	  1971	  in	  the	  US,	  as	  part	  of	  what	  Mazur	  
and	  Lee	  (1993,	  p.	  685)	  describe	  as	  a	  ‘highly	  politicized	  debate’	  over	  a	  plan	  to	  create	  a	  
fleet	  of	  supersonic	  aircraft	  which,	  scientists	  warned,	  would	  seriously	  deplete	  
stratospheric	  ozone.	  The	  publicity	  about	  the	  dangers	  of	  depleting	  atmospheric	  ozone	  
intensified	  between	  1974	  and	  1976	  as	  the	  media	  reported	  on	  the	  use	  of	  
chlorofluorocarbon	  chemical	  compounds	  (CFCs),	  long-­‐lasting	  ozone	  depleting	  
chemicals,	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  products	  which	  were	  sold	  in	  aerosol	  containers	  (Mazur	  &	  
Lee	  1993).162	  The	  widespread	  destruction	  of	  rainforests	  as	  a	  result	  of	  acid	  rain	  and	  
their	  clearance	  for	  commercial-­‐scale	  agriculture	  in	  the	  Global	  South,	  and	  the	  threats	  
this	  deforestation	  posed	  to	  biodiversity	  because	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  species’	  habitats,	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Writing	  in	  2012,	  Christian	  Parenti	  described	  Limits	  to	  Growth	  as	  the	  ‘top-­‐selling	  environmental	  title	  ever	  published’,	  having	  been	  translated	  into	  thirty-­‐seven	  languages	  and	  having	  sold	  12	  million	  copies	  (Parenti	  2012).	  The	  Blueprint	  for	  Survival	  is	  also	  identified	  as	  a	  seminal	  document,	  with	  Callaghan	  (1990,	  p.	  2)	  describing	  it	  as	  “a	  manifesto	  of	  Green	  ideology	  which	  stands	  as	  one	  of	  the	  foundation	  documents	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  direct	  inspiration	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  Europe’s	  first	  Green	  Party,	  ‘People’	  in	  1973	  (restyled	  the	  Ecology	  Party	  in	  1975	  and	  known	  as	  the	  Green	  Party	  [UK]	  since	  September	  1985).”	  	  162	  These	  concerns	  predated	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  ozone	  hole,	  which	  was	  reported	  in	  
Nature	  in	  May	  1985,	  after	  which	  the	  CFC	  issue	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  renewed	  intense	  media	  scrutiny	  and	  additional	  pressure	  from	  environmental	  activists	  to	  ban	  the	  use	  of	  CFCs	  (Mazur	  &	  Lee	  1993).	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became	  growing	  sources	  of	  concern	  to	  actors	  within	  the	  environmental	  movement	  
in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  although	  the	  mass	  media	  did	  not	  pay	  much	  attention	  to	  
these	  issues	  at	  the	  time	  (Callaghan	  1990;	  Mazur	  &	  Lee	  1993).163	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  warnings	  of	  global	  catastrophe	  from	  experts,	  in	  the	  1970s	  more	  
immediate	  concerns	  about	  public	  safety	  were	  provoked	  in	  the	  US	  by	  a	  growing	  
awareness	  of	  hazardous	  practices	  within	  workplaces	  as	  well	  as	  by	  a	  series	  of	  high-­‐
profile	  environmentally	  damaging	  accidents.	  Examples	  of	  environmental	  issues	  that	  
raised	  concerns	  included	  Karen	  Silkwood’s	  1974	  disclosure	  of	  the	  dangers	  that	  
workers	  were	  exposed	  to	  at	  the	  Kerr-­‐McGee	  plutonium	  plant	  in	  Oklahoma,	  the	  
accident	  at	  the	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  nuclear	  power	  station	  in	  1979,	  and	  the	  disclosure	  in	  
the	  same	  year	  that	  homes	  and	  schools	  in	  a	  US	  residential	  suburb,	  Love	  Canal,	  were	  
built	  on	  contaminated	  soil	  (Sale	  1993).164	  The	  weakness	  of	  environmental	  legislation	  
and	  of	  the	  enforcement	  powers	  granted	  to	  environmental	  agencies	  meant	  that	  the	  
risks	  to	  human	  health	  posed	  by	  these	  sorts	  of	  business	  practices	  were	  not	  effectively	  
addressed.	  Environmental	  damage	  and	  the	  associated	  risks	  to	  human	  health	  were,	  in	  
fact,	  compounded	  in	  the	  1980s	  under	  the	  Reagan	  Administration’s	  neoliberalising	  
policy	  agenda	  that	  included	  increasing	  offshore	  drilling,	  expanding	  timber	  cutting,	  
opening	  up	  wilderness	  areas	  to	  oil	  and	  gas	  leases,	  and	  selling	  federal	  lands	  to	  private	  
interests	  (Sale	  1993).	  What	  Sale	  (1993)	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘the	  Reagan	  reaction’	  
downplayed	  existing	  environmental	  regulations	  and	  resisted	  adopting	  new	  ones,	  and	  
the	  Reagan	  Administration	  used	  tactics	  such	  as	  appointing	  individuals	  sympathetic	  to	  
business	  as	  heads	  of	  environmental	  departments	  and	  agencies,	  cutting	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  The	  issue	  of	  mass	  extinction	  events	  attracted	  much	  public	  interest	  in	  the	  1980s;	  however,	  Mazur	  and	  Lee	  (1993,	  p.	  703)	  note	  that	  this	  was	  not	  because	  of	  the	  threats	  to	  plants	  and	  animals	  posed	  by	  the	  loss	  of	  rainforests,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  interest	  in	  dinosaurs.	  Public	  awareness	  and	  concerns	  about	  damage	  to	  tropical	  forests	  came	  later	  in	  the	  decade,	  when	  satellite	  images	  “showing	  perhaps	  100,	  000	  fires”	  burning	  in	  the	  Amazon	  attracted	  widespread	  publicity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interests	  of	  various	  celebrities	  who	  “took	  up	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  tropical	  forest	  and	  its	  inhabitants,	  adding	  enormously	  to	  the	  publicity”	  (Mazur	  &	  Lee	  1993,	  pp.	  705	  –	  706).	  164	  Karen	  Silkwood’s	  mysterious	  death	  received	  extensive	  media	  coverage,	  and	  the	  circumstances	  leading	  up	  to	  her	  death	  were	  further	  popularized	  with	  the	  1983	  screening	  of	  the	  Academy	  Award-­‐nominated	  film,	  Silkwood.	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agencies’	  budgets	  and,	  if	  all	  other	  measures	  failed,	  simply	  refusing	  to	  enforce	  
legislated	  environmental	  protections.165	  
The	  institutionalised	  Washington-­‐based	  ENGOs	  reacted	  to	  the	  Reagan	  
administration’s	  policies	  rolling	  back	  the	  gains	  of	  environmental	  movement	  largely	  
by	  accommodating	  them,	  effectively	  settling	  for	  “crumbs	  today	  in	  hopes	  of	  bread	  
tomorrow”	  (Sale	  1993,	  p.	  56;	  see	  also	  Thomson	  2017	  and	  Woodhouse	  2008).166	  In	  
response	  to	  government	  inaction	  and	  to	  what	  was	  perceived	  by	  many	  as	  the	  co-­‐
optation	  of	  the	  ‘environmental	  majors,’	  some	  environmentalists	  turned	  away	  from	  
tactics	  such	  as	  lobbying	  through	  official	  channels	  that	  had	  achieved	  so	  little,	  and	  
various	  forms	  of	  ‘radical	  environmentalism’	  advocated	  the	  need	  for	  fundamental	  
change	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  environment	  (Sale	  1993).	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  smaller	  
grassroots	  groups	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1980s	  were,	  however,	  not	  radical:	  they	  were	  
organised	  by	  members	  of	  local	  communities	  in	  order	  to	  address	  specific	  local	  
issues.167	  Grassroots	  environmental	  campaigns	  were	  led	  by	  locals	  who	  would	  have	  to	  
live	  with	  the	  consequences	  of	  decisions	  made	  by	  authorities	  working	  within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  Donald	  Trump’s	  administration	  (commencing	  in	  2017)	  has	  adopted	  similar	  strategies	  (Bomberg	  2017):	  Trump	  has	  appointed	  anti-­‐environmentalist	  Scott	  Pruitt,	  who	  has	  close	  ties	  to	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  and	  sued	  the	  EPA	  several	  times	  when	  he	  was	  attorney	  general	  of	  Oklahoma,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  EPA	  and	  Pruitt	  is	  now	  supervising	  the	  withdrawal	  and	  postponement	  of	  environmental	  regulations	  such	  as	  that	  preventing	  mining	  companies	  from	  dumping	  toxic	  waste	  into	  streams	  and	  stricter	  pollution	  standards	  designed	  to	  reduce	  toxic	  emissions	  from	  power	  stations	  (Milman	  2017c).	  The	  institutionalized	  ENGOs	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  prevent	  these	  developments,	  thus	  vindicating	  critiques	  of	  the	  tactics	  of	  accommodation	  adopted	  by	  this	  section	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  166	  Having	  established	  offices	  in	  Washington	  during	  the	  1970s	  in	  order	  to	  lobby	  the	  government	  more	  effectively,	  the	  larger	  ENGOs	  had	  become	  increasingly	  bureaucratised,	  professionalised,	  and	  institutionalised,	  identifying	  more	  closely	  with	  official	  policymakers	  than	  with	  the	  issues	  faced	  by	  organised	  labour	  and	  poor	  urban	  communities	  (Sale	  1993).	  Adopting	  a	  ‘realist’	  position,	  the	  large	  ENGOs	  accepted	  “the	  inviolability	  of	  economic	  growth”	  and	  acquiesced	  in	  providing	  support	  for	  weak	  and	  ineffective	  environmental	  legislation	  passed	  through	  the	  US	  Congress.	  Cisneros	  (2015)	  analyses	  six	  concrete	  examples	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  weakness	  and	  ineffectiveness	  of	  both	  federal	  and	  state	  environmental	  legislation	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  a	  structural	  problem	  because	  such	  laws	  “…are	  grounded	  on	  market	  principles	  and	  consistently	  concede	  to	  capitalism.”	  167	  According	  to	  Sale	  (1993,	  p.	  32),	  increasing	  concerns	  about	  the	  health	  risks	  posed	  by	  toxic	  wastes	  that	  were	  the	  by-­‐products	  of	  economic	  activities	  led	  to	  an	  exponential	  growth	  of	  both	  national	  and	  grassroots	  US	  environmental	  organisations	  in	  the	  1970s,	  when	  their	  numbers	  rose	  “from	  perhaps	  several	  hundred	  as	  the	  decade	  began	  to	  an	  estimated	  3,000	  at	  its	  end.”	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“bureaucratic	  hierarchies	  whose	  economic	  interests	  tend	  to	  side	  with	  industry”	  (Ford	  
2003,	  pp.	  125	  	  126).	  According	  to	  Sale	  (1993,	  p.	  59):	  
Minority groups of all kinds and many blue-collar neighborhoods 
were drawn to environmental activism out of some local need – 
particularly because they were often targets of undesirable and 
dangerous projects that affluent communities resisted – whereas the 
majors were made up largely of white and more affluent staffs and 
constituencies. 
Grassroots	  struggles	  around	  the	  location	  of	  toxic	  waste	  dumps	  in	  particular	  led	  to	  
articulations	  of	  a	  new	  form	  of	  environmentalism	  around	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘environmental	  justice’	  in	  the	  US	  (Ford	  2003).	  One	  such	  campaign	  that	  has	  been	  
studied	  and	  written	  about	  extensively	  is	  that	  conducted	  in	  1982	  by	  a	  primarily	  
African-­‐American	  community	  in	  Warren	  County,	  where	  the	  state	  of	  North	  Carolina	  
planned	  to	  build	  a	  toxic	  waste	  dump	  (Agyeman,	  Schlosberg,	  Craven	  &	  Matthews	  
2016;	  McGurty	  1997;	  Mohai,	  Pellow	  &	  Roberts	  2009;	  Schlosberg	  &	  Collins	  2014).	  The	  
significance	  of	  this	  grassroots	  campaign	  to	  prevent	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  waste	  
facility	  lies	  in	  how	  it	  facilitated	  alliances	  between	  grassroots	  organisers,	  civil	  rights	  
activists,	  black	  political	  leaders,	  and	  environmentalists	  and	  became	  the	  symbol	  (but	  
not	  the	  beginning)	  of	  the	  environmental	  justice	  movement	  (Schlosberg	  &	  Collins	  
2014).168	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  many	  US	  grassroots	  environmental	  struggles	  found	  
inspiration	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  given	  that	  it	  was	  predominantly	  poor	  
African-­‐American	  communities	  that	  were	  affected	  by	  pollution	  and	  hazardous	  waste;	  
arising	  within	  very	  different	  contexts,	  Australian	  urban	  environmental	  campaigns	  of	  
the	  1970s	  drew	  on	  different	  traditions.	  
Australian	  social	  movements	  were	  generally	  very	  active	  during	  the	  1970s;	  they	  had	  
helped	  elect	  Whitlam’s	  Labor	  Party,	  which	  Hutton	  and	  Connors	  (1999,	  p.	  127)	  refer	  
to	  as	  “the	  most	  reformist	  federal	  government	  in	  Australian	  history.”	  This	  wider	  
political	  context	  of	  left-­‐wing	  traditions	  and	  activism	  “helped	  establish	  the	  picket,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  Like	  the	  argument	  presented	  by	  Meyer	  and	  Rohlinger	  (2012)	  against	  resorting	  to	  ‘immaculate	  conception’	  stories	  to	  explain	  the	  origins	  of	  social	  movements,	  Schlosberg	  and	  Collins	  (2014)	  caution	  that	  interpretations	  identifying	  the	  Warren	  County	  incident	  as	  the	  ‘birth’	  of	  the	  environmental	  justice	  movement	  are	  simplistic	  and	  historically	  incorrect;	  race-­‐based	  movements	  and	  civil	  society	  groups	  concerned	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  pollution	  on	  poor	  urban	  communities	  had	  a	  long	  history	  prior	  to	  the	  Warren	  County	  events.	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blockade,	  the	  rally,	  and	  other	  confrontational	  activities	  as	  integral	  parts	  of	  green	  
movement	  tradition	  and	  mythology”	  in	  Australia,	  and	  also	  presented	  opportunities	  
for	  forging	  links	  between	  the	  environmental	  movement	  and	  sections	  of	  organised	  
labour	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999,	  p.	  125).169	  The	  two	  major	  campaigns	  inspiring	  the	  
Australian	  environmental	  movement	  in	  this	  period	  were	  the	  1971-­‐1975	  ‘Green	  Bans	  
movement’	  in	  Sydney	  and	  other	  Australian	  cities,	  and	  the	  1975	  –	  1984	  campaigns	  
opposing	  uranium	  mining.	  There	  were	  also	  bitter	  struggles	  (as	  there	  continue	  to	  be	  
today)	  against	  ‘the	  politically	  powerful	  resource	  industries’	  to	  conserve	  ecologically	  
sensitive	  areas:	  to	  “stop	  sand-­‐mining	  on	  Fraser	  Island,	  to	  protect	  the	  NSW	  
rainforests	  from	  logging,	  to	  prevent	  the	  damming	  of	  the	  Franklin	  River,	  and	  to	  
protect	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  south-­‐west	  Tasmanian	  wilderness”	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	  
1999,	  p.	  127).	  But	  it	  was	  the	  urban	  struggle,	  the	  ‘Green	  Bans	  movement,’	  that	  
promised	  to	  unite	  different	  (and	  traditionally	  perceived	  to	  be	  antagonistic)	  social	  
forces	  to	  fight	  against	  the	  changes	  being	  wrought	  by	  the	  dominant	  classes	  in	  the	  
advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	  
1999).170	  The	  global	  neoliberalisation	  project	  took	  the	  form	  of	  “an	  aggressive	  
industrialism,	  based	  on	  resource-­‐extraction	  industries	  and	  aided	  by	  powerful	  
politicians	  and	  compliant	  bureaucracies”	  in	  Australia	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999,	  p.	  
128).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Hutton	  and	  Connors	  (1999,	  p.	  125)	  draw	  comparisons	  between	  the	  Australian	  and	  European	  movements	  in	  this	  respect:	  “In	  West	  Germany,	  in	  particular,	  the	  green	  movement	  recruited	  heavily	  from	  amongst	  urban	  Leftists	  who	  were	  disenchanted	  by	  the	  centrism	  of	  the	  social	  democrats	  and	  the	  dogmatism	  of	  the	  communists.”	  While	  Hutton	  and	  Connors	  (1999,	  pp.	  125	  –	  126)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  European	  movements	  were	  more	  ‘left’	  than	  the	  Australian	  environmental	  movement,	  they	  cite	  Jan	  Pakulski’s	  observation	  that	  both	  movements	  were	  characterised	  by:	  “a	  proliferation	  of	  groups	  and	  bodies	  involved	  in	  protest	  activities;	  a	  thematic	  extension	  of	  protests	  on	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  issues;	  a	  globalisation	  of	  concerns	  from	  local-­‐specific	  to	  general	  and	  universal;	  a	  coalescence	  of	  protest	  actions	  into	  multi-­‐issues	  events	  that	  involved	  many	  different	  associations	  and	  groups;	  growing	  contacts,	  co-­‐operation	  and	  co-­‐ordination	  between	  various	  movement	  bodies;	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  leading	  personalities	  and	  exemplary	  figures	  at	  the	  extra-­‐local,	  national	  level.”	  170	  As	  McCulloch	  (2005)	  points	  out,	  workers	  and	  environmentalists	  more	  frequently	  have	  antagonistic	  rather	  than	  cooperative	  relationships;	  however,	  this	  antagonism	  (which	  is	  sometimes	  encouraged	  by	  business	  and	  government	  representatives)	  can	  be	  resisted	  if	  one	  recognises	  it	  for	  what	  it	  is:	  a	  ‘divide	  and	  rule’	  tactic.	  As	  is	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  8,	  many	  social	  movement	  activists	  –	  including	  ecosocialists	  –	  are	  trying	  to	  promote	  the	  red/green	  alliances	  that	  are	  so	  crucial	  for	  building	  a	  strong	  climate	  justice	  movement	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  global	  warming	  and	  broader	  environmental	  crises	  in	  socially	  just	  ways.	  
	   178	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  environmental	  damage	  and	  destruction	  of	  communities	  in	  rural	  
areas,	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  Australian	  economy	  during	  this	  period	  had	  
widespread	  socially	  damaging	  consequences	  in	  urban	  centres,	  where	  agents	  of	  
powerful	  financial	  and	  entrepreneurial	  capital	  demolished	  historic	  buildings	  and	  
displaced	  the	  people	  living	  in	  inner-­‐city	  working-­‐class	  neighbourhoods	  to	  make	  way	  
for	  ‘concrete	  and	  glass	  towers’	  (Hutton	  and	  Connors	  1999,	  p.	  128).171	  The	  builders	  
employed	  to	  do	  the	  demolition	  and	  construction	  work	  were	  members	  of	  the	  militant	  
New	  South	  Wales	  Builders	  Labourers	  Federation	  (BLF),	  a	  trade	  union	  which	  
subscribed	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘the	  social	  responsibility	  of	  labour’	  and	  set	  a	  world	  
precedent	  with	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  Green	  Bans	  movement	  when	  it	  joined	  
various	  grassroots	  campaigns	  and	  refused	  to	  work	  on	  environmentally	  and	  socially	  
damaging	  projects.	  Burgmann	  (2008),	  summarises	  the	  aims	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  
Green	  Bans	  movement	  as	  follows:	  
The green bans were of three main kinds: to defend open spaces 
from various kinds of development; to protect existing housing 
stock from demolition to make way for freeways or high-rise 
development; and to preserve older-style buildings from 
replacement by office-blocks or shopping precincts. 
(Burgmann 2008, p. 65) 
The	  Green	  Bans	  movement	  succeeded	  in	  preventing	  many	  environmentally	  and	  
socially	  damaging	  development	  projects,	  with	  its	  enduring	  legacy	  evident	  in	  the	  fact	  
that	  Sydney’s	  popular	  Centennial	  Park	  and	  cultural	  institutions	  such	  as	  Theatre	  Royal	  
can	  still	  be	  enjoyed	  by	  residents	  and	  visitors	  to	  the	  city	  (CFMEU	  2011;	  Cross	  Art	  
Projects	  2011;	  Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999).	  However,	  a	  combination	  of	  sustained	  
opposition	  from	  an	  alliance	  of	  government,	  business	  and	  right-­‐wing	  union	  leaders,	  
aided	  by	  factionalism	  within	  the	  BLF	  itself,	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  its	  activities	  and	  resulted	  in	  
the	  BLF’s	  deregistration	  in	  1975	  (Burgmann	  2008;	  Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999;	  Piccini	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  This	  process	  is	  ongoing	  in	  all	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  (Harvey	  2005),	  and	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘gentrification’	  (Hodkinson	  2012).	  Smith	  (1982,	  p.	  139)	  defines	  gentrification	  as	  “the	  process	  by	  which	  working	  class	  residential	  neighborhoods	  are	  rehabilitated	  by	  middle	  class	  homebuyers,	  landlords,	  and	  professional	  developers.”	  Smith	  argues	  that	  gentrification	  “is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  class	  strategy	  to	  restructure	  the	  economy”	  with	  effects	  that	  are	  detrimental	  to	  the	  working	  class	  (Smith	  1982,	  p.	  153).	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2016).172	  Despite	  this	  defeat,	  organised	  labour	  continued	  to	  work	  with	  
environmentalists	  in	  other	  contexts,	  playing	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  
campaign	  that	  FoE	  initiated	  in	  1975.	  According	  to	  Hutton	  and	  Connors	  (1999,	  pp.	  139	  
–	  140),	  ‘left-­‐wing	  unions’	  such	  as	  the	  Seaman’s	  Union	  of	  Australia,	  the	  Waterside	  
Workers	  Federation,	  the	  Australian	  Railways	  Union,	  and	  the	  Electrical	  Trades	  Union	  
took	  the	  lead	  inside	  the	  union	  movement	  to	  work	  with	  environmentalists	  in	  
opposing	  uranium	  mining.	  Despite	  a	  persistent	  and	  hard-­‐fought	  campaign	  against	  
the	  nuclear	  industry	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	  concerned	  citizens,	  many	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  
members	  of	  organised	  labour,	  and	  the	  Aboriginal	  people	  whose	  land	  in	  the	  Northern	  
Territory	  would	  be	  the	  site	  of	  the	  proposed	  Ranger	  uranium	  mine,	  the	  battle	  was	  lost	  
and	  an	  agreement	  authorising	  the	  mine	  was	  signed	  in	  1978	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999,	  
pp.	  141	  -­‐143).	  It	  was	  Bob	  Hawke,	  then	  president	  of	  the	  Australian	  Council	  of	  Trade	  
Unions	  (and	  Labor	  Prime	  Minister	  between	  1983	  and1991),	  who	  led	  the	  ‘pro-­‐
uranium	  forces’	  within	  the	  union	  movement	  (Hutton	  &	  Connors	  1999),	  so	  the	  
current	  bipartisanship	  within	  formal	  Australian	  politics	  favouring	  business	  interests	  
over	  both	  environmental	  and	  workers’	  interests	  is	  not	  surprising:	  it	  was	  already	  
evident	  in	  this	  campaign’s	  defeat.173	  
As	  noted	  earlier,	  some	  US	  environmentalists	  attributed	  similar	  environmental	  
campaign	  defeats	  to	  the	  co-­‐optation	  of	  the	  mainstream	  environmental	  movement	  
and,	  breaking	  ties	  with	  this	  mainstream	  movement,	  they	  started	  building	  a	  more	  
radical	  stream	  of	  environmentalism	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Like	  the	  community	  grassroots	  
movements	  discussed	  previously,	  the	  radical	  environmental	  groups	  were	  also	  
characterised	  by	  decentralisation;	  however,	  unlike	  the	  community	  grassroots	  
groups,	  many	  of	  the	  leaders	  of	  radical	  environmentalism	  had	  a	  history	  of	  political	  
activism	  within	  the	  1960s	  social	  movements	  as	  well	  as	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  
disillusionment	  from	  having	  worked	  within	  the	  mainstream	  environmental	  
movements	  (Sale	  1993).	  Directly	  opposing	  what	  they	  described	  as	  the	  co-­‐optation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Meredith	  and	  Verity	  Burgmann	  (1998)	  provide	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  NSW	  BLF	  and	  the	  Green	  Bans	  movement.	  173	  It	  is	  a	  Labor	  state	  government,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Annastacia	  Palaszczuk,	  that	  has	  recently	  approved	  environmentally	  damaging	  mining	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  Carmichael	  coalmine	  in	  Queensland	  (Ritter	  2017).	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and	  reformism	  of	  mainstream	  ENGOs,	  radical	  environmentalists	  were	  united	  by	  “an	  
underlying	  criticism	  of	  the	  dominant	  anthropocentric	  Western	  view	  of	  the	  world	  and	  
a	  feeling	  that	  the	  transition	  to	  ecological	  or	  biocentric	  values	  had	  to	  be	  made	  with	  all	  
possible	  speed,	  with	  active	  and	  dramatic	  prodding	  if	  necessary”	  (Sale	  1993,	  p.	  62).	  
Rooted	  in	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  ‘true	  interdependence	  of	  species	  and	  their	  
habitats’,	  radical	  environmentalists	  “demanded	  a	  profound	  change	  in	  the	  values	  and	  
beliefs	  of	  industrial	  society	  from	  the	  bottom	  up”	  (Sale	  1993,	  p.	  62).174	  According	  to	  
Sale	  (1993,	  p.	  69),	  “[b]y	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Reagan	  presidency	  in	  1989,	  and	  in	  defiance	  of	  
the	  Reagan	  Reaction,	  the	  environmental	  movement	  in	  all	  its	  guises	  was	  stronger	  
than	  it	  had	  ever	  been.”	  	  
The	  1990s	  heralded	  what	  Sale	  identifies	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fourth	  period	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  modern	  US	  environmental	  movement.	  In	  this	  phase,	  many	  of	  
the	  major	  US	  ENGOs	  (such	  as	  the	  National	  Defense	  Fund,	  Nature	  Conservancy,	  
World	  Resources	  Institute,	  and	  WWF)	  had	  clearly	  adopted	  ‘third-­‐wave	  
environmentalism’	  strategies,	  working	  “with	  the	  movement’s	  traditional	  enemies,	  
corporate	  polluters	  and	  extractors,	  to	  achieve	  [reforms]	  by	  cooperation	  and	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  Sale	  (1993,	  pp.	  62	  -­‐	  65)	  identifies	  ‘four	  overlapping	  tendencies’	  among	  the	  various	  expressions	  of	  this	  ‘new	  radicalism’:	  bioregionalism,	  deep	  ecology,	  ecofeminism,	  and	  the	  Gaia	  hypothesis.	  Bioregionalists	  seek	  to	  create	  ‘natural	  ecological	  communities’	  by	  demarcating	  the	  territorial	  boundaries	  of	  human	  settlements	  according	  to	  topographical	  and	  biotic	  features	  of	  the	  natural	  environment;	  they	  promote	  decentralised	  government	  within	  each	  bioregion	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  regional	  diversity	  as	  opposed	  to	  current	  centralised	  political	  systems	  that	  facilitate	  monocultures.	  Deep	  ecologists,	  represented	  by	  groups	  such	  as	  Earth	  First!,	  argue	  that	  all	  species	  have	  an	  equal	  ‘intrinsic	  value’	  and	  right	  to	  exist,	  and	  they	  identify	  the	  failure	  of	  ‘industrial	  society’	  “to	  achieve	  a	  harmonious,	  spiritual	  relationship	  with	  nature”	  as	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  environmental	  crises;	  they	  focus	  on	  preserving	  wilderness	  areas	  and	  limiting	  population	  growth.	  Blending	  ‘sixties-­‐style	  feminism	  with	  eighties-­‐style	  ecology’,	  ecofeminists	  argue	  that	  patriarchy	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  domination	  and	  exploitation	  of	  both	  women	  and	  nature.	  James	  Lovelock’s	  ‘Gaia	  hypothesis’	  suggested	  that	  the	  earth	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  single	  self-­‐regulating	  system	  whereby	  living	  organisms	  interact	  with	  the	  atmosphere	  and	  hydrosphere	  as	  part	  of	  ecosystems	  which,	  in	  all	  their	  complex	  interactions,	  maintain	  and	  perpetuate	  conditions	  conducive	  to	  life.	  While	  the	  Gaia	  theory	  has	  attracted	  much	  criticism	  from	  the	  scientific	  community,	  some	  environmentalists	  interpreted	  it	  to	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  beliefs	  informing	  the	  ‘model’	  ecological	  practices	  of	  early	  tribal	  peoples	  who	  thought	  of	  the	  earth	  as	  a	  single	  living	  being	  and	  believed	  that	  it	  was	  their	  responsibility	  to	  ‘ensure	  its	  careful,	  productive	  existence.’	  Refer	  also	  to	  Sessions	  (1987)	  and	  Devall	  (2001)	  for	  overviews	  of	  the	  origins,	  evolution,	  and	  key	  tenets	  of	  the	  deep	  ecology	  movement;	  and	  to	  Taylor	  (2008)	  for	  a	  concise	  overview	  of	  the	  ideologies	  informing	  radical	  environmentalism.	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regulation”	  (Sale	  1993,	  p.	  83).175	  While	  acknowledging	  the	  mainstream	  US	  
environmental	  movement’s	  achievements	  in	  embedding	  environmentalism	  ‘in	  
American	  life’	  by	  the	  early	  1990s,	  Sale	  (1993,	  pp.	  96	  -­‐	  106)	  argues	  that	  its	  future	  
effectiveness	  will	  depend	  on	  whether	  it	  pursues	  a	  reformist	  path	  emphasising	  
scientific,	  technological,	  and	  corporate-­‐led	  market-­‐based	  solutions	  or	  a	  more	  radical	  
path	  aimed	  at	  developing	  public	  understanding	  of	  the	  system	  that	  must	  be	  changed	  
in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  environment	  –	  a	  message	  that	  is	  currently	  echoed	  and	  
amplified	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  (as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below	  and	  in	  
Chapter	  8).	  
Writing	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  Sale	  concedes	  that	  the	  ‘system	  change’	  path	  will	  not	  be	  
easy,	  and	  is	  “made	  all	  the	  more	  difficult	  by	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  time”	  (Sale	  1993,	  p.	  
106).	  The	  urgency	  that	  Sale	  refers	  to	  has	  intensified	  since	  scientists’	  concerns	  about	  
global	  warming	  initially	  started	  filtering	  through	  to	  the	  public	  through	  media	  reports	  
such	  as	  those	  about	  Hansen’s	  1988	  congressional	  testimony	  and	  the	  publication	  of	  
books	  such	  as	  Bill	  McKibbens’	  The	  End	  of	  Nature	  (which	  was	  published	  in	  1989).176	  
Given	  the	  growing	  publicity	  about	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  
that	  some	  environmental	  groups	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  turned	  their	  
attention	  to	  this	  issue	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  started	  collaborating	  in	  
their	  attempts	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  formal	  institutions	  established	  to	  address	  it.	  The	  
current	  climate	  movement	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  its	  ‘pre-­‐history’	  in	  the	  1980s,	  
with	  US	  environmental	  majors	  and	  a	  new	  coalition	  of	  NGOs,	  the	  Climate	  Action	  
Network	  (CAN),	  attending	  the	  UN’s	  climate	  change	  conferences.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  
below,	  however,	  the	  climate	  movement	  has	  evolved	  and	  changed	  in	  important	  ways	  
in	  response	  to	  its	  struggles	  and	  defeats	  in	  the	  past	  twenty-­‐two	  years	  of	  UNFCCC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  ‘Third-­‐wave	  environmentalism’	  during	  the	  first	  Bush	  Administration’s	  years	  involved	  ‘legal,	  electoral,	  and	  legislative’	  tactics,	  although	  some	  ENGOs	  (such	  as	  the	  Environmental	  Defense	  Fund’)	  rejected	  litigation	  as	  being	  ‘overly	  confrontational’	  (Sale	  1993,	  p.	  88).	  The	  ‘appeasement’	  strategies’	  achievements	  were	  both	  limited	  and	  temporary,	  and	  Sale	  (1993,	  p.	  96)	  quotes	  environmentalist	  Jose	  Lutzenberger’s	  ‘sober	  wisdom’	  on	  this	  issue:	  “In	  the	  environmental	  movement,	  our	  defeats	  are	  always	  final,	  our	  victories	  always	  provisional.	  What	  you	  save	  today	  can	  still	  be	  destroyed	  tomorrow,	  don’t	  you	  see?”	  176	  McKibben’s	  The	  End	  of	  Nature	  was	  initially	  published	  as	  a	  serial	  in	  The	  New	  Yorker	  and	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  first	  book	  about	  global	  warming	  to	  target	  a	  general	  audience	  (Baer	  2014,	  p.	  222).	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negotiations,	  and	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  witnessed	  the	  birth	  of	  
Climate	  Justice	  Now!	  (CJN!),	  a	  rival	  network	  encompassing	  climate	  activists	  and	  
NGOs	  that	  disagree	  with	  many	  CAN	  positions.	  
Western	  environmental	  NGOs	  take	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  global	  
warming	  and	  climate	  change	  
While	  major	  environmental	  NGOs	  such	  as	  Greenpeace,	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  
International	  (FoE-­‐I),	  the	  WWF	  and	  the	  Environmental	  Defense	  Fund	  (EDF)	  started	  
paying	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  global	  warming	  from	  the	  early	  days	  of	  international	  
climate	  change	  discussions	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  (Agrawala	  1999;	  Betsill	  2002;	  CAN	  
2014),	  this	  was	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  other	  campaigns.	  Several	  analysts	  claim	  that	  
recent	  years	  have	  witnessed	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  distinct	  ‘climate	  movement’	  
comprised	  of	  a	  heterogeneous	  collection	  of	  groups	  and	  individuals	  focusing	  their	  
activities	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Garrelts	  &	  Dietz	  2014;	  
Guldbrandsen	  &	  Andresen	  2004;	  Moser	  2007).	  	  
Garrelts	  and	  Dietz	  (2014,	  pp.	  2	  -­‐	  7)	  justify	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  distinct	  climate	  movement	  
has	  emerged	  by	  arguing	  that	  CSOs	  and	  activists	  concerned	  about	  climate	  change	  
meet	  three	  of	  the	  four	  criteria	  of	  ‘standard	  definitions	  of	  social	  movements’:	  (1)	  
having	  a	  shared	  aim	  (to	  avert	  climate	  change);	  (2)	  using	  protest	  (as	  opposed	  to	  
lobbying	  and	  advocacy)	  as	  a	  means	  of	  trying	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  necessary	  change	  to	  
avert	  climate	  change;	  and	  (3)	  constituting	  a	  group	  of	  actors	  that	  has	  persisted	  over	  
time.177	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  point	  out	  that	  actors	  within	  the	  field	  of	  climate	  
change	  politics	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  fourth	  criterion	  of	  having	  a	  shared	  identity,	  and	  they	  
summarise	  analysts’	  arguments	  that	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  divided	  along	  at	  least	  
four	  lines:	  nationality,	  types	  of	  actors,	  age	  and	  gender,	  and	  what	  can	  be	  categorised	  
as	  ‘ideology’	  (Garrelts	  &	  Dietz	  2014,	  pp.	  2-­‐3).178	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Quoting	  Rucht	  (1994),	  Garrelts	  and	  Dietz	  (2014,	  p.	  6)	  define	  a	  social	  movement	  as	  “an	  action	  system,	  formed	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time	  and	  based	  on	  collective	  identity,	  of	  mobilized	  networks	  of	  groups	  and	  organizations	  which	  aim	  to	  bring	  about,	  prevent,	  or	  reverse	  social	  change	  by	  means	  of	  protest	  –	  if	  necessary,	  violent	  protest.”	  178	  ‘Types	  of	  actors’	  refers	  to	  distinctions	  between	  what	  Garrelts	  and	  Dietz	  (2014,	  p.	  3)	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘traditional	  nongovernmental	  organizations’	  such	  as	  Greenpeace	  and	  the	  WWF	  and	  grassroots	  groups,	  state	  officials,	  scientific	  institutions	  and	  scientists,	  and	  sub-­‐national	  actors	  such	  as	  cities,	  municipalities,	  and	  local	  authorities.	  They	  also	  point	  to	  the	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second	  criterion	  involving	  the	  deployment	  of	  common	  tactics	  within	  the	  climate	  
movement	  is	  not	  always	  met:	  many	  NGOs	  (for	  example,	  WWF,	  World	  Resources	  
Institute,	  and	  EDF)	  continue	  to	  centre	  their	  efforts	  on	  lobbying,	  advocacy	  work,	  
petitions,	  and	  collaborations	  with	  governments	  and	  industry	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  
direct	  action	  tactics	  (such	  as	  protests	  and	  blockades)	  favoured	  by	  the	  more	  radical	  
groups	  and	  social	  movement	  coalitions	  (Bedall	  &	  Görg	  2014;	  Brunnengräber	  2014;	  
della	  Porta	  &	  Parks	  2014;	  Dietz	  2014a,	  2014b;	  Seabrooke	  &	  Wigan	  2015;	  Steger,	  
Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  2013).	  Nevertheless,	  Garrelts	  and	  Dietz’s	  description	  of	  the	  
climate	  movement	  as	  “a	  loose,	  but	  nonetheless	  highly	  active	  umbrella	  structure	  
which	  is	  supported,	  shaped,	  and	  used	  by	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  who	  are	  
active	  in	  climate	  politics”	  is	  convincing	  given	  that	  social	  movements	  are	  defined	  as	  
“complex,	  in	  many	  cases	  decentralized	  networks,	  whose	  members	  act	  in	  solidarity	  
with	  each	  other,	  have	  very	  strong	  convictions,	  and	  who,	  in	  many	  cases,	  are	  
normatively	  or	  ideologically	  motivate[d]	  in	  their	  struggle	  for	  shared	  aims”	  (Garrelts	  &	  
Dietz	  2014,	  p.	  7).	  
Having	  established	  that	  there	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  distinct	  social	  movement	  that	  can	  be	  
broadly	  categorised	  as	  a	  ‘climate	  movement,’	  understanding	  the	  location	  and	  role	  of	  
ecosocialists	  within	  this	  movement	  entails	  understanding	  its	  composition	  and	  
identifying	  the	  lines	  along	  which	  divisions	  within	  it	  occur.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task	  as	  
the	  climate	  movement	  consists	  of	  a	  bewilderingly	  diverse,	  overlapping,	  dynamic	  and	  
fluid	  variety	  of	  actors	  that	  include	  individuals,	  CSOs,	  SMOs	  and	  networks	  that	  often	  
overlap	  and	  defy	  categorisation	  into	  separate,	  strictly	  defined	  and	  stable	  
groupings.179	  The	  difficulties	  in	  mapping	  the	  climate	  movement	  are	  evident,	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  framing	  of	  climate	  change	  politics	  by	  some	  activists	  as	  a	  ‘generational	  clash’,	  and	  as	  a	  gender	  issue	  by	  activists	  who	  maintain	  that	  climate	  change	  will	  disproportionately	  affect	  women	  (Garrelts	  &	  Deitz	  2014,	  p.	  3).	  179	  As	  Dietz	  and	  Garrelts	  (2014,	  p.	  2)	  note,	  “The	  movement	  is	  made	  up	  of	  hundreds	  of	  organizations,	  several	  thousand	  activists,	  and	  large	  numbers	  of	  sympathisers	  and	  supporters…”	  who	  agree	  in	  their	  demand	  that	  GHG	  emissions	  be	  reduced.	  The	  dynamic	  and	  unstable	  nature	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  evident	  in	  how	  splits	  sometimes	  occur	  within	  it,	  with	  these	  splits	  sometimes	  even	  dividing	  the	  members	  of	  other	  ‘umbrella’	  NGOs	  that	  are	  members	  of	  CAN-­‐I.	  FoE	  is	  one	  example	  of	  such	  a	  split,	  with	  FoE	  International	  and	  some	  other	  country	  FoE	  organisations	  leaving	  CAN	  in	  the	  late	  2000s	  (CAN	  2014)	  while	  others	  (such	  as	  FoE	  Australia	  and	  FoE	  Canada)	  are	  still	  members	  (CAN-­‐I	  n.d.).	  Refer	  to	  Dombrowski	  (2010)	  for	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  ideological	  
	   184	  
instance,	  if	  one	  considers	  that	  the	  NGOs	  active	  in	  the	  climate	  movement	  represent	  a	  
broad	  spectrum	  of	  interests	  and	  include	  both	  large	  ENGOs	  and	  smaller	  grassroots	  
environmental	  groups,	  development	  and	  human	  rights	  NGOs,	  indigenous	  peoples’	  
organisations,	  sections	  of	  organised	  labour,	  women’s	  groups,	  youth	  groups,	  groups	  
representing	  the	  interests	  of	  small-­‐scale	  peasant	  farmers	  and	  fisherpeople,	  and	  
student	  groups	  (Cabré	  2011;	  Wahlström,	  Wennerhag	  &	  Rootes	  2013).180	  Given	  the	  
diversity	  of	  climate	  movement	  actors,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  analysts	  have	  traced	  its	  
roots	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  SMOs,	  such	  as	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  environmental	  movement,	  
the	  environmental	  justice	  movement,	  and	  the	  Global	  Justice	  Movement	  (GJM)	  in	  the	  
Global	  North,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  small-­‐scale	  subsistence	  farmers	  
and	  fisherpeople	  (predominantly,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  in	  the	  Global	  South)	  who	  are	  
trying	  to	  protect	  their	  traditional	  lands	  and	  sources	  of	  reproduction	  that	  are	  being	  
threatened	  as	  global	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  expand.	  
In	  view	  of	  the	  insurmountable	  challenges	  faced	  by	  those	  attempting	  to	  map	  the	  
networks	  of	  component	  actors	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  in	  detail,	  many	  analysts	  
find	  it	  useful	  to	  at	  least	  distinguish	  between	  its	  two	  major	  ‘wings’	  or	  ‘streams’:	  the	  
more	  moderate	  wing	  (which	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  ‘climate	  action’	  wing)	  working	  towards	  
reforming	  global	  capitalism	  by	  calling	  for	  the	  decarbonisation	  of	  the	  global	  economy,	  
and	  the	  system-­‐critical	  ‘radical	  climate	  justice’	  wing	  that	  sees	  climate	  change	  as	  one	  
of	  many	  manifestations	  of	  a	  much	  wider	  crisis	  that	  can	  only	  be	  resolved	  by	  
fundamental	  system	  change.181	  An	  awareness	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  underpinnings	  of	  FoE	  International’s	  decision	  to	  withdraw	  from	  CAN-­‐I,	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  withdrawal	  demonstrates	  the	  perhaps	  unavoidable	  contradiction	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  vulnerable	  people	  at	  ‘local’	  levels	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  global	  elites	  that	  take	  priority	  in	  official	  ‘global	  level’	  meetings	  and	  negotiations.	  180	  The	  diversity	  of	  interests	  that	  climate	  movement	  participants	  represent	  is	  too	  extensive	  to	  describe	  in	  detail,	  and	  this	  is	  far	  from	  an	  exhaustive	  list	  of	  the	  range	  of	  groups	  involved	  in	  the	  movement.	  The	  impossibility	  of	  neatly	  categorizing	  the	  different	  actors	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  Carter’s	  (2001,	  p.	  320)	  observation	  that	  “[t]he	  range	  of	  groups	  in	  attendance	  has	  also	  expanded	  beyond	  environmental	  groups	  from	  industrialized	  countries	  to	  include	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  developing-­‐country	  NGOs,	  student	  groups,	  religious	  groups,	  local	  and	  state	  councils,	  and	  indigenous	  peoples’	  groups.	  These	  efforts	  to	  share	  information,	  influence	  the	  media	  and	  build	  networks	  continue	  beyond	  the	  negotiating	  halls	  of	  high-­‐level	  COPs,	  with	  numerous	  new	  climate-­‐related	  websites,	  reports	  and	  studies	  emerging	  nearly	  every	  month.”	  181	  Different	  analysts	  use	  a	  variety	  of	  criteria	  to	  disaggregate	  the	  climate	  movement	  for	  analytical	  purposes,	  and	  the	  terminology	  they	  invent	  also	  varies	  (sometimes	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extremes	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  of	  the	  nuanced	  differences	  in	  the	  common	  ground	  
they	  seemingly	  share,	  is	  crucial	  if	  one	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  ecosocialist	  
theorists	  and	  activists	  within	  the	  broader	  climate	  movement.	  Also	  important	  in	  
understanding	  the	  role	  of	  ecosocialists	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  being	  aware	  
of	  the	  very	  messy	  ‘in-­‐between’	  space	  which	  many	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  movement	  actors	  (as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  leadership)	  occupy	  (Wahlström,	  Wennerhag	  &	  Rootes	  2013)	  and	  
which	  represents	  a	  continuum	  between	  the	  two	  extreme	  wings.	  Given	  these	  
prerequisites,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  ideological	  division	  is	  the	  most	  crucial	  of	  the	  four	  lines	  
of	  division	  identified	  by	  Garrelts	  and	  Dietz	  (2014).	  Despite	  participating	  in	  the	  same	  
mass	  protest	  actions	  such	  as	  the	  2014	  and	  2015	  People’s	  Climate	  Marches,	  in	  this	  
dissertation	  the	  reformist	  climate	  action	  and	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  extremes	  are	  
treated	  as	  analytically	  distinct	  and	  fundamentally	  ideologically	  opposed	  wings	  of	  the	  
climate	  movement.182	  I	  emphasise	  the	  ideological	  distinction	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  confusingly,	  as	  different	  theorists	  sometimes	  use	  the	  same	  term	  as	  others,	  but	  define	  them	  in	  different	  ways).	  Steger,	  Goodman	  and	  Wilson	  (2013),	  for	  instance,	  seem	  to	  use	  a	  criterion	  that	  hinges	  on	  the	  relative	  access	  to	  power	  of	  different	  groups	  engaged	  in	  the	  climate	  negotiation	  process	  because	  the	  two	  extremes	  they	  identify	  fall	  broadly	  into	  governmental	  and	  intergovernmental	  actors	  in	  one	  category	  and	  actors	  within	  civil	  society’s	  climate	  movement	  in	  another	  category.	  They	  disaggregate	  these	  extremes	  into	  additional	  sub-­‐categories,	  identifying	  two	  reform-­‐oriented	  perspectives	  that	  dominate	  formal	  climate	  negotiations	  as	  ‘market	  globalism’	  and	  ‘elite	  Third-­‐World	  developmentalism,’	  both	  of	  which	  aim	  to	  “protect	  vested	  interests	  and	  maximize	  economic	  growth	  and	  industrialism.”	  They	  also	  distinguish	  between	  three	  positions	  in	  the	  informal	  climate	  movement	  located	  within	  civil	  society:	  ‘climate	  action,’	  ‘climate	  autonomy,’	  and	  ‘climate	  justice,’	  providing	  the	  disclaimer	  that	  several	  of	  the	  groups	  they	  included	  in	  their	  study	  “engaged	  with	  more	  than	  one	  of	  these	  approaches”	  (Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  2013,	  pp.	  127	  –	  128).	  This	  disclaimer	  constitutes	  another	  illustration	  of	  the	  difficulties	  of	  analytically	  disentangling	  the	  continuum	  of	  positions	  that	  the	  climate	  movement’s	  component	  actors	  represent.	  Using	  climate	  movement	  participants’	  ‘prognostic	  framing’	  (that	  is,	  what	  solutions	  they	  propose	  for	  addressing	  global	  warming)	  rather	  than	  relative	  power	  as	  their	  criterion,	  Wahlström,	  Wennerhag	  and	  Rootes	  (2013,	  p.	  102,	  p.	  105)	  categorise	  climate	  movement	  actors	  into	  those	  who	  support	  climate	  justice	  and	  call	  for	  ‘systemic	  changes	  involving	  global	  justice,’	  those	  who	  call	  for	  individual	  ‘behavioural	  changes’	  (which	  may	  be	  either	  reformist	  or	  relate	  to	  social	  movement	  ‘life	  politics’),	  and	  reformists	  who	  support	  policy	  changes	  within	  existing	  institutions.	  182	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  particular	  line	  of	  division	  is	  acknowledged	  by	  Garrelts	  and	  Dietz	  (2014,	  p.	  7),	  who	  point	  out	  that	  there	  are	  serious	  disagreements	  between	  groups	  and	  actors	  who	  are	  supportive	  (and	  sometimes	  actively	  engaged	  in	  facilitating)	  “the	  concrete	  implementation	  of	  existing	  climate	  policy	  instruments”	  and	  groups	  and	  actors	  who	  reject	  all	  such	  compromises.	  Similar	  analytical	  distinctions	  are	  also	  made	  by	  other	  analysts,	  some	  of	  whom	  even	  discuss	  the	  environmental	  and	  climate	  movements	  by	  referring	  explicitly	  to	  Robert	  Cox’s	  important	  distinction	  between	  problem	  solving	  and	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useful	  analytical	  tool	  for	  discussing	  the	  key	  debates	  within	  the	  climate	  movement,	  
where	  climate	  action	  activists	  and	  radical	  climate	  justice	  activists	  (with	  the	  latter	  
including	  ecosocialists)	  are	  engaged	  in	  what	  Gramsci	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  ‘war	  of	  position’	  
in	  contesting	  their	  ideas	  within	  the	  terrain	  of	  the	  political	  arena	  of	  ‘civil	  society’.183	  
The	  ‘war	  of	  position’	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  
As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  ideological	  perspective	  that	  informs	  one’s	  
understanding	  of	  the	  world	  has	  a	  profound	  influence	  on	  the	  identifications	  of	  the	  
causes	  of,	  and	  potential	  solutions	  to,	  complex	  challenges	  such	  as	  global	  warming	  and	  
the	  resulting	  climate	  change.	  Climate	  change	  is	  a	  particularly	  politicised	  issue,	  as	  
Bedall	  and	  Görg	  (2014),	  among	  others	  (for	  example,	  Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  
2013),	  point	  out,	  because:	  
Climate change is embedded in complex societal conflicts… 
[which] are rooted in divergent interests in society. They have to do, 
for example, with the dependence of certain industrial sectors on the 
use of fossil fuels and with the greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with that use. They also have to do with the situation of social 
groups who are particularly hard hit by the impacts of climate 
change. Yet neither of these facets – more narrowly defined 
economic interests on the one hand and social vulnerabilities on the 
other – exists independently of its interpretation and construction 
through language. They have to be created discursively and become 
established and accepted as more or less dominant interpretations. 
(Bedall & Görg 2014, p. 44; emphasis in original) 
The	  war	  of	  position	  between	  reformist	  and	  critical	  positions	  is	  thus	  largely	  fought	  
through	  the	  discursive	  debates	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  causes	  of	  (and	  hence	  possible	  solutions	  
to)	  climate	  change	  between	  different	  actors	  within	  the	  broad	  climate	  movement	  (de	  
Lucia	  2014).	  One	  way	  of	  understanding	  this	  ideological	  difference	  between	  the	  
moderate	  and	  radical	  wings	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  to	  refer	  to	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  
concepts	  that	  distinguish	  between	  problem	  solving	  and	  critical	  approaches	  (as	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  critical	  approaches	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  Gramscian	  notion	  of	  hegemony	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Elliott	  2004,	  pp.	  224	  –	  226	  and	  de	  Lucia	  2009,	  2014).	  183	  This	  ideological	  division	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  tactics	  and	  actions;	  for	  example,	  on	  the	  day	  after	  the	  2014	  People’s	  Climate	  March,	  the	  radical	  wing	  of	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  organised	  and	  participated	  in	  a	  much	  smaller	  but	  more	  militant	  ‘breakaway	  Flood	  Wall	  Street	  action,’	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  links	  between	  ‘Wall	  Street’	  (representing	  capitalism)	  and	  the	  climate	  crisis	  (Giacomini	  &	  Turner	  2015).	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The	  moderate	  climate	  action	  movement	  identifies	  the	  cause	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  
largely	  scientific	  and	  politically	  ‘sanitised’	  technical	  terms;	  for	  example,	  they	  focus	  
almost	  exclusively	  on	  how	  increases	  in	  GHG	  emissions	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  are	  
changing	  the	  Earth’s	  energy	  balance	  (Bedell	  &	  Görg	  2014;	  de	  Lucia	  2014;	  Tokar	  
2014).	  	  This	  approach	  treats	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  specific,	  discrete,	  and	  often	  
technical	  ‘silo	  issue’	  and	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  it	  can	  be	  addressed	  in	  isolation	  
by	  ‘problem	  solving’	  and	  tweaking	  global	  capitalism	  so	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  powered	  
by	  fossil	  fuels.	  This	  leads	  climate	  action	  movement	  supporters	  to	  try	  to	  solve	  the	  
problem	  of	  climate	  change	  by	  lobbying	  governments	  and	  policymakers	  to	  implement	  
reforms	  to	  the	  current	  system.	  The	  solutions	  they	  propose	  include	  the	  adoption	  of	  
renewable	  technologies	  for	  energy	  production	  and	  the	  development	  and	  
implementation	  of	  a	  mix	  of	  regulatory	  policies	  closely	  aligned	  with	  ‘market	  
instruments’	  to	  achieve	  a	  transition	  from	  a	  global	  capitalist	  economy	  based	  on	  the	  
use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  to	  a	  ‘green’	  global	  capitalist	  economy	  based	  on	  renewable	  energy.	  
Many	  supporters	  of	  climate	  action	  are	  therefore	  generally	  committed	  “to	  a	  paradigm	  
of	  ecological	  modernization	  according	  to	  which	  environmental	  problems	  can	  be	  
resolved	  politically,	  economically,	  and	  technologically	  within	  the	  context	  of	  real	  
existing	  institutions	  and	  power	  structures.	  Importantly,	  adherents	  of	  the	  
modernization	  camp	  also	  believe	  that	  their	  aims	  are	  compatible	  with	  continuing	  
economic	  growth”	  (Garrelts	  and	  Dietz	  2014,	  p.	  2).	  
While	  agreeing	  with	  the	  moderate	  climate	  action	  movement’s	  identification	  of	  the	  
physical	  mechanisms	  and	  material	  manifestations	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  
the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  goes	  much	  further	  in	  its	  analyses	  of	  both	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  its	  causes	  and	  consequences,	  pointing	  to	  relations	  of	  
domination	  in	  all	  their	  forms	  (along	  the	  lines	  of	  class,	  sex,	  race,	  and	  human	  attempts	  
to	  dominate	  nature)	  as	  the	  primary	  causes	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  interconnected	  
environmental,	  economic,	  and	  socio-­‐political	  problems	  (Bedell	  &	  Görg	  2014;	  
Giacomini	  &	  Turner	  2015).184	  Actors	  within	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  De	  Lucia	  (2014)	  raises	  the	  crucial	  point	  that	  even	  radical	  climate	  justice	  actors	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  avoid	  being	  drawn	  into	  hegemonic	  discourses	  of	  ‘parts	  per	  million’	  and	  technological	  solutions,	  thus	  diverting	  their	  attention	  and	  presenting	  dangers	  of	  
trasformismo	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3).	  He	  also	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	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thus	  use	  a	  critical	  perspective	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  very	  complex	  understanding	  of	  climate	  
change	  as	  only	  one	  challenge	  to	  humanity	  that	  is	  evolving	  within	  the	  context	  of	  an	  
ever-­‐expanding	  global	  capitalist	  system	  in	  which	  a	  small	  global	  elite	  exploits	  both	  
nature	  and	  people	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  its	  economic	  wealth	  and	  political	  power	  
(Burgmann	  &	  Baer	  2012;	  Tanuro	  2013).	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  radical	  climate	  
justice	  movement	  actors,	  climate	  change	  is	  thus	  only	  one	  symptom	  (albeit	  an	  
extremely	  important	  and	  pressing	  symptom)	  of	  the	  widespread	  ecological	  
destruction	  and	  social	  harms	  that	  results	  from	  the	  pervasive	  relations	  of	  domination	  
that	  characterise	  global	  capitalism	  (Bedall	  &	  Görg	  2014;	  Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  
2013).185	  Given	  their	  analyses	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  causes	  of	  the	  multiple	  crises	  
humanity	  currently	  faces,	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  actors	  argue	  that	  the	  
solution	  to	  these	  interconnected	  problems	  requires	  fundamental	  ‘system	  change’.186	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  concept	  ‘climate	  justice’	  is	  interpreted	  differently	  by	  actors	  within	  the	  climate	  movement;	  having	  always	  had	  a	  moderate,	  institutional	  meaning	  as	  enshrined	  in	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  it	  was	  more	  extensively	  ‘mainstreamed’	  at	  COP-­‐15	  so	  that	  it	  now	  risks	  being	  an	  ‘empty	  signifier.’	  As	  such,	  ‘climate	  justice’	  is	  “a	  contested	  and	  ambiguously	  under-­‐determined	  concept,	  …	  open	  to	  hegemonic	  appropriation	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  mechanics	  of	  trasformismo”	  (de	  Lucia	  2014,	  p.	  67).	  As	  Smith,	  Plummer	  &	  Hughes	  (2017,	  p.	  5)	  point	  out,	  the	  mechanics	  of	  trasformismo	  involve	  not	  only	  the	  assimilation	  and	  co-­‐optation	  of	  movement	  organisations	  themselves,	  but	  also	  their	  ‘discourses	  and	  agendas,’	  thereby	  “obscuring	  the	  boundaries	  between	  social	  movements	  and	  actors	  that	  perpetuate	  the	  status	  quo.”	  To	  avoid	  confusion,	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  resort	  to	  the	  clumsy	  (but	  hopefully	  more	  accurate)	  label	  ‘radical	  climate	  justice’	  wing	  in	  this	  thesis.	  185	  Collins	  (2015)	  identifies	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  radicalism	  in	  those	  groups	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  who	  support	  ‘deep	  ecology’	  positions	  and	  who	  argue	  that	  “the	  survival	  of	  the	  planet	  trumps	  all	  other	  concerns.”	  The	  deep	  ecology	  position	  is	  not	  discussed	  in	  any	  detail	  in	  this	  dissertation	  because	  it	  is	  not	  a	  widely-­‐held	  view	  within	  either	  of	  the	  major	  wings	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  and	  is	  also	  antithetical	  to	  ecosocialist	  thinking,	  which	  aims	  to	  re-­‐establish	  ecological	  balance	  in	  the	  Earth	  System	  so	  that	  humanity	  can	  thrive,	  along	  with	  other	  animals	  and	  life	  forms,	  by	  drawing	  sustainably	  on	  the	  sources	  of	  all	  wealth	  (unalienated	  labour	  and	  nature,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7).	  186	  Some	  climate	  activists	  are	  much	  more	  forthcoming	  than	  others	  about	  what	  sort	  of	  post-­‐capitalist	  future	  they	  envisage	  as	  possible	  or	  desirable,	  which	  is	  another	  instance	  of	  the	  ‘messiness’	  of	  real	  life	  that	  defies	  containing	  either	  ideas	  or	  people	  into	  the	  convenient,	  neat	  categories	  that	  would	  expedite	  analysis;	  for	  example,	  widely-­‐respected	  climate	  activist	  Naomi	  Klein	  has	  been	  critiqued	  on	  this	  issue	  by	  some	  climate	  justice	  movement	  actors	  but	  others,	  with	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  strategy	  and	  tactics,	  defend	  her	  against	  these	  critiques	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Smith	  &	  Foster	  2017).	  This	  debate	  performs	  a	  vital	  function	  (as	  do	  all	  such	  debates	  within	  the	  climate	  movement,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  conducted	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  respectful)	  by	  contributing	  to	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  issues	  by	  all	  parties	  concerned	  and	  by	  others	  following	  it	  and	  thinking	  about	  the	  issues	  raised,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  8.	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A	  comparison	  of	  how	  climate	  action	  supporters	  and	  how	  radical	  climate	  justice	  
activists	  interpret	  phrases	  such	  as	  ‘connecting	  the	  dots’	  demonstrates	  the	  different	  
positions	  adopted	  by	  the	  two	  wings	  of	  the	  climate	  movement.	  The	  2012	  climate	  
action	  movement’s	  350.org-­‐initiated	  campaign	  aimed	  to	  ‘connect	  the	  dots’	  between	  
climate	  change	  and	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  ‘extreme’	  weather	  events	  around	  the	  
world	  (McKibben	  2012a),	  thereby	  narrowly	  focusing	  on	  the	  physical	  and	  technical	  
aspects	  of	  anthropogenic	  GHG	  emissions	  and	  the	  scientific	  and	  technical	  aspects	  of	  
their	  physical	  effects.	  Climate	  justice	  activists	  argue	  that	  a	  genuine	  understanding	  of	  
the	  global	  warming	  crisis	  entails	  ‘connecting	  the	  dots’	  between:	  the	  scientific	  
evidence	  of	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  and	  other	  anthropogenic	  threats	  to	  the	  
Earth’s	  biosphere;	  the	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  systems	  created	  by	  humans	  
(and	  therefore	  subject	  to	  being	  changed	  by	  humans)	  causing	  the	  current	  crises;	  and	  
the	  ethical	  implications	  of	  different	  courses	  of	  action.	  As	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  
Chapters	  7	  and	  8,	  ecosocialist	  analyses	  and	  arguments	  are	  well	  equipped	  to	  make	  
strong	  contributions	  to	  joining	  the	  ‘dots’	  in	  this	  war	  of	  position,	  thereby	  building	  on	  
prevailing	  	  ‘common	  sense’	  understandings	  (which	  can	  be	  partial,	  incomplete,	  or	  
somewhat	  incoherent)	  of	  the	  causes	  and	  dangers	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  
in	  order	  to	  promote	  what	  Gramsci	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  more	  coherent	  and	  developed	  ‘good	  
sense’	  of	  these	  causes	  and,	  very	  importantly,	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  different	  
proposed	  solutions	  for	  different	  groups	  of	  people.	  In	  contrast	  to	  moderate	  climate	  
action	  movement	  concerns	  about	  the	  physical	  and	  technical	  aspects	  of	  climate	  
change,	  ecosocialist	  analyses	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  ethical	  dimensions	  of	  the	  issue.	  
By	  consistently	  linking	  climate	  change	  and	  social	  justice	  issues,	  ecosocialist	  analyses	  
emphasise	  that	  there	  is	  much	  at	  stake	  in	  who	  succeeds	  in	  winning	  this	  ideological	  
debate:	  it	  is	  not	  overstating	  the	  case	  that	  the	  lives	  of	  many	  people	  depend	  on	  the	  
outcome	  of	  this	  war	  of	  position	  and	  its	  success	  in	  building	  a	  powerful	  counter-­‐
hegemonic	  bloc	  to	  shift	  the	  debate	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  from	  what	  radical	  
climate	  justice	  activists	  see	  as	  dangerous,	  narrow	  problem-­‐solving	  ‘false	  solutions’	  
and	  instead	  turn	  its	  energies	  towards	  working	  on	  ‘system	  change’:	  creating	  a	  more	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truly	  sustainable	  society	  with	  different	  values.187	  The	  division	  between	  problem-­‐
solving	  and	  critical	  approaches	  within	  the	  larger	  climate	  movement	  is	  exemplified	  by	  
its	  two	  largest	  umbrella	  organisations,	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  International	  (CAN-­‐I)	  
and	  CJN!,	  which	  are	  networks	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  NGOs,	  CSOs	  and	  social	  movements.	  
Ecosocialists	  align	  themselves	  with	  CJN!,	  and	  were	  involved	  in	  forming	  the	  new	  
coalition	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  CAN-­‐I	  had	  started	  supporting	  what	  radical	  
climate	  justice	  advocates	  saw	  as	  ‘false	  solutions’.	  The	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  
formation	  of	  CJN!	  are	  discussed	  after	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  CAN-­‐I.	  
Climate	  Action	  Network	  International	  (CAN-­‐I)	  
Widely	  acknowledged	  as	  the	  oldest	  and	  most	  popular	  actor	  in	  the	  climate	  movement	  
(Duwe	  2001;	  Garrelts	  2014;	  Guldbrandsen	  &	  Andresen	  2004),	  CAN-­‐I	  claims	  a	  
membership	  of	  “over	  1100	  NGOs	  in	  over	  120	  countries”	  and	  describes	  its	  mission	  as	  
being	  “to	  promote	  government	  and	  individual	  action	  to	  limit	  human-­‐induced	  climate	  
change	  to	  ecologically	  sustainable	  levels”	  (CAN-­‐I	  n.d.,	  viewed	  8	  January	  2017).	  
Originally	  constituted	  as	  the	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  (CAN)	  and	  renamed	  Climate	  
Action	  Network	  International	  in	  2004	  (CAN	  2014),	  this	  umbrella	  organisation	  
represents	  the	  reformist	  wing	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  and	  was	  established	  as	  a	  
coalition	  of	  NGOs	  in	  1989	  “with	  the	  central	  objective	  of	  ensuring	  the	  1992	  UN	  
Conference	  on	  the	  Environment	  and	  Development	  (UNCED)	  would	  implement	  strong	  
emissions	  reductions”	  (Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  2013,	  p.	  137).188	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  As	  Connelly	  (2007)	  points	  out,	  ‘sustainable	  development’	  is	  a	  contested	  concept,	  and	  different	  definitions	  of	  ‘sustainability’	  and	  ‘sustainable	  development’	  favour	  a	  variety	  of	  political	  projects	  (see	  also	  Brown	  2016;	  Connelly	  2007;	  Hadden	  &	  Seybert	  2016;	  Ross	  2009).	  Definitions	  of	  sustainable	  development	  that	  locate	  it	  within	  a	  context	  of	  ‘green	  capitalism’	  are	  sometimes	  used	  to	  support	  neoliberal	  governmentality	  while	  other	  definitions	  support	  radical	  socialist	  egalitarianism	  and	  yet	  others	  support	  a	  range	  of	  positions	  in	  between.	  188	  NGO	  participation	  in	  UN	  events	  pre-­‐dated	  UNCED,	  however.	  Willetts	  (1996,	  pp.	  57,	  67-­‐68)	  identifies	  the	  1972	  Stockholm	  Conference	  (the	  UNCHE)	  as	  a	  ‘turning-­‐point’	  with	  respect	  to	  NGO	  participation	  in	  UN	  events,	  and	  attributes	  this	  largely	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  conference	  Secretary-­‐	  General,	  Maurice	  Strong,	  who	  “contributed	  significantly	  to	  overcoming	  the	  opposition	  to	  participation	  by	  NGOs”.	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CAN-­‐I	  has	  a	  complex	  organisational	  structure,	  and	  only	  some	  features	  of	  its	  
organisation	  and	  operations	  are	  discussed	  here.189	  In	  2015,	  CAN-­‐I	  members	  were	  
organised	  into	  ten	  regional	  and	  eleven	  national	  networks	  (called	  ‘nodes’),	  and	  there	  
were	  also	  16	  working	  groups	  tasked	  with	  formulating	  the	  network’s	  policy	  positions	  
and	  briefs	  on	  various	  issues	  (CAN-­‐I	  2016).190	  	  The	  policy	  briefs	  culminate	  in	  CAN-­‐I’s	  
annual	  policy	  document	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  CAN	  2015),	  which	  is	  used	  to	  support	  
its	  advocacy	  of	  various	  issues	  in	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  (CAN-­‐I	  2016).	  Apart	  from	  its	  
‘insider’	  advocacy	  activities	  as	  a	  registered	  CSO	  observer	  at	  the	  COPs	  (Dombrowski	  
2010),	  CAN-­‐I	  members	  also	  contribute	  in	  many	  valuable	  ways	  to	  information	  
dissemination	  during	  the	  official	  climate	  change	  meetings	  by,	  for	  example,	  providing	  
updates	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  negotiations	  via	  their	  daily	  newsletter,	  ECO,	  a	  
practice	  established	  in	  1990	  (CAN	  2014;	  Carpenter	  2001).191	  Information	  about	  the	  
progress	  of	  official	  climate	  change	  negotiations	  and	  CAN-­‐I	  activities	  is	  also	  
disseminated	  through	  its	  websites,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  was	  established	  in	  1998	  (CAN	  
2014).	  In	  addition	  to	  its	  ‘insider’	  tactics	  of	  working	  with	  officials	  in	  COPs,	  CAN-­‐I	  
members	  also	  engage	  in	  ‘outsider’	  tactics	  like	  protest	  marches	  and	  other	  publicity-­‐
raising	  campaign	  events.	  The	  ‘Fossil	  of	  the	  Day’	  award,	  presented	  to	  the	  countries	  
whose	  representatives	  have	  most	  obstructed	  official	  negotiations	  on	  any	  given	  day,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Refer	  to	  the	  CAN-­‐I	  website	  (n.d.),	  CAN-­‐I	  key	  documents	  (2014,	  2015,	  2016),	  Dombrowski	  (2010)	  and	  Duwe	  (2001)	  for	  more	  detailed	  descriptions	  and	  analyses	  of	  CAN-­‐I’s	  organisational	  structure	  and	  operations.	  190	  CAN-­‐I	  2015	  working	  group	  themes	  included	  ‘Adaptation	  and	  loss	  &	  damage’,	  ‘Legal	  Issues’,	  ‘Flexible	  Mechanisms’,	  ‘Finance’,	  and	  ‘NGO	  Participation’	  (CAN-­‐I	  2015).	  	  191	  Dellmuth	  and	  Tallberg	  (2017,	  p.	  2)	  define	  ‘insider	  strategies’	  as	  “activities	  which	  aim	  to	  influence	  political	  outcomes	  through	  direct	  interaction	  with	  decision-­‐makers”	  and	  ‘outsider’	  strategies	  as	  “activities	  which	  aim	  to	  influence	  outcomes	  by	  putting	  pressure	  on	  decision-­‐makers	  through	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  public	  opinion.”	  Guldbrandsen	  and	  Andresen	  (2004)	  note	  that	  ‘a	  particularly	  large	  contingent’	  of	  US-­‐based	  NGOs	  use	  insider	  tactics.	  Many	  NGOs	  typically	  use	  a	  combination	  of	  insider	  and	  outsider	  tactics	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  aims	  (Dalmuth	  &	  Tallberg	  2017;	  Guldbrandsen	  &	  Andresen	  2004).	  While	  CAN-­‐I	  does	  adopt	  such	  a	  dual	  strategy,	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  does	  not.	  CJN!	  was,	  in	  fact,	  established	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups	  opposing	  CAN-­‐I	  ‘insider’	  tactics;	  it	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  ‘counter-­‐mobilisation’,	  which	  occurs	  “when	  issues	  are	  politically	  contentious”	  (Dellmuth	  &	  Tallberg	  2017,	  p.	  6).	  Redistributive	  demands,	  such	  as	  those	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  supports,	  are	  particularly	  likely	  to	  be	  “highly	  politicised	  because	  of	  their	  transparent	  implications	  for	  costs	  and	  benefits”	  (Dellmuth	  &	  Tallberg	  2017,	  p.	  6).	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demonstrates	  the	  humour	  employed	  in	  some	  CAN-­‐I	  ‘outsider’	  tactics	  (CAN	  2014,	  
2016).192	  	  
Steger,	  Goodman	  and	  Wilson	  (2013,	  p.	  137)	  describe	  CAN-­‐I	  as	  being	  initially	  
‘relatively	  agnostic’	  about	  how	  to	  achieve	  the	  GHG	  emission	  reductions	  required	  to	  
limit	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  although	  Bedell	  and	  Görg	  (2014,	  pp.	  48	  -­‐	  49)	  
comment	  on	  how,	  prior	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  in	  1997,	  CAN-­‐I’s	  
position	  statements	  were	  critical	  of	  market	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  emission	  trading	  
schemes	  (ETS),	  the	  CDM,	  and	  JI	  projects	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  these	  had	  to	  be	  
ineffective	  in	  reducing	  GHGs	  as	  well	  as	  their	  potential	  to	  exacerbate	  social	  
inequalities.	  Bedell	  &	  Görg	  (2014,	  p.	  49)	  argue	  that	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  
Protocol,	  CAN-­‐I’s	  positions	  became	  increasingly	  aligned	  with	  officially-­‐sanctioned	  
policy	  approaches,	  and	  civil	  society	  actors	  under	  its	  umbrella	  came	  to	  be	  “integrally	  
involved	  in	  (re-­‐)producing	  the	  emerging	  hegemonic	  consensus”	  of	  turning	  to	  the	  
market	  to	  solve	  the	  climate	  crisis,	  thus	  contributing	  to	  the	  legitimation	  of	  solutions	  
that	  de-­‐emphasise	  both	  wider	  ecological	  issues	  and	  social	  justice	  issues	  (see	  also	  
CAN	  2014	  and	  Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  2013).	  Taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  disputes	  
between	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  and	  renewable	  energy	  factions	  of	  the	  transnational	  capitalist	  
class,	  CAN-­‐I	  supports	  the	  neoliberalising	  project	  of	  creating	  a	  ‘green	  economy’:	  while	  
calling	  for	  an	  immediate	  end	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  subsidies,	  it	  simultaneously	  urges	  a	  
transition	  to	  a	  global	  economy	  powered	  by	  renewable	  energy	  by	  2050	  at	  the	  latest	  
and	  supports	  a	  variety	  of	  market	  instruments	  to	  facilitate	  this	  transition	  (CAN	  2015).	  	  
The	  argument	  that	  ‘green	  capitalism’	  constitutes	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  
neoliberalisation	  project	  (Goodman	  &	  Salleh	  2013;	  Kenis	  &	  Lievens	  2016)	  is	  evident	  
in	  how	  it	  is	  being	  promoted	  not	  only	  by	  representatives	  of	  emerging	  renewable	  
technology	  industries	  and	  their	  allies	  (like	  CAN-­‐I),	  but	  also	  by	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  
World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IMF,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  other	  financial	  institutions	  working	  to	  
commodify	  the	  natural	  resources	  that	  all	  life	  depends	  on:	  resources	  such	  as	  water	  
(much	  of	  which	  has	  already	  been	  commodified	  and	  privatised),	  the	  atmosphere	  (by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  Refer	  to	  Small	  Window,	  Bright	  Light:	  A	  history	  of	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  (CAN	  2014)	  for	  personal	  accounts	  of	  CAN	  participant	  experiences,	  including	  memorable	  events	  such	  as	  the	  ‘Fossil	  of	  the	  Day’	  awards.	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putting	  a	  price	  on	  carbon),	  forests,	  and	  soil	  (Adelman	  2015).193	  While	  not	  linking	  its	  
policies	  overtly	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  project	  of	  commodifying	  nature,	  CAN-­‐I’s	  support	  for	  
this	  project	  is	  clearly	  evident	  in	  its	  most	  current	  Annual	  Report	  (CAN	  2016)	  and	  
annual	  policy	  document	  (CAN	  2015),	  where	  it	  insists	  on	  the	  need	  to	  accurately	  
monitor,	  measure	  and	  record	  ‘sources	  and	  sinks’	  of	  GHG	  emissions.	  While	  CAN-­‐I	  
justifies	  its	  promotion	  of	  robust	  Monitoring,	  Reporting	  and	  Verification	  (MRV)	  
procedures	  in	  terms	  of	  using	  them	  to	  ensure	  the	  environmental	  effectiveness	  of	  
REDD+	  and	  Land	  Use,	  Land	  Use	  Change	  and	  Forestry	  (LULUCF)	  projects	  (CAN-­‐I	  2015),	  
verifiable	  measurement	  and	  accurate	  record-­‐keeping	  are	  also	  necessary	  steps	  in	  the	  
creation	  of	  new	  commodities	  that	  can	  be	  traded	  (Adelman	  2015;	  Newell	  &	  Bumpus	  
2012).194	  	  
CAN-­‐I’s	  support	  for	  this	  expansive	  neoliberalisation	  project	  that	  aims	  to	  marketise	  
the	  entirety	  of	  nature	  is,	  perhaps,	  motivated	  by	  ‘pragmatic’	  considerations	  regarding	  
what	  CAN-­‐I	  leaders	  perceive	  as	  realistic	  and	  achievable,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  at	  least	  partially	  
attributable	  to	  the	  narrow,	  technical	  focus	  on	  GHG	  emission	  reductions	  that	  prevails	  
as	  the	  solution	  to	  global	  warming	  within	  the	  network.	  Contesting	  ideas	  from	  the	  
smaller	  and	  less	  powerful	  NGOs	  from	  the	  Global	  South	  that	  are	  concerned	  about	  the	  
economic	  and	  social	  implications	  of	  market	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  REDD+	  and	  LULUCF	  
are	  marginalised	  because	  of	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  the	  large,	  established	  North	  
American	  and	  Western	  European	  NGOs	  within	  CAN-­‐I	  (Bedell	  &	  Görg	  2014;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	  Commodification	  entails	  assigning	  monetary	  value	  to	  an	  entity	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  traded	  in	  markets.	  Schrijver	  (2016,	  pp.	  1252	  –	  1253)	  defines	  the	  ‘global	  commons’	  as	  “areas	  and	  natural	  resources	  that	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  national	  jurisdiction	  of	  a	  particular	  state	  but	  are	  shared	  by	  other	  states,	  if	  not	  the	  international	  community	  as	  a	  whole,”	  and	  argues	  that	  “certain	  global	  natural	  assets,	  such	  as	  the	  climate	  system,	  the	  air,	  water,	  seeds,	  winds	  and	  sunshine,	  could	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  global	  commons	  in	  view	  of	  the	  vital	  ecological	  functions	  that	  they	  perform	  for	  the	  Earth	  and	  its	  population.”	  194	  Newell	  and	  Bumpus	  (2012)	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  seemingly	  ‘technical	  exercises’	  of	  measurement	  and	  the	  ‘intricate	  politics’	  of	  commodifying	  carbon:	  “Carbon	  has	  to	  be	  rendered	  manageable,	  containable	  and	  quantifiable,	  fungible	  in	  value,	  and	  commensurate	  to	  be	  tradable	  as	  a	  commodity.	  What	  appear	  as	  mere	  technical	  exercises	  in	  measuring,	  accounting,	  and	  verifying	  emissions	  are	  deeply	  political…”	  (Newell	  &	  Bumpus	  2012,	  p.	  55).	  Bäckstrand	  &	  Lövbrand	  (2006)	  also	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  the	  central	  role	  that	  technocratic	  activities	  such	  as	  measurement,	  monitoring	  and	  certification	  play	  in	  dominant	  climate	  change	  governance	  discourses	  and	  policies.	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Dombrowski	  2010;	  Duwe	  2001;	  Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  2013).195	  Some	  of	  these	  
larger	  and	  well-­‐resourced	  CAN-­‐I	  members	  are	  known	  for	  their	  promotion	  of	  market	  
solutions	  to	  climate	  change;	  for	  example,	  the	  EDF	  has	  a	  reputation	  of	  working	  
‘relentlessly’	  to	  promote	  market-­‐based	  approaches	  in	  the	  climate	  negotiations	  and	  
of	  consistently	  opposing	  NGO	  positions	  that	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  US	  climate	  change	  
negotiators’	  goals	  (Guldbrandsen	  &	  Andresen	  2004;	  see	  also	  Hestres	  2015).196	  Other	  
CAN-­‐I	  members,	  such	  as	  WWF,	  have	  even	  taken	  an	  active	  role	  in	  implementing	  
neoliberal	  market	  solutions	  by	  helping	  to	  develop	  certification	  instruments	  such	  as	  
the	  ‘Gold	  Standard,’	  a	  tool	  designed	  to	  assess	  the	  alignment	  of	  CDM	  projects	  and	  
environmental	  standards	  (Bedell	  &	  Görg	  2014;	  CAN	  2014;	  Headon	  2009).197	  
The	  dangers	  of	  trasformismo	  and	  Passive	  Revolution:	  
Questioning	  the	  CAN-­‐I	  position	  
Radical	  climate	  justice	  advocates	  argue	  that	  CAN-­‐I’s	  close	  collaboration	  with	  official	  
policymakers	  and	  business	  interests	  is	  dangerous	  because	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  co-­‐
option	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  and	  can	  also	  legitimise	  neoliberal	  policies	  while	  
simultaneously	  foreclosing	  more	  socially	  just	  solutions	  to	  climate	  change	  (Bond	  &	  
Dorsey	  2010).198	  In	  Gramscian	  terms,	  the	  trasformismo	  of	  CAN-­‐I	  is	  evident	  in	  how	  its	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  CAN-­‐I	  policy	  documents	  frequently	  mention	  concerns	  about	  social	  justice	  issues	  as	  encapsulated	  in	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘human	  rights,’	  ‘food	  security,’	  ‘resilience,’	  and	  ‘stakeholder	  participation’	  (with	  all	  of	  these	  concepts	  being	  problematic	  given	  that	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  signify	  specific	  agendas	  that	  align	  with	  the	  project	  to	  ‘green’	  an	  expanding	  neoliberal	  global	  capitalism).	  Unlike	  the	  stance	  adopted	  by	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement,	  however,	  social	  justice	  and	  ethical	  issues	  are	  subsidiary	  to	  CAN-­‐I’s	  main	  concern:	  the	  reduction	  of	  GHG	  emissions	  irrespective	  of	  the	  means	  used	  to	  achieve	  this	  end.	  196	  According	  to	  Guldbrandsen	  and	  Andresen	  (2004,	  p.	  66),	  “The	  fact	  that	  ED	  [now	  EDF]	  sided	  with	  the	  US	  on	  key	  points	  has	  made	  it	  somewhat	  ‘suspicious’	  in	  many	  green	  quarters…”	  and	  CAN-­‐I	  temporarily	  suspended	  its	  membership	  at	  COP-­‐6	  at	  The	  Hague	  in	  2000	  because	  it	  broke	  ranks	  with	  other	  ENGO	  majors	  in	  their	  opposition	  against	  the	  adoption	  of	  market	  mechanisms.	  Despite	  the	  suspension,	  “…it	  was	  allowed	  to	  attend	  most	  CAN	  meetings	  and	  its	  membership	  was	  reinstated	  later.”	  	  197	  Carpenter	  (2001)	  discusses	  several	  other	  examples	  of	  industry	  collaborations	  and	  partnerships	  involving	  CAN-­‐I	  NGOs	  such	  as	  the	  WRI	  and	  EDF.	  198	  Similar	  critiques	  of	  voluntary	  certification	  standards	  are	  proposed	  by	  academics	  as	  well;	  for	  example,	  Bernstein	  and	  van	  der	  Ven	  (2017,	  p.	  555)	  discuss	  the	  role	  of	  standard	  setting	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘best	  practice’	  being	  used	  in	  global	  governance	  and	  caution	  that	  “…governance	  through	  best	  practices	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  marginalizing	  more	  disruptive	  approaches	  and	  reinforcing	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  mentality	  instead	  of	  a	  system-­‐transforming	  one.”	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support	  of	  ‘false	  solutions’	  furthers	  current	  attempts	  by	  the	  TCC	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  
rebuild	  and	  strengthen	  capital’s	  hegemonic	  historic	  bloc	  by	  incorporating	  concerns	  
about	  climate	  change,	  neutralising	  them,	  and	  thereby	  achieve	  a	  ‘revolution	  from	  
above.’	  Through	  such	  a	  passive	  revolution,	  neoliberal	  capitalism	  can	  expand	  by	  
commodifying	  nature	  and	  thereby	  not	  only	  ‘save’	  itself	  from	  the	  current	  
accumulation	  crisis	  (which	  has	  been	  ongoing	  since	  the	  GFC),	  but	  it	  can	  also	  
strengthen	  and	  expand	  its	  power	  and	  reach	  (Goodman	  &	  Salleh	  2013;	  Kenis	  &	  
Lievens	  2016).	  
There	  is	  much	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  justify	  arguments	  that	  close	  collaborations	  
between	  NGOs	  and	  official	  government	  and	  business	  interests	  can	  lead	  to	  
trasformismo.199	  For	  example,	  Dreiling,	  Lougee	  and	  Nakamura	  (2017)	  find	  that	  most	  
of	  the	  established	  Japanese	  environmental	  groups	  that	  failed	  to	  support	  the	  
widespread	  protests	  against	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  after	  the	  2011	  nuclear	  
meltdown	  at	  the	  Fukushima	  Daiichi	  power	  plants	  are	  embedded	  within	  a	  
constraining	  state-­‐corporate	  structure.200	  The	  Japanese	  environmental	  organisations	  
that	  refrained	  from	  reacting	  to	  the	  2011	  disaster	  were	  often	  established	  
collaboratively	  with	  the	  state	  and	  industry;	  they	  not	  only	  depend	  on	  government	  
funding,	  they	  are	  also	  ideologically	  aligned	  with	  long-­‐standing	  official	  discourses	  
positioning	  nuclear	  energy	  as	  a	  green,	  efficient,	  and	  modern	  solution	  to	  global	  
warming	  (Dreiling,	  Lougee	  &	  Nakamura	  2017).201	  In	  a	  different	  context,	  Jaffee’s	  
(2012)	  analysis	  of	  changes	  within	  the	  fair	  trade	  movement,	  which	  started	  using	  an	  
authentication	  label	  (a	  form	  of	  certification)	  in	  1988,	  provides	  another	  example	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  While	  many	  social	  movement	  studies	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  Gramscian	  term,	  
trasformismo,	  the	  concept	  ‘co-­‐optation’	  is	  similar.	  Jaffee	  (2012,	  p.	  99)	  cites	  Philip	  Selznick’s	  (1948)	  definition	  of	  co-­‐optation	  as	  “the	  process	  of	  absorbing	  new	  elements	  into	  the	  leadership	  or	  policy-­‐determining	  structure	  of	  an	  organization	  as	  a	  means	  of	  averting	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  stability	  or	  existence.”	  The	  dangers	  of	  such	  co-­‐optation	  are	  that	  the	  social	  movement	  is	  both	  weakened	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  that	  it	  ultimately	  fails	  “to	  achieve	  meaningful	  policy	  gains”	  (Jaffee	  2012,	  p.	  99).	  	  200	  A	  powerful	  earthquake	  followed	  by	  a	  ‘massive	  tsunami’	  in	  north-­‐eastern	  Japan	  on	  11	  March	  2011	  damaged	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  the	  backup	  generators	  powering	  the	  Fukushima	  Daiichi	  (No.	  1)	  nuclear	  power	  plant’s	  cooling	  systems,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  nuclear	  reactor’s	  meltdown	  the	  next	  day	  (Otsuki	  2016).	  201	  In	  2011	  there	  were	  over	  100	  protests	  against	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  Japan,	  and	  while	  the	  number	  of	  protests	  dropped	  in	  2012,	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  increased:	  an	  estimated	  60,000	  people	  participated	  in	  the	  September	  2011	  protests	  and	  75,000	  participated	  in	  the	  September	  2012	  protests	  (Dreiling,	  Lougee	  &	  Nakamura	  2017).	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trasformismo	  as	  a	  result	  of	  social	  movement	  collaborations	  with	  industry.202	  Jaffee	  
(2012)	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  fair	  trade	  certification	  system	  since	  the	  
1990s,	  and	  the	  ‘mainstreaming’	  of	  fair	  trade	  products	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  increase	  the	  
volume	  of	  sales	  through	  conventional	  retail	  outlets,	  led	  to	  the	  successful	  co-­‐optation	  
of	  elements	  of	  the	  fair	  trade	  movement	  by	  large	  multinational	  retailers	  (particularly	  
in	  the	  US,	  according	  to	  this	  study).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  dilution	  of	  standards	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  they	  no	  longer	  present	  an	  alternative,	  socially	  embedded	  relationship	  
between	  producers	  and	  consumers	  is	  the	  chief	  mechanism	  of	  this	  co-­‐optation,	  and	  
Jaffee	  argues	  that	  this	  development	  has	  wider	  implications:	  
On a broader level, the fair trade case demonstrates that private 
regulation by civil society groups and SMOs – via tools such as 
certification and standards – is an approach fraught with serious 
limitations…. Indeed, the fair trade case can be read as a cautionary 
tale about the limits of voluntary, nonstate regulation, and the risks 
of social movements embracing the narrower, less accountable 
realm of the market as the locus of change. 
(Jaffee 2012, p. 113) 
These	  examples	  of	  trasformismo	  illustrate	  only	  one	  of	  a	  repertoire	  of	  tactics	  adopted	  
by	  elites	  to	  ‘neutralize’	  antagonistic	  SMOs;	  other	  tactics	  include	  limiting	  non-­‐state	  
actor	  access	  to	  international	  conferences	  if	  they	  ‘challenge	  market	  ideologies	  or	  
neoliberal	  ideas’,	  using	  legislation	  to	  repress	  ‘non-­‐violent	  progressive	  groups’,	  and	  
stigmatizing	  and	  delegitimizing	  progressive	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  their	  influence	  in	  
the	  wider	  community	  (Smith,	  Plummer	  &	  Hughes	  2017,	  pp.	  4	  –	  6).	  Many	  of	  these	  
tactics	  were	  used	  to	  disempower	  the	  climate	  movement	  at	  COP-­‐15	  in	  Copenhagen	  in	  
2009,	  where	  the	  newly	  formed	  radical	  climate	  justice	  alliance,	  CJN!,	  gained	  
prominence	  as	  a	  major	  actor	  in	  the	  climate	  movement.203	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  The	  Dutch	  NGO,	  Solidaridad’s,	  fair	  trade	  label	  was	  initially	  used	  to	  distinguish	  the	  coffee	  produced	  by	  their	  partner,	  a	  Mexican	  indigenous	  coffee	  co-­‐operative,	  but	  other	  brands	  were	  later	  allowed	  to	  also	  use	  it	  as	  long	  as	  they	  met	  four	  criteria	  for	  ‘fairness’:	  fair	  wages	  for	  smallholders,	  prepayment	  or	  credit	  to	  farmers,	  additional	  payment	  for	  social	  development	  projects,	  and	  “long-­‐term	  trading	  relationships	  with	  democratically	  organized	  producer	  cooperatives	  or	  associations”	  (Jaffee	  2012,	  p.	  103).	  203	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  about	  the	  very	  eventful	  2009	  climate	  change	  negotiations	  at	  COP-­‐15	  in	  Copenhagen,	  riddled	  as	  they	  were	  with	  various	  intrigues	  and	  subterfuges	  that	  led	  to	  the	  ultimate	  failure	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  conference	  and	  resulted	  in	  a	  very	  weak	  and	  ineffectual	  final	  document,	  the	  ‘Copenhagen	  Accord.’	  	  Government	  representatives	  who	  had	  been	  excluded	  from	  the	  secret	  negotiations	  refused	  to	  adopt	  this	  document;	  instead,	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  was	  merely	  ‘noted’.	  Refer	  to	  Carter,	  Clegg	  and	  Wåhlin	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Climate	  Justice	  Now!	  (CJN!)	  
Like	  the	  efforts	  to	  precisely	  date	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  new	  environmental	  
movement	  by	  identifying	  a	  ‘big	  book’	  or	  a	  significant	  event,	  various	  analysts	  have	  
attempted	  to	  locate	  a	  singular	  event	  marking	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  radical	  climate	  
justice	  movement.	  Some	  of	  the	  literature	  points	  to	  COP-­‐13	  in	  Bali	  in	  2007,	  when	  a	  
number	  of	  NGOs	  broke	  away	  from	  CAN-­‐I,	  as	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  
movement’s	  manifestation	  as	  the	  CJN!	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  de	  Lucia	  2014,	  Bond	  
2014	  and	  Tokar	  2014).	  CAN-­‐I	  member	  Hans	  Verolme	  also	  identifies	  COP-­‐13	  in	  Bali	  as	  
signalling	  the	  split	  between	  the	  moderate	  and	  radical	  wings	  of	  the	  climate	  
movement,	  and	  his	  recollections	  emphasise	  the	  role	  that	  social	  justice	  issues	  played	  
in	  this	  split:	  
Equity came to a head in Bali. There was a very large contingent of 
people from the Third World Network, the FOE network and 
climate justice community, who very openly started to challenge 
some of the ‘dinosaurs’ in CAN. That was partly because there was 
an influx into the climate negotiations of people who had worked on 
other issues, like trade.204 As a result they were framing the politics 
of climate change more in terms of trade and development than in 
environmental terms. There was a serious disagreement about how 
to assess both the tactics and substance of the negotiations. That 
battle around equity became very deep and deeply personal because 
people felt that their personal integrity was being called into 
question. It led to several organizations leaving CAN. 
(CAN 2014, p. 57) 
Analysts	  and	  commentators	  also	  identify	  several	  other	  significant	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  
first	  known	  conference	  on	  the	  theme	  of	  ‘climate	  justice’	  at	  the	  2000	  alternative	  
people’s	  climate	  summit	  at	  COP-­‐6	  in	  The	  Hague	  (Bond	  2014,	  p.	  208;	  Tokar	  2014)	  and	  
the	  manifesto	  outlining	  twenty-­‐seven	  Principles	  of	  Climate	  Justice	  developed	  by	  
fourteen	  NGOs	  at	  the	  2002	  United	  Nations	  World	  Summit	  on	  Sustainable	  
Development	  in	  Johannesburg	  (Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  2013).	  COP-­‐15	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2011),	  Ciplet	  (2015),	  Fisher	  (2010),	  Hadden	  (2014),	  Mason	  and	  Askins	  (2013),	  McGregor	  (2011),	  and	  Wahlström,	  Wennerhag	  and	  Rootes	  (2013)	  for	  accounts	  about	  different	  aspects	  relevant	  to	  COP-­‐15	  events	  and	  outcomes.	  204	  According	  to	  Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  (2013,	  p.	  142),	  the	  new	  CJN!	  network	  also	  included	  NGOs	  and	  SMOs	  who	  had	  been	  key	  actors	  in	  the	  GJM	  –	  groups	  such	  as	  Focus	  on	  
the	  Global	  South,	  La	  Via	  Campesina,	  the	  Transnational	  Institute,	  and	  Third	  World	  
Network.	  [This	  footnote	  has	  been	  added;	  it	  was	  not	  in	  the	  original	  quotation	  presented	  above.]	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Copenhagen	  in	  2009	  is	  also	  widely	  referred	  to	  as	  significant	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Bedell	  &	  Görg	  2014,	  
Bond	  2014,	  della	  Porta	  &	  Parks	  2014),	  as	  is	  the	  2010	  Cochabamba	  People’s	  
Agreement,	  a	  program	  developed	  at	  an	  alternative	  climate	  change	  summit	  convened	  
at	  the	  invitation	  of	  Bolivian	  president	  Evo	  Morales	  in	  Cochabamba	  after	  the	  failure	  of	  
COP-­‐15	  (Angus	  2016).	  All	  these	  events	  are	  important	  in	  their	  own	  right	  as	  instances	  
of	  climate	  justice	  activism	  and	  their	  contributions	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  both	  the	  
ideology	  and	  the	  strategy	  and	  tactics	  adopted	  by	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  network	  
have	  been	  extensively	  analysed.205	  However,	  as	  Meyer	  and	  Rohlinger	  (2012)	  caution,	  
the	  evolution	  of	  social	  movements	  is	  complex	  and	  occurs	  over	  a	  much	  longer	  period	  
than	  is	  generally	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  literature;	  it	  should	  therefore	  come	  as	  no	  
surprise	  that	  ideas	  about	  climate	  justice	  were	  being	  discussed	  widely	  for	  many	  years	  
within	  the	  climate	  movement	  and	  the	  global	  justice	  movement	  before	  CJN!	  was	  
created	  as	  an	  identifiable	  radical	  climate	  justice	  network.	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  rather	  
than	  trying	  to	  identify	  all	  the	  significant	  events	  shaping	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
radical	  climate	  justice	  movement,	  I	  focus	  on	  its	  aims	  and	  strategies,	  and	  on	  the	  
ideology	  informing	  these.	  
The	  main	  ideas	  defining	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  have	  been	  linked	  to	  
the	  environmental	  justice	  movement	  of	  the	  1980s	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  a	  
“movement	  that	  especially	  emphasized	  the	  racial	  and	  class	  injustices	  of	  pollution	  in	  
the	  United	  States”	  (Bond	  2014,	  p.	  208),	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  GJM	  associated	  with	  the	  
anti-­‐capitalist	  protests	  against	  the	  WTO	  in	  Seattle	  in	  1999	  (Garrelts	  &	  Dietz	  2014;	  
Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  2013;	  Tokar	  2014).	  According	  to	  Tokar	  (2014),	  the	  first	  
published	  reference	  to	  ‘climate	  justice’	  was	  in	  the	  1999	  report,	  Greenhouse	  
Gangsters	  vs.	  Climate	  Justice	  (TRAC	  1999),	  by	  a	  group	  associated	  with	  the	  GJM.	  Not	  
only	  does	  this	  document	  refer	  to	  ‘climate	  justice,’	  but	  it	  also	  draws	  attention	  to	  ‘false	  
solutions’	  and	  calls	  for	  a	  ‘just	  transition’	  to	  a	  fossil	  fuel-­‐free	  economy.	  With	  a	  strong	  
critique	  of	  corporate	  power,	  and	  especially	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  The	  Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  the	  Climate	  Change	  Movement	  (Dietz	  &	  Garrelts	  2014)	  is	  an	  excellent	  introductory	  resource,	  and	  Steger,	  Goodman	  &	  Wilson	  (2013)	  also	  provide	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  climate	  movement’s	  components	  and	  some	  of	  the	  key	  events	  in	  its	  development.	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Greenhouse	  Gangsters	  vs	  Climate	  Justice	  identifies	  ‘technological	  and	  market	  
oriented’	  solutions	  such	  as	  ETSs,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol’s	  Joint	  
Implementation	  and	  CDM	  mechanisms,	  as	  ‘false	  solutions’,	  and	  attempts	  to	  set	  out	  
‘a	  platform	  for	  Climate	  Justice’	  (TRAC	  1999,	  p.	  6	  and	  pp.	  23	  –	  26).	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  
report	  argue	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  counter	  the	  immense	  power	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  
corporations	  and	  their	  many	  corporate,	  political,	  and	  institutional	  allies	  is	  to	  build	  a	  
powerful	  grassroots	  movement	  linking	  social	  and	  environmental	  struggles	  around	  
the	  globe.	  They	  suggest	  that	  climate	  justice	  activists	  join	  forces	  with	  allies	  such	  as:	  
alter-­‐globalization	  activists	  trying	  to	  dismantle	  the	  power	  of	  corporations	  and	  global	  
economic	  institutions;	  indigenous	  people	  and	  subsistence	  farmers	  in	  the	  Global	  
South	  trying	  to	  defend	  their	  territories,	  health	  and	  livelihoods	  against	  the	  
environmental	  threats	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  projects;	  disadvantaged	  groups	  in	  the	  Global	  
North	  trying	  to	  defend	  their	  communities	  against	  toxic	  pollution;	  and	  workers	  calling	  
for	  a	  just	  transition	  from	  a	  fossil	  fuel	  economy.206	  These	  suggestions	  are	  reflected	  in	  
much	  of	  the	  thinking	  within	  the	  current	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement,	  as	  well	  as	  
in	  its	  operation	  as	  a	  network	  of	  grassroots	  groups	  working	  locally	  on	  specific	  
campaigns	  while	  simultaneously	  demonstrating	  solidarity	  with	  their	  allies’	  campaigns	  
(for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Bond	  2010,	  Klein	  2014,	  and	  Temper	  &	  Gilbertson	  2015).	  
A	  comparison	  of	  the	  principles	  and	  positions	  of	  the	  two	  extreme	  wings	  of	  the	  climate	  
movement	  suggests	  that	  the	  two	  features	  that	  fundamentally	  distinguish	  the	  radical	  
climate	  justice	  movement	  from	  CAN-­‐I,	  and	  from	  other	  groups	  that	  lie	  in	  between	  the	  
two	  extremes,	  are	  its	  anti-­‐capitalism	  and	  its	  uncompromising	  ethical	  stance.	  Radical	  
climate	  justice	  movement	  actors	  do	  not	  support	  measures	  identified	  as	  ‘false	  
solutions’	  by	  those	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  them;	  instead,	  they	  provide	  principled	  
support	  to	  the	  least	  powerful	  and	  most	  marginalised	  people	  whose	  livelihoods	  and	  
very	  lives	  are	  discounted	  by	  a	  neoliberalising	  and	  totalising	  global	  capitalist	  
economy,	  which	  also	  discounts	  the	  lives	  of	  other	  species,	  entire	  ecosystems,	  and	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  	  A	  more	  recent	  publication	  by	  this	  group,	  A-­‐Z	  of	  Green	  Capitalism	  (Corporate	  Watch	  2016),	  is	  available	  on	  the	  Corporate	  Watch	  website	  and	  provides	  explanations	  of	  the	  meaning	  and	  significance	  of	  complex	  concepts	  relevant	  to	  climate	  change	  and	  climate	  justice	  in	  simple	  language.	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future	  generations.207	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  adopts	  
an	  uncompromising	  ethical	  stance	  that	  gives	  it	  the	  moral	  high	  ground,	  and	  although	  
many	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  its	  greatest	  weakness,	  it	  could	  also	  be	  argued	  (as	  I	  do)	  
that	  this	  is	  its	  greatest	  strength.208	  The	  CAN-­‐I	  member	  quoted	  previously,	  who	  
reflected	  on	  the	  split	  between	  CAN	  and	  CJN!,	  ended	  his	  reflection	  as	  follows:	  
Yet, after a year or so it [the split] led to a much deeper exploration 
of what equity means which, in my view, has contributed to the 
growth of CAN and the deepening of positions. Those groups that 
left have become less visible in the UN process, in which CAN is 
now the dominant NGO player. 
(CAN 2014, p. 57) 
But	  an	  objective	  consideration	  of	  what	  CAN-­‐I	  has	  achieved	  as	  a	  result	  of	  choosing	  to	  
work	  cooperatively	  within	  the	  system	  to	  encourage	  reforms	  suggests	  that	  its	  
position	  of	  ‘dominance’	  in	  the	  official	  climate	  change	  negotiations	  is	  perhaps	  not	  as	  
significant	  as	  CAN-­‐I	  hoped	  it	  would	  be.	  COP-­‐15	  was	  a	  disaster,	  with	  many	  analysts	  
agreeing	  that	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  was	  a	  last-­‐minute	  attempt	  to	  salvage	  a	  
very	  bad	  situation	  (Carter,	  Clegg	  &	  Wåhlin	  2011;	  Parker	  et	  al.	  2012).	  The	  2015	  Paris	  
Agreement’s	  so-­‐called	  ‘bottom-­‐up	  approach’	  is	  just	  as	  ineffective	  (if	  not	  actually	  
regressive	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  that	  preceded	  it),	  having	  yielded	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘false	  solutions’	  is	  essential	  if	  one	  is	  to	  understand	  one	  of	  the	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  moderate	  climate	  action	  movement	  and	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement:	  while,	  on	  a	  superficial	  level,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  discern	  ‘averting	  climate	  change’	  as	  a	  broad	  common	  goal,	  unlike	  the	  reformist	  climate	  action	  movement,	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  is	  not	  prepared	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim	  using	  means	  that	  will	  put	  even	  greater	  burdens	  on	  subaltern	  social	  groups	  that	  are	  already	  disadvantaged	  in	  capitalist	  societies.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  radical	  climate	  justice	  activists	  do	  not	  support	  moderate	  climate	  movement	  actors’	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  support	  of	  policies	  that	  aim	  to	  further	  privatise	  the	  commons	  and	  thereby	  facilitate	  the	  exploitation	  and	  dispossession	  of	  powerless	  people.	  Radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  actors	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  than	  moderate	  climate	  movement	  actors	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  technological	  solutions	  that	  further	  tamper	  with	  the	  planet’s	  biosphere	  (for	  example,	  through	  experimental	  and	  potentially	  dangerous	  ‘technological’	  fixes	  such	  as	  geo-­‐engineering).	  208	  UK	  Labour	  Party	  leader	  Jeremy	  Corbyn’s	  popularity	  seems	  to	  indicate	  that	  people	  respond	  well	  to	  honesty	  and	  integrity,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  also	  not	  necessarily	  averse	  to	  positions	  that	  elites	  do	  not	  support.	  Lewis	  (2017)	  suggests	  that	  Corbyn’s	  unexpected	  achievement	  in	  ‘narrowing	  the	  gap	  from	  around	  20	  to	  two	  points’	  in	  the	  June	  2017	  election	  debunks	  several	  myths,	  including	  that	  ‘left-­‐wing	  Labour	  manifestos	  go	  down	  badly	  with	  most	  voters.’	  According	  to	  Rowley	  (2017),	  another	  factor	  explaining	  his	  ‘shock	  performance’	  is	  that	  “He	  may	  not	  be	  slick,	  but	  people	  clearly	  see	  him	  as	  genuine.”	  All	  this	  suggests	  that	  honesty,	  integrity,	  and	  maintaining	  a	  principled	  defense	  of	  common	  human	  decency	  in	  refusing	  to	  be	  complicit	  in	  the	  suffering	  resulting	  from	  ‘false	  solutions’	  may	  be	  the	  best	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  for	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement.	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INDCs	  that	  lock	  in	  a	  global	  average	  warming	  of	  “between	  2.6	  and	  3.1	  degrees	  Celsius	  
by	  2100”	  (Rogelj	  et	  al.	  2016),	  ‘contributions’	  which	  are,	  in	  any	  case,	  voluntary	  and	  
not	  legally	  binding.209	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  best	  that	  global	  ruling	  elites	  can	  do	  given	  the	  
organic	  crisis	  they	  face	  is	  to	  achieve	  a	  temporary	  and	  uneasy	  passive	  revolution:	  they	  
can	  neither	  solve	  the	  ‘natural	  limits’	  problem	  with	  their	  technical	  and	  market	  
solutions	  (which,	  in	  any	  case,	  demonstrably	  often	  serve	  only	  to	  extract	  profits	  and	  
not	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change,	  as	  they	  claim),	  nor	  are	  they	  willing	  to	  devise	  and	  
implement	  a	  real	  compromise	  with	  subaltern	  classes	  whose	  suffering	  intensifies	  as	  
the	  climate	  crisis	  and	  all	  its	  various	  effects	  continue	  to	  unfold.	  
While	  the	  TCC	  and	  its	  allies	  have	  already	  lost	  the	  moral	  battle,	  continuing	  to	  reveal	  
the	  causes	  of	  the	  many	  injustices	  that	  exist	  and	  the	  worse	  ones	  that	  are	  unfolding	  is	  
the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement’s	  main	  strength.	  As	  many	  analysts	  and	  activists	  
argue,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  supporters	  of	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  maintain	  
constant	  vigilance	  against	  adopting	  tactics	  that	  involve	  making	  compromises	  that	  will	  
lead	  to	  very	  different	  scenarios	  to	  those	  it	  aims	  to	  promote.	  Such	  vigilance	  is	  very	  
difficult	  to	  maintain	  given	  the	  pressing	  nature	  of	  the	  challenges	  presented	  by	  
anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  as	  these	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure	  on	  radical	  climate	  
justice	  movement	  actors	  to	  make	  exactly	  these	  sorts	  of	  compromises.	  However,	  the	  
stakes	  of	  ensuring	  that	  ‘real	  solutions’	  that	  incorporate	  socio-­‐economic	  justice	  and	  
democratic	  concerns	  are	  adopted	  are	  very	  high,	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  society	  that	  is	  very	  
likely	  to	  result	  from	  ‘false	  solution’	  reformist	  or	  neoliberal	  compromises	  will	  lead	  not	  
only	  to	  increasing	  social	  inequalities	  but	  to	  much	  death	  and	  destruction.	  One	  of	  the	  
crucial	  roles	  that	  ecosocialists	  play	  within	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  to	  consistently	  
draw	  attention	  to	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  when	  choosing	  between	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  that	  
lead	  to	  ‘false’	  and	  ‘real’	  solutions,	  as	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  Prior	  to	  this	  
discussion	  of	  ecosocialist	  strategy	  and	  tactics,	  however,	  an	  overview	  of	  ecosocialist	  
theories	  and	  debates	  is	  provided	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209	  The	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  approach	  sounds	  democratic	  but	  is,	  in	  true	  Orwellian	  fashion,	  quite	  the	  opposite	  since	  it	  was	  adopted	  at	  COP-­‐21	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  many	  other	  governments	  and	  only	  after	  many	  years	  of	  US	  insistence	  that	  legally	  binding	  GHG	  emission	  targets	  be	  replaced	  by	  voluntary	  and	  non-­‐binding	  INDCs.	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Chapter	  Seven:	  Ecosocialist	  Theories	  and	  Theoretical	  
Debates	  
“From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the 
private property of particular individuals in the earth will appear just 
as absurd as the private property of one man in other men. Even an 
entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken 
together, are not the owners of the earth. They are simply its 
possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved 
state to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias [good heads 
of the household].” 
(Marx Capital Volume 3 [1981], p. 911) 
Introduction	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  ecosocialist	  contributions	  to	  the	  
development	  and	  dissemination	  of	  radical	  climate	  justice	  ideas,	  which	  compete	  with	  
dominant	  analyses	  of	  the	  causes	  and	  proposed	  solutions	  to	  the	  organic	  crisis	  of	  
global	  capitalism	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters.	  Because	  ecosocialism	  is	  not	  a	  
monolithic	  theoretical	  perspective,	  however,	  there	  is	  much	  contestation	  in	  attempts	  
to	  clarify	  the	  meaning	  of	  this	  concept,	  and	  I	  begin	  the	  discussion	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  
these	  debates.	  Theoretical	  clarification	  is	  important	  because,	  as	  prominent	  
ecosocialist	  John	  Bellamy	  Foster	  emphasises	  (and	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  
with	  reference	  to	  the	  role	  of	  theory),	  the	  understanding	  that	  theory	  ultimately	  
informs	  practice	  is	  central	  to	  the	  Marxist	  tradition:	  
Historically, Marxism has always taken the development of 
theory/science very seriously, without which revolutionary praxis 
would be impossible. In the struggles to define the critique of 
capitalism embodied in Marxian ecology and ecosocialism it is 
essential to get the theory and the science correct to the extent 
possible. Our practice, the clarity of our ideas, our way forward 
depend on that. 
(Foster, cited in Stache 2016) 
In	  order	  to	  summarise	  some	  of	  the	  key	  debates	  between	  those	  who	  identify	  as	  
ecosocialists,	  I	  therefore	  begin	  this	  chapter	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  ‘varieties	  of	  
ecosocialism’	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  useful	  distinction	  that	  Foster	  has	  developed	  in	  his	  
categorisation	  of	  first-­‐stage,	  second-­‐stage	  and	  third-­‐stage	  ecosocialism	  which,	  
following	  Holleman’s	  (2015)	  caveat,	  are	  taken	  as	  “shifts	  in	  the	  focus	  of	  debate”	  
rather	  than	  linear	  developments	  within	  that	  body	  of	  thought	  referred	  to	  as	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‘ecosocialist’	  (Foster	  2015a,	  2015b,	  2016a;	  see	  also	  Clark	  &	  Foster	  2010a,	  Foster	  &	  
Clark	  2016,	  and	  Stache	  2016).210	  After	  an	  overview	  of	  these	  internal	  debates,	  I	  briefly	  
summarise	  what	  Foster	  and	  other	  ecosocialists	  such	  as	  Ian	  Angus	  consider	  to	  be	  
critically	  important	  theoretical	  debates	  within	  the	  Left	  between	  Marxist	  ecosocialist	  
thinking	  and	  theories	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  support	  the	  pro-­‐capitalist,	  technology-­‐
dense	  ‘post-­‐environmentalist’	  ecological	  modernization	  project	  as	  represented	  by	  
groups	  such	  as	  The	  Breakthrough	  Institute.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  an	  overview	  
of	  some	  of	  the	  work	  conducted	  by	  third-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  who	  apply	  Marxist	  
ecological	  concepts	  and	  insights	  in	  their	  analyses	  of	  the	  current	  organic	  crisis	  of	  
global	  capitalism.	  Third-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  contributions	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  
strategy	  and	  tactics	  by	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  actors	  are	  discussed	  further	  
in	  Chapter	  8.	  
Contesting	  ideas:	  Varieties	  of	  ecosocialism	  
While	  many	  climate	  movement	  actors	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  the	  links	  
between	  environmental,	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  justice	  struggles,	  ecosocialists	  
have	  developed	  and	  refined	  their	  understanding	  of	  these	  connections	  over	  many	  
years,	  with	  ‘second-­‐stage’	  ecosocialists	  arguing	  that	  this	  understanding	  is	  evident	  
from	  as	  early	  as	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  in	  the	  original	  writings	  of	  Marx	  and	  
Engels.	  Michael	  Löwy	  traces	  the	  origins	  of	  contemporary	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  to	  the	  
1970s,	  and	  states	  that	  the	  word	  ‘ecosocialism’	  gained	  prominence	  within	  the	  
German	  Green	  Party	  in	  the	  1980s	  (Löwy	  2015,	  pp.	  xi-­‐xii).	  As	  with	  all	  complex	  
theoretical	  perspectives,	  however,	  there	  are	  many	  different	  interpretations	  of	  what	  
‘ecosocialism’	  means.	  According	  to	  some	  theorists,	  ecosocialists	  combine	  Marxist	  
critiques	  of	  capitalist	  political	  economy	  with	  ecological	  critiques	  of	  ‘productivism’	  
(‘production	  as	  a	  goal	  in	  itself’)	  and	  wasteful	  (or	  unnecessary)	  consumerism	  that	  
serves	  profit	  accumulation	  rather	  than	  the	  purpose	  of	  meeting	  human	  needs	  in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  While	  I	  try	  to	  incorporate	  enough	  information	  in	  my	  summaries	  of	  the	  debates	  for	  the	  reader	  to	  understand	  the	  key	  issues	  under	  contestation,	  the	  full	  body	  of	  first-­‐	  and	  second-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  writings	  is	  extensive,	  and	  because	  of	  both	  time	  and	  space	  constraints	  I	  have	  had	  to	  be	  selective	  about	  what	  aspects	  of	  the	  debates	  I	  focus	  on.	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sustainable	  way	  (Löwy	  2015;	  emphasis	  in	  original).211	  According	  to	  these	  definitions,	  
ecosocialism	  thus	  constitutes	  what	  has	  been	  called	  a	  ‘red-­‐green	  alliance’	  with	  the	  
broad	  aim	  of	  building	  a	  new	  society	  with	  what	  Ian	  Angus	  describes	  as	  ‘two	  
fundamental	  and	  indivisible	  characteristics’:	  
It will be socialist, committed to democracy, to radical 
egalitarianism, and to social justice…. And it will be based on the 
best ecological principles, giving top priority to stopping anti-
environmental practices, to restoring damaged ecosystems and to re-
establishing agriculture and industry on ecologically sound 
principles. 
(Angus 2011, p. 6)212  
While	  ecosocialists	  agree	  that	  ecological	  concerns	  would	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  
democratic	  and	  egalitarian	  socialist	  society	  they	  envisage	  and	  work	  towards	  creating,	  
many	  of	  their	  disagreements	  revolve	  around	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  classical	  Marxism	  
needs	  to	  be	  modified	  to	  better	  incorporate	  an	  understanding	  of	  capitalism’s	  
environmental	  destruction	  and	  what	  this	  implies	  for	  the	  future	  of	  capitalism	  as	  well	  
as	  for	  the	  Marxist	  emancipatory	  project	  as	  originally	  conceived	  by	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  
in	  comparison	  to	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  Marxists	  today.	  
Debates	  amongst	  academic	  ecosocialist	  theorists	  can	  therefore	  be	  summarised	  as	  
constituting	  disagreements	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  ecosocialist	  theory	  needs	  to	  
draw	  from	  ‘green’	  perspectives	  (representing	  environmentalism)	  to	  supplement	  
what	  some	  ecosocialists	  perceive	  to	  be	  ecologically	  deficient	  ‘red’	  perspectives	  
(representing	  socialism/Marxism).	  John	  Bellamy	  Foster	  posits	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  
need	  for	  a	  ‘red-­‐green	  alliance’	  that	  created	  a	  ‘hybrid	  analysis’	  of	  Marxism	  and	  
environmental	  theory	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘first-­‐stage	  ecosocialism,’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211	  When	  discussing	  production	  and	  consumption	  issues,	  for	  instance,	  many	  ecosocialists	  emphasise	  Marx’s	  distinction	  between	  use	  value	  and	  exchange	  value,	  using	  these	  concepts	  to	  elaborate	  their	  ideas	  about	  how	  ecologically	  sustainable	  consumption	  can	  be	  achieved	  (for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Kovel	  2007).	  212	  As	  Löwy	  (2015,	  p.	  xv)	  emphasises,	  there	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  interpretations	  of	  ecosocialism	  –	  a	  variety	  which	  he	  believes	  should	  be	  celebrated:	  “One	  of	  the	  virtues	  of	  ecosocialism	  is	  precisely	  its	  diversity	  –	  its	  plurality,	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  its	  perspectives	  and	  approaches,	  which	  are	  often	  convergent	  or	  complementary	  but	  also	  sometimes	  divergent	  and	  even	  contradictory.”	  Second-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  such	  as	  Foster	  and	  Burkett	  disagree	  with	  this	  celebration	  of	  theoretical	  diversity	  because	  of	  the	  political	  and	  practical	  implications	  that	  such	  divided	  views	  have	  for	  both	  agency	  and	  for	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  decisions.	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which	  “developed	  under	  the	  hegemony	  of	  Green	  theory”	  (Stache	  2016)	  and	  was	  part	  
of	  the	  ‘self-­‐criticism’	  that	  began	  within	  Marxist	  theorising	  in	  the	  1960s	  (Foster	  
2015b,	  p.	  5).	  Foster	  argues	  that	  this	  perceived	  need	  to	  combine	  ‘green’	  and	  ‘red’	  
theory	  and	  develop	  a	  new	  body	  of	  thought	  that	  negates	  and	  displaces	  ‘classical	  
socialism’	  is	  unnecessary	  as	  Marxism	  is	  inherently	  ecological	  (Stache	  2016),	  an	  
argument	  that	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  after	  the	  brief	  overview	  of	  first-­‐stage	  
ecosocialism	  provided	  below.213	  	  
First-­‐stage	  ecosocialism	  
Foster	  and	  Clark	  	  (2016)	  attribute	  ‘first	  stage’	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  to	  a	  widespread	  
perception	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  that	  Marx’s	  writings	  were	  ‘anti-­‐
ecological’,	  with	  critics	  claiming	  that	  his	  ‘mechanistic-­‐positivistic	  scientific	  view’	  of	  
nature,	  his	  ‘productivism’	  and	  ‘Prometheanism’,	  and	  the	  labour	  theory	  of	  value	  that	  
is	  central	  to	  his	  analysis	  of	  capitalist	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  needing	  
modification.214	  Despite	  what	  Foster	  (2016a,	  p.	  395)	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  
‘prefigurative	  Marxian	  environmental	  perspective’	  evident	  in	  the	  work	  of	  authors	  
such	  as	  Barry	  Commoner,	  Virginia	  Brodine	  and	  Howard	  Parsons,	  perceptions	  that	  
Marx’s	  work	  was	  ‘anti-­‐ecological’	  prevailed	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  
reasons,	  including	  a	  misplaced	  blame	  of	  the	  environmental	  disasters	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  under	  Stalin	  and	  subsequent	  Soviet	  administrations	  on	  ‘Marxism’,	  the	  general	  
disarray	  within	  the	  Left	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  
postmodernist	  thinking	  that	  rejected	  Marxism	  in	  its	  entirety,	  a	  misinterpretation	  and	  
oversimplification	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels’	  views	  on	  nature	  as	  represented	  in	  their	  
writings,	  and	  a	  fundamental	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Marx	  uses	  the	  
labour	  theory	  of	  value	  only	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  analysing	  capitalism,	  the	  system	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Marxists	  such	  as	  Hannah	  Holleman	  also	  argue	  that	  Marx’s	  work	  in	  itself	  provides	  a	  powerful	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  analyzing	  the	  environmental	  crisis;	  as	  she	  said	  in	  one	  of	  her	  presentations,	  “…the	  ecological	  critique	  and	  imperative	  for	  change	  is	  already	  explicit	  in	  Marx’s	  work	  and	  many	  socialist	  traditions.	  Therefore	  I	  consider	  myself	  a	  socialist	  rather	  than	  an	  ecosocialist,	  and	  the	  work	  described	  here	  is	  at	  heart	  simply	  Marxist	  in	  approach”	  (Holleman	  2015,	  p.	  10,	  Note	  1)	  214	  As	  Burkett	  (2014a,	  p.	  147)	  explains,	  “Prometheanism,	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  Enlightenment	  tradition,	  says	  that	  human	  progress	  hinges	  on	  the	  subjugation	  of	  nature	  to	  human	  purposes.	  Human	  development	  thus	  involves	  a	  struggle	  between	  people	  and	  nature	  in	  which	  people	  come	  out	  on	  top.”	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critiques	  in	  his	  work,	  not	  as	  a	  universal	  measure	  valid	  in	  all	  historical	  periods	  under	  
all	  modes	  of	  production.215	  Other	  reasons	  Foster	  offers	  as	  possible	  explanations	  of	  
why	  many	  “ecological	  scholars	  make	  such	  great	  efforts	  to	  ignore,	  downplay,	  or	  
distance	  themselves	  from	  these	  [ecological]	  insights	  by	  Marx	  and	  Engels”	  include	  
Marxism’s	  revolutionary	  potential	  in	  its	  focus	  on	  class	  struggle,	  a	  prospect	  that	  
Foster	  suggests	  ‘frightens’	  some	  Left	  academics	  and	  challenges	  both	  the	  
conventional	  wisdom	  that	  ‘the	  working	  class	  is	  by	  nature	  anti-­‐environmental’	  and	  
the	  normative	  political	  preferences	  of	  ‘non-­‐radical,	  capitalist-­‐oriented	  
environmentalists’	  (Stache	  2016).	  While	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  (if	  not	  impossible)	  to	  
address	  ideological	  motivations	  for	  rejecting	  arguments	  that	  classical	  Marxism	  is	  
inherently	  ecological,	  the	  specific	  charges	  made	  by	  first-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  theorists	  
such	  as	  Ted	  Benton,	  André	  Gorz,	  James	  O’Connor,	  Joel	  Kovel,	  Robyn	  Eckersley,	  
Daniel	  Bensaïd	  and	  Daniel	  Tanuro	  	  (Foster	  2016a;	  Stache	  2016)	  can	  be	  addressed	  by	  
revisiting	  Marx	  and	  Engels’	  writings	  and	  pointing	  out	  the	  misinterpretations,	  
omissions	  and	  misconceptions	  that	  have	  informed	  its	  perceived	  ecological	  
shortcomings.	  In	  addition	  to	  conducting	  close	  textual	  analyses	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels’s	  
original	  works	  to	  determine	  what	  they	  actually	  wrote	  and	  thought	  about	  ecology,	  
second-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  also	  identify	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  widespread	  views	  that	  
classical	  Marxism	  is	  ‘anti-­‐ecological’	  as	  this	  can	  help	  clarify	  some	  of	  the	  ideological	  
motivations	  informing	  these	  views.	  	  
Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2016,	  pp.	  3	  –	  6)	  attribute	  the	  origin	  of	  many	  of	  the	  misconceptions	  
about	  Marx’s	  views	  on	  ecology	  to	  critical	  theorist	  Alfred	  Schmidt’s	  dissertation,	  The	  
Concept	  of	  Nature	  in	  Marx,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  Germany	  in	  1962	  and	  which,	  via	  
several	  ‘inconsistencies’	  and	  ‘convolutions,’	  misinterpreted	  Marx’s	  work	  as	  positivist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	  One	  example	  of	  such	  confusions	  is	  evident	  in	  how	  Löwy	  (2016,	  p.22)	  refers	  to	  Marx	  as	  ‘rejecting	  productivism’	  and	  insisting	  on	  ‘the	  full	  realisation	  of…	  human	  potentialities,’	  but	  then	  proceeds	  to	  define	  ecosocialism	  as	  “…a	  current	  of	  thought	  and	  environmentalist	  action	  that	  integrates	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  Marxism,	  short	  of	  
their	  productivist	  trappings”	  (Löwy	  2016,	  p.	  23;	  emphasis	  added).	  This	  contradiction	  may	  arise	  because	  Löwy	  (2016)	  fails	  to	  distinguish	  clearly	  between	  Marx’s	  views	  as	  represented	  in	  his	  writings	  and	  the	  environmental	  damage	  resulting	  from	  what	  Löwy	  refers	  to	  as	  “the	  productivist	  ideology	  of	  progress,	  whether	  in	  its	  capitalist	  or	  bureaucratic	  (so-­‐called	  ‘real	  socialist’)	  forms”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  23)	  or	  the	  notions	  prevalent	  in	  ‘certain	  vulgar	  Marxism’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  25)	  -­‐	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Marx’s	  work	  has	  been	  misinterpreted	  by	  others.	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and	  mechanistic	  and	  claimed	  that	  he	  had	  promoted	  ‘unrestrained	  productivism’	  (see	  
also	  Burkett	  2005).	  Foster	  (2014,	  2016a)	  points	  out	  that	  Schmidt	  was	  a	  doctoral	  
student	  working	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Frankfurt	  School	  critical	  theorists	  and	  
Western	  Marxists	  Max	  Horkheimer	  and	  Theodor	  Adorno,	  who	  themselves	  had	  
interpreted	  Marx’s	  work	  as	  ‘positivist’.	  The	  English	  translation	  of	  Schmidt’s	  book	  was	  
published	  in	  1971,	  and	  its	  claim	  that	  Marx	  had	  ‘fallen	  prey’	  to	  the	  Enlightenment	  
project	  promoting	  human	  domination	  over	  nature	  influenced	  the	  revived	  Marxism	  of	  
the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  leading	  to	  the	  widespread	  view	  that	  Marx’s	  thought	  did	  not	  
incorporate	  concerns	  about	  the	  natural	  world	  (Foster	  2014,	  2016a).	  Foster	  (2014,	  p.	  
viii)	  argues	  that	  even	  studies	  of	  Marx’s	  writings	  tended	  to	  ignore	  or	  gloss	  over	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  they	  incorporate	  “comprehensive	  scientific	  analysis	  of	  the	  natural	  
conditions	  underlying	  production	  and	  the	  capitalist	  economy.”216	  The	  group	  of	  
theorists	  that	  Foster	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘second-­‐stage	  ecosocialists’	  (a	  group	  that	  includes	  
Foster	  as	  well	  as	  academics	  such	  as	  Paul	  Burkett,	  Brett	  Clark,	  Hannah	  Holleman,	  
Stefano	  Longo,	  Kohei	  Saito	  and	  Richard	  York)	  responded	  by	  revisiting	  Marx	  and	  
Engels’	  original	  work	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  accuracy	  of	  first-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  
critiques	  and	  found	  textual	  evidence	  that	  contradicted	  this	  conventional	  wisdom	  
that	  classical	  Marxism	  ignored	  nature,	  or	  reduced	  its	  intrinsic	  and	  independent	  
importance	  and	  treated	  it	  in	  purely	  instrumental	  terms.	  As	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  
below,	  second-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  identify	  the	  centrality	  of	  capitalism’s	  damaging	  
impact	  on	  nature	  throughout	  Marx	  and	  Engels’	  work,	  pointing	  to	  many	  illustrative	  
examples,	  and	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  way	  this	  body	  of	  work	  was	  read	  and	  interpreted	  
in	  the	  past	  ignored	  this	  aspect	  of	  their	  writing.	  	  
Second-­‐stage	  ecosocialism	  
Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2016)	  identify	  the	  emergence	  of	  ‘second-­‐stage’	  ecosocialism	  in	  the	  
1990s,	  with	  Peter	  Dickens’	  1992	  book	  Society	  and	  Nature:	  Towards	  a	  Green	  Social	  
Theory	  representing	  an	  early	  example	  of	  the	  approach	  subsequently	  also	  adopted	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Foster	  (2015a,	  p.	  4)	  suggests	  that	  the	  ecological	  content	  of	  Marx’s	  work	  may	  have	  been	  previously	  ignored	  partially	  because,	  as	  Marxist	  Rosa	  Luxemburg	  observed	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  his	  vast	  body	  of	  work	  “extended	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  needs	  of	  the	  working-­‐class	  movement	  [and]	  would	  only	  be	  discovered	  and	  incorporated	  much	  later,	  as	  the	  socialist	  movement	  matured	  and	  new	  historical	  challenges	  arose.”	  
	   208	  
other	  key	  second-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  theorists.217	  Dickens’	  approach	  constituted	  a	  
‘turning	  point’	  in	  ecosocialist	  theorising	  in	  that,	  rather	  than	  accepting	  the	  
conventional	  wisdom	  that	  classical	  Marxism	  was	  anti-­‐ecological	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  
revised	  and	  supplemented	  with	  elements	  of	  ‘deep-­‐ecology’	  perspectives,	  it	  revisited	  
Marx’s	  early	  writings	  in	  order	  to	  analyse	  his	  theory	  on	  how	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  
production	  alienate	  humanity	  from	  nature	  (Foster	  &	  Clark	  2016,	  p.	  13).	  Dickens	  
argued	  that	  instead	  of	  ‘grafting’	  green	  theories	  onto	  a	  revised	  Marxism,	  it	  was	  
necessary	  “to	  extend	  Marx’s	  method,	  which	  included	  both	  a	  historical-­‐materialist	  
and	  dialectical	  assessment	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  society	  and	  nature”	  (Foster	  &	  
Clark	  2016,	  p.	  13).	  	  
Second-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  thus	  develop	  what	  Foster	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘anti-­‐critiques’	  in	  
response	  to	  ecological	  critiques	  of	  Marxism	  by	  revisiting	  the	  original	  works	  by	  Marx	  
and	  Engels	  with	  a	  specific	  purpose:	  “to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  ecological	  analysis	  in	  the	  
deep	  structure”	  of	  their	  writings	  (Foster	  cited	  in	  Stache	  2016).218	  This	  re-­‐reading	  of	  
Marx	  and	  Engels	  found	  evidence	  that	  countered	  first-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  critiques	  so	  
that	  over	  the	  next	  decade’s	  debates	  “…first-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  were	  forced	  to	  
accede	  the	  ground	  at	  nearly	  every	  point”	  (ibid.).	  In	  the	  interview	  with	  Stache,	  Foster	  
considers	  the	  book	  Marx	  and	  the	  Earth	  (2016),	  which	  he	  co-­‐authored	  with	  Paul	  
Burkett,	  as:	  
… in many ways the culminating stage in this debate. It is a 
response to a number of counterattacks and persistent 
misconceptions aimed at Marx and Engels, particularly in the area 
of ecological economics. Some ecological economists like Joan 
Martinez-Alier and James O’Connor argued that Marx and Engels 
failed to incorporate thermodynamics into their analysis. Similarly, 
it has been charged that Engels rejected the second law of 
thermodynamics. Other criticisms directed at classical historical 
materialism are also addressed, such as Joel Kovel’s claim that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	  Foster	  (cited	  in	  Stache	  2016)	  identifies	  Paul	  Burkett’s	  Marx	  and	  Nature	  (1999)	  and	  his	  own	  Marx’s	  Ecology	  (2000)	  as	  other	  important	  early	  examples	  of	  second-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  works.	  
218 Foster	  points	  out	  that	  anti-­‐critiques	  are,	  in	  themselves,	  also	  valuable	  exercises,	  as	  the	  process	  of	  conducting	  them	  constitutes	  a	  powerful	  method	  facilitating	  “self-­‐clarification	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  self-­‐critique,	  together	  with	  a	  major	  dialectical	  advance	  in	  theoretical	  understanding.	  In	  this	  way	  Marxism	  has	  continually	  deepened	  and	  revolutionized	  its	  perspective,	  renewing	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  its	  foundational	  views	  and	  new	  historical	  challenges”	  (Foster,	  cited	  in	  Stache	  2016).	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Marx and Engels excluded any notion of the intrinsic value of 
nature, Daniel Tanuro’s charge that Marx and Engels ignored the 
various qualitatively different forms of energy, and John Clark’s 
contention that Marx denied the organic relations between nature 
and society. 
In	  addition	  to	  responding	  to	  specific	  criticisms	  of	  Marx’s	  work	  and	  questioning	  “the	  
tendency	  to	  pit	  the	  young	  Marx	  against	  the	  mature	  Marx,	  Marx	  against	  Engels,	  and	  
natural	  science	  against	  social	  science”	  (Foster	  &	  Clark	  2016,	  p.	  13),	  second-­‐stage	  
ecosocialists	  have	  also	  focused	  on	  ‘reconstructing’	  Marx	  and	  Engels’s	  ecology	  (Foster	  
2014).	  Close	  readings	  of	  Marx’s	  writings	  reveal	  that	  nature	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  his	  
critique	  of	  capitalist	  political	  economy,	  particularly	  in	  his	  “…theory	  of	  metabolic	  rift,	  
his	  ecological-­‐value	  analysis,	  the	  analysis	  of	  ecological	  imperialism,	  and	  Marx	  and	  
Engels’	  development	  of	  the	  dialectics	  of	  ecology”	  (Foster,	  cited	  in	  Stache	  2016;	  see	  
also	  Foster	  2000,	  2009).	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  Marx’s	  metabolic	  rift	  analysis	  after	  
discussing	  the	  second-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  responses	  to	  specific	  critiques	  of	  classical	  
Marxism.	  
Second-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  responses	  to	  specific	  critiques	  by	  first-­‐stage	  
ecosocialists	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  other	  reasons	  (noted	  previously)	  informing	  the	  widespread	  
common	  perception	  that	  classical	  Marxism	  is	  anti-­‐ecological,	  many	  confusions	  and	  
misinterpretations	  of	  Marx’s	  work	  arise	  from	  a	  failure	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  core	  of	  
his	  work	  involves	  a	  critique	  of	  capitalism	  and	  not	  an	  ahistorical	  account	  of	  all	  social	  
formations	  at	  all	  times.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  Marx’s	  labour	  theory	  of	  value	  constitutes	  
an	  analysis	  of	  the	  form	  that	  value	  takes	  in	  capitalist	  societies,	  not	  “of	  all	  labour	  at	  all	  
times”	  (Foster	  &	  Clark	  2016,	  p.	  9).	  While	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation	  does	  not	  allow	  
for	  a	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  all	  the	  critiques	  and	  anti-­‐critiques	  related	  to	  the	  
ecological	  content	  and	  potential	  of	  classical	  Marxism,	  I	  provide	  brief	  overviews	  of	  
some	  of	  the	  most	  common	  and	  important	  debates	  below,	  beginning	  with	  second-­‐
stage	  ecosocialist	  responses	  to	  critiques	  of	  Marx’s	  value	  theory.	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On	  Marx’s	  labour	  theory	  of	  value	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  and	  persistent	  critiques	  of	  classical	  Marxism	  made	  by	  
mainstream	  green	  theorists	  as	  well	  as	  some	  first-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  is	  that	  the	  
centrality	  of	  Marx’s	  labour	  theory	  of	  value	  renders	  Marxist	  political	  economy	  
antithetical	  to	  an	  ecological	  value	  analysis	  (Clark	  &	  Foster	  2010a,	  p.	  148).	  In	  
response,	  Burkett	  (2014a,	  p.	  99)	  observes	  that:	  “Generally	  speaking,	  these	  critics	  fail	  
to	  appreciate	  the	  historical	  and	  social-­‐relational	  aspect	  of	  Marx’s	  theory	  –	  that	  value	  
as	  a	  specifically	  capitalist	  form	  of	  wealth	  does	  not	  represent	  Marx’s	  normative	  
valuation	  of	  nature’s	  intrinsic	  worth	  (e.g.	  in	  terms	  of	  aesthetic	  and	  other	  use	  
values).”	  Moreover,	  as	  Clark	  and	  Foster	  remind	  Marx’s	  critics:	  
The conceptual categories that Marx uses in his critique, such as 
nature as a free gift, and the law of value, are categories that he did 
not invent, but ones that he took over from classical political 
economy – recognizing that they exhibited the real tendencies of the 
[capitalist] system [he critiques] – and that he sought to transcend 
by transcending bourgeois society itself. 
(Clark & Foster 2010a, p. 149; emphasis added) 
Burkett	  attributes	  many	  misinterpretations	  of	  Marx’s	  value	  analysis	  to	  critics’	  failure	  
to	  understand	  “the	  distinctions	  and	  relations	  among	  Marx’s	  conceptions	  of	  use	  value	  
(to	  which	  nature	  always	  contributes),	  value	  (the	  necessary	  wage-­‐labor	  time	  
objectified	  in	  commodity	  use	  values),	  and	  exchange	  value	  (the	  monetary	  price	  paid	  
for	  a	  use	  value)”	  (Burkett	  2014a,	  p.	  69,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  
the	  importance	  of	  these	  distinctions	  and	  relations	  to	  Marx’s	  method	  in	  more	  detail:	  
Only by clearly demarcating and showing the relations and tensions 
among value, exchange value, and use value phenomena is Marx 
able to establish how capitalism’s class-exploitative relations shape 
production together with its human and extra-human natural 
conditions. At the same time, Marx analyses how particular sub-
forms of value and capital (e.g. money, wages, constant capital, 
fixed and circulating capital, rent) are themselves shaped by the 
material conditions of production, that is, by the natural basis and 
substance of use value. In this way, Marx’s value analysis reveals 
the tensions between wealth in its capitalist form and wealth in the 
sense of the individual and collective needs of social human beings 
co-evolving with nature, along with the implications of these 
tensions for class struggle and the movement toward a new stage of 
wealth production. 
(Burkett 2014a, p. 100) 
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Importantly,	  Burkett	  goes	  even	  further	  in	  his	  response	  to	  critics	  who	  challenge	  Marx	  
on	  his	  failure	  to	  ascribe	  an	  intrinsic	  value	  to	  nature,	  explaining	  that	  attempts	  to	  do	  
this	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  conflations	  of	  different	  value	  forms	  that	  obscure	  ecological	  
contradictions	  inherent	  in	  capitalist	  economics:	  
By contrast, many of Marx’s ecological critics want to directly 
attribute value to nature without taking account of the historical 
specificity of wealth’s social forms as determined by particular 
production relations. As a result, when they try to specify the 
precise value-form taken on by nature (value in terms of what, and 
for whom?), they are driven to various theoretical contradictions and 
defaults. The most common contradiction here is the inability to 
define nature’s purported ‘value’ independently of its exchange 
value and/or its use value, which often leads to (implicit or explicit) 
conflations of the three concepts. These conflations cause the critics 
in question to ignore or soft-pedal the ecological contradictions of 
capitalist wealth as revealed by Marx’s relational and dialectical 
approach to value, exchange value, and use value.219 
(Burkett 2014a, p. 100; emphasis in original) 
Although	  there	  are	  many	  additional	  intellectually	  interesting	  aspects	  to	  this	  debate	  
(such	  as	  Marx’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  Lauderdale	  Paradox,	  which	  Clark	  and	  Foster	  
(2010a)	  discuss	  in	  some	  detail),	  I	  conclude	  this	  section	  with	  Foster	  and	  Clark’s	  
important	  point	  that	  critics	  of	  Marx’s	  labour	  theory	  of	  value	  fail	  to	  see	  that:	  	  
…it was… [the] very one-sidedness of the value form in capitalism 
that lay at the center of Marx’s critique, associated with the 
contradiction between wealth (derived from natural-material use 
values) and value or exchange value (which left out nature 
altogether). For Marx, once it was recognized that nature – 
constituting, together with labor, one of the two sources of all 
wealth – was not included in the capitalist value calculus but was 
treated as a ‘free gift… to capital,’ it was impossible not to 
recognize both the existence of natural limits and capital’s 
destructive tendency to override them, in its unending drive for 
accumulation. 
(Foster & Clark 2016, p. 9) 
Related	  to	  critiques	  about	  Marx’s	  neglect	  of	  nature’s	  intrinsic	  value	  in	  his	  value	  
theory,	  are	  the	  claims	  by	  some	  critics	  that	  classical	  Marxism	  is	  anti-­‐ecological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219	  Burkett	  (2014a,	  pp.	  100	  –	  106)	  responds	  in	  detail	  to	  specific	  critiques	  of	  Marx’s	  neglect	  of	  intrinsic	  value	  by	  Gunnar	  Skirbekk,	  David	  Orton,	  Geoffrey	  Carpenter	  and	  Ted	  Benton.	  While	  these	  responses	  are	  very	  illuminating,	  due	  to	  their	  being	  too	  detailed	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  summarise	  his	  responses	  here,	  I	  refer	  the	  interested	  reader	  to	  Burkett’s	  original	  writings.	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because	  of	  its	  ‘productivism’	  and	  ‘Prometheanism.’	  While	  Paul	  Burkett	  addresses	  
such	  claims	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  his	  2014	  book,	  Marx	  and	  Nature:	  A	  Red	  and	  Green	  
Perspective,	  he	  has	  also	  authored	  several	  articles	  on	  these	  issues	  and	  I	  primarily	  
refer	  to	  arguments	  he	  presents	  in	  a	  2005	  paper,	  Marx’s	  vision	  of	  sustainable	  human	  
development,	  to	  summarise	  his	  anti-­‐critique	  of	  claims	  that	  Marx	  was	  a	  ‘productivist’	  
below.	  
On	  Marx’s	  ‘productivism’	  and	  views	  on	  the	  human	  conquest	  of	  nature	  
Burkett	  (2005)	  sets	  out	  to	  address	  critiques	  that	  Marx’s	  vision	  of	  communism	  or	  
socialism	  implies	  an	  ‘ecologically	  unsustainable’	  assumption	  that	  there	  are	  no	  
natural	  limits	  to	  production	  and	  that	  Marx	  is	  ‘Promethean,’	  promoting	  the	  
Enlightenment	  project	  of	  achieving	  human	  domination	  over	  nature.	  Burkett	  begins	  
his	  discussion	  by	  identifying	  a	  few	  examples	  of	  such	  critiques,	  including	  one	  made	  by	  
ecological	  economist	  Herman	  Daly	  who	  contends	  that,	  for	  the	  ‘materialist	  
determinist’	  Marx,	  “…economic	  growth	  is	  crucial	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  the	  
overwhelming	  material	  abundance	  that	  is	  the	  objective	  condition	  for	  the	  emergence	  
of	  the	  new	  socialist	  man.	  Environmental	  limits	  on	  growth	  would	  contradict	  ‘historical	  
necessity’”	  (Daly,	  cited	  in	  Burkett	  2005,	  pp.	  34	  –	  35).220	  Burkett	  (ibid.,	  p.	  35)	  also	  
refers	  to	  Robyn	  Eckersley’s	  claim	  that	  “Marx	  fully	  endorsed	  the	  ‘civilizing’	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  Herman	  Daly	  is	  an	  early	  founder	  of	  a	  tendency	  within	  the	  environmental	  movement	  that	  Leahy	  characterises	  as	  ‘radical	  reformism’	  (2017,	  p.	  1).	  While	  this	  group	  of	  theorists	  critique	  some	  features	  of	  capitalism	  for	  causing	  environmental	  damage,	  according	  to	  Leahy	  (ibid.,	  p.	  2)	  they	  “primarily	  identify	  as	  environmentalists,	  rather	  than	  as	  socialists	  or	  anarchists.”	  Unlike	  ecological	  Marxists,	  they	  do	  not	  see	  capitalism	  (as	  a	  system)	  as	  
inherently	  anti-­‐ecological.	  Despite	  the	  radical	  nature	  of	  the	  reforms	  they	  propose	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  sustainability	  (with	  reforms	  including	  a	  steady-­‐state	  economy,	  the	  redistribution	  of	  wealth,	  strong	  government	  regulation,	  and	  instituting	  minimum	  and	  maximum	  income	  levels),	  they	  do	  not	  propose	  the	  abolition	  of	  capitalism	  because	  of	  their	  belief	  that	  “properly	  functioning	  markets	  allocate	  resources	  efficiently”	  (Daly	  2007,	  cited	  in	  Leahy	  2017,	  p.	  5).	  The	  reforms	  they	  propose	  are	  so	  radical,	  however,	  that	  Leahy	  argues	  that	  they	  would	  likely	  lead	  to	  socialism	  if	  implemented	  (which	  is	  why	  the	  capitalist	  class	  and	  its	  political	  representatives	  and	  defenders	  are	  unlikely	  to	  countenance	  instituting	  them,	  as	  some	  of	  these	  theorists	  hope	  they	  will	  do	  voluntarily).	  Leahy	  (2017,	  p.	  13)	  concludes	  that	  because	  of	  its	  radical	  potential,	  “radical	  reformism	  is	  not	  just	  ecological	  modernization	  in	  a	  new	  garb.”	  Nevertheless,	  the	  radical	  reformist	  perspective	  is	  seen	  as	  problematic	  by	  ecological	  Marxists:	  citing	  Davidson	  (2012),	  Leahy	  (p.	  13)	  presents	  one	  Marxist	  critique	  of	  this	  perspective	  as	  being	  that	  it	  “gives	  credibility	  to	  the	  very	  structures	  which	  ‘have	  been	  responsible	  for	  environmental	  decline’	  in	  the	  first	  place.”	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technical	  accomplishments	  of	  the	  capitalist	  forces	  of	  production	  and	  thoroughly	  
absorbed	  the	  Victorian	  faith	  in	  scientific	  and	  technological	  progress	  as	  the	  means	  by	  
which	  humans	  could	  outsmart	  and	  conquer	  nature”	  and	  her	  argument	  that	  Marx	  
“consistently	  saw	  human	  freedom	  as	  inversely	  related	  to	  humanity’s	  dependence	  on	  
nature.”221	  Briefly	  outlining	  a	  few	  other	  critiques	  along	  similar	  lines,	  Burkett	  points	  
out	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  accepting	  such	  critiques	  without	  engaging	  with	  
Marxism’s	  ‘human	  developmental	  and	  ecological	  elements’:	  such	  ideas	  lead	  even	  
some	  Marxists	  “to	  place	  their	  bets	  on	  a	  ‘greening’	  of	  capitalism	  as	  a	  practical	  
alternative	  to	  the	  struggle	  for	  socialism.”	  Given	  the	  political	  and	  practical	  
implications	  of	  this	  debate,	  Burkett	  (ibid.)	  returns	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  
to	  identify	  the	  key	  elements	  of	  their	  vision	  of	  ‘sustainable	  human	  development’	  
within	  a	  post-­‐capitalist	  economy	  and	  society	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  whether	  these	  
visions	  were,	  in	  fact,	  ‘anti-­‐ecological,’	  ‘productivist,’	  and	  promoted	  (or	  supported)	  
‘the	  human	  domination	  of	  nature.’222	  	  
As	  Burkett	  (ibid.,	  p.	  36)	  points	  out,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  ‘conventional	  wisdom’	  that	  Marx	  
and	  Engels	  rejected	  speculations	  about	  ‘socialist	  utopias’	  and	  provided	  few	  thoughts	  
about	  what	  a	  post-­‐capitalist	  society	  should	  look	  like,	  ‘post-­‐capitalist	  economic	  and	  
political	  relationships’	  are	  recurring	  themes	  in	  all	  their	  major	  works	  and	  most	  of	  their	  
minor	  works.223	  Despite	  this	  body	  of	  thought	  being	  ‘scattered’	  throughout	  the	  entire	  
body	  of	  their	  work,	  Burkett	  (ibid.,	  p.	  36)	  argues	  that	  “one	  can	  easily	  glean	  from	  them	  
a	  coherent	  vision	  based	  on	  a	  clear	  set	  of	  organizing	  principles”,	  which	  he	  summarises	  
as	  follows:	  
The most basic feature of communism in Marx’s projection is its 
overcoming of capitalism’s social separation of the producers from 
necessary conditions of production. This new social union entails a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  221	  The	  texts	  from	  which	  Burkett	  (2005)	  quotes	  these	  arguments	  are	  Herman	  Daly’s	  1992	  Steady-­‐State	  Economics,	  2nd	  ed.,	  London,	  Earthscan,	  p.	  196	  and	  Robyn	  Eckersley’s	  1992	  Environmentalism	  and	  Political	  Theory,	  Albany,	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  p.	  80.	  222	  Some	  of	  the	  original	  works	  that	  Burkett	  (2005)	  refers	  to	  in	  his	  responses	  to	  specific	  criticisms	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels’	  ideas	  include	  Capital	  Volumes	  1,	  2	  and	  3;	  Critique	  of	  the	  
Gotha	  Programme;	  Economic	  and	  Philosophical	  Manuscripts	  of	  1844;	  Anti-­‐Dühring;	  The	  
German	  Ideology;	  Dialectics	  of	  Nature;	  Grundrisse	  and	  Theories	  of	  Surplus	  Value	  223	  Refer	  also	  to	  Peter	  Hudis’	  Marx’s	  Concept	  of	  the	  Alternative	  to	  Capitalism	  (2012)	  for	  a	  detailed	  investigation	  of	  Marx’s	  vision	  of	  a	  post-­‐capitalist	  future.	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complete decommodification of labor power plus a new set of 
communal property rights. Communist or ‘associated’ production is 
planned and carried out by the producers and communities 
themselves, without the class-based intermediaries of wage-labor, 
market, and state. Marx often motivates and illustrates these basic 
features in terms of the primary means and end of associated 
production: free human development. 
(Burkett 2005, p. 36) 
Burkett	  (2005,	  p.	  45)	  argues	  that	  three	  aspects	  of	  Marx’s	  vision	  of	  a	  desirable	  post-­‐
capitalist	  future	  should	  be	  considered	  when	  evaluating	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  
vision	  is	  environmentally	  sustainable:	  “(1)	  the	  responsibility	  of	  communism	  to	  
manage	  its	  use	  of	  natural	  conditions;	  (2)	  the	  ecological	  significance	  of	  expanded	  free	  
time;	  [and]	  (3)	  the	  growth	  of	  wealth	  and	  the	  use	  of	  labor	  time	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  
cost	  of	  production.”	  Key	  features	  of	  the	  development	  of	  Burkett’s	  argument	  in	  
discussing	  these	  three	  aspects	  of	  classical	  Marxism	  are	  summarised	  below.	  
Burkett	  (2005,	  p.	  46)	  notes	  that	  not	  only	  does	  Marx’s	  writing	  clearly	  demonstrate	  his	  
deep	  concerns	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  capitalist	  agricultural	  practices	  sapped	  “the	  
original	  sources	  of	  all	  wealth,	  the	  soil	  and	  the	  labourer,”	  but	  he	  also	  “repeatedly	  
emphasized	  the	  imperative	  for	  post-­‐capitalist	  society	  to	  manage	  its	  use	  of	  natural	  
conditions	  responsibly”	  and	  insisted	  “on	  the	  extension	  of	  communal	  property	  to	  the	  
land	  and	  other	  ‘sources	  of	  life’”	  (ibid.).	  Communal	  land	  ownership,	  in	  Marx’s	  vision,	  
comes	  with	  the	  responsibility	  to	  treat	  “the	  soil	  as	  eternal	  communal	  property,	  an	  
inalienable	  condition	  for	  the	  existence	  and	  reproduction	  of	  a	  chain	  of	  successive	  
generations	  of	  the	  human	  race”	  (Marx,	  Capital	  Volume	  3,	  cited	  in	  Burkett	  2005,	  p.	  
47).	  Burkett	  (ibid.)	  argues	  that	  “Marx’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  future	  society’s	  
responsibility	  toward	  the	  land	  follows	  from	  his	  projection	  of	  the	  inherent	  unity	  of	  
humanity	  and	  nature	  being	  realized	  both	  consciously	  and	  socially	  under	  
communism.”	  He	  links	  this	  argument	  to	  how,	  “for	  Marx	  and	  Engels,	  people	  and	  
nature	  are	  not	  ‘two	  separate	  “things”’;	  hence	  they	  speak	  of	  humanity	  having	  ‘an	  
historical	  nature	  and	  a	  natural	  history’”	  (ibid.).	  In	  addition,	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  regard	  
individuals	  as	  ‘subservient	  to	  nature,’	  and	  communism	  as	  a	  system	  that	  would	  
overcome	  ruptures	  between	  humans	  and	  nature,	  with	  Marx	  going	  “so	  far	  as	  to	  
define	  communism	  as	  ‘the	  unity	  of	  being	  of	  man	  with	  nature’”	  (ibid.).	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Given	  the	  material	  reality	  that	  humans	  cannot	  survive	  unless	  they	  meet	  their	  needs	  
by	  interacting	  with	  nature,	  in	  Marx’s	  vision	  of	  a	  communist	  future	  this	  interaction	  
will,	  of	  course,	  continue	  –	  but	  it	  will	  be	  conducted	  by	  “the	  associated	  producers	  
rationally	  regulating	  their	  interchange	  with	  nature”	  (emphasis	  added),	  a	  regulation	  
that	  “presumes	  that	  the	  producers	  have	  ‘become	  masters	  of	  their	  own	  social	  
organisation’”	  but,	  crucially,	  “does	  not	  presume	  that	  humanity	  has	  overcome	  all	  
natural	  limits;	  nor	  does	  it	  presume	  that	  the	  producers	  have	  attained	  complete	  
technological	  control	  over	  natural	  forces”	  (ibid.).	  If	  Marx	  had	  envisaged	  complete	  
human	  mastery	  over	  nature,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  no	  need	  for	  him	  to	  suggest	  that	  
“the	  associated	  producers	  [should	  set]…	  aside	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  surplus	  product	  as	  a	  
‘reserve	  or	  insurance	  fund	  to	  provide	  against	  misadventures,	  disturbances	  through	  
natural	  events,	  etc.’	  especially	  in	  agriculture”	  (2005,	  p.	  48).	  Burkett	  summarises	  
Marx	  and	  Engels’	  views	  about	  human	  domination	  of	  nature	  as	  follows:	  
Contradicting their ecological critics, Marx and Engels simply do 
not identify free human development with a one-sided human 
domination or control of nature. According to Engels, ‘Freedom 
does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in 
the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of 
systematically making them work towards definite ends…. In short, 
Marx and Engels envision a ‘real human freedom’ based on ‘an 
existence in harmony with the established laws of nature.’ 
(Burkett 2005, pp. 48 – 49) 
Having	  addressed	  the	  claims	  of	  critics	  that	  Marxism	  is	  inherently	  anti-­‐ecological	  
because	  of	  its	  alleged	  promotion	  of	  ‘human	  domination	  over	  nature,’	  Burkett	  turns	  
his	  attention	  to	  arguments	  that	  the	  Marxist	  vision	  of	  ‘expanded	  free	  time’	  is	  
inherently	  anti-­‐ecological.	  Such	  arguments	  are	  based	  on	  assumptions	  that	  labour	  can	  
only	  enjoy	  more	  free	  time	  if	  there	  is	  extensive	  automation	  (using	  energy-­‐intensive	  
technology)	  or	  that	  there	  are	  such	  abundant	  resources	  that	  people	  don’t	  need	  to	  
work	  long	  hours	  (which	  implies	  the	  availability	  of	  limitless	  natural	  resources).	  Burkett	  
(2005,	  pp.	  49	  -­‐	  50)	  points	  out	  that	  “the	  ecological	  critics	  have	  mischaracterised	  the	  
relation	  between	  free	  time	  and	  work	  time	  under	  communism,”	  a	  system	  in	  which	  
not	  only	  is	  producers’	  labour	  time	  “reduced	  to	  a	  normal	  length”	  (emphasis	  added)	  
because	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  compelled	  to	  work	  for	  others,	  but	  the	  labour	  itself	  is	  also	  
qualitatively	  different	  and	  presents	  opportunities	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  higher	  self-­‐
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realisation.	  Burkett	  summarises	  the	  ecological	  nature	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels’	  vision	  of	  
free	  time	  as	  follows:	  
In short, the founders of Marxism did not envision communism’s 
reduced work time in terms of a progressive separation of human 
development from nature. Nor did they see expanded free time 
being filled by orgies of consumption for consumption’s sake. 
Rather, reduced work time is viewed as a necessary condition for 
the intellectual development of social individuals capable of 
mastering the scientifically developed forces of nature and social 
labor in environmentally and humanly rational fashion. The 
‘increase in free time’ appears here as ‘time for the full development 
of the individual’ capable of ‘the grasping of his own history as a 
process, and the recognition of nature (equally present as practical 
power over nature) as his real body.’ …. Far from anti-ecological, 
this process is such that the producers and their communities 
become more theoretically and practically aware of natural wealth 
as an eternal condition of production, free time, and human life 
itself. 
(Burkett 2005, p. 50; emphasis in original) 
Burkett	  (2005,	  p.	  51)	  furthermore	  points	  out	  how	  “ecological	  critics	  also	  seem	  to	  
have	  missed	  the	  potential	  for	  increased	  free	  time	  as	  a	  means	  of	  reducing	  the	  
pressure	  of	  production	  on	  the	  natural	  environment”	  (emphasis	  in	  original),	  which	  
can	  happen	  in	  a	  system	  in	  which	  rising	  productivity	  is	  rewarded	  by	  free	  time	  rather	  
than	  by	  more	  money	  with	  which	  to	  buy	  more	  consumer	  goods.	  Decreased	  
consumption	  is	  furthermore	  linked	  to	  “communism’s	  transformation	  of	  human	  
needs,”	  which	  constitutes	  the	  next	  part	  of	  Burkett’s	  argument	  against	  critics	  who	  
charge	  Marxism	  with	  being	  anti-­‐ecological.	  
Addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels’s	  “notorious	  references	  to	  continued	  
growth	  in	  the	  production	  of	  wealth	  under	  communism,”	  Burkett	  (2005,	  p.	  52)	  
emphasises	  that	  rather	  than	  being	  ‘productivist,’	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  define	  ‘growth’	  in	  
terms	  of	  “free	  and	  well-­‐rounded	  human	  development,”	  not	  “material	  production	  
and	  consumption	  for	  their	  own	  sake.”	  In	  addition,	  he	  points	  out	  that	  when	  Marx	  and	  
Engels	  talk	  about	  growth,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  always	  with	  reference	  “to	  growth	  of	  wealth	  
in	  a	  general	  sense,	  encompassing	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  needs	  other	  than	  those	  
requiring	  the	  industrial	  processing	  of	  natural	  resources	  (matter	  and	  energy	  
throughput)”	  (ibid.).	  Citing	  Ernest	  Mandel,	  Burkett	  (2005,	  p.	  53)	  argues	  that	  the	  
Marxist	  “social	  and	  human	  developmental	  approach	  to	  need	  satisfaction	  is	  quite	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different	  from	  the	  ‘absurd	  notion’	  of	  unqualified	  ‘abundance’	  often	  ascribed	  to	  
Marx...”	  Needs	  can	  be	  categorised	  as	  ‘basic,’	  ‘secondary,’	  and	  ‘luxury,	  inessential	  or	  
even	  harmful	  needs,’	  and,	  drawing	  on	  Mandel’s	  work,	  Burkett	  (2005,	  p.	  53)	  argues	  
that	  Marx	  foresees	  communist	  societies	  as	  meeting	  everyone’s	  basic	  needs	  followed	  
by	  “the	  gradual	  extension	  of	  this	  satisfaction	  to	  secondary	  needs…	  not	  a	  full	  satiation	  
of	  all	  conceivable	  needs”	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  He	  furthermore	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  in	  
Marx’s	  notion	  of	  secondary	  needs	  that	  “one	  begins	  to	  see	  the	  full	  ecological	  
significance	  of	  free	  time	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  communist	  wealth,”	  particularly	  “if	  the	  
secondary	  needs	  developed	  and	  satisfied	  during	  free	  time	  are	  less	  material	  and	  
energy	  intensive…”	  This	  is,	  indeed,	  precisely	  Marx’s	  vision:	  he	  sees	  “the	  producers	  
using	  their	  newfound	  material	  security	  and	  expanded	  free	  time	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  
variety	  of	  intellectual	  and	  aesthetic	  forms	  of	  self-­‐development”	  (ibid.).224	  
As	  Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2016,	  p.	  4)	  also	  conclude	  from	  their	  readings	  of	  Marx’s	  work,	  
rather	  than	  being	  a	  ‘productivist,	  he	  privileged	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  
humanity’s	  qualitative	  needs	  (use	  value);	  nowhere	  did	  he	  suggest	  that	  capitalism’s	  
drive	  for	  “endless	  quantitative	  expansion	  (exchange	  value)	  was	  a	  desirable	  goal	  for	  
humanity.	  He	  saw	  value,	  which	  in	  capitalist	  economics	  emanates	  from	  ‘capital	  
alone,’	  as	  ‘contradicting’	  wealth,	  which	  Marx	  understood	  as	  “deriving	  from	  both	  
nature	  and	  labor.”	  The	  two	  fundamental	  sources	  of	  wealth	  mentioned	  here	  (nature	  
and	  labour)	  are	  relevant	  in	  another	  important	  debate	  between	  first-­‐stage	  and	  
second-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  over	  James	  O’Connor’s	  thesis	  of	  the	  ‘second	  contradiction	  
of	  capitalism.’	  Given	  that	  nature	  is	  an	  essential	  source	  of	  wealth,	  and	  that	  ‘free	  
nature’	  has	  been	  pivotal	  to	  accumulation	  strategies	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  
capitalism,	  first-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  James	  O’Connor	  considered	  how	  the	  serious	  
environmental	  degradation	  that	  was	  already	  evident	  in	  the	  1980s	  (and	  is	  much	  more	  
serious	  now)	  might	  negatively	  impact	  on	  capital	  accumulation.	  O’Connor	  proposed	  a	  
modification	  to	  Marx’s	  theory:	  the	  incorporation	  of	  a	  ‘second	  contradiction	  of	  
capitalism’	  which,	  he	  argued,	  like	  Marx’s	  ‘first	  contradiction	  of	  capitalism’,	  could	  also	  
lead	  to	  economic	  crises.	  This	  came	  to	  be	  another	  contentious	  issue	  generating	  anti-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224	  Refer	  to	  Burkett	  (2005,	  2014a,	  2014b)	  for	  many	  more	  detailed	  investigations	  of	  the	  works	  of	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  demonstrating	  that,	  contrary	  to	  critics’	  assertions,	  their	  vision	  of	  communism	  is	  inherently	  environmentally	  sustainable.	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critiques	  from	  second-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  such	  as	  John	  Bellamy	  Foster	  and	  Paul	  
Burkett.225	  	  
On	  Marx’s	  failure	  to	  identify	  the	  ‘second	  contradiction	  of	  capitalism’	  
O’Connor	  argues	  that	  in	  identifying	  “capitalism’s	  inherent	  tendency	  toward	  a	  
realization	  crisis,	  or	  crisis	  of	  capital	  over-­‐production”	  as	  a	  result	  of	  capital’s	  ‘limitless	  
drive	  to	  increase	  the	  rate	  of	  exploitation’	  of	  labour	  (which	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘first	  
contradiction	  of	  capitalism’),	  Marx	  failed	  to	  identify	  a	  second	  contradiction	  resulting	  
from	  capital	  accumulation	  strategies:	  “a	  tendency	  toward	  the	  amassing	  of	  wealth	  at	  
one	  pole	  and	  the	  accumulation	  of	  conditions	  of	  resource-­‐depletion,	  pollution,	  
species	  and	  habitat	  destruction,	  urban	  congestion,	  overpopulation	  and	  a	  
deteriorating	  sociological	  life-­‐environment	  (in	  short,	  degraded	  ‘conditions	  of	  
production’)	  at	  the	  other”	  (Foster	  1992,	  pp.	  78	  –	  79).	  O’Connor	  furthermore	  argues	  
that	  the	  relative	  stagnation	  in	  the	  world	  economy	  since	  the	  1970s	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  
‘supply-­‐side’	  restructuring	  of	  global	  capitalism:	  “the	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  system	  to	  a	  
more	  intensive	  exploitation	  (and	  superexploitation)	  of	  labor	  and	  the	  environment”	  
which	  has	  accelerated	  the	  pace	  of	  environmental	  degradation	  so	  much	  that	  the	  
‘second	  contradiction	  of	  capitalism’	  is	  ‘rapidly	  gaining	  on	  the	  first’	  (Foster	  1992,	  p.	  
81).	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  argument	  are	  that	  “the	  economic	  repercussions	  of	  the	  
second	  contradiction	  will	  grow	  by	  leaps	  and	  bounds…	  marking	  nature’s	  ultimate	  
‘revenge’	  on	  the	  accumulation	  process”	  (Foster	  1992,	  p.	  81).	  O’Connor’s	  critique	  of	  
Marx’s	  ecological	  concerns	  is	  that	  while	  Marx	  recognised	  that	  capitalist	  agriculture	  
was	  environmentally	  damaging,	  he	  failed	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  
ecological	  degradation	  of	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  production	  “…	  ‘might	  threaten	  
economic	  crisis	  of	  a	  particular	  type,	  namely,	  underproduction	  of	  capital,’	  due	  to	  the	  
impairment	  of	  the	  natural	  conditions	  of	  production”	  (Foster	  2002,	  p.	  7).	  According	  to	  
O’Connor,	  this	  failure	  on	  Marx’s	  part	  requires	  ecological	  Marxists	  to	  develop	  “a	  
theory	  of	  how	  increasing	  ecological	  costs	  [contribute]	  to	  decreasing	  profitability	  and	  
accumulation	  crisis”	  (Foster	  2002,	  p.	  7).	  Before	  discussing	  Foster’s	  response	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  James	  O’Connor	  introduced	  his	  thesis	  of	  the	  ‘second	  contradiction	  of	  capitalism’	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  the	  1988	  inaugural	  volume	  of	  a	  leading	  academic	  ecosocialist	  journal,	  Capitalism	  Nature	  Socialism,	  and	  expanded	  on	  it	  in	  later	  writings	  (Foster	  1992,	  p.	  77).	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O’Connor’s	  argument,	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  Burkett’s	  response,	  which	  
emphasises	  the	  differences	  between	  O’Connor’s	  thesis	  and	  Marx’s	  understanding	  of	  
capitalism’s	  fundamental	  contradiction.	  
Contrary	  to	  popular	  perceptions	  that	  Marx	  located	  capitalism’s	  ‘historical	  limits’	  
solely	  to	  “tendencies	  toward	  overaccumulation	  and	  falling	  profitability,”	  Burkett	  
points	  out	  that	  Marx	  identifies	  capitalism’s	  ‘fundamental	  contradiction’	  as	  “the	  
contradiction	  between	  production	  for	  private	  profit	  and	  production	  for	  human	  
needs”	  (Burkett	  2014a,	  p.	  175,	  p.	  177).	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  Marx’s	  analysis	  the	  ‘real	  
barrier’	  capitalism	  faces	  is	  not	  its	  ‘profitability	  crises’	  but	  is	  actually	  “located	  at	  the	  
more	  basic	  level	  of	  production’s	  ‘motive	  and	  purpose’	  being	  private	  profit	  (‘capital	  
and	  its	  self-­‐expansion’)	  rather	  than	  human	  needs	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  socially	  
developed	  needs	  or	  ‘living	  process’	  of	  the	  producers”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  177).	  Thus,	  in	  contrast	  
to	  O’Connor’s	  understanding	  of	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘first	  contradiction	  of	  
capitalism,’	  Burkett	  points	  out	  that,	  “For	  Marx,	  capitalism’s	  fundamental	  
contradiction	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  accumulation	  crises;	  rather,	  such	  crises	  ‘reveal’	  this	  
fundamental	  contradiction,	  thereby	  showing	  that	  capitalism	  is	  ‘only	  a	  transitional,	  
historical	  form’	  of	  production”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  180).	  Moreover,	  Burkett	  argues	  that	  “…the	  
conflict	  between	  production	  for	  profit	  and	  production	  for	  human	  needs,	  the	  
alienation	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  production	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  producers	  and	  their	  
communities,	  and	  the	  tension	  between	  social	  production	  and	  private	  appropriation,	  
are	  all	  equivalent	  expressions	  of	  capitalism’s	  fundamental	  contradiction	  in	  Marx’s	  
view”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  178).	  O’Connor’s	  ‘two	  contradictions’	  are,	  from	  a	  Marxist	  perspective,	  
thus	  “both	  symptoms	  of	  this	  more	  basic	  contradiction”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  196;	  emphasis	  in	  
original).	  Burkett	  summarises	  his	  critique	  of	  O’Connor’s	  thesis	  as	  follows:	  
For Marx, the fundamental contradiction of capitalism is that 
between wealth for capital versus wealth for the producers and 
their communities – where the latter is defined not in terms of the 
minimalist material and social requirements of capital accumulation 
but rather in terms of the conditions for a less restricted and more 
sustainable human development (cf. Lebowitz, 1992b). Marx does 
not artificially divide capital’s power over both labor and its 
conditions into two separate powers. Rising exploitation, 
overproduction crises, increasing ‘external costs’ of production, and 
the degradation of human, natural, and social wealth are all 
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necessary, mutually constituted aspects of capitalism’s fundamental 
contradiction, in Marx’s view. 
(Burkett 2014a, p. 197; emphasis in original) 
Supplementing	  Burkett’s	  approach	  of	  returning	  to	  Marx’s	  original	  writings	  to	  review	  
his	  theory	  of	  the	  fundamental	  contradiction	  of	  capitalism,	  Foster	  (2002,	  p.	  6)	  
considers	  two	  issues	  in	  evaluating	  O’Connor’s	  argument:	  whether	  ecological	  crises	  
necessarily	  lead	  to	  economic	  crises	  under	  capitalism,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
ecological	  contradictions	  lie	  ‘at	  the	  heart	  of	  capitalist	  society.’	  
Regarding	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  ecological	  crises	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  capitalist	  
economic	  crises,	  Foster	  (2002,	  pp.	  10	  –	  11)	  argues	  that	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  
“underestimate	  capitalism’s	  capacity	  to	  accumulate	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  most	  blatant	  
ecological	  destruction,	  to	  profit	  from	  environmental	  degradation…	  and	  to	  continue	  
to	  destroy	  the	  earth	  to	  the	  point	  of	  no	  return	  –	  both	  for	  human	  society	  and	  for	  most	  
of	  the	  world’s	  living	  species.”	  Burkett	  (2014,	  p.	  195)	  similarly	  argues	  that	  the	  
problems	  created	  by	  environmental	  degradation	  can	  present	  new	  opportunities	  for	  
realising	  surplus	  value,	  and	  recent	  empirical	  evidence	  supports	  this	  view.	  Naomi	  
Klein’s	  (2007,	  2017)	  work	  on	  ‘disaster	  capitalism,’	  as	  well	  as	  other	  analyses	  inspired	  
by	  this	  work,	  provide	  examples	  of	  how	  capitalists	  already	  profit	  from	  environmental	  
degradation	  and	  disasters	  and	  also	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  neoliberalising	  
commodification	  and	  financialisation	  mechanisms	  and	  processes	  being	  used	  to	  profit	  
from	  natural	  ‘resource	  management,’	  neoliberal	  forms	  of	  nature	  conservation,	  and	  
environmental	  disasters	  such	  as	  the	  climate	  change	  caused	  by	  anthropogenic	  global	  
warming.226	  Fletcher	  (2012),	  for	  example,	  discusses	  several	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  need	  
to	  address	  climate	  change	  is	  being	  used	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  financialising	  nature	  
conservation	  through	  UNFCCC-­‐endorsed	  projects	  such	  as	  REDD+	  and	  CDM	  as	  well	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  Fletcher	  (2012,	  p.	  106)	  refers	  to	  Büscher’s	  (n.d.)	  notion	  of	  ‘the	  unique	  nature	  of	  neoliberal	  conservation	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  neoliberal	  natural	  resource	  management	  in	  general’:	  “As	  opposed	  to	  resources	  whose	  use	  can	  be	  bought	  and	  sold	  within	  markets,	  the	  resources	  upon	  which	  carbon	  control	  (like	  other	  conservation	  measures)	  is	  based	  must	  by	  definition	  be	  preserved	  in	  situ,	  and	  thus	  creative	  means	  must	  be	  found	  to	  ascribe	  exchange	  value	  to	  these	  resources	  without	  granting	  access	  to	  their	  use.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ‘fixed	  capital’	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  localized	  natural	  resources)	  upon	  which	  conservation	  is	  based	  must	  be	  transformed	  into	  fluid	  capital	  that	  can	  be	  abstracted	  and	  freely	  circulated	  throughout	  the	  world.”	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through	  the	  creation	  of	  carbon	  trading	  markets	  and	  environmental	  (or	  ‘weather’)	  
derivatives,	  including	  ‘catastrophe	  bonds.’227	  	  	  
Extending	  the	  profit	  opportunities	  provided	  to	  capital	  by	  financial	  instruments	  
facilitating	  speculation	  on	  staple	  food	  crops	  that	  result	  in	  price	  hikes	  disadvantaging	  
the	  poorest	  people	  (Baines	  2017;	  Clapp	  2009),	  additional	  financial	  instruments	  have	  
even	  been	  created	  to	  allow	  speculators	  to	  gamble	  on	  the	  weather	  (Pike	  &	  Pollard	  
2010;	  Randalls	  2010).228	  Randalls	  (2010,	  p.	  711)	  defines	  weather	  derivatives	  as	  
“financial	  contracts	  that	  enable	  companies	  to	  trade	  upon	  weather	  indices	  (such	  as	  
temperature,	  precipitation,	  snowfall,	  wind	  velocity	  or	  frost)	  to	  manage	  their	  
weather-­‐sensitive	  costs	  or	  simply	  to	  speculate”	  and,	  interestingly,	  identifies	  their	  
emergence	  to	  “the	  US	  energy	  sector	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  with	  Enron,	  Aquila	  and	  Koch	  
Industries.”	  These	  ‘weather	  derivatives’	  enable	  wealthy	  financial	  speculators,	  whose	  
lifestyles	  are	  largely	  to	  blame	  for	  global	  warming,	  to	  gamble	  on	  and	  profit	  from	  the	  
resulting	  climate	  change	  crisis	  while	  the	  poor	  and	  disadvantaged	  people	  who	  
contribute	  negligibly	  (if	  at	  all)	  to	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  suffer,	  many	  even	  
losing	  their	  lives	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ‘extreme	  weather’	  events	  manifesting	  as	  prolonged	  
droughts	  and	  extreme	  floods.229	  Fletcher	  concludes	  that:	  
In this way, uncertainty concerning climate change impacts 
becomes not a hindrance to marketization but yet another 
opportunity for profit; both the climate crisis and uncertainty 
concerning the same become distinct sources of value, a double 
reversal of James O’Connor’s (1994) predictions. 
(Fletcher 2012, p. 107) 
Climate	  movement	  actors	  such	  as	  Naomi	  Klein	  argue	  that	  these	  opportunities	  to	  
profit	  from	  this	  model	  of	  ‘disaster	  capitalism’	  may	  even	  motivate	  efforts	  to	  ignore	  or,	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  ‘Catastrophe	  bonds’	  are	  “securities	  that	  manage	  the	  risks	  of	  improbable	  but	  catastrophic	  natural	  events”	  (Fletcher	  2012,	  p.	  107).	  228	  Refer	  to	  Clapp	  (2009)	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  features	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  global	  economy,	  including	  financial	  speculation	  in	  commodities,	  which	  led	  to	  sharp	  price	  hikes	  in	  basic	  food	  staples	  in	  2008.	  Clapp’s	  analysis	  reveals	  structural	  features	  within	  the	  global	  economy	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  more	  food	  price	  hikes	  that	  further	  disadvantage	  the	  poorest	  and	  most	  vulnerable	  people	  in	  the	  world	  while	  generating	  profits	  for	  wealthy	  institutional	  investors.	  	  229	  According	  to	  an	  Oxfam	  Briefing	  Paper,	  the	  richest	  1%	  of	  the	  global	  population	  is	  estimated	  to	  contribute	  up	  to	  175	  times	  as	  much	  to	  CO2	  emissions	  as	  the	  poorest	  10%	  of	  the	  global	  population	  (Oxfam	  2015).	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worse	  still,	  actively	  work	  “to	  discredit	  predictions	  of	  the	  impending	  climate	  crisis,	  in	  
order	  to	  harness	  both	  current	  sources	  of	  profit	  potentially	  compromised	  by	  a	  serious	  
mitigation	  response	  and,	  moreover,	  to	  let	  the	  crisis	  unfold	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  new	  
sources	  of	  profit	  thereby	  created,”	  as	  evidenced	  by	  how	  ExxonMobil	  funded	  climate	  
change	  denial	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  107	  -­‐	  108).	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  capital	  can	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  short	  term)	  transform	  
environmental	  crises	  into	  profit-­‐making	  opportunities,	  Foster	  raises	  two	  more	  issues	  
that	  O’Connor	  failed	  to	  address	  when	  formulating	  his	  thesis	  on	  the	  ‘second	  
contradiction	  of	  capitalism’:	  that	  environmental	  damage	  could	  be	  serious	  while	  not	  
directly	  affecting	  conditions	  of	  production,	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  
effects	  of	  environmental	  damage	  are	  not	  the	  same	  everywhere.	  Listing	  several	  
examples,	  such	  as	  the	  serious	  degradation	  of	  the	  ozone	  layer	  and	  the	  extinction	  of	  
species	  that	  are	  ‘still	  unknown	  to	  science,’	  Foster	  (2002,	  p.	  11)	  points	  out	  that	  the	  
most	  severe	  environmental	  damage	  of	  the	  normal	  operations	  of	  the	  global	  capitalist	  
economy	  does	  not	  necessarily	  occur	  “where	  it	  principally	  affects	  the	  conditions	  of	  
production”	  and	  it	  thus	  need	  not	  result	  in	  accumulation	  crises.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  
implications	  of	  the	  uneven	  effects	  of	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  environmental	  disasters	  
such	  as	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  leading	  to	  climate	  change,	  Foster	  points	  to	  
the	  example	  of	  the	  Bush	  Administration’s	  Climate	  Action	  Report,	  2002,	  in	  which:	  
The EPA acknowledged the dangers to life and living conditions 
represented by global warming, but emphasised that in the United 
States the environmental damage would be most visible in the 
melting of snow in the mountains, and the like. Where the 
conditions of production of agriculture were concerned, global 
warming, it was suggested, might even increase overall agricultural 
productivity. This lack of a clear connection between environmental 
damage and damage to the economic conditions of production was 
used (via standard cost-benefit analysis) to justify a policy of 
adapting to global warming as it developed, rather than taking 
measures to decrease the extent of global warming – since these 
would increase the costs of production. It follows that there is no 
natural feedback mechanism that automatically turns environmental 
destruction into increasing costs for capital itself. 
(Foster 2002, p. 12; emphasis in original) 
Foster	  concludes	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  capitalism’s	  undermining	  of	  its	  own	  conditions	  of	  
production	  therefore	  “downplay[s]	  the	  full	  dimensions	  of	  the	  ecological	  crisis	  and	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even	  of	  capitalism’s	  impact	  on	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  process	  of	  trying	  to	  force	  
everything	  into	  the	  locked	  box	  of	  a	  specific	  economic	  crisis	  theory.”	  
Like	  Burkett,	  who	  points	  out	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  O’Connor’s	  dichotomy	  “tends	  to	  
soften	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  conditions	  required	  for	  capitalist	  production	  and	  
the	  conditions	  required	  for	  human	  development”	  and	  leads	  to	  artificial	  divisions	  
between	  “labor	  and	  ecological	  struggles	  –	  with	  the	  latter	  still	  basically	  defined	  as	  
‘non-­‐class’”	  (Burkett	  2014a,	  p.	  197),	  Foster	  similarly	  identifies	  the	  important	  political	  
implications	  of	  O’Connor’s	  argument:	  the	  way	  the	  ‘second	  contradiction	  of	  
capitalism’	  is	  “tied	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  contemporary	  radical	  social	  movements”	  while	  
his	  ‘first	  contradiction	  of	  capitalism’	  “is	  associated	  with	  the	  class-­‐based	  labor	  
movement”	  (Foster	  2002,	  p.	  9).	  O’Connor’s	  hope	  that	  social	  movements	  will	  succeed	  
in	  forcing	  capital	  to	  internalise	  its	  current	  ‘externalities’	  is	  also	  unlikely	  to	  be	  
realised;	  what	  is	  more	  likely	  is	  that	  environmental	  destruction	  will	  instead	  “provide	  
entirely	  new	  ways	  to	  profit”	  (Foster	  2002,	  p.	  12)	  which,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  is	  
precisely	  what	  is	  happening.230	  
An	  even	  more	  important	  issue	  to	  consider	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  global	  warming	  crisis	  
is	  the	  danger	  that	  capital’s	  ability	  to	  transform	  environmental	  crises	  into	  profit-­‐
making	  opportunities	  in	  the	  short	  term	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  market	  mechanisms	  
deployed	  to	  profit	  from	  these	  new	  accumulation	  opportunities	  will	  also	  do	  what	  they	  
claim	  to	  do:	  address	  environmental	  issues	  effectively.	  As	  noted	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  
the	  complexity	  of	  the	  Earth	  System	  is	  such	  that	  there	  are	  great	  uncertainties	  about	  
what	  will	  happen	  if	  additional	  planetary	  boundaries	  are	  crossed	  and	  what	  
implications	  crossing	  such	  boundaries	  may	  have	  for	  current	  life-­‐forms	  (including	  
humans)	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  biosphere	  remaining	  habitable	  for	  them.	  As	  Fletcher	  
states	  the	  case:	  
… research is needed to investigate the key question raised by this 
analysis: To what extent does all of this actually contribute to 
effectively mitigating the climate change impacts it purports to 
address? After all, critics question whether carbon markets truly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  In	  addition,	  and	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  climate	  action	  movement	  NGOs	  associated	  with	  CAN-­‐I	  are	  collaborating	  with	  financial	  interests	  to	  help	  create	  these	  new	  profit	  opportunities.	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effect a net emissions reduction or merely conceal continued carbon 
production through sleight-of-hand accounting. 
(Fletcher 2012, p. 108) 
	  
Fletcher	  extends	  the	  example	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  carbon	  trading	  to	  decrease	  GHG	  
emissions	  to	  how	  other	  projects	  (such	  as	  hydroelectric	  dams),	  while	  being	  promoted	  
as	  decreasing	  GHG	  emissions,	  actually	  release	  methane	  that	  results	  in	  even	  larger	  
CO2-­‐equivalent	  GHG	  emissions.	  These	  examples	  lead	  Fletcher	  to	  argue	  that	  
“Dynamics	  such	  as	  this	  demand	  further	  investigation	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  the	  swiftly	  growing	  campaign	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  through	  neoliberal	  
carbon	  market	  mechanisms	  is	  in	  fact	  capable	  of	  contributing	  to	  an	  effective	  
resolution	  of	  the	  impending	  crisis	  rather	  than	  merely	  stimulating	  capitalist	  
expansion”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  109).	  Empirical	  research	  of	  this	  nature	  is	  also	  necessary	  if	  one	  is	  
to	  more	  effectively	  counter	  arguments	  made	  by	  proponents	  of	  ecological	  
modernization	  (or	  ‘ecomodernism’)	  and	  the	  theorists	  whose	  work	  is	  used	  to	  support	  
their	  project,	  such	  as	  those	  associated	  with	  ‘production	  of	  nature,’	  ‘radical	  social	  
constructionist	  hybridity’	  and	  ‘radical	  social	  monist’	  perspectives.	  The	  ideological	  
contestations	  between	  ecosocialists	  and	  ecomodernists	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  
below.	  
Contesting	  ideas:	  Ecosocialism	  vs.	  Ecomodernism	  
Promoting	  the	  extension	  and	  intensification	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  and	  
technology	  as	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  address	  contemporary	  environmental	  crises,	  
ecological	  modernisation	  theory	  stands	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  ecosocialism.	  The	  
brand	  of	  ‘post-­‐environmentalist’	  ecological	  modernisation	  founded	  by	  Ted	  Nordhaus	  
and	  Michael	  Shellenberger,	  which	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  debates	  discussed	  here,	  
commences	  from	  their	  critique	  of	  the	  major	  US	  environmental	  organisations	  as	  
espoused	  in	  a	  2004	  ‘influential	  and	  controversial’	  pamphlet,	  The	  death	  of	  
environmentalism:	  Global	  warming	  politics	  in	  a	  post-­‐environmental	  world	  (Buck	  
2013).	  While	  many	  environmentalists	  also	  criticised	  the	  major	  ENGOs	  for	  their	  
complicity	  with	  the	  US	  government’s	  failure	  to	  legislate	  strong	  environmental	  
measures	  (refer	  to	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  6),	  Nordhaus	  and	  Shellenberger’s	  critique	  of	  
	   225	  
environmentalism	  takes	  a	  very	  particular	  form:	  it	  criticises	  US	  environmentalists	  for	  
lacking	  a	  large	  ‘patriotic’	  vision	  to	  help	  them	  build	  alliances	  with	  government,	  
business	  and	  civil	  society	  in	  order	  to	  support	  economic	  growth	  and	  develop	  the	  
technologies	  they	  see	  as	  necessary	  for	  solving	  environmental	  crises.231	  The	  
ecomodernist	  ‘post-­‐environmentalist’	  label	  signals	  this	  perspective’s	  affinity	  with	  
postmodern	  and	  ‘production	  of	  nature’	  theoretical	  perspectives,	  which	  Foster	  argues	  
serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  sowing	  confusion	  about	  the	  causes	  of	  environmental	  
degradation	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  credibility	  for	  their	  project	  and	  win	  over	  supporters	  
from	  the	  wider	  Left.232	  
Foster	  identifies	  the	  ‘production	  of	  nature’	  perspective	  associated	  with	  intellectuals	  
such	  as	  Neil	  Smith	  and	  Noel	  Castree	  as	  a	  separate	  ‘influential	  tradition’	  of	  
environmental	  thinking	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  within	  the	  discipline	  
area	  of	  ‘radical	  geography’	  (Foster	  2016a,	  p.	  396).	  Replacing	  Schmidt’s	  ‘negative	  
critique	  of	  the	  domination	  of	  nature’	  with	  what	  was	  claimed	  to	  be	  a	  ‘more	  positive	  
view	  of	  the	  production	  of	  nature’	  ultimately	  led	  to	  what	  Foster	  refers	  to	  as	  “a	  left	  
social	  constructionism	  and	  social	  monism,	  merged	  with	  political-­‐economic	  
perspectives,	  in	  which	  nature	  was	  seen	  as	  subsumed	  within	  society”	  (ibid.;	  emphasis	  
added).	  Overlapping	  with	  Bruno	  Latour’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  “‘hybridity’	  of	  society	  and	  
nature,”	  and	  drawing	  on	  long-­‐standing	  philosophical	  debates	  over	  Cartesian	  dualism,	  
radical	  social	  constructionist	  and	  social	  monist	  theorists	  argue	  that,	  despite	  his	  
dialectical	  perspective,	  Marx	  ‘fell	  prey’	  to	  ‘nature-­‐society	  dualism’	  and	  that	  Marxism	  
is	  therefore	  ‘fatally	  flawed’	  because	  its	  founders	  “failed	  to	  perceive	  the	  emergence	  
of	  a	  hybrid	  world….	  populated	  by	  networks	  of	  machines,	  artifacts,	  cyborgs,	  etc.	  or	  as	  
Latour	  says	  ‘monsters’”	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  396	  –	  397).	  The	  political	  implications	  of	  this	  
perspective	  are	  evident	  in	  how	  these	  ideas	  are	  used	  to	  justify	  the	  ecomodernist	  
project	  (ibid.,	  p.	  398).	  In	  a	  talk	  Latour	  gave	  at	  the	  Breakthrough	  Institute,	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  Refer	  to	  Shellenberger	  &	  Nordhaus	  (2004)	  and	  the	  Breakthrough	  Institute	  document,	  
An	  Ecomodernist	  Manifesto	  (Asafu-­‐Adjaye	  et	  al.	  2015),	  for	  original	  accounts	  of	  the	  arguments	  this	  group	  of	  ‘ecomodernists’	  present.	  232	  Refer	  to	  Angus	  (2015)	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  ecomodernist	  attempts	  to	  appropriate	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  also	  aim	  “to	  sow	  confusion	  by	  promoting	  a	  caricature	  that	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  actual	  Anthropocene	  and	  everything	  to	  do	  with	  preserving	  the	  status	  quo.”	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example,	  he	  said	  that	  “…	  the	  object	  today	  should	  be	  to	  ‘Love	  Your	  Monsters’	  
(2012),”	  an	  idea	  Foster	  elaborates	  on	  as	  follows:	  
In this view, ‘imbroglios’ or ‘technological monsters’, modern 
versions of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, are a normal part of our 
relation to nature, and we should accept them and their 
consequences, while rejecting environmentalism in favour of 
‘political ecology’ that consciously internalizes or bundles nature. 
(Foster 2016a, p. 398, citing Latour 2004) 
Foster	  (ibid.)	  points	  out	  that	  Latour’s	  views	  align	  with	  the	  thinking	  of	  Nordhaus	  and	  
Shellenberger,	  who	  do	  not	  accept	  any	  notion	  of	  natural	  limits	  to	  capital	  
accumulation	  and	  unlimited	  growth	  but	  propose	  a	  ‘breakthrough’	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
‘post-­‐environmentalism’	  that	  emphasises	  technological	  and	  market-­‐based	  solutions	  
to	  environmental	  crises.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  although	  Foster	  (ibid.)	  
does	  not	  discuss	  this,	  Bruno	  Latour	  joined	  the	  chorus	  of	  other	  critics	  of	  the	  
Breakthrough	  Institute’s	  ecomodernist	  project	  who	  published	  their	  critiques	  in	  
Volume	  7	  of	  the	  journal	  Environmental	  Humanities	  (2015).	  Critiques	  of	  the	  
Breakthrough	  Institute’s	  ecomodernist	  theorists	  in	  that	  journal	  include	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  they	  present	  simplistic	  arguments	  that	  are	  not	  empirically	  supported	  while	  
simultaneously	  ignoring	  existing	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  contradicts	  their	  arguments,	  
and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  their	  arguments	  are	  incoherent	  and	  sometimes	  even	  
inconsistent	  with	  their	  own	  stated	  goals	  of	  ‘saving	  the	  environment’	  (Buck	  2013;	  
Hamilton	  2015,	  2017;	  Latour	  2015;	  Monbiot	  2015;	  Szerszynski	  2015).	  In	  his	  
contribution	  to	  this	  collection	  of	  critiques,	  in	  an	  article	  entitled	  Fifty	  Shades	  of	  Green,	  
Latour	  (2015,	  p.	  220)	  expresses	  his	  misgivings	  about	  “…this	  monster,	  
‘ecomodernism,’	  that	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  we	  should	  learn	  to	  love,	  and	  that	  triggers	  in	  me,	  I	  
have	  to	  confess,	  a	  deep	  antipathy.”	  One	  of	  the	  points	  Latour	  emphasises	  in	  this	  
paper	  is	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  ecomodernists	  to	  understand	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  
Anthropocene,	  a	  point	  that	  Clive	  Hamilton	  focuses	  on	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  
Breakthrough	  Institute’s	  vision	  of	  ecomodernism.	  
Clive	  Hamilton,	  Professor	  of	  Public	  Ethics	  and	  well-­‐known	  author	  of	  many	  books	  
trying	  to	  alert	  the	  public	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  geo-­‐engineering,	  presents	  a	  particularly	  
scathing	  assessment	  of	  ecomodernists	  who	  refer	  to	  a	  ‘good	  Anthropocene’	  (an	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oxymoron	  that	  Hamilton	  emphasises	  is	  both	  inappropriate	  and	  dangerous)	  and	  who	  
welcome	  the	  opportunities	  a	  disturbed	  Earth	  System	  present	  “to	  prove	  our	  ingenuity	  
and	  technological	  facility”	  (Hamilton	  2017,	  pp.	  22	  –	  23).	  Hamilton’s	  critiques	  of	  these	  
ecomodernist	  arguments	  succinctly	  describe	  both	  the	  philosophy	  informing	  this	  
project	  as	  well	  as	  the	  dangers	  it	  poses:	  
For the ecomodernists, instead of final proof of the dangers of 
hubris, the new epoch is greeted as a sign of humankind’s ability to 
renovate and control nature…. In this eco-Promethean view, the 
Anthropocene is not evidence of human short-sightedness or 
foolishness, nor of global capitalism’s rapaciousness, but presents 
an opportunity for humans finally to come into their own…. For the 
ecomodernists, if we are capable of developing technologies to 
control the climate and regulate the Earth as a whole, then why not? 
Planetary engineering reframes global warming. No longer a 
vindication of environmentalist warnings that humans have gone too 
far, climate change becomes the spur to final victory for the human 
mastery project. 
(Hamilton 2017, pp. 23 – 24) 
Hamilton	  argues	  that	  not	  only	  are	  the	  technological	  fixes	  ecomodernists	  propose	  for	  
a	  ‘good’	  Anthropocene	  unlikely	  to	  work,	  they	  also	  constitute	  a	  continuation	  along	  a	  
course	  that	  will	  exacerbate	  unpredictable	  and	  dangerous	  shifts	  in	  the	  Earth	  System:	  
… we cannot know the ultimate outcome of the Anthropocene 
because it is beyond our capacity to predict the Earth System’s 
behavior and beyond our capacity to control it, the more so after the 
recent rupture to its functioning…. in the transition from the 
Holocene to the Anthropocene new forces have been unleashed that 
we can only ever understand imperfectly, and regulate even less. 
Yet it is not only the… unwillingness of the Earth System to subject 
itself to human regulation that upends the ecomodernist position, 
but also their curious unwillingness to acknowledge the manifest 
failure of humans to create social structures and institutions 
consistent with the sustained flourishing of the biosphere we 
inhabit, and their determination to continue making worlds that are 
incompatible with the possibilities provided by the Earth. 
(Hamilton 2017, pp. 70 – 71) 
In	  addition	  to	  identifying	  the	  flaws	  in	  ecomodernist	  thinking,	  Hamilton	  also	  critically	  
analyses	  several	  other	  theorists’	  positions	  on	  the	  disruption	  of	  the	  Earth	  System’s	  
functioning,	  including	  Jason	  Moore’s	  thesis	  that	  the	  origins	  of	  this	  outcome	  lie	  in	  the	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‘Nature/Society	  binary’	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  modernist	  project.233	  	  Hamilton	  
argues	  that	  Moore’s	  epistemology,	  which	  “blurs	  the	  distinction	  between	  scientific	  
facts	  and	  social	  facts,”	  leads	  to	  an	  ‘impossible	  contradiction,’	  and	  that	  such	  thinking	  
is	  not	  uncommon	  in	  contemporary	  social	  science	  disciplines:	  
That Moore cannot distinguish between geological history and 
human history is symptomatic of much contemporary critical social 
science. He takes to its extreme the argument that we must dissolve 
all Cartesian dualisms, that is, the divide between nature and 
culture, pursuing an ontological flat-land of entanglement…. 
Transcending science altogether, Moore ends up rejecting the claim 
that we are living in the Anthropocene because it is ‘a curiously 
Eurocentric vista of humanity.’ And the determination to reject all 
dualisms sees him challenging the foundational scientific claim that 
‘humans are overwhelming the great forces of nature.’ We cannot 
overwhelm nature when we are indistinguishable from it. How 
could social science come to this? The impossible contradiction in 
Moore’s position now becomes clear. On the one hand, he wants to 
deny humans their power and special place with a ‘post-humanist’ 
embedding of humans in nature; on the other hand, he wants to 
define the new epoch in terms of historical relations of human 
power and exploitation.” 
(Hamilton 2017, pp. 96 – 97)  
Hamilton’s	  critiques	  of	  ecomodernist	  thinking	  touch	  on	  some	  of	  the	  core	  issue	  that	  
concerns	  ecosocialists	  about	  this	  philosophy:	  the	  way	  in	  which	  aspects	  of	  
postmodern	  thinking	  open	  it	  to	  appropriation	  as	  a	  tool	  by	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  spread	  
confusion	  and	  thereby	  remove	  attention	  from	  both	  the	  causes	  and	  the	  severity	  of	  
the	  environmental	  damage	  caused	  by	  the	  Great	  Acceleration.	  As	  Foster	  (2016a,	  p.	  
401)	  points	  out,	  Moore	  deploys	  his	  rejection	  of	  ‘Cartesian	  binaries’	  to	  critique	  
ecosocialist	  theorists	  who	  use	  Marx’s	  concepts	  of	  the	  universal	  metabolism	  of	  
nature,	  social	  metabolism,	  and	  the	  metabolic	  rift	  in	  their	  dialectical	  analyses	  
critiquing	  capitalism’s	  environmental	  destruction.	  In	  opposition	  to	  the	  ‘binaries’	  of	  
‘nature’	  and	  ‘society’,	  Moore:	  
…substitutes his own ‘singular metabolism,’ which is nothing other 
than the idealized capitalist notion of the market expanded to 
encompass the entire web of life. This view adamantly rejects the 
whole notion of ‘natural limits,’ or the idea that in numerous cases 
ecological ‘limits are outside of us’… constituting insuperable 
barriers to production…. To point to antagonistic relations between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  Moore’s	  key	  work	  is	  Capitalism	  in	  the	  Web	  of	  Life:	  Ecology	  and	  the	  Accumulation	  of	  
Capital	  (2015).	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capitalism and nature (or to conceive of nature as apart from society 
even by means of abstraction) is for Moore… to fall prey to the 
‘Cartesian divide.’ 
(Foster 2016a, p. 405) 
In	  an	  interview	  with	  Ian	  Angus,	  the	  transcript	  of	  which	  was	  published	  on	  the	  
ecosocialist	  website	  Angus	  founded	  and	  edits,	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  
(climateandcapitalism.com),	  Foster	  concludes	  that	  Moore	  may	  have	  set	  off	  to	  
‘update	  or	  deepen	  Marxism’	  but	  has,	  instead,	  “…ended	  up	  by	  abandoning	  Marxism’s	  
revolutionary	  essence	  and	  adapting	  to	  capitalist	  ideologies”	  (Angus	  &	  Foster	  2016).	  
The	  rejection	  of	  historical	  materialist	  dialectics	  and	  critical	  realism	  on	  the	  grounds	  
that	  this	  analytical	  framework	  constitutes	  a	  simplistic	  ‘Cartesian	  dualism’	  ultimately	  
leads	  to	  a	  social	  monism	  that	  is	  incapable	  of	  understanding	  the	  “complex	  mediations	  
between	  nature	  and	  society	  within	  a	  dialectical	  concept	  of	  totality”	  (Foster	  2016a,	  p.	  
399).	  Even	  more	  problematically,	  Foster	  points	  out	  that	  “for	  many	  social	  
constructionists,	  radical	  postmodernists,	  and	  left	  idealists,	  the	  problem	  of	  nature	  is	  
essentially	  eliminated	  through	  its	  subordination	  to	  society,”	  as	  is	  natural	  science	  
itself	  “since	  natural	  processes	  are	  now	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  internal	  to	  the	  social	  
dialectic”	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  399	  -­‐	  401).	  In	  contrast	  to	  radical	  social	  monist	  positions,	  the	  
historical	  dialectical	  materialism	  developed	  by	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  provides	  a	  powerful	  
analytical	  tool	  that	  accounts	  for	  and	  accommodates	  “dynamics,	  complexity,	  
contradiction,	  emergence,	  and	  transformation	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  world	  at	  large”	  
(ibid.	  p.	  414),	  enabling	  Marx	  to	  analyse	  the	  way	  in	  which	  human	  labour,	  as	  a	  
necessary	  activity	  that	  mediates	  between	  humans	  and	  nature,	  causes	  metabolic	  rifts	  
in	  natural	  biophysical	  cycles	  and	  processes	  under	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  commodity	  
production.234	  Second-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  highlight	  the	  relevance	  of	  Marx’s	  metabolic	  
rift	  analysis	  to	  explaining	  the	  way	  in	  which	  late	  capitalism	  causes	  ecological	  rifts	  on	  a	  
planetary	  scale,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  Foster	  (2016a,	  p.	  414)	  cautions	  that	  the	  complex	  method	  of	  dialectical	  materialism	  developed	  and	  deployed	  by	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  “the	  dogmatic,	  mechanical	  views	  that	  were	  sometimes	  crudely	  advanced	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  under	  this	  label.”	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Marx’s	  ecology:	  metabolic	  rift	  analysis	  
Referring	  to	  a	  range	  of	  his	  writings,	  Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2016)	  point	  out	  that	  Marx	  
incorporated	  German	  chemist	  Justus	  von	  Liebig’s	  concept	  of	  ‘metabolism’	  in	  his	  
critique	  of	  political	  economy.235	  Marx	  refers	  to	  the	  biophysical	  cycles	  and	  processes	  
that	  “constitute	  and	  help	  regenerate	  ecological	  conditions”	  as	  the	  ‘universal	  
metabolism	  of	  nature,’	  an	  ‘earthly	  metabolism’	  within	  which	  humans	  exist	  as	  they	  
continually	  interact	  with	  the	  natural	  environment	  to	  meet	  their	  needs	  and	  produce	  
goods	  and	  services,	  and	  he	  refers	  to	  the	  labor	  process	  (which	  includes	  “exchanges	  
with	  ecological	  systems”)	  as	  the	  ‘social	  metabolism’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  15).	  Marx	  argues	  that	  
different	  modes	  of	  production	  generate	  ‘distinct	  social	  metabolic	  orders’	  and,	  unlike	  
in	  previous	  socio-­‐ecological	  systems,	  the	  social	  metabolism	  of	  capitalist	  commodity	  
production	  “generates	  ecological	  crises,	  manifesting	  as	  a	  ‘rift’	  in	  the	  metabolism	  
between	  society	  and	  nature	  (or	  disjunctions	  within	  both	  the	  social	  metabolism	  and	  
the	  wider	  universal	  metabolism)”	  (ibid.).	  In	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  production,	  which	  
is	  defined	  by	  a	  ‘compulsion	  to	  accumulate,’	  capital’s	  needs	  “are	  imposed	  on	  nature,	  
increasing	  the	  demands	  placed	  on	  ecological	  systems	  and	  the	  production	  of	  wastes”	  
and	  creating	  what	  Marx	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  ‘metabolic	  rift’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  16).	  	  
Marx’s	  insights	  about	  the	  metabolic	  rift	  that	  results	  from	  capitalist	  commodity	  
production	  and	  its	  spatial	  organisation	  are	  evident	  in	  his	  writings	  about	  the	  most	  
serious	  ecological	  issue	  attracting	  the	  attention	  of	  scientists	  in	  his	  lifetime:	  the	  issue	  
of	  soil	  fertility.	  Providing	  a	  historical	  account	  of	  how	  soils	  retained	  their	  fertility	  in	  
pre-­‐capitalist	  modes	  of	  agricultural	  activity	  by	  recycling	  both	  animal	  and	  human	  
waste	  in	  the	  soils	  where	  food	  was	  grown	  because	  it	  was	  consumed	  at	  the	  same	  place	  
or	  nearby,	  Marx	  analyses	  how	  capitalism	  transformed	  this	  particular	  metabolic	  
interchange	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  enclosure	  movement	  that	  forced	  peasants	  off	  the	  
land,	  alienating	  them	  from	  their	  means	  of	  production	  so	  that	  they	  had	  to	  seek	  
employment	  in	  the	  industrial	  centres	  located	  in	  towns.	  The	  greater	  separation	  
between	  town	  and	  country	  that	  the	  new	  industrial	  systems	  necessitated	  also	  led	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  In	  the	  extracts	  referred	  to	  here,	  Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2016)	  reference	  Marx’s	  Text	  on	  
Methods,	  Economic	  and	  Philosophical	  Manuscripts,	  Poverty	  of	  Philosophy,	  and	  Capital	  Volumes	  1	  and	  3.	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the	  transfer	  of	  soil	  nutrients	  from	  one	  location	  to	  another	  “as	  food	  and	  fibre	  from	  
farms	  were	  increasingly	  shipped	  to	  distant	  markets”	  (ibid.).	  The	  expansion	  of	  
capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  thus	  alienated	  the	  producers	  from	  nature	  and	  
simultaneously	  led	  to	  both	  the	  ‘squandering’	  of	  nutrients	  and	  increased	  levels	  of	  
pollution	  in	  the	  towns	  and	  rivers	  that	  had	  to	  absorb	  the	  wastes	  (ibid.).	  In	  addition,	  
Marx	  also	  discusses	  the	  way	  in	  which	  profit-­‐maximising	  capitalist	  agricultural	  
production	  practices	  “increased	  the	  scale	  of	  operations,	  transforming	  and	  
intensifying	  the	  social	  metabolism	  while	  exacerbating	  the	  depletion	  of	  the	  soil	  
nutrients”	  (ibid.).	  Citing	  Marx	  (Capital	  Volume	  1),	  Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2016,	  p.	  17)	  draw	  
attention	  to	  his	  argument	  that	  capitalism	  thus	  creates	  “…a	  metabolic	  ‘rift’	  in	  the	  soil	  
nutrient	  cycle,	  ‘robbing	  the	  soil’	  and	  ‘ruining	  the	  more	  long-­‐lasting	  sources	  of	  that	  
fertility’.”	  This	  theme	  recurs	  throughout	  Marx’s	  writing,	  and	  in	  Capital	  Volume	  3	  he	  
argues	  that:	  	  
…the drive to capital accumulation ‘reduces the agricultural 
population to an ever decreasing minimum and confronts it with an 
ever growing industrial population crammed together in large 
towns; in this way it produces conditions that provoke an irreparable 
rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism, a 
metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself. The result of 
this is a squandering of the vitality of the soil, which is carried by 
trade far beyond the bounds of a single country’ 
(Marx, cited in Foster & Clark 2016, p. 17) 
	  
Marx	  also	  writes	  about	  how	  attempts	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  soil	  fertility	  in	  
England	  by	  importing	  “millions	  of	  tons	  of	  guano	  and	  nitrates	  from	  Peru	  and	  Chile”	  
constitute	  a	  form	  of	  ‘ecological	  imperialism,’	  contributing	  to	  a	  ‘global	  metabolic	  rift,’	  
and	  he	  notes	  how	  such	  ‘artificial	  solutions’	  compound	  the	  overall	  environmental	  
degradation	  that	  is	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  intensive	  agricultural	  production	  (Clark	  &	  Foster	  
2010a,	  p.	  146).	  Marx’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  ecological	  crisis	  of	  soil	  
depletion	  constitutes	  a	  valuable	  illustrative	  case	  study	  of	  how	  to	  apply	  the	  method	  
of	  ecological	  materialism	  to	  analyse	  contemporary	  ecological	  issues,	  as	  many	  third-­‐
stage	  ecosocialists	  have	  done.	  Moreover,	  Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2016,	  p.	  22)	  argue	  that	  
the	  “enduring	  value	  of	  Marx’s	  ecological	  materialism…	  is	  that	  it	  points	  in	  a	  co-­‐
evolutionary	  and	  co-­‐revolutionary	  direction	  –	  highlighting	  the	  need	  for	  a	  new	  order	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of	  social	  metabolic	  reproduction	  rooted	  in	  substantive	  equality.”	  Expanding	  on	  this	  
point,	  they	  state:	  
Here social and natural necessity, natural science and social science, 
humanity and the earth become one human-mediated totality, in a 
wider universal struggle – one pointing to a revolutionary dialectic 
of humanity and the earth in which the necessary outcome is a 
world of sustainable human development. It is this higher synthesis 
of the various Marxian ecological and social critiques – building on 
the foundations of historical materialism – that we are most in need 
of today. 
(Foster & Clark 2016, p. 22, Footnote 121) 
It	  is	  towards	  this	  end	  that	  third-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  apply	  Marx’s	  method	  of	  
‘ecological	  materialism’	  to	  analyse	  contemporary	  environmental	  crises	  and	  thereby	  
advance	  the	  theoretical	  understanding	  that	  ecosocialist	  activists	  within	  the	  climate	  
justice	  movement	  need	  in	  order	  to	  inform	  their	  strategies	  and	  tactics.	  Before	  
proceeding	  to	  discuss	  ecosocialist	  activism	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  provide	  a	  brief	  
overview	  of	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  third-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  analyses	  address.	  
Third-­‐stage	  ecosocialism	  
In	  her	  book,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Global	  Warming:	  The	  terminal	  crisis,	  Del	  
Weston	  (2014,	  p.	  7)	  uses	  the	  analytical	  tools	  of	  classical	  Marxism	  that	  integrate	  
metabolic	  rift	  analysis	  to	  discuss	  how	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  “is	  just	  one	  of	  a	  
number	  of	  converging	  and	  accelerating	  symptoms	  of	  a	  planet	  plundered	  beyond	  its	  
capacity	  to	  repair,	  regenerate	  and	  sustain	  life	  and	  civilisation	  as	  we	  have	  known	  it	  
over	  the	  last	  10,000	  years	  of	  the	  Holocene	  epoch.”236	  Weston	  (ibid.	  p.	  61)	  argues	  
that	  “…the	  Marxist	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  development	  of	  capitalism	  is	  critical	  to	  
an	  understanding	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  global	  warming”	  for	  three	  interrelated	  
reasons:	  	  
First, to understand the inseparable dichotomy between 
accumulation and dispossession and to address this division so there 
can be justice for all impoverished peoples around reparations for 
ecological debt – a prerequisite to any solution to global warming. 
Second, as a basis for understanding and changing the systemic 
structural underpinnings of global warming. Third, to enable the 
development of new political economy structures which avoid the 
pitfalls of capitalism. One can only understand the causes of global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236	  Weston’s	  book	  was	  published	  posthumously,	  after	  she	  died	  in	  tragic	  circumstances	  in	  2012.	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warming by understanding and then critiquing its political economy. 
Then one can begin to build alternatives that address the causes of 
global warming and not just those of selective symptoms. 
(Weston 2014, p. 61) 
In	  this	  paragraph,	  Weston	  establishes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Marxist	  theory	  links	  to	  
practice,	  and	  this	  understanding	  is	  what	  informs	  all	  third-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  analyses	  
of	  the	  interrelated	  crises	  engendered	  by	  the	  capitalist	  system,	  whose	  environmental	  
destruction	  now	  extends	  throughout	  the	  entire	  Earth	  System	  (including	  its	  human	  
component).	  
Third-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  analyses	  thus	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  more	  academic	  
and	  specialist	  debates	  between	  first-­‐stage	  and	  second-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  writings	  on	  
the	  one	  had,	  and	  activists	  engaged	  in	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  political	  activity	  on	  the	  other.	  
The	  distinction	  between	  theoreticians	  and	  activists	  is	  not	  so	  clear-­‐cut,	  however:	  
some	  third-­‐stage	  ecosocialist	  authors	  are	  not	  only	  academics	  but	  also	  climate	  justice	  
activists,	  with	  Chris	  Williams	  being	  one	  such	  example.	  In	  addition	  to	  Williams’s	  
Ecology	  and	  Socialism:	  Solutions	  to	  capitalist	  ecological	  crisis	  (2010),	  other	  popular	  
ecosocialist	  texts	  that	  provide	  general	  critiques	  of	  capitalism’s	  social	  and	  
environmental	  harms	  include	  Joel	  Kovel’s	  The	  enemy	  of	  nature:	  The	  end	  of	  capitalism	  
or	  the	  end	  of	  the	  world?	  (2007),	  Michael	  Löwy’s	  Ecosocialism:	  A	  radical	  alternative	  to	  
capitalist	  catastrophe	  (2015),	  Daniel	  Tanuro’s	  Green	  capitalism:	  Why	  it	  can’t	  work	  
(2013),	  and	  Brian	  Tokar’s	  Toward	  Climate	  Justice:	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  climate	  crisis	  
and	  social	  change	  (2014).237	  In	  addition	  to	  providing	  broad	  overviews	  of	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  capitalism	  is	  inherently	  both	  exploitative	  and	  anti-­‐ecological,	  another	  
approach	  taken	  by	  third-­‐stage	  authors	  is	  to	  focus	  their	  analysis	  more	  specifically	  on	  
particular	  issues,	  as	  Stefano	  Longo,	  Rebecca	  Clausen	  and	  Brett	  Clark	  do	  in	  their	  book	  
The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commodity:	  Oceans,	  Fisheries,	  and	  Aquaculture	  (2015)	  and	  Ian	  
Angus	  does	  in	  Facing	  the	  Anthropocene:	  Fossil	  capitalism	  and	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  earth	  
system	  (2016).	  
According	  to	  Foster	  (2016a,	  p.	  413,	  citing	  Meadows	  et	  al.	  1972),	  it	  was	  István	  
Mészáros,	  a	  student	  of	  renowned	  Marxist	  Georg	  Lukács,	  who	  provided	  “the	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  This	  is	  just	  a	  very	  small	  and	  randomly	  selected	  sample	  of	  the	  many	  ecosocialist	  monographs	  that	  have	  been	  written.	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comprehensive	  Marxian	  critique	  of	  the	  emerging	  planetary	  ecological	  crisis	  in	  his	  
1971	  Deutscher	  Prize	  Lecture	  –	  published	  a	  year	  before	  the	  Club	  of	  Rome’s	  Limits	  to	  
Growth.”238	  In	  this	  lecture,	  Mészáros	  “argued	  that	  the	  waste-­‐based	  accumulation	  
characterizing	  US	  monopoly	  capitalism	  could	  not	  be	  expanded	  globally	  without	  
breaking	  the	  ecological	  budget	  of	  the	  entire	  planet”	  (ibid.).	  While	  Mészáros’	  work	  is	  
not	  easily	  accessible	  to	  a	  non-­‐academic	  audience	  due	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  
concepts	  he	  discusses,	  Ian	  Angus’s	  book	  on	  the	  Anthropocene	  provides	  a	  very	  clear	  
account	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  planetary	  metabolic	  rift	  that	  has	  resulted	  in	  this	  
new	  geological	  epoch	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  what	  responsibilities	  these	  
developments	  place	  on	  ecosocialists.	  The	  exemplary	  way	  in	  which	  Ian	  Angus	  has	  
explained	  the	  Anthropocene	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  Clive	  Hamilton,	  who	  contends	  
that	  most	  people	  simply	  do	  not	  understand	  this	  new	  geological	  epoch’s	  radical	  
implications,	  has	  praised	  Angus	  not	  once,	  but	  twice	  in	  his	  book,	  Defiant	  Earth:	  The	  
fate	  of	  humans	  in	  the	  Anthropocene	  (Hamilton	  2017)	  for	  conveying	  these	  clearly.239	  
Moreover,	  the	  value	  of	  Angus’s	  work	  in	  publishing	  this	  book	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  
many	  ecosocialist	  discussions	  it	  has	  initiated.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  writing	  books	  that	  are	  
easily	  accessible	  to	  the	  general	  public	  and	  are	  also	  widely	  read	  by	  activists,	  
ecosocialists	  write	  articles	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  topics,	  including	  on	  current	  events.	  They	  
also	  participate	  in	  climate	  movement	  activist	  debates	  about	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  
that	  are	  appropriate	  for	  supporting	  and	  furthering	  the	  project	  of	  achieving	  radical	  
climate	  justice,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  The	  Deutscher	  Prize	  is	  awarded	  annually	  to	  the	  author	  of	  “the	  book	  which	  exemplifies	  the	  best	  and	  most	  innovative	  new	  writing	  in	  or	  about	  the	  Marxist	  tradition,”	  and	  which	  was	  awarded	  to	  István	  Mészáros	  in	  1970	  for	  his	  book	  Marx’s	  Theory	  of	  
Alienation	  (http://www.deutscherprize.org.uk/wp/,	  n.d.).	  239	  Hamilton	  (2017)	  describes	  Angus’s	  overview	  of	  the	  science	  as	  ‘superb’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  10)	  and	  later	  says	  “Ian	  Angus	  presents	  a	  Marxist	  view	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  that,	  whatever	  one	  may	  think	  of	  the	  politics,	  stays	  true	  to	  the	  new	  science	  of	  the	  Earth	  System	  “	  (ibid.,	  p.	  20).	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Chapter	  Eight:	  Ecosocialists	  and	  the	  Climate	  Justice	  
Movement	  
 “There are no guarantees. Marxism is not deterministic. An 
ecosocialist revolution is not inevitable. It will only happen if 
people consciously decide it is necessary, and take the steps needed 
to bring it about. Marx and Engels posed the alternative: the class 
struggle will lead either to ‘a revolutionary reconstitution of society 
at large’ or to ‘the common ruin of the contending classes.’ In the 
Anthropocene, the common ruin of all, the destruction of 
civilization, is a real possibility. That’s why we need a movement 
with a clear vision, an ecosocialist program that can bridge the gap 
between the spontaneous anger of millions of people and the 
beginning of an ecosocialist transformation... The longer it takes to 
get the necessary changes under way, the more difficult the 
transformation will be.” 
(Angus 2016, p. 222) 
Introduction	  
Having	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  key	  points	  of	  contention	  in	  academic	  theoretical	  
debates	  between	  ecosocialists	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  how	  these	  
debates	  manifest	  at	  the	  level	  of	  activism	  on	  questions	  regarding	  strategy	  and	  tactics.	  
My	  discussion	  of	  debates	  about	  strategy	  and	  tactics	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  how	  
these	  relate	  to	  ecosocialist	  contributions	  to	  furthering	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  radical	  climate	  
justice	  movement.	  After	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  issues	  generating	  
discussion	  among	  ecosocialists,	  I	  illustrate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  debates	  about	  strategy	  
and	  tactics	  unfold	  by	  conducting	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  three	  case	  studies.	  The	  
first	  case	  study	  involves	  a	  debate	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  ecosocialists	  should	  support	  
carbon	  trading	  as	  a	  means	  of	  reducing	  GHG	  emissions,	  the	  second	  case	  study	  
discusses	  the	  reasoning	  underlying	  the	  decision	  of	  ecosocialist	  activists	  to	  support	  a	  
strike	  by	  workers	  in	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry,	  and	  the	  third	  case	  study	  examines	  the	  
debate	  between	  ecosocialists	  and	  climate	  justice	  activists	  in	  the	  wider	  climate	  justice	  
movement	  on	  appropriate	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  to	  be	  adopted	  at	  the	  COP-­‐21	  2015	  
climate	  negotiations	  in	  Paris.	  These	  debates	  were	  selected	  as	  foci	  because	  the	  first	  
demonstrates	  ecosocialist	  views	  on	  market	  mechanisms	  (the	  ‘false	  solutions’/‘real	  
solutions’	  issue	  within	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6),	  the	  
second	  demonstrates	  ecosocialist	  views	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  working	  class	  in	  
struggles	  to	  mitigate	  and	  adapt	  to	  climate	  change,	  and	  the	  third	  demonstrates	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ecosocialist	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  formal	  climate	  change	  institutions	  and	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  their	  ideas	  influence	  the	  broader	  climate	  movement.	  While	  ecosocialists	  
aim	  to	  assist	  in	  building	  a	  broad	  based	  movement	  that	  resists	  capitalism,	  in	  Chapter	  
9	  I	  suggest	  that	  this	  movement	  could	  be	  strengthened	  if	  ecosocialist	  oppositional	  
tactics	  were	  complemented	  with	  prefigurative	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  linked	  to	  new	  
modes	  of	  economic	  production.	  	  I	  begin	  the	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter	  with	  a	  brief	  
overview	  of	  the	  material	  capabilities	  (or	  resources)	  of	  the	  North	  American	  
ecosocialists	  I	  focus	  on	  in	  my	  research,	  including	  the	  System	  Change	  Not	  Climate	  
Change	  (SCNCC)	  ecosocialist	  coalition.	  
Social	  dynamics:	  Ecosocialist	  material	  capabilities	  
I	  begin	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  social	  movements	  (or	  their	  ‘material	  
capabilities’)	  lies	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  are	  able	  to	  garner	  support	  for	  their	  aims	  
and	  ideas	  and	  members	  for	  their	  movements	  rather	  than	  in	  their	  access	  to	  material	  
resources	  (which,	  in	  class	  societies,	  will	  always	  favour	  their	  opponents	  -­‐	  those	  who	  
have	  economic	  wealth	  and	  other	  material	  resources).	  With	  reference	  to	  progress	  
made	  in	  the	  ‘war	  of	  position,’	  the	  influence	  of	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  within	  the	  climate	  
movement	  (and	  within	  the	  wider	  community	  of	  social	  movement	  activists)	  is	  thus	  
the	  measure	  I	  use	  to	  gauge	  ecosocialist	  material	  capabilities.	  
One	  indicator	  that	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  have	  gained	  ground	  within	  the	  climate	  
movement	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  have	  shifted	  from	  debates	  within	  the	  academy	  
(as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7)	  and	  are	  now	  used	  by	  many	  climate	  movement	  activists	  to	  
inform	  their	  analyses	  of	  the	  causes	  of,	  and	  potential	  solutions	  to,	  climate	  change.	  
The	  adoption	  of	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  various	  explicitly-­‐
named	  ‘ecosocialist	  coalitions’	  are	  currently	  active	  in	  both	  North	  America	  and	  
Europe,	  with	  the	  North	  American	  groups	  only	  emerging	  in	  their	  present	  coherent	  
form	  after	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  Two	  events	  point	  to	  the	  year	  2007	  as	  
being	  significant	  in	  this	  respect	  in	  that	  it	  signalled	  efforts	  by	  activists	  to	  form	  
coalitions	  calling	  for	  ‘system	  change’	  (rather	  than	  system	  reform):	  the	  formation	  of	  
the	  Climate	  Justice	  Now!	  (CJN!)	  coalition	  in	  December	  2007	  at	  COP-­‐13	  in	  Bali	  (as	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discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6)	  and,	  predating	  the	  formation	  of	  this	  coalition	  by	  two	  months,	  
the	  attempt	  to	  establish	  an	  international	  ecosocialist	  coalition.	  
While	  attempts	  to	  form	  an	  international	  ecosocialist	  coalition	  date	  back	  to	  October	  
2007,	  when	  more	  than	  sixty	  ecological	  activists	  from	  twelve	  countries	  met	  in	  Paris	  
and	  inaugurated	  the	  Ecosocialist	  International	  Network	  (Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  2007;	  
EIN	  2017),	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  this	  network	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  had	  ‘obvious	  
weaknesses’	  –	  in	  particular,	  its	  lack	  of	  representativeness:	  “the	  great	  majority	  of	  
attendees	  were	  from	  left	  groups	  in	  western	  Europe,	  and	  only	  a	  handful	  came	  from	  
the	  global	  south”	  (Angus	  2008).	  In	  a	  2016	  interview,	  Ian	  Angus	  also	  emphasised	  his	  
conviction	  that	  the	  Ecosocialist	  International	  Network’s	  (EIN)	  greatest	  weakness	  was	  
that	  it	  was	  a	  ‘top-­‐down’	  attempt	  to	  form	  an	  organisation,	  and	  that	  for	  this	  reason	  it	  
was	  bound	  to	  fail	  (personal	  communication	  2016).	  The	  EIN	  nevertheless	  constituted	  
what	  Angus	  (2008)	  describes	  as	  “a	  big	  step	  forward	  for	  the	  ecosocialist	  current”	  in	  
that	  it	  constituted	  an	  initial	  attempt	  to	  build	  a	  movement	  that	  could	  act	  on	  the	  
emerging	  ‘ecosocialist	  project’	  outlined	  in	  the	  First	  Ecosocialist	  Manifesto	  authored	  
by	  Michael	  Löwy	  and	  Joel	  Kovel	  and	  published	  in	  2001.240	  One	  outcome	  of	  the	  2007	  
EIN	  meeting	  was	  the	  Draft	  Second	  Ecosocialist	  Manifesto	  developed	  by	  Kovel,	  Löwy	  
and	  Angus,	  and	  publicly	  discussed	  on	  a	  ‘yahoogroups’	  EIN	  forum	  convened	  by	  a	  four-­‐
person	  committee	  whose	  members	  included	  women,	  people	  from	  the	  Global	  South	  
(Brazil),	  and	  younger	  people	  (Angus	  2008).	  The	  document	  that	  emerged	  from	  these	  
discussions,	  entitled	  The	  Belem	  Ecosocialist	  Declaration,	  was	  endorsed	  “by	  hundreds	  
of	  people	  from	  dozens	  of	  countries”	  (Löwy	  2015,	  p.	  xiii)	  and	  presented	  at	  the	  2009	  
World	  Social	  Forum	  (WSF)	  in	  Belem,	  Brazil	  (EIN	  2009).241	  	  
While	  the	  EIN	  represents	  a	  significant	  milestone	  in	  the	  development	  of	  ecosocialist	  
activism,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6	  there	  is	  no	  simple	  ‘origin	  story’	  (Taylor	  2008)	  
through	  which	  one	  can	  trace	  the	  history	  of	  social	  movements	  or	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  240	  Refer	  to	  Löwy	  (2015,	  pp.	  77	  –	  82)	  for	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  First	  Ecosocialist	  Manifesto.	  241	  The	  annual	  WSF	  was	  established	  by	  social	  movement	  activists	  in	  2001,	  and	  is	  described	  as	  a	  ‘dynamic	  process’	  that	  “operates	  autonomously	  from	  the	  interstate	  system	  and	  has	  become	  the	  leading	  focal	  point	  for	  transnational	  mobilization	  and	  interchange	  among	  movements”;	  it	  aims	  “to	  build	  transnational	  and	  cross-­‐sectoral	  movement	  alliances	  and	  encourages	  ongoing	  efforts	  to	  link	  local	  struggles	  with	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  global	  neoliberal	  economic	  order”	  (Smith	  &	  Wiest	  2012,	  p.	  2).	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System	  Change	  Not	  Climate	  Change	  (SCNCC)	  ecosocialist	  coalition.	  The	  complex	  
origins	  and	  alliances	  of	  the	  contemporary	  ‘ecosocialist	  current’	  within	  the	  broader	  
climate	  movement	  are	  evident	  in	  how,	  according	  to	  information	  in	  an	  SCNCC	  
pamphlet,	  some	  ecosocialists	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  alter-­‐globalization	  movement	  that	  
emerged	  in	  the	  1990s	  as	  well	  as	  in	  how	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  and	  solidarity	  actions	  are	  
informed	  by	  indigenous	  environmental	  justice	  activist	  groups	  and	  by	  grassroots	  
movements	  such	  as	  the	  Landless	  Workers’	  Movement	  in	  Brazil	  and	  the	  food	  
sovereignty	  movement	  represented	  by	  La	  Via	  Campesina,	  a	  worldwide	  organisation	  
uniting	  peasant	  and	  subsistence	  farmers	  (SCNCC	  n.d.).	  While	  all	  this	  history	  
constitutes	  the	  background	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  SCNCC,	  the	  coalition	  itself	  emerged	  
in	  its	  present	  form	  after	  the	  20	  April	  2013	  Ecosocialist	  Conference	  organised	  by	  the	  
‘Ecosocialist	  Contingent’	  that	  had	  participated	  in	  the	  17	  February	  2013	  Forward	  on	  
Climate	  March	  campaign,	  a	  mass	  demonstration	  held	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  against	  the	  
Keystone	  XL	  tar	  sand	  pipeline	  (Angus	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  2013).	  
SCNCC	  describes	  itself	  as:	  “…	  a	  joint	  Canadian	  and	  US	  coalition	  of	  ecosocialists	  and	  
fellow	  travellers	  united	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  capitalism	  is	  driving	  climate	  change	  and	  
that	  a	  radical	  international	  grassroots	  movement	  can	  stop	  it”	  (SCNCC	  2017e).	  Having	  
participated	  in	  various	  campaigns	  as	  the	  ‘Ecosocialist	  Contingent’	  and	  then	  ‘System	  
Change	  Not	  Climate	  Change’	  for	  ‘roughly	  a	  year,’	  ecosocialists	  organised	  a	  
conference	  in	  New	  York	  City	  in	  2013	  that	  featured	  speakers	  “from	  across	  the	  leftish	  
spectrum,”	  some	  of	  whom	  went	  on	  to	  form	  SCNCC	  as	  it	  currently	  exists	  (SCNCC	  n.d.;	  
see	  also	  Ecosocialist	  Conference	  2013,	  Ecosocialist	  Contingent	  2013,	  and	  Zill	  &	  Ware	  
2014).242	  The	  SCNCC	  coalition	  is	  organised	  in	  chapters	  located	  in	  different	  cities	  or	  
regions	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Canada,	  with	  members	  participating	  in	  monthly	  conference	  
calls	  to	  coordinate	  their	  activities	  and	  discuss	  future	  plans	  (SCNCC	  n.d.).	  While	  some	  
members	  of	  SCNCC	  belong	  to	  other	  political	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  International	  
Socialist	  Organization,	  Solidarity,	  and	  the	  Green	  Party,	  others	  are	  independent	  and,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	  Prominent	  ecosocialists	  advertised	  to	  speak	  at	  this	  conference	  included	  Joel	  Kovel,	  Fred	  Magdoff,	  Brian	  Tokar,	  Chris	  Williams,	  Richard	  Smith	  and	  John	  Riddel	  (Ecosocialist	  Conference	  2013).	  Other	  prominent	  speakers	  included	  labour	  activists	  and	  authors	  Sean	  Sweeney	  and	  Jeremy	  Brecher,	  and	  US	  Green	  Party	  nominee	  for	  the	  2012	  and	  2016	  presidential	  campaigns,	  Jill	  Stein	  (ibid.).	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in	  recognition	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  members,	  the	  coalition	  focuses	  on	  ‘areas	  
of	  agreement’	  in	  their	  struggles	  for	  environmental	  and	  social	  justice	  (ibid.,	  p.7).	  The	  
issues	  on	  which	  SCNCC	  members	  agree	  are	  embodied	  in	  six	  ‘points	  of	  unity’	  that	  
were	  developed	  “as	  a	  step	  towards	  overcoming	  the	  sectarianism	  that	  has	  dogged	  
the	  Left”	  (ibid.).	  	  
The	  points	  of	  unity	  that	  SCNCC	  members	  agree	  on	  are	  that	  they:	  see	  capitalism	  as	  
the	  cause	  of	  the	  current	  ecological	  crisis;	  see	  exploitation	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  as	  being	  
intricately	  linked,	  and	  therefore	  oppose	  “all	  forms	  of	  oppression	  including	  racism,	  
sexism,	  xenophobia,	  homophobia	  and	  transphobia”	  in	  their	  struggles	  to	  stop	  “the	  
exploitation	  and	  destruction	  of	  the	  planet”;	  share	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  future	  “free,	  just,	  and	  
equitable	  [society]	  that	  fosters	  human	  creativity	  and	  productivity	  while	  healing	  the	  
rifts	  generated	  by	  capitalism	  among	  people	  and	  between	  human	  society	  and	  the	  
earth’s	  ecology”;	  are	  open	  to	  supporting	  reformist	  campaigns	  such	  as	  those	  initiated	  
by	  organisations	  such	  as	  350.org,	  FoE	  and	  Greenpeace	  in	  order	  to	  address	  
‘immediate	  ecological	  concerns’	  while	  working	  towards	  the	  fundamental	  system	  
change	  that	  is	  required	  for	  building	  a	  truly	  sustainable	  society	  in	  the	  long	  term;	  
oppose	  ‘green	  capitalism’	  and	  support	  alternative	  political	  formations	  such	  as	  
grassroots	  movements	  rather	  than	  “the	  capitalist-­‐controlled	  two-­‐party	  system”;	  and	  
adopt	  a	  non-­‐sectarian	  stance	  “in	  order	  to	  build	  as	  strong	  an	  environmental	  
movement	  as	  possible”	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  7	  -­‐	  8).	  In	  Gramscian	  terms,	  these	  points	  of	  unity	  
represent	  ecosocialist	  attempts	  to	  work	  with	  other	  groups	  and	  individuals	  in	  
constructing	  a	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  bloc	  to	  challenge	  capitalism.	  The	  discussion	  in	  this	  
chapter	  analyses	  these	  contributions	  to	  the	  global	  ecosocialist	  project	  of	  conducting	  
a	  Gramscian	  war	  of	  position	  on	  the	  terrain	  of	  civil	  society,	  whereby	  dominant	  ideas	  
regarding	  the	  causes	  of,	  and	  solutions	  to,	  the	  current	  organic	  crisis	  discussed	  in	  
detail	  in	  Chapter	  4	  are	  challenged.	  
Ecosocialist	  ideas	  are	  developed,	  refined,	  and	  disseminated	  through	  various	  online	  
media,	  including	  websites,	  video	  conferences,	  public	  book	  launches,	  social	  media	  
such	  as	  Facebook	  and	  Twitter,	  and	  video	  recordings	  of	  meetings	  and	  conferences	  
that	  are	  shared	  via	  online	  media	  platforms	  such	  as	  youtube	  and	  vimeo.	  The	  use	  of	  
ICTs	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  tactic	  whereby	  ecosocialists	  engage	  in	  the	  war	  of	  
	   240	  
position	  to	  present	  their	  system-­‐critical	  arguments	  about	  the	  causes	  of,	  and	  
solutions	  to,	  the	  current	  organic	  crisis	  of	  global	  capitalism.	  I	  analyse	  the	  specific	  
content	  of	  these	  online	  communications	  and	  interactions	  to	  determine	  ecosocialist	  
understandings	  of	  strategy	  and	  tactics.	  The	  two	  most	  significant	  ecosocialist	  
websites	  in	  North	  America	  are	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  (climateandcapitalism.com),	  and	  
SCNCC’s	  website	  (systemchangenotclimatechange.org).	  Examples	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  
material	  published	  on	  these	  websites	  include	  articles	  about	  climate	  science	  and	  
about	  environmental	  campaigns	  as	  well	  as	  articles	  outlining	  ecosocialist	  theory	  and	  
action,	  including	  crucial	  debates	  about	  strategy	  and	  tactics.	  
While	  the	  SCNCC	  website	  largely	  acts	  as	  a	  clearing	  house	  for	  climate	  change-­‐	  and	  
climate	  justice-­‐related	  information	  published	  elsewhere	  (with	  occasional	  original	  
articles	  not	  published	  elsewhere),	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  publishes	  many	  original	  
articles	  written	  by	  ecosocialist	  activists	  and	  academics.	  Collaboration	  between	  
various	  North	  American	  ecosocialist	  groups	  and	  projects	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  SCNCC	  website	  has	  direct	  links	  to	  articles	  published	  on	  the	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  
website	  and	  in	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism’s	  alliance	  with	  the	  prominent	  ecosocialist	  
journal	  Monthly	  Review,	  with	  which	  it	  explores	  “ways	  to	  increase	  both	  technical	  and	  
political	  collaboration”	  and	  shares	  technical	  resources	  (Angus	  n.d.).	  There	  are	  also	  
links	  on	  both	  the	  SCNCC	  and	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  websites	  to	  articles	  published	  on	  a	  
variety	  of	  other	  alternative	  political	  organisation	  websites,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Socialist	  
Project	  (socialistproject.ca)	  and	  Solidarity	  (solidarity-­‐us.org).	  While	  the	  Climate	  &	  
Capitalism	  website	  offers	  readers	  opportunities	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  content	  it	  
publishes	  and	  the	  SCNCC	  website	  does	  not	  offer	  such	  opportunities,	  a	  new	  feature	  
added	  to	  SCNCC’s	  website	  in	  June	  2017	  is	  a	  forum	  which	  is	  already	  generating	  much	  
lively	  discussion.	  It	  is	  through	  such	  online	  communications	  that	  ecosocialist	  strategy	  
and	  tactics	  are	  actively	  debated	  and	  co-­‐developed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  available	  to	  a	  
global	  audience	  and	  invites	  input	  from	  this	  audience,	  and	  examples	  of	  such	  debates	  
are	  explored	  below.	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Social	  dynamics	  in	  building	  counter-­‐hegemony:	  Ecosocialist	  
strategies	  and	  tactics	  
As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  moderate	  climate	  action	  
movement’s	  generally	  reformist	  positions,	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement’s	  
understanding	  of	  capitalism	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  current	  ecological,	  social,	  economic,	  
and	  political	  crises	  leads	  it	  to	  conclude	  that	  climate	  change	  and	  other	  equally	  
important	  problems	  can	  only	  be	  addressed	  by	  fundamental	  ‘system	  change.’	  Thus	  
the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  movement	  sees	  the	  solutions	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  
change	  proposed	  by	  supporters	  of	  the	  moderate	  climate	  action	  movement	  as	  being	  
fundamentally	  ‘false	  solutions,’	  although	  some	  of	  these	  solutions	  are	  perceived	  as	  
necessary	  interim	  or	  transitionary	  measures	  that	  should	  be	  pursued	  to	  mitigate	  
further	  climate	  change.	  As	  some	  critical	  theorists	  (for	  example,	  see	  de	  Lucia	  2014)	  
emphasise,	  however,	  this	  support	  of	  transitionary	  measures	  is	  risky	  as	  it	  opens	  up	  
avenues	  for	  the	  moderate	  climate	  movement	  to	  co-­‐opt	  the	  radical	  climate	  justice	  
movement	  and	  can	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  trasformismo.	  
One	  of	  the	  central	  challenges	  faced	  by	  climate	  justice	  activists	  is,	  therefore,	  how	  to	  
build	  alliances	  with	  other	  climate	  movement	  actors	  while	  avoiding	  co-­‐optation	  and	  
continuing	  to	  focus	  their	  efforts	  on	  promoting	  ‘real	  solutions’	  that	  are	  not	  only	  
effective	  in	  maintaining	  a	  habitable	  planet	  but	  are	  also	  socially	  just.	  As	  stated	  in	  
Chapter	  6,	  I	  argue	  that	  ecosocialist	  analyses	  and	  theoretical	  contributions	  are	  very	  
valuable	  in	  this	  respect.	  One	  of	  the	  articles	  written	  by	  prominent	  ecosocialist	  
activist-­‐academic	  and	  author,	  Chris	  Williams,	  addresses	  the	  issue	  of	  strategy	  and	  
tactics	  and	  refers	  to	  an	  example	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  tactics	  that	  build	  a	  stronger	  and	  more	  
effective	  climate	  justice	  movement	  as	  opposed	  to	  tactics	  that	  legitimise	  the	  existing	  
system	  of	  unequal	  power	  relationships.	  Williams’s	  discussion	  is	  summarised	  below	  
as	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  about	  strategy	  and	  tactics.	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Ecosocialist	  activism:	  Strategy	  and	  Tactics	  
In	  a	  2013	  article	  entitled	  Strategy	  and	  tactics	  in	  the	  environmental	  movement	  and	  
published	  on	  the	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  website,	  Chris	  Williams	  provides	  the	  following	  
definitions	  from	  the	  New	  Webster’s	  Comprehensive	  Dictionary:	  
Tactics: the science and art of using a fighting force to the best 
advantage having regard to the immediate situation of combat. 
Strategy: the science and art of conducting a military campaign in 
its large-scale and long-term aspects. 
Referring	  to	  a	  debate	  sparked	  by	  ‘prominent	  climate	  blogger	  Joseph	  Romm,’	  who	  
advised	  that	  Naomi	  Klein’s	  soon-­‐to-­‐be-­‐published	  book,	  This	  changes	  everything:	  
Capitalism	  vs.	  the	  climate,	  be	  ignored	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  Klein’s	  views	  are	  “filled	  
with	  contrarian	  ‘media	  bait’	  statements	  devoid	  of	  substance,”	  Williams	  argues	  that	  
“the	  single	  and	  vitally	  important	  question”	  that	  the	  broader	  debates	  boils	  down	  to	  is	  
the	  question:	  
what is the most effective terrain, and with which combination of 
troops and allies, should the environmental movement engage with 
opposing forces in order to emerge victorious? 
Rephrasing	  this	  question	  later	  on	  in	  the	  article,	  Williams	  asks:	  
How can we both fight for meaningful change right now (tactics) 
that simultaneously helps build the movement and brings us closer 
to our larger, more long-term goals (strategy)? How do we 
differentiate between effective tactics that supplement our overall 
strategy, versus those that lead us up blind alleys? 
Acknowledging	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  analyses	  of	  groups	  such	  as	  350.org	  regarding	  
the	  causes	  of	  climate	  change,	  and	  the	  limited	  potential	  of	  reformist	  efforts	  such	  as	  
the	  fossil	  fuel	  Divestment	  Campaign	  to	  effect	  the	  changes	  necessary	  to	  decisively	  
address	  climate	  change,	  Williams	  argues	  that	  the	  most	  important	  contribution	  
socialists	  and	  radicals	  can	  make	  is	  nevertheless	  to	  join	  such	  struggles	  and	  help	  to	  
play	  a	  role	  in	  how	  the	  many	  new	  organisations	  popping	  up	  around	  the	  issue	  of	  
climate	  change	  develop:	  
… the most important thing is to dive into the resistance as and 
where it currently exists and consistently engage with the fight 
for… immediate goals of campaigns such as those calling for 
universities and pension funds to divest from fossil fuels and 
attempts to shut down the KXL oil pipeline. 
(Williams 2013) 
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At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  Williams	  warns	  that	  radical	  activists	  should	  hold	  ‘no	  
illusions’	  that	  participating	  in	  such	  campaigns	  is	  sufficient.	  While	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
achieve	  short-­‐term	  and	  limited	  victories	  because	  of	  the	  optimism	  and	  motivation	  
these	  engender,	  Williams	  emphasises	  that	  how	  these	  victories	  are	  achieved	  (in	  other	  
words,	  which	  tactics	  are	  followed)	  is	  crucial,	  and	  that	  ecosocialists	  should	  be	  
participating	  in	  discussions	  about	  strategy	  and	  tactics:	  
A court victory achieved by NGO lawyers working in a social 
vacuum is completely different to a court victory achieved on the 
backs of mass mobilization, as illustrated by the civil rights 
movement…. We should be part of all the discussions now going on 
in the movement about tactics and strategy, suggest alternatives, 
make the case for actions that will draw in more participants, and 
create links with frontline communities of color and indigenous 
rights, while working with the bigger organizations where we are 
able. Where we have criticisms, we should voice them; in my 
experience they will likely find a strong echo. The ever more 
desperate ecological and economic situation is in itself driving 
people toward the need for more radical, systemic change. 
(Williams 2013) 
As	  these	  extracts	  demonstrate,	  ecosocialists	  try	  to	  further	  their	  overall	  strategic	  aim	  
of	  helping	  to	  bring	  about	  radical	  system	  change	  by	  participating	  in	  public	  debates	  
such	  as	  this	  one.	  Williams’s	  contribution	  in	  this	  article	  demonstrates	  that	  
ecosocialists	  understand	  one	  of	  their	  primary	  roles	  within	  the	  wider	  climate	  justice	  
and	  global	  justice	  movements	  as	  being	  to	  support	  and	  join	  with	  existing	  campaigns	  
that	  attempt	  to	  mobilise	  more	  people	  and	  build	  a	  large	  and	  effective	  climate	  
movement	  while	  simultaneously	  engaging	  in	  discussions	  with	  their	  fellow	  activists	  
about	  the	  causes	  of,	  and	  solutions	  to,	  climate	  change	  in	  ways	  that	  provoke	  critical	  
thinking	  about	  these	  issues.	  The	  tactic	  of	  joining	  existing	  organisations	  and	  groups	  
that	  are	  working	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  justice	  issues	  (rather	  than	  creating	  new,	  
specifically	  ecosocialist,	  organisations)	  is	  also	  consistently	  emphasised	  by	  other	  
ecosocialists	  such	  as	  Ian	  Angus	  (2011;	  personal	  communication	  2016),	  Benjamin	  
Silverman	  (Angus,	  Riddell,	  Proyect	  &	  Silverman	  2013)	  and	  Gemma	  Weedall	  (2013).243	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243	  Ian	  Angus	  repeats	  this	  message	  consistently	  in	  many	  of	  his	  presentations	  and	  also	  emphasised	  it	  in	  our	  interviews,	  during	  which	  he	  explained	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ‘ecosocialist	  movement’	  as	  such	  (an	  erroneous	  idea	  I	  had	  when	  I	  commenced	  my	  research	  project)	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As	  Ian	  Angus	  stated	  in	  his	  keynote	  presentation	  at	  the	  Climate	  Change	  Social	  Change	  
Conference	  held	  in	  Melbourne	  in	  2011:	  
… [one] lesson we can learn from the 20th century is that monolithic 
socialist grouplets [sic] do not turn into mass movements. They 
stagnate and decay, they argue and they split, but they don’t change 
the world. So I want to emphasise that I am not urging you to rush 
out and found yet another sect. Ecosocialism is not a separate 
organisation, it is a movement to win existing red and green groups 
and individuals to an ecosocialist perspective. 
(Angus 2011, p. 14) 
The	  seriousness	  with	  which	  ecosocialists	  approach	  the	  challenge	  of	  formulating	  
appropriate	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  is	  evidenced	  in	  the	  many	  ongoing	  discussions	  
related	  to	  these	  issues;	  thus,	  for	  example,	  in	  2014	  the	  group	  Solidarity	  established	  an	  
‘Ecosocialist	  Working	  Group’	  that	  formulated	  six	  questions	  (later	  adding	  a	  seventh)	  
around	  which	  to	  focus	  such	  discussions	  (Solidarity	  2015;	  see	  also	  SCNCC	  2017d,	  
where	  a	  link	  is	  provided	  to	  the	  webpage	  introducing	  these	  questions	  on	  the	  
Solidarity	  website).244	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  1	  below	  (which	  presents	  summary	  versions	  
of	  the	  original	  questions	  and	  which	  I	  organise	  into	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  categories),	  I	  
identify	  two	  of	  the	  questions	  as	  primarily	  related	  to	  strategy	  because	  they	  
interrogate	  what	  ecosocialist	  long-­‐term	  goals	  should	  be	  while	  the	  rest	  are	  more	  
concerned	  with	  tactical	  issues.245	  Responses	  to	  these	  questions	  by	  members	  of	  
Solidarity’s	  Ecosocialist	  Working	  Group	  and	  by	  two	  other	  authors	  were	  also	  
published	  on	  its	  website	  (refer	  to	  Becker	  2014,	  Bloom	  2015,	  Engel-­‐DeMauro	  2015	  
and	  Feeley	  2015),	  and	  all	  the	  respondents	  make	  interesting	  points;	  however,	  it	  is	  the	  
questions	  themselves	  that	  I	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  as	  they	  reveal	  the	  kinds	  of	  issues	  
that	  are	  contested	  amongst	  ecosocialists.	  Question	  5,	  which	  relates	  to	  what	  ideas	  
ecosocialists	  should	  be	  raising	  in	  the	  climate	  movement,	  for	  instance,	  emerges	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  guises	  in	  the	  debates	  published	  on	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism,	  including	  in	  
debates	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  Naomi	  Klein’s	  2014	  book,	  This	  
Changes	  Everything:	  Capitalism	  vs	  The	  Climate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  but	  that	  ecosocialists	  are	  generally	  members	  of	  groups	  engaged	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  justice	  and	  ecological	  struggles	  and	  work	  within	  wide	  coalitions.	  244	  Solidarity	  describes	  itself	  as	  “a	  socialist,	  feminist,	  anti-­‐racist	  organization”	  (Solidarity	  2017).	  245	  There	  is	  not	  always	  a	  clear	  demarcation	  between	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  questions,	  however;	  for	  example,	  Question	  2	  in	  Table	  1	  has	  both	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  elements.	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Questions	  about	  Strategy	  
	  
(1) ‘How	  does	  ecosocialist	  politics	  differ	  from	  traditional	  socialist	  and	  labor	  
politics?’	  
(2) ‘What	  role	  do	  science,	  technology,	  labor	  productivity	  and	  production	  play	  in	  the	  
transition	  from	  capitalism	  to	  ecosocialism,	  also	  in	  an	  ecosocialist	  society	  after	  
the	  transition?’	  
Questions	  about	  Tactics	  
	  
(3) ‘How	  does	  the	  ecological	  crisis	  affect	  the	  orientation	  of	  [workers’]	  unions	  and	  
their	  place	  in	  the	  class	  struggle?’	  
(4) ‘How,	  if	  scaling	  back	  production	  is	  necessary,	  will	  ecosocialist	  strategy	  remain	  
committed	  to	  meeting	  human	  needs?’	  
(5) ‘What	  ideas	  do	  ecosocialists	  raise	  in	  the	  climate	  change	  movement?	  Are	  James	  
Hansen’s	  proposals	  (for	  example,	  advocacy	  of	  a	  “carbon	  tax”	  rather	  than	  “cap	  
and	  trade”)	  in	  some	  form	  useful	  for	  ecosocialist	  transitional	  demands,	  or	  are	  
they	  simply	  an	  attempt	  to	  solve	  the	  ecological	  crisis	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
capitalism?”	  
(6) ‘What	  kinds	  of	  cooperatives	  that	  can	  be	  built	  today	  might	  be	  able	  to	  teach	  us	  
something	  about	  a	  post-­‐capitalist	  world?	  What	  role,	  if	  any,	  should	  ecosocialists	  
seek	  to	  play	  in	  these	  communities?’	  
(7) ‘Is	  it	  possible	  for	  left	  governments	  in	  developing	  countries	  to	  pursue	  a	  more	  
egalitarian	  social	  project,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  global	  economy	  that	  continues	  to	  
be	  dependent	  on	  extractivism,	  without	  violating	  basic	  ecological	  principles	  –	  in	  
particular	  the	  demands	  of	  their	  own	  indigenous	  populations?’	  	  
Source:	  Solidarity	  (2015)	  
Ecosocialist	  strategy	  –	  Building	  a	  powerful	  climate	  movement	  
John	  Bellamy	  Foster	  and	  Brett	  Clark	  (2015)	  address	  both	  liberal	  and	  radical	  critiques	  
of	  Klein’s	  book	  about	  climate	  change,	  pointing	  out	  that	  liberal	  critics	  aim	  to	  ‘rein	  in	  
her	  arguments’	  and	  either	  impose	  interpretations	  that	  ‘refashion	  her	  message’	  so	  
that	  it	  does	  not	  question	  the	  permanency	  of	  capitalism	  or,	  failing	  that,	  they	  attempt	  
to	  discredit	  her	  analysis	  entirely	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  ‘simplistic’	  or	  ‘idealistic’	  
(with	  one	  critic	  even	  referring	  to	  Klein	  as	  an	  ‘idiot’).	  Addressing	  socialist	  critiques	  
that	  Klein’s	  argument	  is	  liberal	  rather	  than	  radical	  and	  that	  it	  has	  little	  to	  say	  about	  
the	  working	  class	  and	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  its	  critique	  of	  capitalism	  (Smith	  
Table	  1:	  Summary	  of	  ecosocialist	  questions	  regarding	  strategy	  and	  tactics	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2014;	  Smith	  &	  Foster	  2017),	  Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2015)	  argue	  that	  Klein’s	  ambivalent	  
stance	  that	  fails	  to	  go	  as	  far	  as	  calling	  for	  socialism	  is	  strategic:	  
Her aim at present is clearly confined to the urgent and strategic – if 
more limited – one of making the broad case for System Change 
Not Climate Change. Millions of people, she believes, are crossing 
or are on the brink of crossing the river of fire. Capitalism, they 
charge, is now obsolete, since it is no longer compatible either with 
our survival as a species or our welfare as individual human 
beings…. It is this burgeoning global movement that is now 
demanding anti-capitalist and post-capitalist solutions. Klein sees 
herself merely as the people’s megaphone in this respect.246 
(Foster & Clark 2015) 
Similar	  acknowledgements	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  Klein’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  climate	  
justice	  movement,	  and	  the	  wider	  global	  justice	  movement,	  are	  made	  by	  other	  
ecosocialists	  (for	  example,	  Foran	  2014;	  Hornick	  2015,	  2017;	  Riddell	  2014).	  Brad	  
Hornick’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  Klein’s	  work	  emphasises	  its	  revolutionary	  
nature	  with	  reference	  to	  Marx’s	  critique	  of	  philosophy:	  
Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach is a critique of both idealism and 
mechanical materialism. The theme that reconciles the two – the 
admonition to make history while studying it – is a crucial aspect of 
the revolutionary formula. The notion that Klein’s book emerges out 
of personal and political engagement is a confirmation that ‘radical’ 
analysis includes the type of embeddedness in praxis that Marx so 
brilliantly defined in this piece as well as in the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. 
(Hornick 2015) 
The	  positive	  responses	  to	  Klein’s	  work	  indicate	  that	  ecosocialists	  are	  serious	  about	  
participating	  in	  the	  wider	  project	  of	  building	  a	  strong	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  movement	  
and	  also	  that	  they	  understand	  that	  Klein’s	  authority	  within	  the	  ‘Blockadia’	  (protest)	  
movement	  derives	  from	  her	  dual	  role	  as	  activist-­‐theorist	  and	  that	  they	  respect	  her	  
for	  this.	  Unlike	  some	  of	  her	  socialist	  critics,	  Klein	  is	  an	  organic	  intellectual	  in	  that	  she	  
is	  embedded	  and	  emotionally	  involved	  in	  the	  struggles	  she	  writes	  about,	  and	  Brad	  
Hornick	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  what	  all	  ecosocialists	  should	  be	  doing:	  
What I would like to emphasize in this review, is that Klein’s mode 
of writing as embodied experience within the crisis itself grants it 
considerable power, and at the same time marks a departure from a 
problem central to both the mainstream natural and social sciences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  As	  Foster	  and	  Clark	  (2015)	  explain	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  article,	  ‘crossing	  the	  river	  of	  fire’	  refers	  to	  William	  Morris’s	  metaphor	  for	  becoming	  “a	  critic	  of	  capital	  as	  a	  system.”	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and to the relationship between the two. This is a difference between 
impersonal, objective observation and a kind of praxis – the street-
level fighter’s interweaving of theory and practice. While there are 
many academic writers who have paid their dues and produced 
much more exacting accounts of the connections between ecology 
and capitalism, few can say that they have contributed so directly to 
a relatively consequential ‘movement,’ (amidst the miserable dearth 
of North American radical organizing), whilst doing so. 
(Hornick 2015) 
Hornick’s	  argument	  links	  back	  to	  Chris	  Williams’s	  (2013)	  discussion	  of	  tactics,	  where	  
he	  advises	  ecosocialists	  to	  ‘dive	  into	  the	  resistance	  as	  and	  where	  it	  exists,’	  and	  also	  
demonstrates	  a	  determined	  effort	  to	  shift	  ecosocialist	  debates	  in	  directions	  that	  are	  
less	  sectarian.	  However,	  the	  matter	  of	  ‘principled	  opposition’	  emerges	  more	  
forcefully	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  other	  tactical	  questions,	  such	  as	  the	  debate	  discussed	  in	  
the	  first	  case	  study	  (below)	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  ecosocialists	  should	  support	  market	  
mechanisms	  such	  as	  carbon	  trading	  and	  carbon	  taxes.	  
Case	  Study	  1:	  Ecosocialist	  tactics	  -­‐	  Are	  market	  mechanisms	  acceptable	  
transitional	  demands?	  
One	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  ecosocialists	  engage	  in	  debates	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  
support	  climate	  movement	  actor	  calls	  for	  market	  measures	  such	  as	  carbon	  trading	  
and	  carbon	  taxes	  as	  a	  means	  of	  reducing	  GHG	  emissions	  (as	  represented	  by	  Question	  
5	  in	  Table	  1)	  is	  because	  these	  are	  perceived	  as	  ‘false	  solutions’	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  
trasformismo.	  Avoiding	  trasformismo	  involves	  being	  alert	  to	  what	  de	  Lucia	  (2014,	  p.	  
67)	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘boundary	  line’	  between	  ‘system-­‐critical’	  and	  ‘system-­‐friendly’	  
interpretations	  and	  approaches	  to	  key	  contested	  concepts	  within	  climate	  politics,	  
and	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  choices.	  The	  debate	  about	  carbon	  
trading	  between	  prominent	  climate	  justice	  advocate	  Robin	  Hahnel	  and	  ecosocialist	  
Nicholas	  Davenport	  demonstrates	  that	  activists	  working	  within	  ecosocialist	  
organisations	  are	  clearly	  aware	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  trasformismo,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  
need	  to	  take	  actions	  that	  further	  their	  larger	  goal	  of	  working	  towards	  the	  
establishment	  of	  ecosocialism	  rather	  than	  supporting	  actions	  that	  logically	  imply	  
further	  entrenching	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production.	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The	  debate	  analysed	  here	  originated	  with	  an	  article	  written	  by	  Hahnel	  and	  published	  
on	  4	  November	  2013	  in	  the	  journal	  New	  Politics.	  In	  this	  article,	  entitled	  ‘An	  Open	  
Letter	  to	  the	  Climate	  Justice	  Movement,’	  Hahnel	  advocates	  that	  the	  climate	  justice	  
movement	  support	  international	  carbon	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  market	  mechanisms,	  a	  
measure	  that	  goes	  against	  climate	  justice	  movement	  assessments	  that	  market	  based	  
climate	  change	  solutions	  are	  ‘false	  solutions’	  (Dietz	  2014b).247	  Hahnel’s	  stated	  
reasons	  for	  adopting	  this	  position	  despite	  being	  “a	  long-­‐time	  advocate	  of	  both	  
climate	  justice	  and	  fundamental	  system	  change”	  include	  the	  urgency	  of	  what	  the	  
science	  is	  telling	  us	  about	  the	  need	  “to	  reduce	  global	  [GHG]	  emissions	  dramatically	  
over	  the	  next	  decade”	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  what	  is	  politically	  feasible	  within	  the	  context	  
of	  a	  global	  capitalist	  system	  which,	  Hahnel	  contends,	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  seriously	  
challenged	  in	  the	  immediate	  future.	  As	  Patrick	  Bond	  (2013)	  points	  out,	  this	  was	  not	  
the	  first	  time	  Hahnel	  had	  raised	  this	  issue,	  having	  previously	  published	  at	  least	  two	  
articles	  (Hahnel	  2012a,	  2012b)	  that	  had	  sparked	  similar	  debates	  within	  the	  climate	  
justice	  movement.	  Hahnel’s	  2013	  letter	  again	  provoked	  responses	  and	  debates	  
among	  climate	  justice	  movement	  actors,	  and	  Davenport’s	  (2014)	  response	  is	  
discussed	  in	  detail	  as	  it	  not	  only	  refutes	  Hahnel’s	  argument	  at	  a	  theoretical	  and	  
empirical	  level,	  it	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  sort	  of	  nuanced	  analysis	  that	  informs	  
ecosocialist	  understandings	  of	  system-­‐critical	  tactics	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  avoiding	  
trasformismo.248	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  Climate	  justice	  activist	  publications	  such	  as	  Hoodwinked	  in	  the	  Hothouse:	  False	  
Solutions	  to	  Climate	  Change	  (RTNA	  &	  CTW),	  The	  COP19	  Guide	  to	  Corporate	  Lobbying:	  
Climate	  crooks	  and	  the	  Polish	  government’s	  partners	  in	  crime	  (Tansey	  2013),	  and	  the	  
Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Guide	  to	  Climate	  Change	  (earthpeoples.org)	  classify	  as	  false	  a	  range	  of	  market	  based	  solutions,	  such	  as	  carbon	  trading	  and	  ‘flexible	  mechanisms’	  like	  the	  CDM	  and	  REDD+	  projects.	  Solutions	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  sophisticated	  and	  expensive	  technology	  (such	  as	  ‘clean	  coal’	  power	  plants,	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage,	  nuclear	  energy,	  ‘natural	  gas’,	  waste	  incinerators,	  and	  ‘biogenic	  fuels’	  such	  as	  biomass)	  are	  also	  perceived	  to	  be	  false,	  as	  are	  solutions	  that	  will	  result	  in	  displacing	  populations	  and	  destroying	  food	  production	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  agrofuels	  or	  build	  megadams	  for	  the	  production	  of	  ‘clean	  energy’.	  As	  de	  Lucia	  (2014,	  p.	  80)	  summarises,	  “False	  solutions	  are	  generally	  seen	  to	  imply	  also	  a	  high	  level	  of	  centralization,	  economic,	  political,	  structural	  and	  technical”	  (de	  Lucia	  2014,	  p.	  80).	  248	  Davenport	  was	  only	  one	  of	  many	  to	  respond	  to	  Hahnel’s	  proposal;	  other	  responses	  included	  an	  online	  debate	  between	  Hahnel	  and	  well-­‐known	  South	  African-­‐based	  climate	  justice	  activist,	  Patrick	  Bond	  that	  occurred	  on	  ZNet’s	  debate	  webpage.	  Bond	  (2013)	  also	  responded	  to	  Hahnel’s	  proposal	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  Capitalism	  Nature	  Socialism,	  while	  environmental	  activist	  Gar	  Lipow	  responded	  with	  a	  Grist	  article	  entitled	  ‘Zombie	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While	  respectful	  of	  Hahnel	  as	  a	  fellow	  climate	  justice	  advocate,	  Davenport’s	  
response	  is	  nevertheless	  detailed	  and	  uncompromising	  on	  the	  specific	  issues	  Hahnel	  
raises	  as	  he	  outlines	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  system-­‐critical	  activists	  should	  decide	  what	  
tactics	  and	  programs	  they	  adopt.	  Davenport’s	  article,	  significantly	  entitled	  ‘Reform	  or	  
revolution	  for	  the	  environmental	  movement?’	  (emphasis	  added),	  concedes	  that	  
revolutionaries	  operating	  within	  the	  context	  of	  capitalist	  societies	  are	  engaged	  in	  
struggles	  for	  reforms	  most	  of	  the	  time;	  however,	  echoing	  Williams	  (2013),	  
Davenport	  states	  that	  “The	  question	  is	  how	  to	  struggle	  for	  reforms	  in	  a	  revolutionary	  
way.”	  	  This	  question	  leads	  Davenport	  to	  distinguish	  between	  reformist	  tactics	  “based	  
on	  accommodation	  to	  the	  class	  enemy”	  (emphasis	  in	  original)	  and	  class-­‐independent	  
revolutionary	  tactics.	  Davenport	  (2014)	  critiques	  reformist	  tactics	  such	  the	  one	  
proposed	  by	  Hahnel	  because	  they	  constitute	  capitalist	  policy	  solutions,	  which	  it	  is	  
not	  the	  task	  of	  the	  Left	  to	  work	  towards.249	  Davenport	  points	  out	  that	  “It	  is	  
bourgeois	  legislators’	  job	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  implement…	  concessions	  within	  the	  
framework	  of	  bourgeois	  policy	  –	  we	  should	  not	  do	  their	  jobs	  for	  them.”	  He	  argues	  
that	  supporting	  capitalist	  policy	  solutions	  such	  as	  carbon	  trading	  mechanisms	  
entrenches	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	  rather	  than	  leading	  to	  the	  qualitative	  
changes	  required	  to	  create	  sustainable	  and	  democratic,	  socially	  just	  societies.	  
Support	  for	  such	  measures	  also	  limits	  the	  political	  imagination	  of	  the	  Left	  “to	  what’s	  
possible	  within	  the	  capitalist	  system	  and	  pull[s]	  our	  politics	  rightwards”	  rather	  than	  
affirming	  the	  message	  that	  “another	  world	  is	  possible.”	  In	  addition,	  reformist	  tactics	  
promote	  the	  view	  that	  “progressive	  bourgeois	  legislators”	  are	  allies,	  and	  that	  the	  
capitalist	  state	  is	  a	  neutral	  agent	  that	  can	  be	  negotiated	  with,	  rather	  than	  
demonstrating	  that	  change	  will	  only	  come	  from	  confronting	  “the	  state	  and	  the	  
capitalist	  class.”	  Most	  importantly,	  Davenport	  argues,	  if	  one	  is	  concerned	  about	  
addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  global	  warming,	  such	  policies	  are,	  contrary	  to	  their	  claims,	  
unrealistic:	  the	  actual	  implementation	  of	  carbon	  trading	  markets	  has	  not	  only	  failed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  carbon	  trading’s	  latest	  resurrection’	  (posted	  online	  on	  15	  January	  2014)	  as	  well	  as	  with	  a	  more	  detailed	  argument	  in	  his	  article,	  ‘Shutting	  Down	  the	  Fog	  Machine’	  (which	  was	  published	  in	  the	  Review	  of	  Radical	  Political	  Economics).	  	  249	  Davenport	  makes	  the	  additional	  point	  that	  Hahnel	  is	  not	  the	  only	  academic	  of	  the	  Left	  to	  call	  for	  a	  “shift	  towards	  reformist	  politics”	  because	  of	  the	  urgent	  need	  to	  take	  action	  on	  mitigating	  further	  climate	  change.	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to	  reduce	  GHG	  emissions,	  it	  has	  enriched	  major	  polluters,	  and	  this	  is	  an	  inevitable	  
outcome	  in	  a	  capitalist	  system.	  In	  summary,	  Davenport	  argues	  that	  “it	  is	  unrealistic	  
to	  expect	  capitalist	  governments	  to	  implement	  carbon	  trading	  schemes	  in	  
accordance	  with…	  [Hahnel’s]	  principles	  given	  that	  their	  purpose	  is	  to	  appear	  as	  if	  
they	  are	  doing	  something	  while	  in	  fact	  they	  defend	  the	  continuation	  of	  business	  as	  
usual	  for	  as	  long	  as	  possible.”250	  Ultimately,	  Davenport	  points	  out,	  reformist	  tactics	  
misdiagnose	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  ecological	  crisis:	  “…the	  climate	  crisis	  and	  other	  
ecological	  problems	  are	  rooted	  in	  the	  structure	  [of	  the]	  capitalist	  system	  (not	  just	  a	  
few	  sectors	  of	  capital,	  like	  the	  fossil-­‐fuel	  industry,	  but	  the	  system	  itself),	  and	  cannot	  
be	  reformed	  away.”251	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  reformist	  tactics	  that	  support	  capitalist	  solutions,	  Davenport	  argues	  
that	  revolutionary	  tactics	  attempting	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  environmental	  
degradation	  and	  climate	  crisis	  caused	  by	  capitalism	  can	  be	  developed	  with	  a	  more	  
nuanced	  understanding	  “of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  power	  in	  capitalism	  and	  socialism”	  
(emphasis	  added):	  
…although in a capitalist system the capitalist class is always in 
power, at no point is the relationship of forces between classes 
static. The working class, the capitalist class, and other social forces 
are always vying for power and influence within the system and its 
units – within workplaces, neighbourhoods, and various levels of 
government, for example. Reforms, in general, happen when the 
working class or oppressed groups gain enough power to force the 
hand of the ruling class – putting them in the position of either 
implementing the reform or losing needed credibility and influence. 
It	  is	  this	  understanding	  of	  power	  relations,	  and	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  class	  struggle,	  
that	  informs	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  revolutionary	  tactics	  that	  are,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  250	  As	  Davenport	  (2014)	  notes,	  “To	  his	  credit,	  Hahnel	  does	  not	  water	  down	  his	  proposal	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  palatable	  to	  the	  capitalist	  class	  and	  the	  politicians	  that	  serve	  them.	  He	  insists	  that	  a	  global	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  scheme	  would	  have	  mandatory	  emissions	  caps	  for	  all	  countries	  based	  on	  science,	  differential	  emissions	  caps	  based	  on	  principles	  of	  global	  justice,	  and	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  to	  prevent	  cheating	  and	  bogus	  carbon	  credits.”	  However,	  Davenport	  also	  points	  out	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  this	  is	  a	  ‘principled	  proposal’	  that	  “The	  ruling	  class	  would	  never	  agree	  to...	  [it	  as	  this]	  would	  amount	  to	  voluntarily	  abandoning	  imperialism	  and	  agreeing	  to	  destroy	  huge	  sectors	  of	  highly	  profitable	  capital.”	  251	  For	  discussions	  about	  the	  failure	  of	  carbon	  markets	  to	  decrease	  GHG	  emissions,	  refer	  to	  Böhm,	  Misoczky	  and	  Moog	  (2012);	  Bond	  (2011);	  Lohmann	  (2010);	  and	  Pearse	  and	  Böhm	  (2014).	  For	  a	  Marxist	  ecosocialist	  analysis	  of	  why	  and	  how	  capitalist	  (or	  market-­‐based)	  solutions	  inevitably	  favour	  capital	  accumulation	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  workers	  and	  other	  subordinate	  groups,	  refer	  to	  Burkett	  (2014).	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  first	  and	  foremost,	  ‘class	  independent’	  in	  that	  they	  “build	  popular	  power	  
independently	  from	  state	  institutions”	  and	  are	  thus	  capable	  of	  “confront[ing]	  the	  
state	  and	  the	  capitalist	  class.”	  Davenport’s	  distinctions	  between	  reformist	  and	  	  
revolutionary	  tactics	  are	  summarised	  in	  Table	  2	  (below).	  
Source:	  Summary	  of	  Davenport	  (2014)	  
Reformist	  tactics	   Revolutionary	  tactics	  Do	  not	  challenge	  hegemonic	  capitalist	  ideology	   Aim	  to	  change	  participants’	  consciousness	  and	  encourage	  activists	  “to	  think	  and	  act	  outside	  the	  confines	  of	  capitalist	  ideology.”	  Entrench	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production	   Lead	  to	  qualitative	  changes	  required	  to	  create	  sustainable	  and	  democratic,	  socially	  just	  societies	  Limit	  the	  political	  imagination	  of	  the	  Left	  to	  what	  is	  possible	  within	  a	  capitalist	  system	   Affirm	  the	  message	  that	  another	  world	  is	  possible;	  “promote	  solidarity	  and	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  capitalist	  system.”	  Promote	  the	  view	  that	  reformist	  legislators	  are	  allies	   Are,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  ‘class	  independent’;	  “build	  popular	  power	  independently	  from	  state	  institutions”	  and	  are	  thus	  capable	  of	  “confront[ing]	  the	  state	  and	  the	  capitalist	  class.”	  Promote	  the	  view	  that	  the	  capitalist	  state	  is	  a	  neutral	  agent	  that	  can	  be	  negotiated	  with	   Demonstrate	  that	  change	  can	  only	  come	  from	  confronting	  the	  state	  and	  the	  capitalist	  class	  Promote	  what	  are	  erroneously	  perceived	  as	  ‘realistic’	  solutions	   Recognise	  that	  mainstream	  solutions	  are	  false:	  they	  do	  not,	  in	  fact,	  reduce	  GHG	  emissions	  but	  enrich	  major	  polluters	  instead.	  This	  is	  a	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  the	  capitalist	  system.	  Misdiagnose	  the	  root	  of	  the	  ecological	  crisis,	  which	  lies	  within	  the	  structure	  of	  capitalist	  relations,	  not	  just	  in	  some	  economic	  sectors	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  mitigating	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming,	  “uncompromisingly	  demand	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  fossil	  fuels,	  done	  in	  a	  way	  that	  meets	  human	  needs.”	  
See	  capital’s	  power	  as	  hegemonic	  and	  immovable;	  do	  not	  understand	  the	  class	  struggle.	   Have	  a	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  power	  in	  capitalism	  and	  socialism,	  recognising	  that	  “reforms,	  in	  general,	  happen	  when	  the	  working	  class	  or	  oppressed	  groups	  gain	  enough	  power	  to	  force	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  ruling	  class…”	  Solutions	  are	  individualistic	   Encourage	  people	  to	  think	  in	  collective	  rather	  than	  in	  individual	  terms	  and	  focus	  on	  principles	  that	  unite	  working-­‐class	  people	  Solutions	  ignore	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  working	  class	  and	  subaltern	  groups	   Address	  the	  “immediate	  concerns	  of	  working-­‐class	  people”	  while	  making	  connections	  between	  workers’	  struggles	  and	  struggles	  to	  counter	  “ecological	  destruction	  and	  the	  overcoming	  of	  racial,	  national,	  and	  gender-­‐	  and	  sexuality-­‐based	  oppressions.”	  Solutions	  do	  not	  challenge	  existing	  power	  relations	   Typically	  argue	  “for	  stances	  that	  are	  further	  to	  the	  left	  of	  those	  in	  the	  mainstream	  of	  the	  movement,	  while	  posing	  them	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  relatable	  and	  responsive	  to	  the	  movement’s	  aims,”	  
Table	  2:	  Reformist	  vs	  Revolutionary	  Tactics	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Given	  his	  argument	  that	  supporting	  carbon	  trading	  lends	  legitimacy	  to	  reformist	  
policies	  that	  fail	  (and	  that	  ultimately	  must	  fail)	  to	  achieve	  their	  stated	  goal	  of	  
reducing	  GHG	  emissions,	  Davenport	  makes	  a	  compelling	  case	  that	  the	  radical	  climate	  
justice	  movement	  should	  not	  support	  this	  policy	  or	  any	  other	  market	  mechanisms	  
proposed	  as	  solutions	  to	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming.	  This	  position,	  however,	  
raises	  interesting	  questions	  about	  whether	  it	  is	  ever	  progressive	  to	  support	  reforms	  –	  
an	  issue	  that	  crucially	  relates	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  labour	  movement	  (refer	  to	  
Questions	  1	  and	  3	  in	  Table	  1)	  and	  that	  the	  left	  faced	  during	  the	  2015	  US	  oil	  workers’	  
strike.	  In	  the	  arguments	  he	  presents	  against	  Hahnel’s	  proposal,	  Davenport	  (2014)	  
also	  makes	  the	  important	  point	  that	  revolutionary	  strategy	  is	  necessarily	  situational,	  
and	  that	  a	  programme	  that	  is	  reformist	  in	  one	  situation	  may	  be	  revolutionary	  in	  
another.	  Such	  nuances	  are	  significant	  when	  analysing	  specific	  tactical	  decisions	  such	  
as	  the	  decision	  by	  SCNCC	  members	  to	  support	  the	  2015	  US	  oil	  refinery	  workers’	  
strike,	  which	  constitutes	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  second	  case	  study	  analysed	  below.	  
Case	  Study	  2:	  Ecosocialist	  tactics	  –	  The	  question	  of	  class	  struggle	  
Renowned	  Marxist	  industrial	  relations	  scholar	  Richard	  Hyman	  (1975)	  argues	  that	  
trade	  unions	  have	  traditionally	  been	  problematic	  institutions	  for	  Marxists.	  
Originating	  in	  Britain	  as	  self-­‐organised	  alliances	  of	  craft	  tradespeople	  who	  banded	  
together	  to	  defend	  their	  rights	  as	  workers,	  trade	  unions	  were	  transformed	  
(frequently	  forcibly)	  into	  compliant	  institutions	  that	  are	  routinely	  used	  by	  
management	  (with	  support	  from	  both	  the	  state	  and,	  often,	  the	  union	  leadership)	  to	  
control	  the	  working	  class.252	  From	  their	  inception,	  trade	  unions	  have	  inhabited	  a	  
terrain	  that	  is	  fraught	  with	  contradictions	  arising	  from	  their	  orientation	  as	  workers’	  
collectives	  operating	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  system	  of	  capitalist	  relations	  that	  is	  
implicitly	  accepted	  by	  the	  trade	  unions	  and	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  workers	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  Hyman	  (1975,	  pp.	  43	  -­‐	  44)	  traces	  the	  earliest	  unions	  back	  to	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  These	  early	  unions	  (more	  accurately	  described	  as	  ‘traditional	  craft	  societies’)	  “often	  emerged	  spontaneously	  from	  the	  informal	  ‘occupational	  community’	  of	  a	  craft	  group”,	  met	  at	  the	  local	  pub,	  and	  had	  unilateral	  control	  over	  the	  rules	  of	  their	  trade.	  The	  emergence	  of	  large	  employers	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  labour	  market	  (facilitated	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  railways	  in	  the	  1840s)	  undermined	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  early	  unions	  and	  led	  ultimately	  to	  “the	  consolidation	  of	  trade	  unionism	  on	  a	  national	  basis”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  45).	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constitute	  their	  membership.	  This	  fundamental	  contradiction	  has	  many	  additional	  
contradictory	  flow-­‐on	  effects:	  for	  example,	  while	  trade	  unions	  are,	  by	  their	  nature,	  
situated	  in	  a	  conflictual	  relationship	  with	  capital	  (workers	  can	  only	  make	  wage	  gains	  
or	  improvements	  to	  their	  working	  conditions	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  capital),	  the	  
membership’s	  dependence	  on	  having	  work	  if	  they	  are	  to	  survive	  forces	  workers	  
(through	  their	  defensive	  organisations,	  the	  trade	  unions)	  to	  negotiate	  with	  
employers	  and	  co-­‐operate	  in	  their	  own	  continued	  exploitation.	  However,	  while	  trade	  
unions	  are	  undoubtedly	  institutions	  that	  are	  firmly	  entrenched	  within	  the	  capitalist	  
system	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies,	  and	  have	  undergone	  processes	  that	  
have	  rendered	  them	  organisations	  that	  are	  used	  by	  the	  ruling	  class	  and	  its	  managers	  
(including	  trade	  union	  officials)	  to	  control	  labour,	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  the	  
organisations	  of	  the	  working	  class	  whose	  members	  cannot	  be	  ignored	  by	  any	  
counterhegemonic	  movement	  that	  wants	  to	  develop	  broad-­‐based	  support	  for	  its	  
project.	  The	  ecosocialist	  argument	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  support	  workers’	  struggles	  
as	  part	  of	  the	  fight	  against	  climate	  change	  is	  merely	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  
Marx,	  Engels,	  Lenin,	  Gramsci	  and	  other	  Marxists	  that	  the	  working	  class	  is	  the	  key	  
agent	  of	  social	  change	  within	  a	  capitalist	  system.253	  Ecosocialist	  efforts	  to	  ally	  with	  
workers,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  support	  the	  2015	  oil	  workers’	  strike,	  is	  
especially	  important	  in	  periods	  of	  organic	  crisis;	  as	  Hyman	  argues:	  
In periods of unrest and instability, the presence in positions of 
influence of workers with a developed oppositional ideology can be 
of immense significance. When engaged in collective struggle, 
workers are most susceptible to the appeal of new world-views: the 
‘deviant’ elements in working-class attitudes are thrust to the fore, 
while the conventional assumptions of ‘official’ society 
momentarily lose their hold. 
(Hyman 1975, pp. 176 - 177) 
It	  is	  not	  surprising,	  then,	  that	  one	  of	  SCNCC’s	  key	  demands	  is	  to:	  “Provide	  full	  
employment,	  transitioning	  millions	  from	  military	  and	  fossil-­‐fuel	  related	  jobs	  to	  union	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  Notwithstanding	  the	  debates	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  trade	  union	  officials	  and	  privileged	  sections	  of	  the	  working	  class	  (the	  so-­‐called	  ‘labour	  aristocracy’)	  act	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  capital	  and	  thereby	  wilfully	  betray	  the	  working	  class	  as	  a	  whole,	  more	  nuanced	  analyses	  of	  trade	  unionism	  identify	  underdeveloped	  class	  consciousness	  among	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  membership	  as	  the	  main	  reason	  explaining	  why	  workers	  are	  not	  more	  militant	  (for	  example,	  see	  Hyman	  1975,	  McIlroy	  2014).	  Gramsci’s	  notions	  of	  the	  consensual	  aspects	  of	  hegemony	  are	  also	  relevant	  when	  considering	  this	  issue.	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jobs	  creating	  a	  renewable	  energy	  infrastructure.	  In	  the	  fight	  to	  save	  the	  
environment,	  working	  people	  must	  not	  be	  left	  behind”	  (SCNCC	  n.d.,	  p.	  9).	  
Ecosocialist	  strategy	  involves	  fighting	  for	  both	  short-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐term	  reforms	  with	  
a	  long-­‐term	  aim	  of	  fundamental	  system	  change,	  and	  the	  reformist	  measure	  calling	  
for	  full	  employment	  is	  justified	  as	  follows:	  
In any case, we can never expect workers to support the changes 
needed to save the planet and their children unless they are provided 
with other jobs, at least as good with at least equivalent pay and 
benefits, as the ones they are losing 
(SCNCC n.d., p. 9) 
However,	  given	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  fossil	  
fuel	  industry	  and	  demand	  a	  transition	  to	  the	  use	  of	  renewable	  energy,	  some	  climate	  
justice	  activists	  questioned	  the	  tactic	  of	  supporting	  the	  United	  Steelworkers	  Union	  
oil	  workers’	  strike	  (Johnson	  2015;	  Rugh	  2015).	  	  
While	  support	  for	  striking	  workers	  employed	  in	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  may	  appear	  
incongruous	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  contradict	  ecosocialist	  demands	  to	  
“uncompromisingly…	  shift	  away	  from	  fossil	  fuels”	  (as	  Davenport	  suggests),	  several	  
climate	  justice	  movement	  actors	  presented	  strong	  arguments	  for	  supporting	  this	  
industrial	  action.	  Citing	  historian	  and	  labour	  activist	  Jeremy	  Brecher,	  for	  instance,	  
Trish	  Kahle	  (2014)	  argues	  that	  ecosocialists	  need	  to	  “break	  down	  the	  false	  ‘jobs	  
versus	  environment’	  dichotomy”	  and	  act	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  “the	  exploitation	  
of	  workers	  and	  the	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment	  go	  hand	  in	  hand”	  so	  that	  
workers	  and	  environmentalists	  must	  “evolve	  toward	  a	  common	  program	  and	  a	  
common	  vision.”	  Kahle	  furthermore	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  
climate	  justice	  activists	  to	  engage	  with	  workers	  employed	  in	  energy	  industries	  
because	  these	  workers	  “occupy	  a	  special	  place	  at	  the	  nexus	  of	  capitalism’s	  ecological	  
destruction	  and	  human	  exploitation,	  a	  place	  that	  is	  simultaneously	  powerful	  and	  
vulnerable.”	  The	  position	  that	  energy	  workers	  occupy	  in	  a	  capitalist	  system	  is:	  
Powerful, because energy sets the entire economic system in 
motion, and any action taken by the workers responsible for 
producing this energy quickly fans out to every sector of the 
economy. And vulnerable because the radical realignment of energy 
production they have the power to affect can threaten their 
livelihoods. 
(Kahle 2014) 
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Workers	  in	  the	  energy	  industry	  thus	  “have	  the	  power	  to	  bring	  our	  planet	  back	  from	  
the	  tipping	  point,”	  although	  this	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  if	  energy	  workers	  regain	  
control	  of	  their	  organisations	  from	  “a	  labor	  leadership	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  
risk	  the	  future	  of	  our	  species	  for	  slightly	  relieved	  unemployment”	  (Kahle	  2014).	  In	  
this	  respect,	  Kahle	  (2015)	  argued	  that	  ecosocialist	  support	  for	  the	  2015	  oil	  workers’	  
strike	  demanding	  safer	  working	  conditions	  was	  crucial:	  
…for ecosocialists, it’s not just the immediate demands of workers 
that are important, but the long-term ramifications of a victory. 
Workers have power if they act collectively. Just as they can stop oil 
production (30,000 workers have the capacity to halt 64 percent of 
the nation’s refining capacity), they can halt capitalism’s assault on 
the planet. To be sure, there’s not a direct line between a strike for 
better working conditions and a strike for new energy and a more 
just economy. It is the job of ecosocialists to demonstrate the deep 
connection between the two, to offer an analysis and strategy of 
struggle that speaks to workers’ lived experiences. 
(Kahle 2015)  
Referring	  to	  the	  oil	  workers’	  strike	  as	  containing	  within	  it	  “the	  seeds	  of	  an	  
alternative:	  class-­‐struggle	  environmentalism,”	  Kahle	  suggested	  several	  concrete	  
actions	  that	  climate	  justice	  activists	  could	  engage	  in	  to	  support	  the	  oil	  workers’	  
action,	  including	  donating	  to	  strike	  funds,	  participating	  in	  picket	  lines,	  and	  inviting	  
workers	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  strike	  at	  community	  meetings	  and	  on	  campuses.	  Such	  
support	  would	  have	  both	  a	  short-­‐term	  goal	  of	  helping	  workers	  win	  the	  strike	  but	  also	  
a	  longer-­‐term	  goal	  of	  helping	  unions	  to	  become	  stronger	  and	  perhaps	  even	  join	  in	  
the	  struggle	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change	  and	  environmental	  destruction.	  The	  SCNCC	  
website	  provided	  links	  to	  Kahle’s	  articles,	  and	  SCNCC	  members	  joined	  picket	  lines	  in	  
support	  of	  the	  striking	  workers	  (Rugh	  2015).	  Several	  other	  environmental,	  trade	  
union	  and	  left-­‐leaning	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  California	  Nurses	  Association,	  Labor	  
Network	  for	  Sustainability,	  350.org,	  the	  Sierra	  Club,	  and	  Oil	  Change	  International	  
also	  expressed	  their	  support	  for	  what	  developed	  into	  the	  largest	  oil	  refinery	  workers’	  
strike	  in	  35	  years	  (Johnson	  2015;	  Light	  2015;	  Rugh	  2015;	  Turnbull	  2015;	  Uehlein	  
2015).	  
While	  the	  SCNCC	  (n.d.	  p.	  9)	  demand	  for	  “…full	  employment,	  transitioning	  millions	  
from	  military	  and	  fossil-­‐fuel	  related	  jobs	  to	  union	  jobs	  creating	  a	  renewable	  energy	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infrastructure”	  is,	  arguably,	  better	  served	  by	  confining	  their	  collaborations	  to	  other	  
trade	  union	  organisations	  that	  better	  align	  with	  this	  aim	  -­‐	  such	  as	  Trade	  Unions	  for	  
Energy	  Democracy	  (TUED	  n.d.)	  and	  the	  International	  Transport	  Workers’	  Federation	  
(ITF	  n.d.;	  see	  also	  Felli	  2014),	  confining	  actions	  to	  terrains	  in	  which	  everyone	  already	  
agrees	  does	  not	  extend	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement,	  and	  the	  challenge	  is	  to	  create	  
a	  broad	  popular	  movement	  that	  is	  powerful	  enough	  to	  fight	  for	  a	  habitable	  planet.	  
Moreover,	  an	  application	  of	  Davenport’s	  guidelines	  for	  determining	  whether	  a	  
course	  of	  action	  is	  progressive	  or	  not	  demonstrates	  that	  SCNCC	  support	  of	  the	  oil	  
workers’	  strike	  was	  overwhelmingly	  progressive:	  by	  participating	  in	  picket	  lines,	  
SCNCC	  members	  not	  only	  concretely	  demonstrated	  a	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  power	  relations	  in	  capitalist	  societies	  as	  well	  as	  their	  solidarity	  with	  the	  
workers	  and	  their	  concern	  for	  workers’	  well-­‐being	  and	  safety,	  they	  also	  created	  
possibilities	  for	  further	  collaborations	  between	  ecosocialists,	  workers,	  and	  
communities	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  such	  broad	  coalitions	  are	  possible.	  
By	  supporting	  the	  oil	  workers,	  SCNCC	  members	  also	  participated	  in	  a	  collective	  
action	  that	  by	  its	  nature	  challenged	  the	  power	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  (albeit	  to	  a	  
limited	  extent)	  and	  contributed	  towards	  efforts	  to	  strengthen	  future	  challenges	  to	  
this	  power.	  As	  Kahle	  argues,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  needs	  to	  be	  
challenged	  on	  many	  different	  fronts:	  
As significant as winning better working conditions would be – for 
the workers themselves, as well as for the communities around the 
refineries – it’s also important to consider what the long-term 
effects of this strike could be in terms of increasing militancy and 
organization. Strong unions can fight for jobs and the planet, but we 
still have a long way to go. To defeat the oil industry ecologically, 
we need to defeat it ideologically, politically, socially, 
economically: this strike is a step in that direction, and that’s why 
it’s so important to win. 
(Kahle 2015) 
In	  addition	  to	  these	  arguments	  for	  supporting	  workers	  in	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  in	  
their	  challenges	  to	  capital,	  while	  more	  overtly	  progressive	  campaigns	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  
Campaign	  Against	  Climate	  Change’s	  call	  for	  ‘One	  Million	  Climate	  Jobs’	  funded	  by	  the	  
public	  sector	  (Empson	  2010)	  are	  undoubtedly	  a	  great	  step	  forward	  in	  the	  fight	  for	  a	  
just	  transition	  to	  a	  sustainable	  energy	  system	  they	  are	  not	  completely	  unproblematic	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as	  they	  exist	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  emerging	  focus	  on	  a	  so-­‐called	  ‘blue-­‐green’	  alliance	  
between	  ‘blue	  collar’	  workers	  and	  the	  ‘green’	  (environmental)	  movement.	  Such	  
blue-­‐green	  alliances	  (and	  related	  notions	  of	  a	  ‘green	  economy’,	  ‘green	  technology’,	  
‘green	  jobs’	  and	  ‘sustainable	  development’)	  can	  be	  easily	  co-­‐opted	  into	  supporting,	  
legitimising	  and	  entrenching	  liberal	  and	  neoliberal	  agendas	  to	  create	  new	  avenues	  
for	  capital	  accumulation	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  both	  nature	  and	  subordinate	  classes	  and	  
groups.	  Returning	  to	  de	  Lucia’s	  distinction	  between	  ‘system-­‐critical’	  and	  ‘system-­‐
friendly’	  approaches,	  the	  current	  conjuncture	  is	  particularly	  perilous	  for	  radical	  
climate	  justice	  activists	  seeking	  real	  solutions	  to	  the	  organic	  crisis	  given	  the	  struggle	  
within	  the	  capitalist	  class	  between	  the	  faction	  supporting	  the	  long-­‐established	  
vested	  interests	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  the	  faction	  supporting	  an	  emerging	  ‘green	  
capitalism,’	  which	  could	  gain	  much-­‐needed	  leverage	  if	  it	  succeeds	  in	  mobilising	  a	  
broad	  support	  base	  comprised	  of	  subordinate	  classes	  and	  groups	  to	  build	  a	  re-­‐
formed	  historic	  bloc	  legitimising	  capital’s	  continued	  expansion.254	  
The	  new	  ‘green	  economy’	  thus	  constitutes	  an	  arena	  of	  struggle	  between	  those	  
forces	  working	  towards	  building	  a	  new	  hegemony	  and	  those	  trying	  to	  build	  a	  
counterhegemonic	  movement.	  This	  battle	  is	  being	  waged	  in	  both	  discursive	  terms	  (in	  
a	  war	  of	  position)	  involving	  the	  interpretations	  of	  contested	  concepts	  such	  as	  
‘sustainable	  development,’	  ‘green	  economy,’	  ‘green	  jobs,’	  ‘climate	  justice,’	  a	  ‘just	  
transition,’	  and	  ‘system	  change’	  and	  on	  the	  terrain	  of	  political	  action	  (which	  could	  be	  
described	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  limited	  ‘war	  of	  manoeuvre’	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  development	  
of	  appropriate	  strategies	  and	  tactics).	  The	  war	  of	  position	  is	  crucial	  as	  some	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  contested	  concepts	  could	  result	  in	  a	  ‘reformed	  green	  
capitalism’	  that	  furthers	  the	  neoliberal	  agenda	  of	  capital	  accumulation	  without,	  in	  
the	  worst	  case	  scenario,	  even	  actually	  making	  the	  changes	  required	  to	  stop	  further	  
anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  and	  general	  environmental	  degradation.255	  This	  could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  254	  Refer	  to	  Tansey	  (2013)	  and	  Mittler	  (2014)	  for	  discussions	  of	  the	  dominance	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  interests	  in	  global	  politics.	  255	  Boehnert	  (2015)	  provides	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  contested	  meanings	  of	  the	  ‘green	  economy’,	  with	  a	  useful	  summary	  of	  different	  perspectives	  on	  ‘Economic	  approaches	  to	  the	  environment’	  in	  Figure	  2	  in	  her	  article.	  Refer	  to	  Goodman	  &	  Salleh	  (2013)	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  years	  of	  effort	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  UN	  institutions,	  business	  interests,	  CSOs	  and	  trade	  union	  groups	  to	  develop	  a	  global	  consensus	  around	  the	  idea	  of	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open	  the	  path	  to	  an	  intensified	  assault	  on,	  and	  the	  deeper	  economic	  exploitation	  of,	  
both	  nature	  and	  subordinate	  classes.	  
The	  ‘green	  capitalism’	  route	  is	  also	  highly	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  dangerous	  (but	  very	  
profitable)	  large-­‐scale	  projects	  such	  as	  attempts	  to	  ‘sequester’	  carbon	  and,	  even	  
more	  dangerously,	  large-­‐scale	  geoengineering	  projects.256	  Thus,	  while	  intellectuals	  of	  
the	  left	  argue	  that	  capitalism	  is	  incapable	  of	  addressing	  climate	  change	  and	  see	  
‘saving	  the	  planet’	  as	  a	  catalyst	  around	  which	  to	  organise	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  more	  
socially	  just	  world	  order,	  the	  need	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  could	  equally	  be	  the	  
uniting	  issue	  that	  justifies	  and	  legitimises	  the	  power	  of	  global	  capital	  (at	  least	  until	  
the	  planet	  is	  no	  longer	  habitable)	  while,	  as	  Goodman	  and	  Salleh	  (2014)	  note,	  
simultaneously	  opening	  up	  much-­‐needed	  avenues	  of	  new	  ‘economic	  growth’	  and	  
capital	  accumulation	  (see	  also	  Boehnert	  2015,	  Burkett	  2014,	  Elgot	  2015	  and	  Kotz	  
2009).	  Moreover,	  de	  Lucia	  (2014,	  p.	  68)	  points	  out	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  
rejuvenating	  the	  profitability	  of	  global	  capitalism,	  the	  concerted	  attempt	  to	  present	  
market	  mechanisms	  and	  technological	  fixes	  as	  the	  only	  possible	  solutions	  to	  the	  
climate	  crisis	  simultaneously	  “…	  ‘aims	  to	  forestall	  more	  radical	  critiques	  that	  argue	  
that	  capitalism	  and	  sustainability	  are	  inimical’	  (Paterson	  2010:	  345).	  Antagonistic	  
forces	  are	  thus	  either	  embraced	  as	  potential	  partners	  or	  ejected	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  shift	  towards	  ‘green	  capitalism’	  to	  facilitate	  continued	  economic	  growth.	  McIntyre	  and	  Hillard	  (2012)	  also	  provide	  an	  important	  analysis	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which,	  contrary	  to	  common	  misperceptions,	  the	  original	  ‘New	  Deal’	  in	  the	  US	  constituted	  a	  victory	  for	  capital.	  Their	  argument	  could	  be	  extended	  to	  contemporary	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  a	  ‘new	  green	  deal,’	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  similar	  results.	  256	  Huttunen,	  Skytén	  and	  Hilden	  (2015)	  identify	  a	  clearly	  discernible	  trend	  of	  increasing	  attention	  being	  paid	  in	  recent	  academic	  literature	  to	  the	  development	  of	  large-­‐scale	  geoengineering	  ‘governing	  regimes’	  and	  also	  to	  ways	  of	  gaining	  popular	  consent	  for	  more	  radical	  geoengineering	  projects	  involving	  Solar	  Radiation	  Management	  (SRM);	  for	  example,	  refer	  to	  Lloyd	  &	  Oppenheimer	  (2014);	  Research	  Highlights	  (2014);	  Bipartisan	  Policy	  Center	  Task	  Force	  on	  Climate	  Remediation	  Research	  (n.d.);	  the	  US	  National	  Academies	  Press	  2015	  report,	  Climate	  Intervention:	  Reflecting	  Sunlight	  to	  Cool	  Earth;	  and	  Wright,	  Teagle	  &	  Feetham	  (2014).	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  way	  language	  referring	  to	  geoengineering	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  (presumably	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  defuse	  the	  negative	  connotations	  of	  the	  term),	  with	  ‘geoengineering’	  being	  replaced	  by	  ‘climate	  engineering,’	  then	  ‘climate	  manipulation,’	  and	  finally	  ‘climate	  remediation.’	  Many	  scientists	  argue	  that	  large-­‐scale	  geoengineering	  projects	  such	  as	  SRM	  are	  dangerous	  because	  they	  lock	  humanity	  into	  long-­‐term	  pathways	  of	  attempting	  to	  manipulate	  the	  planet’s	  complex,	  dynamic,	  and	  imperfectly-­‐understood	  climate	  system	  while	  the	  regional	  short-­‐term	  and	  global	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  these	  attempts	  are	  potentially	  extremely	  disruptive	  but,	  even	  more	  worryingly,	  largely	  unknown	  (Barrett,	  Timothy,	  Millner	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Cairns	  2014;	  Keller,	  Fend	  &	  Oschlies	  2014).	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the	  reasonable,”	  and	  it	  is	  thus	  that	  trasformismo	  is	  attempted.	  The	  task	  of	  the	  TCC	  
and	  its	  allies	  is	  therefore	  to	  achieve	  consensus	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  only	  ‘green	  
capitalism’	  and	  its	  ‘green	  innovation’	  and	  ‘green	  technology’	  can	  ‘save’	  the	  planet,	  
and	  there	  are	  factions	  within	  capital	  that	  clearly	  recognise	  this	  and	  are	  working	  
towards	  this	  end	  (Goodman	  &	  Salleh	  2013).257	  The	  UNFCCC’s	  annual	  COPs	  constitute	  
an	  important	  forum	  in	  which	  the	  project	  to	  promote	  ‘green	  capitalism’	  is	  advanced,	  
and	  ecosocialist	  contributions	  to	  discussions	  amongst	  climate	  justice	  activists	  who	  
were	  planning	  actions	  for	  the	  2015	  COP-­‐21	  in	  Paris,	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  third	  
case	  study,	  demonstrate	  a	  profound	  awareness	  of	  this	  issue.	  
Case	  Study	  3:	  Ecosocialist	  tactics	  –	  Shutting	  down	  COP-­‐21	  
In	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  COP-­‐21	  in	  Paris	  in	  2015,	  ecosocialists	  participated	  in	  several	  
discussions	  about	  possible	  actions	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  by	  climate	  justice	  activists	  
given	  the	  likely	  official	  outcomes	  of	  the	  meeting	  and	  the	  prevailing	  balance	  of	  
forces.258	  Anticipating	  that	  any	  agreement	  emanating	  from	  COP-­‐21	  would,	  like	  
previous	  official	  outcomes,	  promote	  the	  implementation	  of	  ‘false	  solutions’	  such	  as	  
the	  extension	  of	  carbon	  markets	  and	  the	  further	  commodification	  of	  nature	  (Carbon	  
Trade	  Watch	  2015;	  Temper	  &	  Gilbertson	  2015),	  radical	  climate	  justice	  activists	  
debated	  how	  best	  to	  approach	  these	  climate	  talks	  in	  a	  way	  that	  avoided	  both	  
legitimising	  the	  official	  negotiations	  and	  making	  useless	  appeals	  to	  authorities	  to	  
adopt	  more	  effective	  and	  socially	  just	  policies.	  As	  the	  editors	  of	  the	  Carbon	  Trade	  
Watch	  publication	  discussing	  the	  forthcoming	  COP-­‐21	  put	  it:	  
So what can we do? We can start by recognizing that the climate 
negotiations are making things worse. We need to think beyond the 
UNFCCC and to stand in active solidarity with those who are at the 
frontlines of fighting the climate and environmental criminals while 
defending their territories. 
(Carbon Trade Watch 2015, p. 5) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  257	  For	  example,	  refer	  to	  Faccer,	  Nahman	  &	  Audouin	  (2014)	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  summary	  of	  three	  contending	  discourses	  (which	  they	  label	  as	  ‘incrementalist’,	  ‘reformist’	  and	  ‘transformative’)	  on	  how	  capitalism	  could	  respond	  to	  global	  warming.	  258	  Debates	  and	  decisions	  about	  appropriate	  climate	  justice	  movement	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  for	  COP-­‐21	  were	  published	  on	  a	  dedicated	  SCNCC	  website	  (SCNCC	  2015b)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  various	  activist	  documents	  (for	  example,	  Carbon	  Trade	  Watch	  2015;	  Foran	  2015;	  SCNCC	  2015a,	  2015c;	  Temper	  &	  Gilbertson	  2015).	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Coalition	  Climat21,	  the	  coalition	  of	  approximately	  130	  activist	  organisations	  
established	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  activities	  in	  France	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  COP-­‐21,	  held	  a	  
strategy	  meeting	  in	  Tunis	  on	  23	  and	  24	  March	  2015	  (Bond	  2015,	  p.	  22).	  Ecosocialist	  
Patrick	  Bond	  (pp.	  23	  –	  27)	  critiqued	  the	  prevailing	  approaches	  that	  sacrificed	  political	  
analysis	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  seek	  unity	  at	  this	  strategising	  meeting,	  and	  argued	  that	  a	  
more	  appropriate	  strategy	  would	  be	  that	  proposed	  by	  Pat	  Mooney	  to	  ‘shut	  down’	  
the	  official	  COP,	  which	  many	  radical	  climate	  justice	  activists	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  ‘Conference	  
of	  Polluters,’	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  ‘no	  deal	  is	  better	  than	  a	  bad	  deal.’	  In	  a	  series	  of	  
email	  exchanges	  that	  occurred	  between	  March	  and	  June	  2015	  and	  that	  was	  
compiled	  and	  distributed	  by	  SCNCC	  member	  John	  Foran	  (2015),	  ecosocialists	  
continued	  to	  discuss	  the	  option	  of	  shutting	  down	  the	  official	  climate	  talks.	  Most	  of	  
the	  participants	  in	  these	  discussions	  supported	  this	  action,	  but	  some	  raised	  concerns	  
about	  the	  ability	  to	  succeed	  given	  that	  the	  French	  state	  would	  be	  out	  in	  force	  to	  pre-­‐
empt	  such	  actions	  and	  also	  because	  it	  was	  unlikely	  that	  a	  broad	  enough	  consensus	  
within	  the	  climate	  movement	  would	  agree	  to	  this	  strategy.	  Another	  concern	  raised	  
was	  that	  if	  it	  acted	  on	  such	  an	  aim,	  a	  failure	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  official	  talks	  would	  
have	  a	  demoralising	  effect	  on	  the	  broader	  climate	  justice	  movement.	  
While	  Climate	  Coalition21	  ultimately	  decided	  not	  to	  attempt	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  
official	  talks,	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  mass	  actions	  were	  planned	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  building	  a	  
stronger	  climate	  movement	  that	  would	  ‘move	  through’	  Paris2015.	  Referring	  to	  
‘Paris2015’	  was	  symbolically	  important	  because,	  in	  rejecting	  the	  label	  ‘COP-­‐21,’	  
activists	  emphasised	  that	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  had	  convened	  in	  Paris	  not	  to	  
lend	  any	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  official	  negotiations	  but	  to	  build	  their	  independent	  climate	  
movement	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  local	  struggles	  for	  climate	  justice	  after	  the	  
anticipated	  failure	  of	  COP-­‐21	  (Temper	  &	  Gilberston	  2015).	  The	  major	  planned	  mass	  
actions	  for	  Paris2015	  adopted	  the	  theme	  that	  “red	  lines	  are	  not	  for	  crossing”	  and	  
Coalition	  Climat21	  decided	  that	  the	  main	  mass	  action,	  the	  ‘December	  12’	  (‘D12’)	  red	  
line	  protest,	  would	  occur	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  talks	  (SCNCC	  2015c).	  By	  holding	  the	  main	  
action	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  talks,	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  would	  have	  “the	  last	  
word”:	  instead	  of	  making	  more	  futile	  calls	  for	  climate	  justice	  that	  official	  negotiators	  
would	  ignore	  (thus	  demoralising	  activists),	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  would	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instead	  denounce	  the	  ineffective	  and	  damaging	  decisions	  of	  the	  official	  COP-­‐21	  
delegates	  after	  they	  reached	  the	  agreement	  that	  was	  predicted	  to	  ‘burn	  the	  planet’	  
and,	  as	  climate	  justice	  activist	  Pablo	  Salon	  cautioned,	  was	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  ‘setting	  a	  
course	  for	  geoengineering’	  (Foran	  2015;	  SCNCC	  2015c).	  
The	  activist	  plan	  was	  to	  introduce	  five	  ‘red	  lines’	  that	  should	  not	  be	  crossed	  (because	  
they	  represent	  ‘minimal	  necessities	  for	  a	  liveable	  planet’)	  in	  mass	  marches	  on	  the	  
eve	  of	  the	  COP-­‐21	  opening,	  and	  to	  have	  the	  final	  word	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  official	  
negotiations:	  
…when the deal inevitably crosses these red lines, people encircle 
the summit and in a show of collective power and shaming, refuse 
to let the delegates return home to carry out the criminal agreement 
in their communities.259 
(SCNCC 2015c) 
In	  addition	  to	  these	  major	  mass	  protest	  actions	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  end	  of	  the	  
official	  talks,	  Coalition	  Climat21	  also	  planned	  to	  facilitate	  and	  host	  a	  series	  of	  other	  
events	  around	  the	  city	  of	  Paris,	  including	  the	  decentralised	  Climate	  Games	  involving	  
acts	  of	  nonviolent	  civil	  disobedience	  by	  small,	  self-­‐organised	  groups	  participating	  in	  
acts	  of	  ‘creative	  resistance’	  (see	  McDonald	  2015);	  daily	  presentations	  by	  social	  
movement	  activists	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  civil	  society	  groups	  at	  the	  alternative	  Climate	  
Action	  Zone	  during	  the	  second	  week	  of	  the	  official	  negotiations;	  and	  many	  stalls,	  
events	  and	  discussions	  at	  a	  two-­‐day	  alternative	  climate	  summit,	  Alternatiba,	  held	  on	  
5	  and	  6	  December	  in	  Montreuil,	  a	  working	  class	  Parisian	  suburb	  (SCNCC	  2015a).	  
When	  the	  French	  government	  declared	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  
13	  November	  2015	  Paris	  terror	  attacks	  and	  banned	  all	  planned	  climate	  movement	  
mass	  mobilisations,	  Coalition	  Climat21	  organised	  alternative	  actions	  (such	  as	  the	  
‘human	  chain’	  of	  29	  November	  2015	  along	  the	  march’s	  original	  planned	  trajectory).	  
Moreover,	  displaying	  a	  dedication	  that	  suggests	  that	  calls	  to	  try	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  
official	  talks	  may	  not	  have	  been	  as	  unpopular	  as	  Coalition	  Climat21	  organisers	  
feared,	  many	  activists	  defied	  the	  government	  ban	  on	  mass	  protests	  so	  that	  the	  D12	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  Suggestions	  for	  relevant	  red	  lines	  not	  to	  be	  crossed	  in	  the	  discussion	  paper	  circulated	  by	  SCNCC	  (2015c)	  included	  GHG	  emission	  reduction	  targets;	  equity;	  finance;	  justice;	  and	  compliance.	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actions	  went	  ahead	  (as	  did	  many	  of	  the	  other	  nonviolent	  civil	  disobedience	  actions)	  
even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  increased	  police	  repression	  (de	  Moor	  2015).	  This	  spontaneous	  
show	  of	  defiance	  by	  climate	  movement	  activists,	  coupled	  with	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  
rapidly	  unfolding	  planetary-­‐scale	  ecological	  catastrophe	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  just	  a	  
part	  of,	  suggests	  that	  future	  ecosocialist	  arguments	  for	  less	  accommodative	  tactics	  
may	  garner	  more	  widespread	  support	  within	  the	  climate	  movement.	  My	  evaluation	  
of	  ecosocialist	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses,	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  and	  final	  
chapter,	  is	  therefore	  both	  partial	  (based	  on	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  issues	  I	  have	  been	  
able	  to	  research)	  and	  necessarily	  transient	  (based	  on	  a	  fast-­‐changing	  ‘present’	  while	  
we	  live	  in	  an	  age	  defined	  by	  an	  organic	  crisis	  where	  the	  balance	  of	  forces	  can	  shift	  
very	  rapidly	  and	  dramatically	  as	  events	  unfold).	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Chapter	  Nine:	  General	  Discussion	  and	  Conclusion	  
“Ecosocialism or barbarism: There is no third way” 
(Subtitle of Climate & Capitalism website) 
Material	  capabilities:	  Biosphere	  vs	  Capital	  and	  Capital	  vs	  the	  
Climate	  Justice	  Movement	  
In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  deploy	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  critical	  GPE	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  
perspective,	  which	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II,	  to	  analyse	  the	  origins	  and	  ongoing	  
causes	  of	  the	  interrelated	  ecological,	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  crises	  humanity	  
now	  finds	  itself	  dealing	  with.	  My	  analysis	  demonstrates	  the	  power	  of	  this	  heuristic	  
device	  to	  appropriately	  analyse	  the	  complex	  challenges	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  using	  a	  
critical	  Marxist	  perspective,	  and	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  human	  species	  is	  at	  a	  very	  
dangerous	  point	  in	  its	  history.	  This	  conclusion	  becomes	  evident	  because,	  instead	  of	  
treating	  the	  biosphere	  as	  a	  sub-­‐system	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  (as	  many	  
analysts	  and	  official	  policymakers	  do),	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  enables	  me	  to	  take	  the	  
findings	  of	  my	  academic	  colleagues,	  the	  natural	  scientists,	  seriously	  and	  reverse	  that	  
normative	  assumption:	  in	  the	  analysis	  that	  deploys	  the	  categories	  comprising	  the	  
MHS	  Redux	  II,	  the	  biosphere	  is	  the	  larger	  context	  within	  which	  the	  global	  political	  
economy	  is	  embedded.	  Moreover,	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  provides	  tools	  that	  facilitate	  an	  
analysis	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  Earth’s	  life	  forms	  (including	  
humans)	  and	  natural	  systems	  are	  in	  a	  dialectical	  relationship	  whereby	  they	  
constitute	  and	  co-­‐shape	  the	  integrated	  Earth	  System	  that	  they	  are	  all	  a	  part	  of.	  In	  
analyses	  conducted	  using	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II,	  the	  biosphere	  is	  therefore	  also	  given	  
‘agency’	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  a	  force	  that	  reacts	  in	  accordance	  with	  physical	  laws	  that	  are	  
not	  subject	  to	  the	  complete	  control	  of	  humans.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  the	  point	  that	  while	  capitalist	  production,	  trade	  and	  
consumption	  patterns	  damage	  and	  disrupt	  the	  Earth’s	  ecosystems	  at	  a	  planetary	  
level	  and	  have	  had	  the	  cumulative	  result	  of	  propelling	  the	  Earth	  into	  a	  new	  
geological	  epoch,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  humans	  can	  develop	  and	  
deploy	  technologies	  powerful	  and	  sensitive	  enough	  to	  dominate	  and	  control	  natural	  
processes	  at	  the	  Earth	  System	  level	  in	  a	  predetermined	  way	  that	  suits	  capitalist	  (and,	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more	  importantly,	  human)	  aims.	  As	  Clive	  Hamilton	  explains,	  “…in	  the	  transition	  from	  
the	  Holocene	  to	  the	  Anthropocene	  new	  forces	  have	  been	  unleashed	  that	  we	  can	  
only	  ever	  understand	  imperfectly,	  and	  regulate	  even	  less”	  (Hamilton	  2017,	  p.	  70).	  
Despite	  the	  temporary	  ‘wins’	  of	  vested	  interests	  in	  the	  official	  climate	  change	  
negotiations	  that	  prevent	  the	  adoption	  of	  policies	  and	  regulations	  that	  would	  be	  
effective	  in	  eradicating	  GHG	  emissions,	  therefore,	  I	  conclude	  that	  in	  this	  particular	  
battle	  between	  capital	  and	  the	  biosphere,	  capital	  cannot	  ‘win’	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  
While	  humanity	  is	  locked	  into	  inaction	  because	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  capital	  to	  escape	  
the	  contradictions	  that	  are	  inherent	  to	  its	  existence,	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  capital	  
contradicting	  the	  logic	  of	  physical	  laws,	  the	  biosphere	  responds	  in	  accordance	  with	  
the	  laws	  of	  physics	  (as	  all	  physical	  systems	  must).	  For	  example,	  the	  biosphere	  
responds	  to	  the	  energy	  imbalances	  caused	  by	  GHG	  emissions	  with	  what	  are	  still	  
perhaps	  erroneously	  perceived	  as	  ‘extreme’	  weather	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  increasingly	  
severe	  droughts	  and	  floods	  that	  are	  occurring	  more	  frequently	  and	  threatening	  the	  
lives	  and	  livelihoods	  of	  many	  people.	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  official	  government	  representatives	  and	  policymakers	  have,	  
under	  pressure	  from	  business	  interests,	  proved	  incapable	  of	  effectively	  addressing	  
the	  global	  warming	  crisis,	  civil	  society	  actors	  have	  been	  building	  a	  climate	  movement	  
to	  try	  to	  generate	  enough	  pressure	  to	  force	  the	  officials	  charged	  with	  protecting	  
them	  to	  address	  it.	  However,	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  very	  weak,	  and	  the	  climate	  
justice	  wing	  of	  the	  climate	  movement	  is	  even	  weaker.	  Ecosocialists	  constitute	  only	  a	  
very	  small	  minority	  within	  what	  is	  already	  a	  minority	  of	  the	  global	  population	  that	  
actively	  engages	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  (as	  Ian	  Angus	  consistently	  reminds	  
his	  audiences),	  which	  means	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  much	  power	  in	  terms	  either	  of	  
material	  capabilities	  or	  of	  ‘membership.’	  Given	  what	  is	  at	  stake,	  however,	  even	  if	  the	  
balance	  of	  forces	  are	  such	  that	  any	  rational	  analysis	  of	  the	  situation	  indicates	  that	  
the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  will	  lose,	  activists	  understand	  that	  they	  have	  no	  option	  
but	  to	  try	  to	  work	  against	  the	  logic	  of	  capital,	  and	  they	  frequently	  apply	  Gramsci’s	  
motto,	  	  “pessimism	  of	  the	  intellect,	  optimism	  of	  the	  will,”	  to	  the	  attitude	  needed	  
when	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  global	  warming.	  	  As	  Ian	  Angus	  also	  routinely	  reminds	  
his	  audiences	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  presentations,	  “If	  we	  fight,	  we	  may	  lose;	  if	  we	  don’t	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fight,	  we	  will	  lose.”	  The	  determination	  and	  tenacity	  among	  ecosocialists	  are	  
strengths	  they	  share	  with	  many	  other	  climate	  justice	  activists;	  like	  other	  climate	  
justice	  activists,	  however,	  they	  also	  face	  many	  challenges.	  
Ecosocialist	  strengths	  and	  challenges:	  a	  partial	  and	  
transient	  evaluation	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  ecosocialist	  suggestions	  to	  try	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  COP-­‐21	  
negotiations	  were	  not	  adopted	  by	  Coalition	  Climat21	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  
ecosocialist	  contingent’s	  influence	  within	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  broader	  climate	  
justice	  movement	  is	  limited;	  it	  does	  not,	  however,	  necessarily	  demonstrate	  that	  
ecosocialists	  have	  no	  influence	  at	  all	  in	  the	  broader	  climate	  justice	  movement.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  8,	  the	  redlines	  mass	  action	  that	  was	  planned	  for	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
Paris	  2015	  climate	  negotiations	  was	  meant	  to	  send	  a	  strong	  message	  that	  the	  
climate	  justice	  movement	  was	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  official	  outcomes	  of	  COP-­‐21,	  and	  
the	  decision	  to	  take	  this	  action	  was	  perhaps	  at	  least	  partially	  motivated	  by	  
ecosocialist	  inputs	  in	  the	  discussions	  about	  appropriate	  strategies	  and	  tactics.	  
Moreover,	  while	  ecosocialists	  calls	  for	  more	  radical	  actions	  at	  Paris2015	  were	  not	  
adopted,	  this	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  sectarian	  divisions	  and	  ecosocialists	  continued	  to	  
circulate	  information	  about	  the	  actions	  that	  were	  planned,	  with	  some	  ecosocialists	  
also	  attending	  Paris2015	  and	  participating	  in	  these	  actions.	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  
ecosocialists	  adopt	  a	  disciplined	  approach	  that	  prioritises	  solidarity	  and	  tries	  to	  avoid	  
traditional	  ‘left’	  sectarianism	  as	  they	  participate	  in	  the	  struggles	  for	  climate	  justice,	  
even	  if	  their	  preferences	  for	  stronger	  actions	  are	  not	  adopted.	  While	  ecosocialist	  
ideas	  about	  appropriate	  tactics	  for	  building	  a	  counterhegemonic	  climate	  justice	  
movement	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  widely	  adopted,	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  
oppositional	  tactics	  that	  are	  necessary	  if	  they	  are	  to	  achieve	  the	  aim	  of	  furthering	  
the	  project	  of	  building	  a	  post-­‐capitalist	  ecological	  socialist	  society	  is	  well	  developed,	  
as	  evidenced	  in	  my	  case	  study	  discussions	  and	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  12	  that	  follows	  
the	  discussion	  below.	  There	  is,	  however,	  scope	  for	  building	  on	  these	  ecosocialist	  
strengths,	  with	  the	  most	  urgent	  task	  being	  to	  focus	  more	  efforts	  on	  promoting	  and	  
building	  alternatives	  to	  the	  current	  system.	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Social	  facts	  and	  competing	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  
One	  of	  the	  greatest	  strengths	  of	  ecosocialist	  theorists	  and	  activists	  is	  their	  powerful	  
and	  clear	  analysis	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  capital’s	  organic	  crisis,	  including	  the	  global	  
warming	  crisis.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  7	  and	  8,	  third-­‐stage	  ecosocialists	  apply	  
classical	  Marxism’s	  analytical	  tools	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  why	  system	  change	  is	  
necessary,	  and	  many	  of	  these	  ideas	  are	  now	  commonly	  discussed	  among	  activists	  
within	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  have	  
become	  more	  prominent,	  they	  have	  replaced	  the	  previously	  prevailing	  ‘social	  facts’	  
that	  ‘there	  is	  no	  alternative’	  to	  capitalism	  (to	  quote	  one	  of	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  
famous	  sayings).	  
Ecosocialists’	  familiarity	  with	  the	  Marxist	  notion	  of	  the	  dialectic	  has	  also	  enabled	  
them	  to	  develop	  a	  sound	  understanding	  of	  the	  profound	  implications	  of	  the	  
Anthropocene.	  To	  Marxists,	  there	  is	  no	  difficulty	  in	  understanding	  the	  Anthropocene	  
as	  a	  ‘phase	  shift’	  whereby	  quantitative	  changes	  to	  natural	  systems	  and	  cycles	  caused	  
by	  the	  normal	  operations	  of	  capital	  have	  reached	  a	  point	  where	  they	  have	  
cumulatively	  resulted	  in	  a	  qualitative	  change	  in	  the	  Earth	  System.	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  
surprising	  that	  it	  was	  Ian	  Angus’s	  book,	  Facing	  the	  Anthropocene:	  Fossil	  capitalism	  
and	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  Earth	  System	  (2016),	  that	  Clive	  Hamilton	  (2017)	  singled	  out	  to	  
praise	  for	  the	  clarity	  with	  which	  it	  explains	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  new	  geological	  
epoch.	  Ian	  Angus’s	  focus	  on	  the	  Anthropocene	  is	  very	  valuable,	  and	  the	  concept	  and	  
its	  implications	  are	  now	  widely	  discussed	  amongst	  climate	  justice	  movement	  
activists	  and	  are	  also	  gaining	  a	  wider	  audience	  among	  the	  readership	  of	  articles	  on	  
ecosocialist	  websites.	  Despite	  evidence	  that	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  are	  becoming	  more	  
prevalent	  within	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement,	  however,	  it	  would	  be	  false	  to	  
conclude	  that	  they	  have	  made	  inroads	  within	  the	  broader	  society,	  where	  ‘social	  
facts’	  generally	  continue	  to	  prevail	  (although	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  ‘common	  sense’	  
view	  that	  there	  are	  widespread	  problems	  with	  the	  current	  system).	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  ecosocialist	  writings	  have	  some	  influence,	  as	  is	  evidenced	  by	  many	  of	  the	  ideas	  
prevailing	  among	  climate	  movement	  activists	  and	  also	  by	  how	  these	  ideas	  changed	  
the	  course	  of	  my	  own	  research,	  as	  I	  briefly	  discuss	  below.	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An	  anecdote:	  How	  reading	  ecosocialist	  articles	  about	  the	  ecological	  
crisis	  changed	  the	  course	  of	  my	  studies	  
When	  I	  originally	  enrolled	  as	  a	  PhD	  candidate,	  I	  intended	  to	  research	  a	  very	  different	  
topic	  than	  the	  one	  I	  ultimately	  decided	  to	  embark	  on.	  The	  2012	  Occupy	  movement	  
protests	  had	  aroused	  my	  interest	  in	  different	  forms	  of	  democracy,	  and	  I	  intended	  to	  
study	  the	  sort	  of	  consensus	  based	  democratic	  politics	  practised	  within	  the	  Occupy	  
camps.	  My	  research	  on	  the	  Occupy	  movement	  involved	  reading	  articles	  on	  various	  
alternative	  websites	  and,	  after	  some	  time	  of	  reading	  these	  websites,	  I	  started	  
noticing	  more	  and	  more	  articles	  about	  climate	  change.	  Some	  of	  these	  articles	  had	  
quite	  alarming	  titles,	  and	  I	  began	  reading	  them.	  It	  was	  not	  long	  before	  I	  became	  
convinced	  that	  global	  warming	  is	  the	  most	  important	  issue	  of	  our	  times	  (in	  fact,	  I	  
agree	  with	  many	  other	  analysts	  who	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  the	  most	  important	  challenge	  
the	  human	  species	  has	  ever	  had	  to	  address)	  and	  that	  this	  issue	  should	  be	  the	  
primary	  focus	  of	  my	  research.	  After	  consulting	  with	  my	  supervisor,	  I	  changed	  my	  
topic	  to	  research	  ecosocialist	  responses	  to	  the	  anthropogenic	  global	  warming	  crisis,	  
as	  I	  had	  read	  many	  of	  their	  articles	  about	  climate	  change	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  alternative	  
websites	  and	  had	  found	  the	  arguments	  presented	  in	  their	  analyses	  compelling.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  while	  it	  is	  important	  to	  maintain	  specifically	  ecosocialist	  websites	  that	  
climate	  justice	  activists	  can	  regularly	  consult	  to	  stay	  up	  to	  date	  with	  the	  latest	  
climate	  science	  and	  developments	  within	  the	  climate	  movement,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  
ecosocialists	  simultaneously	  continue	  to	  publish	  their	  articles	  on	  other	  websites	  in	  
order	  to	  reach	  a	  wider	  audience	  and	  be	  read	  by	  people	  who	  are	  less	  familiar	  with	  
their	  ideas.	  However,	  a	  more	  widespread	  acceptance	  of	  ecosocialist	  ideas	  that	  
challenge	  prevailing	  social	  facts	  faces	  formidable	  obstacles	  given	  that	  the	  dominant	  
institutions	  (such	  as	  the	  mass	  media	  and	  educational	  institutions)	  discourage	  
system-­‐critical	  thinking.	  In	  their	  discussions	  of	  strategies	  and	  tactics,	  ecosocialists	  try	  
to	  address	  the	  challenges	  of	  how	  to	  move	  from	  where	  we	  are	  right	  now	  (that	  is,	  in	  a	  
capitalist	  world	  order	  where	  neoliberalising	  forces	  are	  hegemonic)	  to	  where	  they	  
believe	  we	  should	  be	  (building	  an	  ecosocialist	  civilization),	  as	  summarised	  in	  Figure	  
12	  and	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	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Revisiting	  ecosocialist	  tactics:	  what	  role	  ‘prefiguration’?	  
As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  8,	  ecosocialists	  regularly	  engage	  in	  debates	  about	  which	  
strategies	  and	  tactics	  would	  best	  suit	  the	  purposes	  of	  realising	  the	  necessary	  
immediate	  reforms	  required	  to	  gain	  time	  given	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  global	  warming	  
crisis	  while	  still	  furthering	  their	  long-­‐term	  goal	  of	  achieving	  the	  system	  change	  they	  
believe	  is	  necessary.	  While	  the	  first	  and	  second	  case	  studies	  I	  analyse	  demonstrate	  
that	  ecosocialists	  have	  a	  sophisticated	  understanding	  of	  the	  sorts	  of	  oppositional	  
tactics	  that	  are	  appropriate	  for	  furthering	  their	  long-­‐term	  goals,	  the	  third	  case	  study	  
illustrates	  that	  these	  tactics	  do	  not	  necessarily	  garner	  support	  within	  the	  wider	  
climate	  justice	  movement.	  Ecosocialist	  suggestions	  to	  ‘shut	  down’	  the	  official	  COP-­‐21	  
climate	  negotiations	  are	  an	  instance	  of	  what	  Naomi	  Klein	  (2014)	  refers	  to	  as	  
‘Blockadia’	  –	  a	  nonviolent	  civil	  disobedience	  act	  that	  blocks	  actions	  that	  damage	  the	  
planet.	  Like	  earlier	  SMOs,	  such	  as	  the	  US	  ‘Movement	  for	  a	  New	  Society’	  that	  was	  
active	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  adopted	  the	  strategy	  ‘oppose	  and	  propose’	  (Cornell	  2011),	  in	  
addition	  to	  the	  more	  system-­‐critical	  ‘Blockadia’	  actions	  it	  planned,	  Coalition	  Climat21	  
also	  organised	  the	  establishment	  of	  Alternatiba,	  a	  ‘village	  of	  alternatives’	  where	  the	  
climate	  movement	  held	  its	  own	  climate	  summit.	  Ecosocialists	  seem	  to	  find	  the	  idea	  
of	  prefigurative	  projects	  such	  as	  Alternatiba	  problematic,	  however,	  and	  it	  is	  perhaps	  
a	  potentially	  important	  tactic	  that	  deserves	  more	  discussion	  and	  debate.	  Figure	  12	  
provides	  a	  schematic	  summary	  of	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  ecosocialists	  could	  adopt.	  It	  
depicts	  a	  range	  of	  tactical	  decisions	  from	  those	  that	  challenge	  the	  current	  
hegemonic	  bloc	  (refer	  to	  the	  left	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  figure)	  to	  examples	  of	  tactics	  that	  
could	  promote	  the	  building	  of	  new	  institutions	  within	  the	  current	  disintegrating	  
world	  order	  (refer	  to	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  figure).	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While	  the	  role	  that	  prefigurative	  projects	  could	  play	  in	  ecosocialist	  politics	  was	  raised	  
in	  Solidarity’s	  discussion	  about	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  in	  Chapter	  8	  (refer	  to	  Table	  1,	  
Question	  6),	  as	  noted	  above	  it	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  that	  generates	  much	  discussion	  
amongst	  ecosocialists.	  Most	  ecosocialists	  affirm	  the	  need	  for	  visions	  of	  an	  alternative	  
to	  capitalism	  (an	  issue	  that	  is	  understood	  in	  both	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  terms);	  
however,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  ecosocialists	  should	  participate	  in	  prefigurative	  actions	  
and	  projects	  that	  try	  to	  build	  alternatives	  in	  the	  present	  is	  contested.	  Most	  
ecosocialist	  understandings	  seem	  to	  narrowly	  limit	  the	  idea	  of	  prefiguration	  to	  
individualistic,	  personal	  ‘lifestyle’	  changes	  such	  as	  riding	  bicycles,	  adopting	  
vegetarian	  or	  vegan	  eating	  habits,	  and	  changing	  light	  bulbs.	  On	  the	  occasions	  that	  I	  
asked	  ecosocialists	  I	  interviewed	  about	  their	  views	  of	  the	  role	  prefiguration	  could	  
play	  in	  effecting	  system	  change,	  their	  response	  was	  always	  that	  while	  they	  have	  
nothing	  against	  such	  personal	  lifestyle	  changes,	  people	  adopting	  these	  practices	  
should	  recognise	  that	  these	  individual	  practices	  will	  not,	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  
achieve	  the	  social	  transformation	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  a	  habitable	  planet	  –	  a	  
position	  I	  agree	  with	  wholeheartedly.	  Limiting	  the	  definition	  of	  prefiguration	  to	  
encompass	  only	  changes	  in	  individual	  behaviour	  is	  questionable,	  however,	  because	  
there	  are	  other	  examples	  of	  collective	  prefigurative	  projects	  that	  could	  be	  both	  
educational	  and	  help	  to	  create	  nascent	  communities	  for	  future	  collective	  action.	  
Figure	  12:	  Summary	  of	  Strategies	  and	  Tactics	  available	  to	  Ecosocialists	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While	  not	  without	  their	  problems	  and	  challenges,	  examples	  of	  collective	  
prefigurative	  projects	  that	  ecosocialists	  could	  consider	  include	  the	  Transition	  Town	  
movement	  and	  the	  European	  ‘Alternatiba’	  projects	  and	  events	  organised	  by	  various	  
climate	  movement	  actors;	  these	  projects	  are	  briefly	  described	  below.	  
The	  Transition	  Town	  movement	  
Originally	  pursued	  because	  its	  founders	  were	  concerned	  that	  peak	  oil,	  climate	  
change	  and	  economic	  instability	  would	  create	  conditions	  forcing	  people	  to	  change	  
how	  they	  live,	  the	  Transition	  Town	  movement	  aims	  to	  create	  ‘resilient	  communities’	  
by	  encouraging	  the	  people	  living	  in	  their	  towns	  and	  cities	  to	  transition	  “to	  more	  
sustainable	  lifestyles	  around	  localisation,	  co-­‐operation,	  organic	  food	  production	  and	  
energy	  descent	  into	  renewable	  and	  reduced	  energy	  systems”	  (Weston	  2014,	  pp.	  	  185	  
–	  186).	  While	  the	  Transition	  Town	  movement	  is	  not	  without	  its	  problems	  (with	  the	  
notion	  of	  ‘resilience’	  being	  a	  contested	  term	  which	  is	  largely	  used	  to	  justify	  
adaptation	  practices	  rather	  than	  pursuing	  the	  large-­‐scale	  systemic	  changes	  
necessary	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change	  and	  environmental	  destruction),	  it	  
nevertheless	  presents	  a	  model	  that	  could	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  alternative	  collective	  
prefigurative	  projects.260	  For	  example,	  ecosocialist	  political	  theorist	  Del	  Weston	  
(2014,	  p.	  183)	  argues	  that:	  
Without a clear way forward, I believe that we must validate and 
support all attempts to break from the capitalist social relations of 
production and the imperatives of capitalism and work towards 
solidarity amongst alternatives. By doing so, by embracing and 
supporting the Transition Towns, the Abalimi Bezekhavas, the 
Campesino movements, we are building a solidarity across 
alternatives to capitalism, showing examples of how it is possible 
for people to become empowered and positively involved in making 
their own history, that it is possible to form new values in which we 
are comfortable and at home…. We must at every opportunity show 
that capitalism is not the only viable political and economic system, 
that there are coherent and current alternatives to it.261 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  260	  Naomi	  Klein	  suggests	  substituting	  the	  term	  ‘regenerative’	  for	  ‘resilient’	  to	  avoid	  the	  latter’s	  associations	  with	  passive	  processes	  that	  imply	  “the	  ability	  to	  absorb	  blows	  and	  get	  back	  up”	  (Klein	  2014,	  p.	  447).	  261	  Del	  Weston’s	  reputation	  amongst	  ecosocialists	  is	  evident	  in	  that	  her	  book,	  The	  
political	  economy	  of	  global	  warming:	  The	  terminal	  crisis,	  is	  listed	  by	  Ian	  Angus	  (2017)	  as	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The	  Transition	  Town	  movement	  has	  the	  decided	  advantage	  that	  it	  works	  within	  local	  
communities	  that	  remain	  integrated	  within	  the	  broader	  society,	  unlike	  other	  groups	  
such	  as	  the	  The	  Bruderhof,	  the	  religious	  prefigurative	  intentional	  community	  that	  
Joel	  Kovel	  (2007)	  discusses	  as	  a	  model	  that	  ecosocialists	  can	  draw	  lessons	  from.	  
Members	  of	  this	  collective	  problematically	  seem	  to	  live	  in	  isolated	  communities	  that	  
are	  largely	  divorced	  from	  the	  wider	  society,	  and	  I	  would	  agree	  with	  ecosocialist	  
views	  that	  are	  sceptical	  of	  the	  utility	  of	  such	  projects	  that	  entail	  withdrawing	  from	  
mainstream	  society.262	  This	  is	  because,	  while	  isolated	  communities	  may	  find	  it	  easier	  
to	  adopt	  sustainable	  living	  practices,	  they	  are	  unlikely	  to	  attract	  ‘ordinary	  people’	  to	  
participate	  in	  collective	  actions	  that	  promote	  solidarity	  and	  develop	  new	  ways	  of	  
thinking	  and	  doing	  things.	  It	  seems	  logical	  that	  only	  prefigurative	  projects	  that	  are	  
located	  within,	  and	  welcome	  the	  participation	  of,	  the	  wider	  community	  would	  have	  
any	  chance	  of	  furthering	  the	  aim	  of	  building	  a	  new	  society.	  There	  are	  many	  reasons	  
why	  I	  think	  that	  properly	  developed	  collective	  prefigurative	  projects	  are	  not	  only	  
valuable	  but	  necessary	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  their	  indispensible	  
regenerative	  function	  at	  a	  time	  when	  climate	  movement	  actors	  are	  experiencing	  
much	  stress.	  The	  value	  of	  participating	  in	  activities	  with	  others	  in	  a	  prefigurative	  
‘alternative	  village’	  became	  evident	  to	  me	  when	  I	  attended	  the	  Paris2015	  events,	  
and	  I	  recount	  those	  experiences	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  what	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  talk	  about	  
the	  regenerative	  function	  of	  such	  projects.	  
Alternatiba	  
Alternatiba	  was	  a	  temporary	  Paris2015	  project	  that	  showcased	  many	  ideas	  of	  
socially	  just	  solutions	  to	  climate	  change	  while	  simultaneously	  providing	  an	  important	  
space	  within	  which	  climate	  movement	  activists	  could	  experience	  a	  sociality	  and	  
conviviality	  that	  was	  completely	  absent	  from	  the	  ‘Climate	  Generations	  Areas’	  set	  
aside	  for	  ‘civil	  society’	  at	  the	  official	  COP-­‐21	  talks.	  Attending	  this	  two-­‐day	  event,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  one	  of	  the	  ‘Essential	  Books	  on	  Marxism	  and	  Ecology’	  on	  the	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism	  website.	  	  262	  Kovel	  (2007,	  p.	  211)	  emphasises	  that	  the	  Bruderhof	  model	  does	  not	  fully	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  an	  ecosocialist	  prefigurative	  community	  “…because	  an	  ecosocialist	  society	  must	  be	  fully	  democratic,	  and	  not	  the	  province	  of	  any	  religious	  interpretation;	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  because	  the	  Bruderhof	  are	  not	  actually	  ecocentric	  in	  their	  orientation.”	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which	  provided	  an	  enjoyable	  (albeit	  temporary)	  prefigurative	  experience	  at	  a	  time	  
that	  was	  exceedingly	  stressful	  given	  the	  tensions	  generated	  by	  the	  French	  state’s	  
decision	  to	  declare	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  ban	  planned	  climate	  movement	  
actions,	  was	  both	  motivating	  and	  restored	  my	  beliefs	  that	  people	  are	  caring	  and	  that	  
they	  can,	  indeed,	  achieve	  great	  things	  when	  they	  co-­‐operate.	  I	  had	  found	  the	  
previous	  days’	  experiences	  at	  Paris2015	  very	  stressful:	  on	  my	  first	  day	  in	  Paris,	  for	  
instance,	  I	  accidentally	  got	  myself	  teargassed.	  I	  was	  halfway	  up	  the	  stairs	  leading	  
from	  the	  metro	  to	  the	  Place	  de	  la	  Republique	  to	  join	  other	  Paris2015	  climate	  
movement	  participants	  when	  the	  metro	  tunnel	  filled	  with	  teargas.	  The	  situation	  was	  
chaotic,	  with	  people	  running	  down	  the	  stairs	  to	  escape	  police	  who	  were	  chasing	  
them	  colliding	  with	  commuters	  who	  had	  just	  disembarked	  from	  the	  train,	  and	  with	  
everyone	  coughing	  and	  rubbing	  their	  streaming	  eyes,	  which	  were	  burning	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  teargas	  that	  had	  filled	  the	  metro	  tunnel.	  
While	  my	  visits	  to	  the	  ‘Climate	  Generations	  Areas’	  in	  Le	  Bourget,	  where	  the	  official	  
COP-­‐21	  negotiations	  were	  taking	  place,	  were	  not	  as	  dramatic,	  they	  were	  not	  
pleasant	  experiences.	  Members	  of	  ‘civil	  society’	  disembarking	  from	  the	  trains	  had	  to	  
catch	  special	  buses	  to	  get	  to	  the	  venue	  and,	  once	  there,	  were	  treated	  suspiciously	  
and	  subjected	  to	  security	  check	  as	  thorough	  as	  those	  conducted	  at	  airports.	  Inside	  
the	  sterile	  ‘Climate	  Generations	  Areas’	  there	  were	  few	  food	  and	  beverage	  stalls,	  and	  
people	  had	  to	  wait	  in	  long	  queues	  to	  buy	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  what	  was	  advertised	  as	  
being	  on	  sale	  (with	  many	  products,	  including	  coffee,	  being	  sold	  out	  early	  in	  the	  day).	  
In	  contrast,	  a	  friend	  of	  mine	  who	  had	  registered	  to	  attend	  the	  official	  talks	  as	  a	  
representative	  of	  an	  NGO	  said	  that	  there	  was	  no	  shortage	  of	  free	  and	  excellent	  food	  
in	  the	  areas	  where	  the	  negotiations	  were	  taking	  place	  (and	  where	  the	  members	  of	  
‘civil	  society’	  were	  not	  allowed	  entry).	  This	  seemed	  to	  me	  a	  microcosm	  of	  the	  
inequality	  and	  injustice	  that	  characterises	  all	  of	  life	  in	  a	  world	  dominated	  by	  global	  
capital,	  and	  perhaps	  it	  was	  the	  contrasts	  between	  the	  official	  ‘Climate	  Generations	  
Areas’	  and	  the	  Alternatiba	  experience	  that	  made	  such	  a	  deep	  impression	  on	  me	  
when	  I	  arrived	  at	  the	  ‘village	  of	  alternatives’	  in	  Montreuil,	  a	  working	  class	  suburb	  of	  
Paris.	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Guardedly	  emerging	  from	  the	  Montreuil	  metro,	  my	  heart	  sank	  when	  someone	  
wearing	  an	  official-­‐looking	  fluorescent	  vest	  approached	  me.	  To	  my	  relief	  and	  delight,	  
the	  person	  who	  approached	  me	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  volunteer	  working	  with	  Coalition	  
Climat21	  who,	  rather	  than	  teargassing	  me,	  smiled	  broadly	  and	  welcomed	  me,	  
handing	  me	  a	  map	  and	  pointing	  out	  the	  location	  of	  various	  stalls	  and	  facilities.	  There	  
were	  no	  security	  checks	  and	  no	  police	  in	  sight;	  instead,	  there	  was	  a	  relaxed,	  festive	  
atmosphere	  with	  many	  stalls	  selling	  locally	  produced	  foods	  and	  beverages.	  The	  food	  
was	  not	  only	  abundant,	  it	  was	  also	  very	  fresh	  and	  healthy	  and	  reasonably	  priced.	  As	  
well	  as	  people	  who	  were	  clearly	  climate	  activists,	  there	  were	  also	  many	  families	  with	  
babies	  and	  young	  children	  and	  a	  seemingly	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  people	  from	  all	  walks	  
of	  life.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  festivities	  and	  stalls,	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  events	  one	  
could	  attend,	  such	  as	  a	  presentation	  by	  the	  TUE	  and	  another	  by	  the	  UK	  group	  
advocating	  ‘One	  Million	  Climate	  Jobs.’	  Alternatiba’s	  value	  lay	  in	  how	  it	  incorporated	  
interesting	  learning	  experiences	  while	  simultaneously	  promoting	  a	  general	  
atmosphere	  of	  convivial	  solidarity	  and	  also	  demonstrating	  what	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  
people	  working	  collectively	  and	  cooperatively	  despite	  their	  limited	  material	  
resources.	  Another	  important	  feature	  of	  Alternatiba	  during	  Paris2015	  was	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  it	  was	  embedded	  in	  the	  local	  community	  of	  Montreuil,	  attracting	  local	  
residents	  and	  inviting	  them	  to	  join	  in	  the	  organised	  activities.	  
My	  experiences	  at	  the	  Paris2015	  Alternatiba	  event	  reinforced	  my	  interest	  in	  the	  
value	  of	  prefigurative	  projects	  to	  supplement	  (not	  replace)	  direct	  actions	  aimed	  at	  
challenging	  existing	  power	  structures.	  Ecosocialists	  participating	  in	  suitable	  
community	  projects	  could	  engage	  in	  discussions	  that	  build	  on	  participants’	  ‘common	  
sense’	  while	  simultaneously	  building	  solidarity	  and	  prefiguring	  the	  kind	  of	  social	  
relations	  they	  want	  to	  build.	  Such	  projects	  may	  also	  provide	  the	  resources	  that	  
people	  will	  need	  	  (particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  practices	  of	  solidarity)	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  
global	  warming	  continue	  to	  unfold	  in	  ‘extreme	  weather’-­‐related	  disasters	  that	  will	  
force	  people	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  own	  resources	  because	  governments	  will	  be	  unlikely	  to	  
respond	  to	  them	  effectively	  –	  particularly	  when	  these	  disasters	  affect	  the	  most	  
disadvantaged	  people	  who	  are	  perceived	  as	  ‘disposable’	  and	  have	  no	  political	  
power,	  as	  happened	  in	  the	  aftermaths	  of	  Hurricanes	  Katrina	  and	  Sandy	  in	  the	  US	  and	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as	  is	  happening	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing,	  with	  Hurricane	  Irma	  unleashing	  its	  force	  in	  
the	  US	  and	  the	  Caribbean.263	  	  
‘Extreme	  weather’	  disasters:	  August	  and	  September	  2017	  
As	  I	  complete	  the	  final	  revisions	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  media	  attention	  has	  shifted	  
from	  the	  floods	  in	  Texas	  resulting	  from	  the	  unprecedented	  amount	  of	  precipitation	  
Hurricane	  Harvey	  brought	  to	  the	  region	  (Milman	  2017a)	  to	  the	  ongoing	  catastrophic	  
effects	  of	  Hurricane	  Irma,	  the	  strongest	  hurricane	  recorded	  to	  date	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  
Ocean	  (Staletovich	  2017).	  Barbuda	  PM	  Gaston	  Browne	  said	  that	  Hurricane	  Irma	  has	  
reduced	  the	  entire	  island	  of	  Barbuda	  to	  ‘literally	  rubble’	  and	  rendered	  it	  ‘barely	  
inhabitable’	  (Boyle	  2017)	  as	  it	  proceeds	  in	  its	  path	  over	  other	  Caribbean	  islands	  
towards	  Florida,	  many	  of	  whose	  communities	  are	  under	  mandatory	  evacuation	  
orders	  (Mazzei,	  Hanks	  &	  Smiley	  2017).264	  The	  reporting	  of	  these	  and	  other	  ‘natural	  
disasters’	  is	  very	  uneven	  and	  indicative	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  already	  disadvantaged	  
groups	  also	  have	  to	  suffer	  climate	  injustice:	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  media	  outlets	  
reported	  extensively	  on	  the	  property	  damage	  and	  the	  tens	  of	  people	  who	  lost	  their	  
lives	  in	  the	  floods	  in	  Texas,	  there	  were	  very	  few	  reports	  on	  the	  deaths	  of	  an	  
estimated	  1,200	  people	  in	  Asia	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  unprecedented	  severity	  of	  the	  
flooding	  due	  to	  the	  Monsoon	  combined	  with	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  sea	  level	  rise	  and	  
urbanization	  (Ratcliffe	  2017;	  Siddique	  2017).	  
The	  Asian	  floods	  are	  affecting	  more	  than	  40	  million	  people	  in	  India,	  Bangladesh	  and	  
Nepal	  and	  have	  also	  devastated	  crops	  in	  the	  region,	  resulting	  in	  severe	  food	  
shortages	  (Ratcliffe	  2017;	  Siddique	  2017).265	  I	  refer	  to	  these	  catastrophic	  impacts	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  263	  Governor	  of	  Florida,	  Rick	  Scott,	  has	  warned	  residents	  of	  the	  state	  that	  “At	  some	  point,	  people	  are	  going	  to	  be	  on	  their	  own,	  so	  to	  speak,	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  during	  which	  the	  flooding	  and	  raining	  and	  the	  wind	  bear	  down	  on	  them,	  and	  they	  need	  to	  be	  prepared	  if	  they	  are	  in	  that	  path	  and	  haven’t	  taken	  some	  action	  to	  get	  themselves	  in	  a	  less	  dangerous	  position”	  (Luscombe,	  Pilkington	  &	  Smith	  2017).	  However,	  as	  Pilkington	  (2017)	  notes,	  some	  people	  he	  interviewed	  simply	  do	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  follow	  Governor	  Scott’s	  advice	  and	  “get	  themselves	  in	  a	  less	  dangerous	  position.”	  264	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  Caribbean	  islands	  already	  devastated	  by	  Hurricane	  Irma	  a	  few	  hours	  previously	  were	  about	  to	  be	  pounded	  by	  another	  ‘category	  five’	  hurricane,	  Hurricane	  Jose	  (Farrer	  2017).	  265	  The	  Guardian	  is	  to	  be	  commended	  for	  publishing	  a	  few	  articles	  that	  report	  on	  climate	  injustices,	  such	  as	  that	  by	  Pilkington	  (2017)	  entitled	  A	  tale	  of	  two	  Irmas:	  rich	  Miami	  
ready	  for	  tumult	  as	  poor	  Miami	  waits	  and	  hopes.	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disadvantaged	  and	  marginalized	  groups	  as	  ‘climate	  injustices’	  because	  although	  
scientists	  emphasise	  that	  climate	  change	  did	  not	  cause	  the	  Atlantic	  hurricanes	  or	  the	  
Asian	  floods,	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  the	  warmer	  oceans	  and	  the	  larger	  amounts	  of	  water	  
vapor	  in	  the	  air,	  compounded	  by	  higher	  sea	  levels,	  have	  exacerbated	  the	  intensity	  
and	  effects	  of	  these	  naturally	  occurring	  events	  (Nutticelli	  2017;	  Watts	  2017a,	  2017b,	  
2017c).	  Another	  great	  climate	  injustice	  is	  evident	  in	  how	  many	  of	  the	  Global	  North	  
tourists	  and	  foreign	  nationals	  on	  the	  Caribbean	  islands	  affected	  by	  Hurricane	  Irma	  
have	  been	  evacuated	  (Simpson	  2017)	  while	  the	  poverty-­‐stricken	  local	  inhabitants	  of	  
these	  islands	  do	  not	  have	  the	  option	  of	  escaping	  to	  a	  safer	  place.	  This	  is	  in	  stark	  
contrast	  to	  the	  nearly	  7	  million	  people	  who	  have	  been	  told	  to	  evacuate	  in	  
preparation	  for	  Hurricane	  Irma’s	  landfall	  in	  the	  US,	  with	  various	  evacuation	  shelters	  
and	  other	  support	  systems	  in	  place	  to	  help	  many	  of	  them	  do	  this	  (Slawson	  &	  Phipps	  
2017).	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  while	  relatively	  affluent	  individuals	  in	  the	  US	  
have	  the	  resources	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  can	  escape	  such	  ‘extreme	  weather’	  
catastrophes,	  the	  poor	  do	  not	  have	  such	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  options	  and	  must	  rely	  on	  
the	  state	  for	  support,	  which	  is	  only	  available	  to	  a	  limited	  extent	  (Pilkington	  2017).266	  
These	  dramatic	  illustrations	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  effects	  of	  anthropogenic	  global	  
warming	  compound	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  the	  marginalized	  reinforce	  
ecosocialist	  arguments	  that	  we	  now	  face	  the	  prospect	  of	  barbarism.	  In	  a	  5	  
September	  2017	  article	  republished	  on	  Climate	  &	  Capitalism,	  Hearse	  argues	  that	  
these	  events	  lead	  
…to a clear conclusion for strategy. We have to fight for a realistic 
international strategy to limit climate change, but also we need to 
fight for climate change victims and refugees, and of course to 
prevent millions more becoming victims and refugees. 
(Hearse 2017) 
In	  addition	  to	  the	  human	  suffering	  resulting	  from	  these	  ‘extreme	  weather’	  disasters,	  
the	  past	  few	  weeks	  have	  also	  witnessed	  a	  dangerous	  geopolitical	  crisis	  unfolding	  as	  
US	  reactions	  to	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  weapons	  program	  escalate	  the	  dangers	  of	  a	  
potentially	  catastrophic	  war	  on	  the	  Korean	  peninsula	  (Bisley	  2017;	  Habib	  2017).	  It	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  266	  For	  example,	  a	  man	  en	  route	  to	  Cuba	  on	  a	  cruise	  ship	  who	  got	  stranded	  in	  Miami	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Hurricane	  Irma	  simply	  bought	  a	  car	  to	  get	  himself	  and	  his	  family	  out	  of	  danger	  (Patterson	  2017).	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impossible	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  a	  world	  that	  is	  characterized	  by	  new	  dramatic	  conflicts,	  
disasters	  and	  crises	  as	  they	  unfold	  on	  an	  almost	  daily	  basis,	  much	  less	  to	  try	  to	  
analyse	  the	  reactions	  these	  developments	  may	  provoke	  from	  battered	  populations,	  
and	  this	  constitutes	  one	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  study,	  as	  discussed	  further	  below.	  	  
Contributions	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  study	  
As	  noted	  above,	  one	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  it	  can	  have	  no	  clear	  ‘cut-­‐
off’	  point;	  it	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  an	  enormous	  research	  project	  that	  will	  always,	  by	  its	  
nature,	  be	  incomplete.	  In	  attempting	  to	  study	  current	  events	  as	  they	  unfold,	  and	  to	  
try	  to	  identify	  the	  dynamics	  of	  how	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  Earth	  System	  (human	  
systems	  and	  the	  biosphere)	  influence	  one	  another,	  the	  study	  oversimplifies	  the	  
complexities	  involved	  since	  many	  of	  the	  ideas	  I	  had	  wanted	  to	  incorporate	  had	  to	  be	  
omitted	  because	  of	  time	  and	  space	  limitations.	  Another	  limitation	  of	  the	  study	  is	  its	  
narrow	  focus	  on	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  North	  American	  ecosocialist	  coalition;	  again,	  
time	  and	  space	  limitations	  did	  not	  permit	  me	  to	  investigate	  European	  and	  UK	  
ecosocialist	  groups.	  
Despite	  these	  limitations,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  study	  makes	  three	  contributions	  that	  
may	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  critical	  GPE	  theorists:	  it	  presents	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  neo-­‐
Gramscian	  critical	  perspective,	  the	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  and	  demonstrates	  how	  it	  can	  be	  
used	  to	  analyse	  the	  current	  organic	  crisis	  of	  global	  capitalism	  that	  includes	  its	  
relationship	  to	  the	  biosphere	  it	  is	  embedded	  in;	  it	  also	  locates	  the	  climate	  movement	  
and	  its	  radical	  climate	  justice	  wing	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  not	  only	  other	  
traditional	  GPE	  actors	  such	  as	  states,	  international	  institutions	  and	  business	  
interests,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  challenges	  of	  living	  in	  the	  Anthropocene.	  
These	  contributions	  are	  preliminary	  and	  would	  benefit	  from	  refinement	  and	  
extension.	  	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  more	  detailed,	  albeit	  brief,	  evaluation	  of	  my	  own	  
attempts	  to	  more	  fully	  incorporate	  the	  Earth	  System	  in	  this	  research	  project	  by	  using	  
the	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  analytical	  perspective.	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The	  MHS	  Redux	  II	  and	  Academic	  practice	  in	  the	  
Anthropocene	  
My	  arguments	  that	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  Anthropocene	  suggest	  a	  need	  for	  ecosocialist	  
theorists	  and	  activists	  to	  reconsider	  some	  of	  their	  positions	  and	  practices	  regarding	  
prefigurative	  politics	  extend	  also	  to	  suggestions	  that	  academics	  should	  consider	  
changing	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  conduct	  their	  research.	  As	  I	  note	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  I	  
have	  attended	  several	  academic	  conferences	  in	  the	  course	  of	  conducting	  this	  
research	  project,	  and	  I	  have	  been	  both	  surprised	  and	  shocked	  to	  discover	  that	  very	  
few	  academics	  in	  the	  field	  of	  IR	  and	  GPE	  pay	  any	  attention	  to	  the	  global	  warming	  
crisis,	  or	  seem	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  profound	  significance	  of	  the	  Anthropocene.	  I	  am	  
not	  the	  only	  academic	  to	  notice	  this	  ‘gap’	  in	  IR	  and	  GPE	  scholarship;	  as	  Harrington	  
(2016,	  pp.	  486	  -­‐	  487)	  notes:	  
While over 1000 articles on the Anthropocene have been written 
since the term was first coined in 2000, IR remains remarkably 
silent. The 2015 International Studies Association (ISA) Annual 
Conference, the largest annual event in the discipline, contained 
over 6000 presentations. Only one paper abstract explicitly 
mentioned the Anthropocene. This, despite the fact that, according 
to the latest TRIP survey of IR Scholars, the most important foreign 
policy issue the world faces over the next ten years is global climate 
change. Curiously, though, the same poll revealed that only 2.44% 
of the 3977 scholars surveyed listed the international/global 
environment as their main area of research. 
	  
My	  own	  understanding	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Anthropocene,	  which	  developed	  
over	  time	  as	  my	  research	  project	  progressed	  (and	  particularly	  after	  reading	  Ian	  
Angus’s	  and	  Clive	  Hamilton’s	  books	  on	  the	  topic)	  led	  me	  to	  modify	  the	  neo-­‐
Gramscian	  perspective	  so	  that	  it	  places	  the	  Earth	  System	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  my	  analysis	  
by	  incorporating	  the	  biosphere	  as	  an	  ‘agent’	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  While	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  
MHS	  Redux	  II	  helped	  me	  to	  retain	  a	  focus	  on	  how	  human	  systems	  (such	  as	  the	  global	  
political	  economy)	  and	  natural	  systems	  (the	  biosphere)	  interact	  dynamically,	  this	  
research	  project	  is	  only	  an	  initial	  and	  tentative	  attempt	  to	  develop	  and	  deploy	  a	  GPE	  
perspective	  that	  aspires	  to	  meet	  the	  challenge	  of	  conducting	  academic	  work	  in	  the	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Anthropocene.	  As	  noted	  in	  a	  previous	  quotation,	  which	  I	  repeat	  here	  to	  emphasise	  
its	  significance,	  
The social sciences taught in our universities – including those that 
‘take the environment into account’ – must now be regarded as 
Holocene disciplines. The process of reinventing them – so that 
what is taught in arts faculties is true to what has emerged in science 
faculties – will be a sustained and arduous intellectual enterprise. 
(Hamilton 2017, p. 129) 
The	  current	  research	  project	  constitutes	  an	  initial	  step	  in	  the	  ‘arduous	  intellectual	  
enterprise’	  of	  developing	  Anthropocene	  social	  science	  perspectives	  to	  inform	  
research	  that	  may	  help	  humanity	  to	  meet	  the	  unfolding	  challenges	  with	  as	  much	  
wisdom,	  dignity	  and	  compassion	  as	  possible.	  A	  next	  step	  in	  this	  intellectual	  
enterprise	  which,	  as	  Hamilton	  argues,	  entails	  a	  sustained	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
academics,	  may	  partially	  comprise	  of	  constructive	  critiques	  of	  this	  research	  project,	  
which	  I	  welcome.	  
As	  Robert	  Cox	  famously	  stated,	  “Theory	  is	  always	  for	  some	  one	  and	  for	  some	  
purpose,”	  and	  one	  of	  my	  major	  aims	  in	  conducting	  this	  research	  has	  been	  to	  join	  
Clive	  Hamilton	  in	  raising	  the	  alarm	  amongst	  my	  own	  community	  of	  GPE	  scholars	  in	  
the	  academy	  that	  there	  is	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  focus	  our	  research	  efforts	  on	  the	  
greatest	  challenges	  humanity	  has	  ever	  had	  to	  face:	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  ensuring	  the	  
survival	  of	  a	  civilised	  humanity	  that	  acts	  with	  compassion	  and	  respects	  the	  life	  and	  
dignity	  of	  all	  of	  us.	  It	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  become	  engaged	  because	  these	  
challenges	  arise	  not	  because	  of	  natural	  disasters	  that	  are	  beyond	  our	  control,	  but	  
because	  of	  social	  systems	  that	  we	  collectively	  create	  and	  have	  the	  power	  to	  either	  
continue	  pursuing	  or	  to	  change	  (albeit	  presently	  under	  conditions	  defined	  by	  very	  
unequal	  power	  struggles	  between	  different	  classes	  and	  social	  groups).	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Appendix	  I:	  Interview	  Schedule	  
Questions	  about	  participant	  
1. What	  is	  your	  preferred	  name	  or	  pseudonym?	  
2. What	  is	  your	  role	  in	  the	  group	  (including	  ‘normal	  activities’)?	  
3. Could	  you	  please	  tell	  me	  a	  bit	  about	  your	  personal	  history	  with	  the	  group	  
(e.g.	  length	  of	  membership,	  whether	  you	  are	  a	  founding	  member,	  why	  you	  
joined	  if	  not	  a	  founding	  member)?	  
Questions	  about	  the	  ecosocialist	  group	  
4. What	  is	  the	  group’s	  history	  (e.g.	  when	  founded,	  by	  whom)?	  
5. What	  is	  the	  group’s	  general	  ideology	  and	  aims?	  
6. What	  is	  the	  group’s	  organisational	  structure?	  
7. How	  prominently	  do	  prefigurative	  and	  democratic	  practices	  feature	  in	  the	  
group’s	  aims	  and	  practices?	  
8. Can	  you	  tell	  me	  about	  the	  group’s	  current	  activities	  and	  campaigns,	  and	  plans	  
for	  future	  activities?	  
9. Does	  this	  group	  work	  with,	  or	  have	  alliances	  with,	  other	  groups	  (either	  within	  
the	  ecosocialist	  movement	  or	  with	  other	  groups	  in	  the	  wider	  global	  justice	  
movement)?	  
Questions	  about	  the	  participant’s	  evaluation	  of	  the	  group	  
10. What	  are	  your	  views	  on	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  your	  group?	  
11. In	  your	  view,	  what	  are	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  any	  of	  this	  group’s	  alliances	  (if	  
any)?	  
12. In	  your	  view,	  where	  does	  your	  group	  fit	  in	  within	  the	  wider	  global	  social	  
justice	  movement	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  
13. In	  your	  view,	  how	  does	  your	  group	  relate	  to	  other	  key	  players	  such	  as	  local	  
civil	  society	  groups	  working	  on	  environmentally-­‐related	  issues,	  national	  
political	  parties	  and	  governments,	  global	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  United	  
Nations,	  and	  national	  and	  international	  environmental	  Civil	  Society	  
Organisations?	  
14. Are	  you	  aware	  of	  any	  pressing	  issues	  facing	  the	  ecosocialist	  movement	  that	  
require	  further	  research?	  
15. Can	  you	  think	  of	  other	  groups/anyone	  else	  I	  could	  speak	  to	  about	  
ecosocialism?	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